May I add an explanatory remark. If the Court is interested in seeing the original, the collection which is up in the document room would have to be brought down.
This collection is in the German language and I do not believe that it would be of any value to the High Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Horn, as a matter of formality and certainty, the Tribunal ought to have in its record every document which forms part of the record, whether it is an original or whether it is a copy, and whatever the document is that is offered in evidence, it ought to be handed in to the Tribunal and kept by the Tribunal. It ought to be offered in evidence and handed in to the General Secretary or his representative, and then the Tribunal has a full record of every document which is in evidence.
But we can't treat documents such as this, which is a mere copy of the originaal document which ought to be offered in evidence. If it is at the information center, then it is quite capable of being produced here.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, the Court decided some time ago that we are justified in copying documents and certifying the authenticity so that these documents may be submitted in evidence. Therefore, as far as the evidence that we have on hand is concerned, we compared the copies with the original and at the end of the document we attested the authenticity of the copies. I certified it with my own signature. This document is, I believe, in the hands of the Tribunal, with five copies.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Dodd.
MR. DODD: We think that this might be helpful; We say that we are willing to accept this quotation from the volume referred to, and I do think that we did put in some documents ourselves and ask the Court's indulgence at the time in something of the same fashion. document on that same basis. French and Russian colleagues will agree as well.
THE PRESIDENT: I think, Mr. Dodd, the point is -- and, of course, it is probably only a formal point -- that the only document which is offered in evidence or put in evidence is a copy which doesn't contain Dr. Horn's signature and therefore there is nothing to show that it is in fact a true copy.
Of course, if we had Dr. Horn's signature, we should be prepared to accept that it was a true copy of the original. What we have got, of course, is a mere mimeograph, I suppose, of some document which hasn't been produced to us.
MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor. I hadn't had an opportunity to examine it carefully. We didn't get this document, by the way, until pretty late last night. We have not had the usual period of time to examine it, but in any event, I have suggested it might go in and if Dr. Horn would verify it, as suggested by the Lord Justice and later furnish the original copy, it might be all right.
THE PRESIDENT: That would be all right, certainly.
Dr. Horn, you understand what I mean. If you will produce to us at some future date the actual document which you signed yourself, to show that it was a true copy, that will be quite satisfactory.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, in the entire document book there is no document which I have not signed in five copies and given to be translated. Of course, I cannot sign all the translations. Each document which is contained in your document book had my signature in the German text.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that you have handed your documents in to be translated, in German, with your signature on the bottom saying it is a true extract, and you don't know where those documents are because they have gone into the Translation department. That is right, isn't it ?
DR. HORN: Only partially, Mr. President. I know that I handed these documents, in German, to the proper office, and my signature was on the German text. That office sent them on to be translated. From the moment I gave the document up I had no further control over their whereabouts or their disposition. only available in a single copy for the use of all attorneys and the same obtains now for our future work. Because of that, I cannot produce the original since it is not my property.
That can only happen with the agreement of the person in charge of the document book, Lt. Shrader.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, if, in thefuture, you and the other defense counsel could get your document books ready in sufficient time, you could perhaps then make the arrangement that you hand the document book, when you were offering it, in evidence, and then it would be capable of being handed to the officer of the Court.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I do not believe that that possibility would exist at all, for these documents of German politics -- just to use the point at issue -- are available only in one copy at the disposal of all defense attorneys. I cannot take these books away from my colleagues if they wish to continue working on them, and I cannot submit them to the High Tribunal as evidence. I receive these books only to use them, and then I have to return the books.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but you are putting in evidence now a certain extract from the book,and all the Tribunal wants is that that extract be certified, either by you or by some other person who can be trusted, as a correct extract from the book, and that document, so signed, can be produced. It may be difficult to produce it at the moment because you have handed it in to some official or to somebody in the Translation Department and therefore you can't produce it, but it could be arranged that it should be produced in the future. I don't mean this particular one, but in the future other defense counsel can produce their documents certified by themselves or by some other person of authority.
DR. HORN: That has already been done, Mr. President. Five document books of the same type were handed to the Tribunal and they were all signed. Five copies were handed in.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, the rule of the Tribunal happens to be that they should be handed in in this court at the time that they are being used, as well as their being handed in to somebody for the purpose of translation. That is the rule. time over this.
DR. HORN: I have just heard that the documents which I Signed are being sent for from the General Secretary, so I will be able to submit them to the Tribunal signed in German.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. HORN: I would like to continue. Regarding the legal consequences of thepact made between France and Russia in 1937, I would like to quote from page 3, that is, page 8 of the document books:
"Consequently, the real question is whether France by accepting treaty obligations has kept herself within those limits, as regards Germany, which were imposed on her by the Rhine pact.
"This, however, the German government must deny.
"The Rhine pact was supposed to achieve the goal of securing peace in Western Europe by having Germany on the one hand, and France and Belgium on the other, renounce for all time the employment of military force in their relations to each other. If, at the conclusion of the pact, certain reservations to this renunciation of war, going beyond the right of selfdefense, had been permitted, the political basis was, as is generally known, solely the fact that France had already taken on certain pact obligations towards Poland and Czechoslovakia which she did not want to sacrifice to the idea of absolute peace security in the West.
Germany at that time resigned herself, with a clear conscience, to these restrictions of the renunciation of war. She did not object to the treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, put on the table of Locarno by the representative of France, but only with the self-understood presupposition that these treaties adopt themselves to the structure of the Rhine pact and not contain any provisions about execution of Article 16 of the Statute of the League of Nations, as are provided for in the new French-Soviet agreements. This corresponded also to the contents of this special agreements, which came to the knowledge of the German Government at that time. The exceptions permitted in the Rhine pact by all means are not expressly oriented towards Poland and Czechoslovakia, but were formulated in an abstract manner. But it was the sense of all negotiations concerning this matter to find a balance between the German-French renunciation of war and the desire of France for maintaining her pact obligations already in existence. If, therefore, France now uses the abstract formulation of war possibilities, permitted by the Rhine treaty, in order to conclude a new pact against Germany, a new pact with a well armed State, if she thus in such a decisive manner limits the application of the renunciation of war, agreed upon by her and Germany, and if she, by doing as so set forth above, does not even observe the fixed formal juridical limits, then she has created thereby a completely new situation and has destroyed the political system of the Rhine poet as much in theory as in practice." book as follows:
"The German Government has always emphasized during the negotiation of recent years that it would maintain and carry out the obligations resulting from theRhine pact so long as the other partners to the treaty are willing on their part to adhere to this pact. This self-explanatory presuppoisition cannot any longer be regarded as fulfilled by France. France has replied to the friendly offers and friendly assurances, made again and again by Germany, with a military pact with the Soviet Union, directed exclusively against Germany and in violation of the Rhine pact. Therefore the Rhine pact of Locarno lost its inner meaning and has ceased to exist in any practical sense. For that reason Germany on her part does not consider herself bound any longer to this void pact."
question him about this supposed position of England by a reoccupation of Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: You are reading from the document, are you not, Dr. Horn? You began to tell us something about Hitler.
DR. HORN: Yes, I interrupted in order to bring in the role of Ribbentrop briefly. On the basis of this pact and the intention of the French General Staff, Hitler summoned the defendant Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Are shall hear that from von Ribbentrop, shall we not?
DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are permitted to tie in a few connecting words to the documents. I can explain.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Pokrovsky.
COLONEL POKROVSKY: As far as I understand, the Tribunal has already explained to the defense that the defense can submit documents. However, Dr. Horn does not consider it necessary to stick to the documents but deviates all the time. I have had the opportunity to notice just now that in the document which he has just cited as "Ribbentrop 1", there is complete absence of any reference to the plans of the French General Staff. Among the documents which are in the book of documents submitted by the defense I also could find no copies whatsoever referring to the French General Staff. That is quite incomprehensible. How is it that Dr. Horn appears to be informed with regard to the plans of the French General Staff? On what basis does he refer to these plans since they seem to be completely absent from the documents/which he refers?
DR. HORN: Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: One minute. Now, Dr. Horn, what you have just been telling the Tribunal then was not anything explanatory of the document, but you were telling us what Hitler did and what the defendant Ribbentrop did in consequence of what Hitler did. That is not in evidence. You cannot tell us what is not in evidence. You could only give us explanatory remarks to make the document itself intelligible.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, the defendant von Ribbentrop is accused of carrying on foreign political activities.
The Prosecution has interpreted the foreign political activity according to their light and we were permitted not to give a speech but, in connection with the documents submitted, to show our view, which is opposite to that of the Prosecution, and in order to do that, I must refer to certain facts, documents and quotations. I cannot give a complete picture if I may just submit a document without giving a frame to this matter and show the course of events as they took place.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal is not expecting you to give a complete picture at this stage. All you are doing atthe present moment is introducing the evidence. You are going to give the complete picture when you make your final speech. This document is perfectly intelligible. It is a document which is well known, but it is perfectly intelligible without telling us what Hitler or the defendant Ribbentrop did.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, a little while ago, as far as the objection of the Russian prosecution is concerned, I asked forvon Neurath as a witness. I can only interrogatehim on this point only aftervon Neurath is in the witness box. But it seems to me that I may refer to facts which are evidence to the contrary.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, that would be his function. If you are going to tell us what you think the defendant von Neurath is going to say in answer to questions which you put to him that would be making an opening statement. Well, that has not been provided for by the Charter. We must wait until you question von Neurath.
DR. HORN: Now I will read from the quotation from Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 1 on page ten of the document book.
"The German Government therefore is forced to face the new situation created by this alliance, a situation which is made more critical by the fact that the French-Soviet pact has found its supplement in a pact of exactly parallel nature--between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In the interest of the elementary right of a nation to safeguard her borders and for the sake of preserving her possibilities for defense the German Reich Government has therefore re-established the full and unrestricted sovereignty of the Reich within the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, effective today." Through this step of the German Government certain articles of the Treaty of Versailles which were concerned with the demilitarization of the Rhine -these terms had become obsolete since this morning a decision of the Court does not permit me to make any statements about Versailles nor take a position on Versailles.
I ask that I may turn to the document Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 8 which is found on page twenty-one of the document book. May I put a question, Mr. President? Versailles is concerned? These things were exchanged between governments before the Treaty of Versailles -- these are purely government documents -but no arguments about the treaty.
May these documents be submitted in line with the decision?
THE PRESIDENT: The ones on page twenty-one?
DR. HORN: I mean Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 3.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is that?
DR. HORN: It is on page fourteen of the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal would like to know what issue in this trial this document is relevant to.
DR. HORN: I wanted to justify German opinion to the Treaty of Versailles. We are concerned with Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 2 and we are dealing with the notes of Germany addressed to the United States with an offer for a truce and for a conclusion of the peace. and I wanted to show further through the next note that this offer was based on the Fourteen Points of President Wilson. Further, from Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 4, I wanted to prove that the peace and the truce were concluded on the basis of the Fourteen Points with two exceptions. I also wanted to show through Ribbentrop Exhibit -
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I tried not to interrupt, but really this is the issue which the Tribunal ruled on a fortnight ago when the defendant Goering, I think, applied for documents on exactly this issue; and that also, as I understand, the Tribunal ruled on again this morning. The only issue to which this can be directed is whether the Treaty of Versailles was in accordance with the Fourteen Points and if it was therefore an unjust treaty, and it comes directly within the Tribunal's ruling of an hour ago.
DR. HORN: May I add something more, Mr. President? As far as I and my colleagues could interpret the ruling of the Tribunal, we are prohibited from using explanations or statements on the injustice of the Versailles Treaty and also about the fact that this Treaty was concluded under duress. We interpreted it only in that way and no other way.
THE PRESIDENT: That was why I asked you to what issue you said this was relevant, and you said that it was relevant to show what the German opinion on the Treaty was.
Well, these are documents before the Treaty was made and they seem to be only relevant upon the question whether or not the Treaty was a just treaty or not a just treaty.
DR. HORN: I personally did not want to prove through this document whether the Treaty of Versailles and the peace was just or unjust; I wanted to show that it was a treaty which had many legal loopholes and inadequacies, since the main treaty was not in line with the agreements of the preliminary treaty.
THE PRESIDENT: If the main treaty was not in accordance withthe preliminary treaty then the main treaty would, according to that argument, be an unfair treaty. That is the very point upon which the Tribunal has ruled.
DR. HORN: For that reason, Mr. President, I omitted these documents and said that I will not refer to those documents, as was suggested by the ruling of the Court. I will now turn to document number eight.
THE PRESIDENT: As you are going through a lot of documents we might break off for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
MR. DODD: I don't want to take much of the Tribunal's time, but in view of the statement of Dr. Horn concerning the condition of the Defendant von Ribbentrop, I think it is required that we inform the Tribunal of his condition as we understand it, which is something quite different from the understanding of Dr. Horn.
Colonel Andrus has talked with both of them. And our understanding is that Ribbentrop is not ill and is able to take the witness-stand; that he is nervous, and appears to be frightened, but he is not disabled in any sense and is capable of testifying.
DR. HORN: I come now to page 21 of the Document Book, and ask the Court to take judicial notice of Exhibit 8 in the Ribbentrop book. It is a copy, and from the Documents of German Politics, which I turned over to the Court, having certified it. It is the speech of Ambassador von Ribbentrop at the 91st meeting of the League of Nations in London, regarding the Soviet Pact, the Locarno Pact and the German Peace Plan. The speech was delivered on the 19th of March, 1936. I refer to page 3 of the speech and begin my quotation with No.5:
"5. According to this alliance, France and Russia appoint themselves the judge in their own affairs by independently determining the aggressor if occasion arises, without resolution or recommendation, on the part of the League of Nations, and thereby are able to instigate a war against Germany at their own discretion.
"This strict obligation of the two countries is clearly and unequivocally evident from paragraph 1 of the signatory protocol to the treaty of alliance.
"In other words, in a given case France may decide at her own discretion whether Germany or Soviet Russia is the aggressor. She only reserves the right to have to expose herself through her military actions based on her own decision to sanctions on the part of the powers guaranteeing the Rhino Pact,namely England and Italy.
"From a legal and 'real political' point of view, this objection is meaningless. In terms of law, if France determines the aggressor herself, how will she then be able to foresee that attitude the powers guaranteeing the Locarno Pact will afterwards assume towards her decision? The answer to the question whether France would have to fear sanctions in such a case defends in practice not only on the faithful adherence to the pact by the guarantors -- whichthe German Government does not doubt in any way -- but also on various prerequisites of a purely factual nature, the probability or improbability of which cannot be perceived in advance.
"In addition, the evaluation of the relationship between the new treaty of alliance and the Rhine Pact cannot possibly be based on the treaty relationship between Germany and France on the one hand and the guaranteeing powers on the other, but only on the immediate relationship between France and Germany themselves. Otherwise one would have to demand from Germany that she tolerate quietly every possible violation of the Rhine Pact by France, basing her confidence on the fact that the guarantors would have to provide for her security. That certainly was not the purpose of the Rhine pact.
"In terms of real politics, when being attacked by a superior military coalition as a consequence of a decision which is incorrect, having been cast on somebody's own volition, it is an inconsequential consolation to a country to obtain its right through subsequent sanctions against the aggressors condemned by the League of Nations Council. For what kind of sanctions could actually hit such a gigantic coalition which reaches from East Asia to the Channel? These two countries are such powerful and important members and especially militarily strong factors of the League of Nations that according to all practical deliberations sanctions against them would be unthinkable from the start.
"Therefore this second restriction dealing with the consideration of eventual sanctions is wholly inconsequential from a real political point of view.
"I now ask the members of this Council to realize not only the legal, political and practical consequences of this obligation on the part of France to act independently, but to ask yourselves above all whether the opinion can be advocated that the German Government which signed the Locarno Pact would have over taken uponitself the obligations of this Pact, had it contained such onesided stipulations as later developed." and to clarify the German point of view, I add the following: "The French-Soviet Russian alliance means, beyond that -- in the German Government's view of history -- a complete elimination of the hitherto existing European balance of power and consequently of the fundamental political and legal conditions under which the Locarno Pact was concluded at that time."
and the Versailles Treaty, regarding the demilitarization of the Rhineland. page 27 of the Document Book -- an exhaustive and detailed plan for disarmament. I ask the Tribunal to accept in evidence the document just cited, so that I may later refer to it.
With this exposition I conclude my presentation on Germany's reasons for reoccupying the Rhineland. occupation of the Rhineland, I shall enter upon that when I call him to the witness-stand.
turned to London, where he was appointed as ambassador. On 4 February 1938 he was appointed Foreign Minister, and from that time on, conducted the foreign policy along the lines laid down by Hitler.
In proof of this, I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 10, to be found in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: We have not got this bock. Our last document in Number 8, I think, but you had better go on.
DR. HORN: This is a very short document that I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of. It is an excerpt from the speech of the Fuehrer before the German Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin on 19 July 1940. I quote:
"I cannot conclude my remarks without finally thanking that man who for years has carried out my foreign policies with the same selfless devotion as I would have. The name of the Party Member von Ribbentrop will be identified with the political uprising of the German Nation as Foreign Minister, and will be so identified for all time". ciples the defendant von Ribbentrop conducted the foreign policy. I should like now to ask the Tribunal to hear the witness State Secretary von Steengracht.
(ADOLF von STEENGRACHT, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:' BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your name, please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: truth, and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish. BY DR. HORN:
A What was your last position in the Foreign Office?
A What were your activities? make the following prefatory remarks: the neighborhood of Hitler's Headquarters; that is to say, several hundred kilometers distant from Berlin. Here he carried on his business with a limited personnel. The Foreign Office in Berlin had tasks of a routine and administrative nature, but above all, he was concerned with setting on current business with foreign countries. hold the responsibility. The foreign political decisions and instructions originated in the headquarters, mostly without any understanding one then part of the Foreign Office.
Q Who determined, question of foreign policy? most minute details, was determined by Hitler. Ribbentrop frequently stated that the Fuehrer needed no Foreign Minister, he simply wanted only a foreign political secretary, Ribbentrop in my opinion would jave been agreeable to such a position, since, so far as Hitler's authority was concerned, he would have liked to have excluded himself from those, in part, destructive influences. He also had, in part, some influence on Hitler's speeches, so far as they were concerned with the foreign policy. Hitler was accustomed to prepare these speeches without Ribbentrop's help. ed themselves with foreign policy? subdivisions that from 1933 on had no foreign political ambitions. Every one of these offices had a sort of foreign bureau that kept up connections with foreign countries and in this way created for itself its own foreign political channels.
I should judge the number of these to be approximatively thirty. For example, the Hitler Jugend, the SA, the German Work Front, the SS, Rosenberg's office, the Propaganda Ministry, the office of Fritz Walde, Ribbentrop's office, the Nordic Society, the German Academy, the Reichsbahn. rage of Hitler--Goering, Bormann, Goebbels, who also were of influence in the formation of foreign policy. Goering, too, as fas as I see, also had a certain influence, but only until 1933, at any rate, sa far as foreign political matters were concerned. Later on he had no such influence. clude them?
A From my own observation, I can only give the following judgment: Almost every one of those persons who had ever been in foreign countries, considered themselves to be from then on experts in foreign political enthusiasm. they stood at variance with actual political necessities, and the more strength was shown, the mere they stood in contradiction to the primitive feeling for necessity. Uneducated judgment of this sort did have an effect on Hitler and formed in Hitler's mind, along with his so-called intuition, the point of departure far a basic standpoint. an opinion on the part of Hitler, I should, like to point out the following: As long as the later German Ambassador in Paris was there, Hitler read his reports with interest, but when he became the official representative of the Reich, his reports were mostly thrown into the wastebasket without having been read. Himler's reports and Goebbels' reports and Bormann's reports played, on the other hand, a much larger role, and reports from uncontrollable agents played a greater role than those of the experts.
Q Was the Foreign office responsible for relations with all foreign countries?
part of years previous questions, namely, the elimination of these influences.
In accordance with Hitler's methods of work, these so-called wild influences simply could not be excluded. Against this organized lack of organization Ribbentrop waged a bitter war, namely, against all German offices. I should like to state that at least 60 percent of his time was devoted to these things. foreign countries?
Q Did the situation change with the outbreak of war?
A Yes. In point of fact, the foreign office lost its responsibility at the moment at which the German bayonet closed the border; direct relations with the foreign countries in all occupied areas were withdrawn. The Foreign Office did not even have the right to have a representative there, or, at any rate, only as observer, without any authority. This is particularly true for the eastern regions and for Norway. independence of a country, as, far example, in Norway, this activity was considered almost traitorous, and those responsible had to stop this work, on Hitler's orders, and disappeared from the Foreign office. be characterized by Hitler's statement: "The Foreign office shall, so far as possible, disappear from the picture until the end of the war." Hitler wanted to limit the Foreign office to 20 to 40 people, and it was even partially forbidden to have any connections with the Foreign office or to maintain such connections. He considered them defeatists, and what not, who could concern themselves with a matter only if it was not to be carried out. Germany.
A No; at least, I never noticed anything of it. Hitler made the statement: "Diplomacy is treason; treaties are to to used only as long as they are useful." That was Hitler's opinion of all diplomats in the world. regions that were under civilian administration?
A I have already touched on this question. I have already said that in those regions in which there was a military government or a civilian administration, a representative of the Foreign Office, if he was tolerated at all, was tolerated only as an observer and occupied no official position. various countries and gave the details on them. The situations varied.
Q Do you consider Ribbentrop a typical Nazi or not? Socialism. He knew extraordinarily little of the doctrines of National Socialism. He felt himself only personally bound to Hitler, whom he followed with soldierly obedience, and he also stood under a certain hypnotic dependence on Hitler. However, I could not characterize him as a typical exponent of National Socialism.
Q Was Hitler a man who was accessible to expositions and objections? himself off more and more, during the course of the years, from such influence. From the time that I was Secretary of State on, I saw him only twice on official occasions. I can only judge from the success or lack of success of our work. In the course of my activities, covering almost two years, I can remember no single case in which he agreed to any one of our suggestions. On the contrary, it was always to be feared that through some impulse or impetus of a personal nature he would be persuaded to take contrary and forceful measures. The basic trait of his character was lack of confidence, which bore heavy fruit. in an altogether vain task. On theother hand, however, when Hitler was urged to do violent acts, on the part of irresponsible people, he responded to these influences. These men were then called by him "strong", whereas thebehaviour of anyone who was even half-way normal was called "weak" or "defeatist". And through an opinion that might have been uttered just once in this way, the influence of that man could be forever destroyed.
in the various influences subjected to him?
A I cannot answer that question in general terms. I have already adumbrated that in my previous answers. First of all the reaction depended, in my opinion, on the mood of the Dictator at the time, it is also a matter of importance as to who contradicted and how much strength he had already shown. But how the atmosphere really was can perhaps be demonstrated by this case.
When Ribbentrop's liaison man with Hitler told about the circumstances shortly after Roosevelt's death, he said: "Today was almost the last hour of my life. Goebbels came out of the Fuehrer's room and reported on Germany's chances in the future so far as they were affected by Roosevelt's death. He drew up a very hopeful picture of the future. I, Hewel, was of the opinion that that view was not justified and recommended to him to be careful viz a viz Goebbels. Hitler fell into a rage, called me a person who demoralized everyone, who deprived every decent person of his good mood and hopes. I was forced," Hewel reports, "to go privately to Goebbels and to ask him to take this matter on his own shoulders, for if he had informed the Fuehrer of my attitude, Hitler would have called Rattenhuber, the Chief of his Security Service, and had me taken away and shot."
Q How do you explain the fact that so many people come into Hitler's immediate neighborhood, although they didn't agree with him? disapproved of Hitler's methods of government, indeed, who were inimical to those methods. The reasons for this are of various sorts. Reichstag, according to Parliamentary rules, had come to power. The officialdom, in consequence of this change of government, had no reason to retire from its various offices. The transition to dictatorship, and the therewith connected altogether different concept of the State, did not permit the individual officials to have their own opinions of the Government. At first there was a terrible reign of terror everywhere in the ministries and chancelleries.
In private dwellings and in restaurants there were spies who, out of fanaticism or for pay, were willing to denounce everything they heard.
. Nevertheless, many would have done everything they could if their withdrawal would have been of any avail, but it became obvious that these cases were simply useless self-sacrifice, the consepuences of which were concealed from the public and which had no effect. Nazi was placed. For this reason many people remained at their posts in order to prevent the development that I have just described. or Himmler or were order d by them led any foreigners to the conclusion that the German people in their entirety were equally guilty of these things and had known of them. This is not the case. Even most of the people in high public positions found out about these matters only after the conclusion of the war-about their extent and their details. Perhaps the key to this can be found in the speech Himmler delivered in Posen on October 3, 1943, before his gruppenfuehrer, and of which I discovered anything only for the first time here. In this speech he instructed them to keep the concentration camps and the nations against the Jews just as secret as the events of the 20th of July were being kept secret-of which the German people knew nothing. the thousand who might be considered guilty. It was these who carried out this reign of terror against the German people. But those who thought differently--and to this is to be thanked that, for example, the Geneva Convention was not renounced and tens or even hundreds of thousands of English or American fliers and prisoners were not shot. Unfortunate prisoners and those seriously wounded were returned to their families in their home countries. Greece in its terrible condition received food. Balances were kept as far as possible in Belgium and France, and many senseless acts of destruction in foreign countries and in the home country were in part prevent and in part alleviated. justice remained alive. These circles were encouraged in their attitude earlier by the fact that no foreign power had used the conditions in Germany as a reason for breaking off diplomatic relations but until the outbreak of war had relations with National Socialism and concluded treaties with it and had its diplomatic representatives at the National Socialist party days at Nurnberg.