Q What political aims did Ribbentrop take to achieve the Three-Power Pact?
America out of the war?
Q And now another problem. What was Ribbentrop's attitude towards the church and chruch matters? tolerant. As far as I know, as early as 1920 or so, he left the church, but in that respect he exercised no pressure of influence on his personnel or, rather, he wasn't interested in such matters. His tolerance went so far that his two eldest children in 1935 were given the opportunity by their own request to reenter the chruch. In the personal question of religion his tolerance was equivalent to his church policy. In that connection I remember a principle note sent to the Fuehrer in which von Ribbertrop was working for a tolerant church policy. In the winter, 1944, he received Bishop Heckel to discuss church matters with him. On the occasion of a journey to Rome in 1942 or '43, he paid a long visit to the Pope. or was the opposite true? experienced that he really let himself go. His work, which was often done in writing, obsorbed him to such an extent intellectually that he had hardly any time for private matters, I couldn't name anybody, outside his immediate family, for instance, who was in really close human touch with von Ribbentrop. But that does not exclude, of course, that he was interested in the well being of his subordinates in the warmest possible way and that, particularly in times of emergency, he was very very generous towards them. differences between Ribbentrop and Hitler?
A Yes. According to his attitude, which I have mentioned, he hardly discussed such differences with us, his subordinates, but I do remember clearly that there were times when such differences certainly did exist.
During such times the Fuehrer often refused for a period of weeks to receive von Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop suffered very badly psychologically under such a state of affairs.
Q Was Ribbentrop. as far as the achievement of his foreign political aims was concerned, very independent or was he depending on Hitler's orders and directives? man responsible for the carrying out of the Fuehrer's foreign policy, and with that he has already expressed that he, in setting up his political aims, was not independent. But, over and above that, in the carrying out of the tasks and directives given him by the Fuehrer, he was tied down to the instructions from Hitler to a considerable extent. For instance, regarding the reports submitted by the liason officer of the Foreign Office to the Fuehrer, there were often requests for decisions from the Fuehrer. In connection with these reports sent to the Fuehrer through the liason officer of the Foreign Office, Ambassador Hewel, they contained requests for further decisions regarding certain questions or they contained a draft for telegrams to the various missions abroad for the Fuehrer's approval. foreign policy, which he could not yet decide, however? feeling.
Q What was Hitler's attitude towards the German Foreign Office? servants, untouched by national socialism. As I gathered from men of his immediate surroundings, he was often making fun of the Foreign Office. He considered it a central of defeatism. to Hitler? intended to carry out a generous reorganization of German diplomatic services. He also intended to make basic changes in the training of young diplomats. These attempts remained in the initial stages because of the war. During the course of the war they were started again, when the question of finding new personnel for the Foreign Offices became acute.
Certain positions abroad had to be filled by untrained diplomats, people who were SS leaders, and that was due to Ribbentrop's anxiety to meet the Fuehrer's animosity towards the Foreign Office.
Q. What were his views and intentions towards Russia? What were Ribbentrop's views and intentions regarding Russia?
A. The intentions regarding Russia found their expression in the part of friendship in August 1939, and the commercial agreement in 1939.
Q. Do you know that more than a non-aggression pact and a commercial pact was concluded in Moscow?
A. Yes, there was an additional secret agreement.
GENERAL RUDENKO: The secretary of the former Minister Ribbentrop can give testimony concerning the personality of the defendant Ribbentrop, his method, his way of life, and his character, and others, but the witness is not competent to give any testimony on the question of treaties of the Foreign Office and others, and, therefore, I consider that the question asked of the witness is absolutely irrelevant and I object to it.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, that is the same matter that was raised, is it not, upon the affidavit of Dr. Gauss? I mean, you said that you were going to produce an affidavit of Dr. Glauss which dealt with a secret agreement between-I beg your pardon. I ought to have said that Dr. Seidl was going to produce an affidavit of Dr. Gauss with reference to this alleged agreement. That is right, is it not?
DR. HORN: I assume so, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Soviet's Prosecutor objected to that agreement being true until the affidavit should be admitted, until it had been seen. Well, now, is the agreement in writing? Is the alleged agreement between the Soviet Government and Germany in writing?
DR. HORN: Yes. That has been put down in writing, but I do not have a copy of that agreement, and I should therefore like to ask the Tribunal if the decision is depending upon the affidavit of Ambassador Gauss? If I, on my part, can call upon Miss Blank, who has seen the original, I can obtain an affidavit, if that is necessary; covering the same points.
Would Your Lordship be agreeable to that?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, do you have a copy of the agreement itself?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, regarding that agreement, only two copies are available, dated 22 August 1939. The other copy was taken to Berlin by von Ribbentrop. After an announcement made in the press, all the archives on the Foreign Office were confiscated by the Soviet Union troops. I, therefore, herewith apply that the Soviet Government or the Soviet delegation is to be ordered to submit to the Tribunal the original of that agreement.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question, Dr. Seidl. I did not ask you for an argument. I asked you whether you have a copy of that agreement available.
DR. SEIDL: I, myself, do not own a copy of that agreement. The affidavit from Ambassador Gauss merely states the contents of that secret agreement, and he is in a position to do so since he had made the draft for that secret agreement. The secret pact was so signed by Foreign Commissar Molotov and Ribbentrop as it had been drafted by Ambassador Gauss. That is all I have to say to that, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko?
GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr. President, I want to say the following: about the agreement allegedly seized by the Soviet troops, in other words, the agreement which was concluded in Moscow in March, 1939, I can call the attention of the Defense Counsel to the articles in the press, which appeared in the newspapers throughout the world, as to the non-aggression pact concluded in August, 1939. That is a well-known fact. considers that the application of Dr. Seidl to incorporate into the record an affidavit by Friedrich Gauss should be denied. Gauss's testimony as to this agreement, and the history of the conclusions of this pact, is irrelevant to thematter. Presentation of such testimony or affidavit does not shed a true light on the events, really as a matter of provocation. This is borne out by the fact that Ribbentrop himself repudiated the affidavit, while Defense Counsel for Hess wanted to include it. thematter, due to this consideration on my part and the basic facts, I request the Tribunal to deny the application to admit the affidavit, and also to deny the question asked of this witness by Dr. Horn, as not relevant to the matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl? Do you want to say something?
DR. SEIDL: May I perhaps add very briefly with regard to the statement of the Soviet Prosecutor, that the translation of it was only received fragmentarily. I couldn't quite make up my mind whether General Rudenko wanted to deny altogether that such an agreement was concluded or whether he wanted to state merely that the contents of that secret pact are not relevant. If the former is the case, then I repeat my application that the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Molotov, should be called before this Tribunal; but if the second is applicable, then may I request an opportunity immediately -- new -- to submit to the Tribunal evidence regarding the relevance of that secret pact?
THE PRESIDENT: At the moment we are considering an objection to the evidence of this witness on the stand, so we won't trouble with that.
The Tribunal will adjourn for a few moments. (A recess was taken).
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal desires to point out to Counsel for the Defense that there was no mention of this alleged treaty in its application for evidence to be given by the witness now in the witness box, but as the matter has now been raised the Tribunal rules that the witness may be questioned upon the matter. BY DR. HORN:
Q. You were speaking about the secret treaty. How did you receive knowledge of the conclusion of this pact?
THE PRESIDENT: I am told that what I said was wrongly translated into the Russian language, at any rate. I don't know whether it was rightly translated into the German language; but what I said was that the witness may be questioned not that the witness may not be questioned. Is that clear to you?
DR. HORN: Thank you. I understood the question correctly, but I wish to thank you again. BY DR. HORN:
Q. In connection with your previous statement about the secret treaty, I would like to know how you received knowledge of the conclusion of this pact?
A. Because of illness, I could not accompany von Ribbentrop on his trips to Russia. I was also not present when the preliminary preparations for this pact were made. I was not there. I received knowledge of the conclusion of this through a special sealed cover which was kept separately and secretly and had the inscription "German-Russian Secret Agreement."
Q. Then you were responsible for the keeping secret of this secret pact?
A. Yes.
Q. I would like to turn to another complex of questions now. Was von Ribbentrop concerned to keep the pact with Russia under any and all circumstance
A. As a signatory of the German-Russian pact von Ribbentrop was, of course vitally interested in keeping the agreement. He knew of the terrific danger which a German-Russian war would mean for Germany. In this sense he instructed and warned the Fuehrer. As far as I recall, Ambassador Hilger from Moscow was called to Berchtesgaden to report; and for the same purpose, in the spring of 1941, Ambassador von Schulenberg was called in again to report and to again give the warning of von Ribbentrop to the Fuehrer and to emphasize them.
Q. Do you know whether von Ribbentrop knew of Hitler's intention prior to the annexation of Austria to the Reich?
A. As far as the German invasion into Austria is concerned, von Ribbentrop was at London and heard with surprise that the invasion was taking place. He himself had in mind an entirely different solution for Austria. What he contemplated was an economic union with Austria.
Q. Do you know whether von Ribbentrop repeatedly made efforts to end the war in a diplomatic way?
A. Yes. One of the steps he undertook was the sending of Professor Berber to Switzerland in the winter of 1943-44. Later on the steps were intensified by the sending of Herr con Sch mieden to Bern and Dr. Hesse to Stockholm. Since there was no official authorization by the Fuehrer for these negotiations, they could only be concerned with submitting of negotiations with which perhaps Germany might converse with the Allies and negotiate. Equal instructions were received by Ambassador von Biebrach at Madrid, Consul Moellhausen at Lisbon, and the Ambassador at the Vatican, von Weitwecker. They were charged with similar missions. A former member of the office of Ribbentrop who was living at Madrid was instructed to attempt to get in touch with the British Government also along similar lines. which he now wished to initiate negotiations. The decision upon this request I did not see through, because I left Berlin.
Q. Did you know what Hitler's basic attitude was toward this question?
A. I know only from what I heard from men who were in his vicinity that the Fuehrer did not put much stock in this. He would have sanctioned negotiations only if military successes had been present. If and when these military successes were present, he was against diplomatic initiative anyway. As far as the mission of Dr. Hesse is concerned, when it failed he said that from the beginning he had not expected much of this mission anyway.
Q. Just one more question: Is it correct that von Ribbentrop only shortly before the invasion of Norway and Denmark was notified of these actions?
A. Yes; just a few days prior to the actual fact.
Q. Is it correct to say that von Ribbentrop was of the opinion that England would march for Poland -- on behalf of Poland?
A. Yes. With his view that England would stay with the balance of power politics, he was of the opinion that England would support her guarantee to Poland.
DR. HORN: I have no further questions to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defendants' Counsel wish to ask any questions of this witness? Do the Prosecution?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution has very carefully considered this matter. They hope that the Tribunal will not hold it against them that they accept everything that this witness says, but they feel that all the matters could be more conveniently put to the Defendant himself, and therefore they do not intend to cross examine.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
DR. SEIDL: (Counsel for Hess) Mr. President, the Tribunal, as far as the question of the secret pact is concerned, has permitted this question to be put to the witness. The witness knew only of the existence of this pact but not about its contents. to the witness, it is also the rule of the Tribunal, as far as the admissibility of Ambassador Gauss'affidavit is concerned, whether I might now have the opportunity to read an excerpt from this affidavit at this time.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been submitted to the Prosecution?
DR. SEIDL: Last Monday -- that is, three days ago -- I submitted six copies of the affidavit to the Translating Division, that is, to Lt Shrader of the information center of the Prosecution. I assume that in the meantime, since three days have elapsed, the Prosecution have received their copies.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution have not received the copies. I haven't seen the affidavit yet. Neither has my friend Mr Dodd nor have my other colleagues, General Rudenko, or Mr. Champetier de Ribes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then I think we had better wait until the document is in the hands of the Prosecution, Then it can be considered.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I believe that I did everything that it was possible for me to do in order to facilitate the Prosecution receiving the affidavit. I have no influence over official channels within the General Secretariat.
THE PRESIDENT: Nobody has said that you have done anything wrong about it, Dr. Seidl.
Yes, Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: As my next witness I should like to call Ambassador Paul Schmidt.
________
PAUL OTTO SCHMIDT, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you tell me your name?
A Dr. Paul Otto Schmidt.
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeat the oath.) BY DR. HORN: fore the outbreak of the war between Sir Nevile Henderson, the British representative, and members of the Reich Government. Is it correct to say that you were present at the conferences of the 30th of August 1939?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 1:45.
(A recess was taken until 1345 hours.)
Military Tribunal in the matter of: The
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn.
DR. PAUL SCHMIDT--resumed. BY DR. HORN: on 30 August 1939 between the defendant von Ribbentrop and the British Ambassador Henderson?
Q Where did that conference take place? Berlin.
Q In what capacity did you participate in that conference?
A It took part as interpreter and reporter. That is to say, I took the record. who did you work forin that capacity? conferences, and in that capacity I worked for all foreign ministers, from von Stresemann to Ribbentrop as an interpreter, as well as for a number of German chancellors like Hermann Mueller, Marx, Bruenig, Hitler, and for other members of the cabinet, delegates and so on and so forth, who represented Germany during international conferences. In other words, I have taken part in all international conferences since 1923 as an interpreter whenever Germany was represented. and Sir Nevil Henderson, to work as an interpreter? in German.
Q Was Ambassador Henderson able to speak German fairly well?
AAmbassador Henderson's knowledge of German was fairly good, but not absolutely perfect, so that it could occur that in moments of excitement he did not quite understand certain matters, as proved by an event which occurred during that conference which you have just mentioned. Sometimes it wouldn't be easy for him to make himself understood in German, but during these conversations he used to address/Ribbentrop in German and preferred that language. Henderson which contained the German proposals regarding the settlement of the difficulties existing between Germany and Poland? And now I am asking you, Witness, whether Henderson asked you during that discussion to translate to him the contents of that memorandum handed him by Ribbentrop? attitude, indicated that he understood the contents of that memorandum fully?
A That is, of course, very hard to say. You can't look into somebody's brain, but I doubt that he understood that document in its details. give explanations of the text to Henderson? Foreign Minister commented upon individual points whichmight not have been quite clear, and gave explanations to Henderson.
Q Did Henderson ask for such explanations personally?
read and he was listening to the comment which was given. ference? somewhat loaded with electricity. Both participants were extremely nervous. Henderson was not at all quiet and I had never before and only once afterwards seen the Foreign Minister as nervous as he was during that conference. which occurred during the first part of the discussion. This concerned the case that the individual points on Germany's part were to be explained precisely which could be held against Poland and the Foreign Minister had done that in great detail and had finished with the words:
"You can see, therefore, Sir Neville Henderson, that the situation is damned serious." words, "damned serious" he got up, half raised himself from his seat and with a sort of warning finger, he pointed it at the Foreign Minister and said:
"You have just said 'damned'. That is not the language of a statesman in so serious a situation."
THE PRESIDENT: What charge has this relevancy to in the Indictment.
DR. HORN: That point of the Indictment that von Ribbentrop handed over that decisive memorandum on the 30th of August, 1939, and read it so quickly that Ambassador Sir Neville Anderson was not in a position to appreciate the contents of that memorandum and pass it on to his government, causing his government at the same time to pass it on to the Polish Government so as to insure continuation of the negotiations between Germany and Poland. England at that time had offered its good services and agency to both governments.
THE PRESIDENT: Which passage of the Indictment are you referring to? You may be right, I do not know. I only want to know which passage in the Indictment you are referring to.
DR. HORN: I am referring to the Preamble--I beg your Pardon--to the preparation or failing to prevent aggressive wars of which Ribbentrop is accused as a conspirator.
THE PRESIDENT: That is on page 9, is it not, from F (c) 4? There is nothing about the way in which this document was handed over to Sir Neville Henderson. I do not know but presumably you have got the Indictment. Where is it in the Indictment?
DR. HORN: It has been presented by the Prosecution and it has furthermore been mentioned, stated in the House of Commons by Chamberlain, namely that this memorandum was read at top speed by von Ribbentrop so that the transmission or even the reception of the contents and transmission of its contents through diplomatic channels which England had expressly offered was not possible. The defendant von Ribbentrop is therefore under direct accusation that this last possibility of further negotiation with Poland was prevented by him and thestatement of the witness is to prove that this guilt of the defendant von Ribbentrop does not exist.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Horn, you made the point that it was read in that way. There is no charge about it in the Indictment at all. It may be that the Prosecution referred to it in the course ofhistory. You have made the point, surely it is not necessary to go on at length about it.
DR. HORN: In that case may I proceed? BY DR. HORN: were extremely excited?
Q To what causes do you attribute that excitement?
A To the tension which prevailed during those negotiations; to the numerous conferences which had taken place during the preceding days practically uninterruptedly and which had made considerable demands upon the nervous resistance of all participants. states in his book, said in the worst possible expression that he would never ask the Polish Ambassador for his visit?
A I cannot remember that. The Foreign Minister merely said that he could only consider the Polish Foreign Minister as a partner for discussions if the Polish Ambassador would arrive with the necessary authority to negotiate.
Q Ambassador Lipski did not have that authority, did he? Foreign Minister when Ambassador Lipski was there -- he answered that question with a clean "no." He had no authority to negotiate. therefore not receive the ambassador, is that right? had with the Polish Ambassador and in the course of which the question was put to the Polish Ambassador whether he had authority to negotiate and on that the Polish Ambassador answered "no." Subsequently, the Foreign Minister said that in that care a conference would not be possible. discussed to Sir Nevile Henderson. Did you have the impression that Ribbentrop did not hand the text of that memorandum to Ambassador Henderson because he did not wish to or because he could not do so? since during the preparation and preparatory conferences which Hitler had with the Foreign Minister regarding that point, before the conference with the British Ambassador took place, I was not present. Therefore, I can only talk on the strength of my impressions which I gathered during the discussion with the British Ambassador and can draw conclusions regarding what may have been told the Foreign Minister by Hitler and what may have been his instructions regarding that discussion and to that I can say the following. be handed to him the Foreign Minister said:
"No, I cannot give you the document."
He used whose words. That was, of course, a somewhat unusual procedure because normally Henderson could have expected that a document which has just been read would subsequently be handed to him. I myself was rather surprised by the answer of the Foreign Minister and looked up since I thought that I had misunderstand. I looked at the Foreign Minister and heard that he said for the second times:
"I cannot give you the document." and that he was aware of the rather difficult position into which he put himself through this answer. A certain uncomfortable smile was on his lips when he said the words, "I cannot give you the documents", though he said it in a quiet voice. would ask me to translate the document to him but that request was not made. I looked at Henderson invitingly, since I wanted to translate that document, knowing how extremely important a quick and complete transmission of the contents of that document would be to his government. If I had been asked to translate I would have translated very slowly, practically at dictation speed, so as to use that, shall we say, back door to enable the British Ambassador not only to understand the principal lines of the document but also the details of the German suggestions and to take them down and pass them on to his government. But even upon my inviting glance Henderson did not react so that soon after that the discussion came to an end and events took their course. ultimatum to the German Government?
Q To whom did you hand that ultimatum? three o'clock, had telephoned the Reich Chancellor, where I was to go with the Foreign Minister, to be available for possible conferences, and the information was given that the British ambassador had received instructions from his government, according to which, at exactly nine o'clock a.m., he would have to make important announcements to the Foreign Minister on behalf of the British Government. He asked, therefore, to be received by Ribbentrop at that time. He was given the reply that he personally would not be available but that a member of the Foreign Office, in this case I, would be given authority to take his place and receive the announcement from the British Government and through the British ambassador. That is how it happened that I, at nine o'clock in the morning, received the British ambassad in Ribbentrop's office. My invitation to sit down was turned down by Henderson, and standing he read to me the well known ultimatum of the British Government, addressed to the German Government, according to which, unless certain conditions were met on the part of Germany, the British Government would at eleven o'clock that morning consider themselves at war with Germany. After we had exchanged a few farewell words, I took the document and went to the Reich Chancellery.
Q And to whom did you give it there in the Reich Chancellery?
A I gave it to Hitler. That is to say, I found him during conference with the Foreign Minister in his office and I translated the document into German for him. When I had completed my translation, there was at first silence.
Q Was Hitler alone in that room? the Foreign Minister. And when I had completed my translation, both gentlemen were absolutely silent for about oneminute. I could clearly see that that development of things was by no means agreeable to them. For some time Hitler sat in his chair deep in thought and he looked in front of him, looking rather concerned. Then the silence was ended with a rather sudden question of his addressed to the Foreign Minister, and he said "What are we going to do now?"
Subsequently they began to discuss the next diplomatic stops which were to be taken, whether this or that ambassador would have to be recalled, and so forth, and I, of course, left the room since I had nothing else to do. When I entered the anti-room, I had seen some members of the cabinet and higher officials who had assembled there to whom, upon their questioning looks when I had entered, since they knew I had seen the British ambassador, I could only say that no second Munich conference would take place. faces that my remark had been understood. When I now told them that I had just handed over a British ultimatum to Hitler, a very depressed silence fell upon the room. The faces became very serious suddenly. I still remember that Goering, for instance, who stood in front of me, turned to me and said, "If we lose this war, then Heaven help us."
Goebbels stood in a corner by himself and had a very serious, if not depressed, expression. That atmosphere of depression was prevalent with all these present, and that was something which I considered most remarkable for the first dry of the war in that ante-room of the Chancellory, and it is still today in my memory.
Q You didn't have the impression, therefore, that these men expected a declaration of war?
A No, I didn't have that impression. reacted to the news that Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor?
A I didn't have a direct opportunity, no, but the Foreign Office knew generally that the Foreign Minister, just like the whole Foreign Office, was completely surprised by the news of Pearl Harbor. As far as I am concerned, that impression was confirmed by news regarding a member of the press section. The press section had a department concerning itself with radio news, and in the case of important news, the official on duty had orders to inform the Foreign Minister personally and at once. When the first news regarding pearl Harbor was received by that section of the press, the official on duty considered it important enough to report to his chief, that is to say, the chief of the press section, who in turn intended to pass it on to the Foreign Minister. But, as I was told, the Foreign Minister turned him down rather harshly and he said that that was surely some invention of the press or "some red herring", and that he didn't wish to be disturbed by cur press section with stories like that. was received, I think a Reuter report, and that had been received by that department. At that stage the chief of the press section gathered his courage together, in spite of the order not to disturb the Foreign Minister, and informed him of this news.
THE PRESIDENT: This evidence seems to be utterly uninteresting and irrelevant to the Tribunal.
DR. HORN: Von Ribbentrop is accused of having prepared the aggressive war against the United States of America.