MR. DODD: I don't want to take much of the Tribunal's time, but in view of the statement of Dr. Horn concerning the condition of the Defendant von Ribbentrop, I think it is required that we inform the Tribunal of his condition as we understand it, which is something quite different from the understanding of Dr. Horn.
Colonel Andrus has talked with both of them. And our understanding is that Ribbentrop is not ill and is able to take the witness-stand; that he is nervous, and appears to be frightened, but he is not disabled in any sense and is capable of testifying.
DR. HORN: I come now to page 21 of the Document Book, and ask the Court to take judicial notice of Exhibit 8 in the Ribbentrop book. It is a copy, and from the Documents of German Politics, which I turned over to the Court, having certified it. It is the speech of Ambassador von Ribbentrop at the 91st meeting of the League of Nations in London, regarding the Soviet Pact, the Locarno Pact and the German Peace Plan. The speech was delivered on the 19th of March, 1936. I refer to page 3 of the speech and begin my quotation with No.5:
"5. According to this alliance, France and Russia appoint themselves the judge in their own affairs by independently determining the aggressor if occasion arises, without resolution or recommendation, on the part of the League of Nations, and thereby are able to instigate a war against Germany at their own discretion.
"This strict obligation of the two countries is clearly and unequivocally evident from paragraph 1 of the signatory protocol to the treaty of alliance.
"In other words, in a given case France may decide at her own discretion whether Germany or Soviet Russia is the aggressor. She only reserves the right to have to expose herself through her military actions based on her own decision to sanctions on the part of the powers guaranteeing the Rhino Pact,namely England and Italy.
"From a legal and 'real political' point of view, this objection is meaningless. In terms of law, if France determines the aggressor herself, how will she then be able to foresee that attitude the powers guaranteeing the Locarno Pact will afterwards assume towards her decision? The answer to the question whether France would have to fear sanctions in such a case defends in practice not only on the faithful adherence to the pact by the guarantors -- whichthe German Government does not doubt in any way -- but also on various prerequisites of a purely factual nature, the probability or improbability of which cannot be perceived in advance.
"In addition, the evaluation of the relationship between the new treaty of alliance and the Rhine Pact cannot possibly be based on the treaty relationship between Germany and France on the one hand and the guaranteeing powers on the other, but only on the immediate relationship between France and Germany themselves. Otherwise one would have to demand from Germany that she tolerate quietly every possible violation of the Rhine Pact by France, basing her confidence on the fact that the guarantors would have to provide for her security. That certainly was not the purpose of the Rhine pact.
"In terms of real politics, when being attacked by a superior military coalition as a consequence of a decision which is incorrect, having been cast on somebody's own volition, it is an inconsequential consolation to a country to obtain its right through subsequent sanctions against the aggressors condemned by the League of Nations Council. For what kind of sanctions could actually hit such a gigantic coalition which reaches from East Asia to the Channel? These two countries are such powerful and important members and especially militarily strong factors of the League of Nations that according to all practical deliberations sanctions against them would be unthinkable from the start.
"Therefore this second restriction dealing with the consideration of eventual sanctions is wholly inconsequential from a real political point of view.
"I now ask the members of this Council to realize not only the legal, political and practical consequences of this obligation on the part of France to act independently, but to ask yourselves above all whether the opinion can be advocated that the German Government which signed the Locarno Pact would have over taken uponitself the obligations of this Pact, had it contained such onesided stipulations as later developed." and to clarify the German point of view, I add the following: "The French-Soviet Russian alliance means, beyond that -- in the German Government's view of history -- a complete elimination of the hitherto existing European balance of power and consequently of the fundamental political and legal conditions under which the Locarno Pact was concluded at that time."
and the Versailles Treaty, regarding the demilitarization of the Rhineland. page 27 of the Document Book -- an exhaustive and detailed plan for disarmament. I ask the Tribunal to accept in evidence the document just cited, so that I may later refer to it.
With this exposition I conclude my presentation on Germany's reasons for reoccupying the Rhineland. occupation of the Rhineland, I shall enter upon that when I call him to the witness-stand.
turned to London, where he was appointed as ambassador. On 4 February 1938 he was appointed Foreign Minister, and from that time on, conducted the foreign policy along the lines laid down by Hitler.
In proof of this, I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 10, to be found in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: We have not got this bock. Our last document in Number 8, I think, but you had better go on.
DR. HORN: This is a very short document that I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of. It is an excerpt from the speech of the Fuehrer before the German Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin on 19 July 1940. I quote:
"I cannot conclude my remarks without finally thanking that man who for years has carried out my foreign policies with the same selfless devotion as I would have. The name of the Party Member von Ribbentrop will be identified with the political uprising of the German Nation as Foreign Minister, and will be so identified for all time". ciples the defendant von Ribbentrop conducted the foreign policy. I should like now to ask the Tribunal to hear the witness State Secretary von Steengracht.
(ADOLF von STEENGRACHT, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:' BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your name, please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: truth, and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish. BY DR. HORN:
A What was your last position in the Foreign Office?
A What were your activities? make the following prefatory remarks: the neighborhood of Hitler's Headquarters; that is to say, several hundred kilometers distant from Berlin. Here he carried on his business with a limited personnel. The Foreign Office in Berlin had tasks of a routine and administrative nature, but above all, he was concerned with setting on current business with foreign countries. hold the responsibility. The foreign political decisions and instructions originated in the headquarters, mostly without any understanding one then part of the Foreign Office.
Q Who determined, question of foreign policy? most minute details, was determined by Hitler. Ribbentrop frequently stated that the Fuehrer needed no Foreign Minister, he simply wanted only a foreign political secretary, Ribbentrop in my opinion would jave been agreeable to such a position, since, so far as Hitler's authority was concerned, he would have liked to have excluded himself from those, in part, destructive influences. He also had, in part, some influence on Hitler's speeches, so far as they were concerned with the foreign policy. Hitler was accustomed to prepare these speeches without Ribbentrop's help. ed themselves with foreign policy? subdivisions that from 1933 on had no foreign political ambitions. Every one of these offices had a sort of foreign bureau that kept up connections with foreign countries and in this way created for itself its own foreign political channels.
I should judge the number of these to be approximatively thirty. For example, the Hitler Jugend, the SA, the German Work Front, the SS, Rosenberg's office, the Propaganda Ministry, the office of Fritz Walde, Ribbentrop's office, the Nordic Society, the German Academy, the Reichsbahn. rage of Hitler--Goering, Bormann, Goebbels, who also were of influence in the formation of foreign policy. Goering, too, as fas as I see, also had a certain influence, but only until 1933, at any rate, sa far as foreign political matters were concerned. Later on he had no such influence. clude them?
A From my own observation, I can only give the following judgment: Almost every one of those persons who had ever been in foreign countries, considered themselves to be from then on experts in foreign political enthusiasm. they stood at variance with actual political necessities, and the more strength was shown, the mere they stood in contradiction to the primitive feeling for necessity. Uneducated judgment of this sort did have an effect on Hitler and formed in Hitler's mind, along with his so-called intuition, the point of departure far a basic standpoint. an opinion on the part of Hitler, I should, like to point out the following: As long as the later German Ambassador in Paris was there, Hitler read his reports with interest, but when he became the official representative of the Reich, his reports were mostly thrown into the wastebasket without having been read. Himler's reports and Goebbels' reports and Bormann's reports played, on the other hand, a much larger role, and reports from uncontrollable agents played a greater role than those of the experts.
Q Was the Foreign office responsible for relations with all foreign countries?
part of years previous questions, namely, the elimination of these influences.
In accordance with Hitler's methods of work, these so-called wild influences simply could not be excluded. Against this organized lack of organization Ribbentrop waged a bitter war, namely, against all German offices. I should like to state that at least 60 percent of his time was devoted to these things. foreign countries?
Q Did the situation change with the outbreak of war?
A Yes. In point of fact, the foreign office lost its responsibility at the moment at which the German bayonet closed the border; direct relations with the foreign countries in all occupied areas were withdrawn. The Foreign Office did not even have the right to have a representative there, or, at any rate, only as observer, without any authority. This is particularly true for the eastern regions and for Norway. independence of a country, as, far example, in Norway, this activity was considered almost traitorous, and those responsible had to stop this work, on Hitler's orders, and disappeared from the Foreign office. be characterized by Hitler's statement: "The Foreign office shall, so far as possible, disappear from the picture until the end of the war." Hitler wanted to limit the Foreign office to 20 to 40 people, and it was even partially forbidden to have any connections with the Foreign office or to maintain such connections. He considered them defeatists, and what not, who could concern themselves with a matter only if it was not to be carried out. Germany.
A No; at least, I never noticed anything of it. Hitler made the statement: "Diplomacy is treason; treaties are to to used only as long as they are useful." That was Hitler's opinion of all diplomats in the world. regions that were under civilian administration?
A I have already touched on this question. I have already said that in those regions in which there was a military government or a civilian administration, a representative of the Foreign Office, if he was tolerated at all, was tolerated only as an observer and occupied no official position. various countries and gave the details on them. The situations varied.
Q Do you consider Ribbentrop a typical Nazi or not? Socialism. He knew extraordinarily little of the doctrines of National Socialism. He felt himself only personally bound to Hitler, whom he followed with soldierly obedience, and he also stood under a certain hypnotic dependence on Hitler. However, I could not characterize him as a typical exponent of National Socialism.
Q Was Hitler a man who was accessible to expositions and objections? himself off more and more, during the course of the years, from such influence. From the time that I was Secretary of State on, I saw him only twice on official occasions. I can only judge from the success or lack of success of our work. In the course of my activities, covering almost two years, I can remember no single case in which he agreed to any one of our suggestions. On the contrary, it was always to be feared that through some impulse or impetus of a personal nature he would be persuaded to take contrary and forceful measures. The basic trait of his character was lack of confidence, which bore heavy fruit. in an altogether vain task. On theother hand, however, when Hitler was urged to do violent acts, on the part of irresponsible people, he responded to these influences. These men were then called by him "strong", whereas thebehaviour of anyone who was even half-way normal was called "weak" or "defeatist". And through an opinion that might have been uttered just once in this way, the influence of that man could be forever destroyed.
in the various influences subjected to him?
A I cannot answer that question in general terms. I have already adumbrated that in my previous answers. First of all the reaction depended, in my opinion, on the mood of the Dictator at the time, it is also a matter of importance as to who contradicted and how much strength he had already shown. But how the atmosphere really was can perhaps be demonstrated by this case.
When Ribbentrop's liaison man with Hitler told about the circumstances shortly after Roosevelt's death, he said: "Today was almost the last hour of my life. Goebbels came out of the Fuehrer's room and reported on Germany's chances in the future so far as they were affected by Roosevelt's death. He drew up a very hopeful picture of the future. I, Hewel, was of the opinion that that view was not justified and recommended to him to be careful viz a viz Goebbels. Hitler fell into a rage, called me a person who demoralized everyone, who deprived every decent person of his good mood and hopes. I was forced," Hewel reports, "to go privately to Goebbels and to ask him to take this matter on his own shoulders, for if he had informed the Fuehrer of my attitude, Hitler would have called Rattenhuber, the Chief of his Security Service, and had me taken away and shot."
Q How do you explain the fact that so many people come into Hitler's immediate neighborhood, although they didn't agree with him? disapproved of Hitler's methods of government, indeed, who were inimical to those methods. The reasons for this are of various sorts. Reichstag, according to Parliamentary rules, had come to power. The officialdom, in consequence of this change of government, had no reason to retire from its various offices. The transition to dictatorship, and the therewith connected altogether different concept of the State, did not permit the individual officials to have their own opinions of the Government. At first there was a terrible reign of terror everywhere in the ministries and chancelleries.
In private dwellings and in restaurants there were spies who, out of fanaticism or for pay, were willing to denounce everything they heard.
. Nevertheless, many would have done everything they could if their withdrawal would have been of any avail, but it became obvious that these cases were simply useless self-sacrifice, the consepuences of which were concealed from the public and which had no effect. Nazi was placed. For this reason many people remained at their posts in order to prevent the development that I have just described. or Himmler or were order d by them led any foreigners to the conclusion that the German people in their entirety were equally guilty of these things and had known of them. This is not the case. Even most of the people in high public positions found out about these matters only after the conclusion of the war-about their extent and their details. Perhaps the key to this can be found in the speech Himmler delivered in Posen on October 3, 1943, before his gruppenfuehrer, and of which I discovered anything only for the first time here. In this speech he instructed them to keep the concentration camps and the nations against the Jews just as secret as the events of the 20th of July were being kept secret-of which the German people knew nothing. the thousand who might be considered guilty. It was these who carried out this reign of terror against the German people. But those who thought differently--and to this is to be thanked that, for example, the Geneva Convention was not renounced and tens or even hundreds of thousands of English or American fliers and prisoners were not shot. Unfortunate prisoners and those seriously wounded were returned to their families in their home countries. Greece in its terrible condition received food. Balances were kept as far as possible in Belgium and France, and many senseless acts of destruction in foreign countries and in the home country were in part prevent and in part alleviated. justice remained alive. These circles were encouraged in their attitude earlier by the fact that no foreign power had used the conditions in Germany as a reason for breaking off diplomatic relations but until the outbreak of war had relations with National Socialism and concluded treaties with it and had its diplomatic representatives at the National Socialist party days at Nurnberg.
at any rate, received much more consideration from foreign countries than had the Weimar Republic, despite all fidelty to treaties or points of law. as well is every individual German: When could these people who felt themselves to be servants of their people leave their posts, if they could at all? when would such a step be useful to the people? when would such a step warn Hitler? nature the French campaign?
A Yes. I had at that time, to be sure, no official position, but I nevertheless felt the need, and I believe it was a heartfelt wish of all Germans to bring about again peaceful conditions in the world. On the day of the capitulation of the King of Belgium I suggested, first, the creation of the United States of Europe on the democratic basis. This would have meant independence of Holland and Belgium. Poland, and so on. If this could not be brought about, at any rate to make as many encroachments on the self-determination of the powers as possible.
Q Did Ribbentrop speak to Hitler on this Matter?
A So far as I know, yes; but at that time Hitler considered such plans as premature. same subject?
A Yes. Ribbentrop at that time also laid down very concrete proposals. He foresaw the sovereignty and independence of all the conquered countries, including Poland, and, Moreover, an exhaustive far-reaching collaboration.
Q How did Hitler react to these proposals? was not ripe--the military situation was not favorable enough--so that these would be interpreted as signs of weakness.
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Q Now to another question: Before the outbreak of the Russian campaign, Did Ribbentrop mention to Hitler Bismarck's statement about the danger of preventive wars? the Pact with Russia. In regard to preventive war, he had stated to Hitler: "God does not let anyone look into His cards." Ribbentrop also made efforts to bring Russian experts to Hitler in order to explain the situation there to Hitler and to advise him to wait before he started a war. Hitler paid, no attention to these people. So far as I know only Ambassador Graf Schulenburg had a short audience with him. He, who considered such a war inadvisable, could make clear his attitude toward Russia and the reasons why he considered it inadvisable. Hitler held his own speech on this subject for about twenty minutes without letting him speak a word and the took his leave of him.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the order of the Tribunal was that witnesses might refresh their memory by notes, but this witness here seems to the Tribunal to have read practically every word he said. That is not refreshing your memory with notes. That is making a speech which you have written out beforehand, and if that sort of thing goes on the Tribunal will have to think whether it is necessary to alter its rule and to adhere to the ordinary rule, which is that no witness is allowed to refer to any notes at all except those that are made at the time.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, to be sure, I discussed my questions with the witness, but his notes, if he has any, were made by the witness and were made without my knowledge of their contents. I shall now ask the witness to answer my questions without making use of any means with which I a unfamiliar. BY DR. HORN: stop interference with Jews and the Church?
A Yes, K knew of this. I know that Ribbentrop spoke frequently with Hitler on this theme. I was absolutely desperate because of this policy toward Jews and churches, and for this reason had occasion to speak to Ribbentrop about it, but he explained to me again and again when he returned from Hitler that Hitler could not be spoken to on these subjects. Hitler said that these problems had to be solved befor he had died.
Q. Did von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office have any knowledge of the military planning?
A. Ribbentrop frequently fold me that he was completely unoriented militarily. So far as the office is concerned, this Foreign Office had no influence on strategic planning.
Q. What were the relations between Ribbentrop, Himmler, Goebbels and Bormann?
A. The relations between Ribbentrop and those other gentlemen were as bad as can be imagined. There was a perpetual fight between them. In my opinion Ribbentrop would have been Himmler's first sacrifice if occasion had arisen. A fight was being carried on continually between these men.
Q. What was the relationship in general in the highest Party positions?
A. The relations in the individual offices depended on the character of the chief of the section and were various. But one can say that the relations were by no means good, and, above all, that reciprocal orientation, so necessary for conducting the State, was not there. It was almost impossible for one minister to discuss a question with another minister by telephone, as impossible as if the Angel Gabriel had come down to earth. Even in the most important matters a factual discussion could not take place. There was, in other words, no connection. Moreover, they were very different, and not only in characters but in every other respect.
Q. Do you know anything about objections on the part of the Vatican regarding the Polish clergy?
A. I heard about that later, and it must be a matter of two protests concerning the Polish clergy. These protests were submitted by the Nuncio to the Secretary of State at that time. He, the Secretary of State, turned these protests over to Ribbentrop, and he in his turn presented them to Hitler. accordingly, since the Nuncio was not responsible in these regions, Hitler declared when he saw these notes, "They are just on long lie. Give these notes back to the Nuncio with a reproof and tell him that we want to hear nothing mor about the matter."
Q. Were these notes worked on by the Foreign Office?
A. Sharp and precise instructions were issued that all cases in which matters were brought up by representatives of countries in matters for which they were not authorized, whether in converstaions, verbally, written notes, or any other piece of wirting -- instructions were issued that these were not to be accepted, and our protests were turned down sharply.
Q. Did you know that Ribbentrop prevented the shooting of about 10,000 fliers after the air attack on Dresden?
A. I know the following: Ribbentrop's liaison man with Hitler called me up one day in great excitement and informed me that on a suggestion by Goebbels the Fuehrer intended, as reprisal for the air attack on Dresden, to kill a large number of English and American fliers of war, largely fliers. I went immediately to Ribbentrop and informed him of this. Ribbentrop became very excited, stated that this was impossible, called up this liaison man in person in order to verify the report. The liaison man corroborated it. Then Ribbentro got up and went to Hitler, came back after a half hour, and said that he had succeeded in having Hitler withdraw this report. That is all I know about that matter.
Q. Do you know anything about the meeting of an anti-Jewish Congress?
A. I know something about it, namely, I believe this same liaison man informed us that on a suggestion of Bormann's, Hitler had ordered the immediate calling of an anti-Jewish Congress through Rosenberg's office. Ribbentrop did not want to believe this, but nevertheless had to accept it as true once he had spoken with our liaison officer. Then, since on the basis of this decision we could do nothing officially to prevent this thing, we nevertheless insinuated ourselves into the matter. We made efforts by a policy of delay to make the carrying out of this anti-Jewish Congress impossible. Since the war ended in 1945, this policy of delay was successful, and the Congress did not take place.
Q. Could you observe whether Ribbentrop took a strong attitude toward his collaborators for reasons of state, although he often thought entirely differently?
A. You ask me to express a judgment. I believe, however, that I must affirm this.
Thinking that he was being loyal to Hitler, Ribbentrop in my opinion in those visits when he went to Hitler and found Hitler with exactly the opposite opinion, tried to explain Hitler's attitude. I should like to assume that this stood in contradiction to his own ideas.
Q. Did Ribbentrop during the course of the war ask that Rome and Florence be spared?
A. So far as I know he did speak with Hitler on this subject.
Q. Do you know about an article by Goebbels in the paper "Reich" or perhaps the paper "Voelkischer Beobachter," an article dealing with lynch shootings?
A. Yes. Once by accident I came to Ribbentrop when he was reading a paper and was again very excited. He asked me if I had read this unheard of article by Goebbels. It was an article on Lynch law.
Q. Did Ribbentrop protest to Goebbels about this article?
A. Of course he charged our press chief who had connections with Goebbels entered a protest against this article. But to his surprise he found out that this protest was useless since the article had not only been inspired but recommended by Hitler, so that there was nothing more to be done.
Q. How did the Foreign Office stand on the opinions espressed in this article?
A. The Foreign Office repudiated such articles vehemently, because they were offenses against international law and thus brought us one step further from the family of nations. Moreover, if appealed to the lower instincts of man, and both in internal and external policy did great damage, particularly since many of those articles were read by several millions of people and did their own sort of irreparable damage. appear in the press any further. I must, however, unfortunately, state that we had great difficulties in this matter since the enemy low altitude fliers often shot at peasants in the fields and pedestrians in the streets, that is to say, purely civilian people. Our arguments that we did not want to offend international law on our part under these conditions were not taken into account either by the German people or by Hitler.
On the contrary, in this case too we were regarded as interested in formal law only. But we did try, with the help of military officers, to prevent the carrying out of this order.
Q Do you know of a Battalion Guensberg?
Legation Consular Guensberg in the Foreign Office. His office received, so far as I recall --I did not at that time concern myself with these matters--received the charge from Ribbentrop along with a few very small, a few experts, from the Foreign Office, to follow the fighting troops and see to it that: first, the foreign missions, for instance, in Brussels and Paris, and so forth, that stood under the protection of the guarantor powers, that these buildings should not be entered by our troops; secondly, Guensberg was charged with making sure that the files that were of foreign political interest were not disturbed. After the conclusion of the French campaign, Guensberg, so far as I recall, was no longer active officially. What he had been doing was carried on by the Gestapo, by the Secret Field Police, because from then on, foreign office officials could not enter foreign countries.
Q When did Guensberg's job end? then after the beginning of the Russian campaign, Guensberg, so far as I remember, reported again for duty and said that he intended to do the same thing in the East, and Ribbentrop told him, "Very well, you may go with a few people to the army groups and see whether anything of interest is happening there and also see to it that when we approach Moscow, the foreign embassies are not damaged and that the documents are not damaged," but he did not consider himself any longer to be a part of the foreign office and received his orders from elsewhere. Then, as I later heard, he had a large number of men under him and could even wear a military uniform.
Q He did not belong to the foreign office in a military capacity?
A No. When Ribbentrop heard that Guensberg had such a large job under him, charged me to turn personally to the SS and say that I and Ribbentrop do not want to have Guensberg under me any longer, and at that time I told Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff--I should like to point out that we wanted nothing more to do with Guensberg--"see to it that you keep him with the Waffen SS along with all his subordinates." That is all I know about the matter of Guensberg.
DR. HORN: Would the Lord Justice like to conclude this session or should I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: Unless you are going to conclude almost immediately, we better adjourn. Will you be sometime longer with this witness?
DR. HORN: I have a number of further questions.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 27 March, 1946, at 1000 hours).
THE PRESIDENT: Go ahead, Dr. Horn. BY DR. HORN (Counsel for defendant Ribbentrop):
Q. Witness, you know Count Ciano. Where and When did you meet him?
A. I know Count Ciano but not politically speaking, only personally. I can't remember exactly when I met him but probably it was on the occasion of a state visit. I was working at the time in the department, making records in the Foreign Office.
Q. What experiences did you make with Count Ciano?
A. Since I didn't work with him poltically, I didn't make any political experiences with him.
Q. And, now, a different sphere. Is it right that von Ribbentrop gave orders that under all circumstances, the French franc should be protected against inflation?
A. That type of measure can only happen during a time when I was not yet State Secretary but I know that the principal attitude towards France and occupied territories was that their currency was to be preserved and, to put it right, should be preserved with all means. That is the reason why we sent gold to Greece, for instance, so as to at least attempt to maintain the value of their currency.
Q. What was the effect scored in Greece through sending any of that gold there?
A. By sending gold to Greece, we lowered the rate of exchange of foreign currencies which enable Greek merchants, which caused these merchants to be afraid and they waited with putting foodstuffs on the market. In that way they were in fact brought back to the disposal of the Greek population.
Q. Is it correct that von Ribbentrop gave strict orders that there were not to be any confiscation in occupied territories but that only direct negotiations with the governments were to take place?
A. If you put the question like that, then it is basically correct but I have to repeat what I said yesterday, that in the occupied territories he had no principle functions. Therefore, he had no officials for confiscations, a matter of which was under somebody else's jurisdiction; but it is correct to say that we negotiated with the governments concerned and that he had forbidden strictly that any direct measures were to be introduced -- measures which were carried out by other departments were not to be supported by us.
DR. HORN: For the time being, I have no further wuestions to put to that witness. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for defendant von Papen):
Q. Witness, do you know von Papen intimately, from the period when you were active in the Foreign Office and particularly when you were active as State Secretary in the Foreign Office?
A. I know von Papen since several years before 1933, but privately. Then I lost sight of him for some time and reestablished closer contact when I became State Secretary in the German Foreign Office, after which I had concurrent official contact with him and contact which went past that type of contact.
Q. Did you, particularly in the last period of your activities as State Secretary, receive reports from him currently, reports which he sent from Ankara, when he was ambassador, to Berlin.
A. Wherever he didn't send these reports directly to von Ribbentrop, which may have been possible -- I don't know -- I received them through official channels.
Q. Do you remember that von Papen started to be active as ambassador in Ankara in April 1932, after he had twice before refused, that he took on that position on the day that Italy occupied Albania, by which a danger of war arose in the southeast?