at any rate, received much more consideration from foreign countries than had the Weimar Republic, despite all fidelty to treaties or points of law. as well is every individual German: When could these people who felt themselves to be servants of their people leave their posts, if they could at all? when would such a step be useful to the people? when would such a step warn Hitler? nature the French campaign?
A Yes. I had at that time, to be sure, no official position, but I nevertheless felt the need, and I believe it was a heartfelt wish of all Germans to bring about again peaceful conditions in the world. On the day of the capitulation of the King of Belgium I suggested, first, the creation of the United States of Europe on the democratic basis. This would have meant independence of Holland and Belgium. Poland, and so on. If this could not be brought about, at any rate to make as many encroachments on the self-determination of the powers as possible.
Q Did Ribbentrop speak to Hitler on this Matter?
A So far as I know, yes; but at that time Hitler considered such plans as premature. same subject?
A Yes. Ribbentrop at that time also laid down very concrete proposals. He foresaw the sovereignty and independence of all the conquered countries, including Poland, and, Moreover, an exhaustive far-reaching collaboration.
Q How did Hitler react to these proposals? was not ripe--the military situation was not favorable enough--so that these would be interpreted as signs of weakness.
23-1
Q Now to another question: Before the outbreak of the Russian campaign, Did Ribbentrop mention to Hitler Bismarck's statement about the danger of preventive wars? the Pact with Russia. In regard to preventive war, he had stated to Hitler: "God does not let anyone look into His cards." Ribbentrop also made efforts to bring Russian experts to Hitler in order to explain the situation there to Hitler and to advise him to wait before he started a war. Hitler paid, no attention to these people. So far as I know only Ambassador Graf Schulenburg had a short audience with him. He, who considered such a war inadvisable, could make clear his attitude toward Russia and the reasons why he considered it inadvisable. Hitler held his own speech on this subject for about twenty minutes without letting him speak a word and the took his leave of him.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the order of the Tribunal was that witnesses might refresh their memory by notes, but this witness here seems to the Tribunal to have read practically every word he said. That is not refreshing your memory with notes. That is making a speech which you have written out beforehand, and if that sort of thing goes on the Tribunal will have to think whether it is necessary to alter its rule and to adhere to the ordinary rule, which is that no witness is allowed to refer to any notes at all except those that are made at the time.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, to be sure, I discussed my questions with the witness, but his notes, if he has any, were made by the witness and were made without my knowledge of their contents. I shall now ask the witness to answer my questions without making use of any means with which I a unfamiliar. BY DR. HORN: stop interference with Jews and the Church?
A Yes, K knew of this. I know that Ribbentrop spoke frequently with Hitler on this theme. I was absolutely desperate because of this policy toward Jews and churches, and for this reason had occasion to speak to Ribbentrop about it, but he explained to me again and again when he returned from Hitler that Hitler could not be spoken to on these subjects. Hitler said that these problems had to be solved befor he had died.
Q. Did von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office have any knowledge of the military planning?
A. Ribbentrop frequently fold me that he was completely unoriented militarily. So far as the office is concerned, this Foreign Office had no influence on strategic planning.
Q. What were the relations between Ribbentrop, Himmler, Goebbels and Bormann?
A. The relations between Ribbentrop and those other gentlemen were as bad as can be imagined. There was a perpetual fight between them. In my opinion Ribbentrop would have been Himmler's first sacrifice if occasion had arisen. A fight was being carried on continually between these men.
Q. What was the relationship in general in the highest Party positions?
A. The relations in the individual offices depended on the character of the chief of the section and were various. But one can say that the relations were by no means good, and, above all, that reciprocal orientation, so necessary for conducting the State, was not there. It was almost impossible for one minister to discuss a question with another minister by telephone, as impossible as if the Angel Gabriel had come down to earth. Even in the most important matters a factual discussion could not take place. There was, in other words, no connection. Moreover, they were very different, and not only in characters but in every other respect.
Q. Do you know anything about objections on the part of the Vatican regarding the Polish clergy?
A. I heard about that later, and it must be a matter of two protests concerning the Polish clergy. These protests were submitted by the Nuncio to the Secretary of State at that time. He, the Secretary of State, turned these protests over to Ribbentrop, and he in his turn presented them to Hitler. accordingly, since the Nuncio was not responsible in these regions, Hitler declared when he saw these notes, "They are just on long lie. Give these notes back to the Nuncio with a reproof and tell him that we want to hear nothing mor about the matter."
Q. Were these notes worked on by the Foreign Office?
A. Sharp and precise instructions were issued that all cases in which matters were brought up by representatives of countries in matters for which they were not authorized, whether in converstaions, verbally, written notes, or any other piece of wirting -- instructions were issued that these were not to be accepted, and our protests were turned down sharply.
Q. Did you know that Ribbentrop prevented the shooting of about 10,000 fliers after the air attack on Dresden?
A. I know the following: Ribbentrop's liaison man with Hitler called me up one day in great excitement and informed me that on a suggestion by Goebbels the Fuehrer intended, as reprisal for the air attack on Dresden, to kill a large number of English and American fliers of war, largely fliers. I went immediately to Ribbentrop and informed him of this. Ribbentrop became very excited, stated that this was impossible, called up this liaison man in person in order to verify the report. The liaison man corroborated it. Then Ribbentro got up and went to Hitler, came back after a half hour, and said that he had succeeded in having Hitler withdraw this report. That is all I know about that matter.
Q. Do you know anything about the meeting of an anti-Jewish Congress?
A. I know something about it, namely, I believe this same liaison man informed us that on a suggestion of Bormann's, Hitler had ordered the immediate calling of an anti-Jewish Congress through Rosenberg's office. Ribbentrop did not want to believe this, but nevertheless had to accept it as true once he had spoken with our liaison officer. Then, since on the basis of this decision we could do nothing officially to prevent this thing, we nevertheless insinuated ourselves into the matter. We made efforts by a policy of delay to make the carrying out of this anti-Jewish Congress impossible. Since the war ended in 1945, this policy of delay was successful, and the Congress did not take place.
Q. Could you observe whether Ribbentrop took a strong attitude toward his collaborators for reasons of state, although he often thought entirely differently?
A. You ask me to express a judgment. I believe, however, that I must affirm this.
Thinking that he was being loyal to Hitler, Ribbentrop in my opinion in those visits when he went to Hitler and found Hitler with exactly the opposite opinion, tried to explain Hitler's attitude. I should like to assume that this stood in contradiction to his own ideas.
Q. Did Ribbentrop during the course of the war ask that Rome and Florence be spared?
A. So far as I know he did speak with Hitler on this subject.
Q. Do you know about an article by Goebbels in the paper "Reich" or perhaps the paper "Voelkischer Beobachter," an article dealing with lynch shootings?
A. Yes. Once by accident I came to Ribbentrop when he was reading a paper and was again very excited. He asked me if I had read this unheard of article by Goebbels. It was an article on Lynch law.
Q. Did Ribbentrop protest to Goebbels about this article?
A. Of course he charged our press chief who had connections with Goebbels entered a protest against this article. But to his surprise he found out that this protest was useless since the article had not only been inspired but recommended by Hitler, so that there was nothing more to be done.
Q. How did the Foreign Office stand on the opinions espressed in this article?
A. The Foreign Office repudiated such articles vehemently, because they were offenses against international law and thus brought us one step further from the family of nations. Moreover, if appealed to the lower instincts of man, and both in internal and external policy did great damage, particularly since many of those articles were read by several millions of people and did their own sort of irreparable damage. appear in the press any further. I must, however, unfortunately, state that we had great difficulties in this matter since the enemy low altitude fliers often shot at peasants in the fields and pedestrians in the streets, that is to say, purely civilian people. Our arguments that we did not want to offend international law on our part under these conditions were not taken into account either by the German people or by Hitler.
On the contrary, in this case too we were regarded as interested in formal law only. But we did try, with the help of military officers, to prevent the carrying out of this order.
Q Do you know of a Battalion Guensberg?
Legation Consular Guensberg in the Foreign Office. His office received, so far as I recall --I did not at that time concern myself with these matters--received the charge from Ribbentrop along with a few very small, a few experts, from the Foreign Office, to follow the fighting troops and see to it that: first, the foreign missions, for instance, in Brussels and Paris, and so forth, that stood under the protection of the guarantor powers, that these buildings should not be entered by our troops; secondly, Guensberg was charged with making sure that the files that were of foreign political interest were not disturbed. After the conclusion of the French campaign, Guensberg, so far as I recall, was no longer active officially. What he had been doing was carried on by the Gestapo, by the Secret Field Police, because from then on, foreign office officials could not enter foreign countries.
Q When did Guensberg's job end? then after the beginning of the Russian campaign, Guensberg, so far as I remember, reported again for duty and said that he intended to do the same thing in the East, and Ribbentrop told him, "Very well, you may go with a few people to the army groups and see whether anything of interest is happening there and also see to it that when we approach Moscow, the foreign embassies are not damaged and that the documents are not damaged," but he did not consider himself any longer to be a part of the foreign office and received his orders from elsewhere. Then, as I later heard, he had a large number of men under him and could even wear a military uniform.
Q He did not belong to the foreign office in a military capacity?
A No. When Ribbentrop heard that Guensberg had such a large job under him, charged me to turn personally to the SS and say that I and Ribbentrop do not want to have Guensberg under me any longer, and at that time I told Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff--I should like to point out that we wanted nothing more to do with Guensberg--"see to it that you keep him with the Waffen SS along with all his subordinates." That is all I know about the matter of Guensberg.
DR. HORN: Would the Lord Justice like to conclude this session or should I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: Unless you are going to conclude almost immediately, we better adjourn. Will you be sometime longer with this witness?
DR. HORN: I have a number of further questions.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 27 March, 1946, at 1000 hours).
THE PRESIDENT: Go ahead, Dr. Horn. BY DR. HORN (Counsel for defendant Ribbentrop):
Q. Witness, you know Count Ciano. Where and When did you meet him?
A. I know Count Ciano but not politically speaking, only personally. I can't remember exactly when I met him but probably it was on the occasion of a state visit. I was working at the time in the department, making records in the Foreign Office.
Q. What experiences did you make with Count Ciano?
A. Since I didn't work with him poltically, I didn't make any political experiences with him.
Q. And, now, a different sphere. Is it right that von Ribbentrop gave orders that under all circumstances, the French franc should be protected against inflation?
A. That type of measure can only happen during a time when I was not yet State Secretary but I know that the principal attitude towards France and occupied territories was that their currency was to be preserved and, to put it right, should be preserved with all means. That is the reason why we sent gold to Greece, for instance, so as to at least attempt to maintain the value of their currency.
Q. What was the effect scored in Greece through sending any of that gold there?
A. By sending gold to Greece, we lowered the rate of exchange of foreign currencies which enable Greek merchants, which caused these merchants to be afraid and they waited with putting foodstuffs on the market. In that way they were in fact brought back to the disposal of the Greek population.
Q. Is it correct that von Ribbentrop gave strict orders that there were not to be any confiscation in occupied territories but that only direct negotiations with the governments were to take place?
A. If you put the question like that, then it is basically correct but I have to repeat what I said yesterday, that in the occupied territories he had no principle functions. Therefore, he had no officials for confiscations, a matter of which was under somebody else's jurisdiction; but it is correct to say that we negotiated with the governments concerned and that he had forbidden strictly that any direct measures were to be introduced -- measures which were carried out by other departments were not to be supported by us.
DR. HORN: For the time being, I have no further wuestions to put to that witness. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for defendant von Papen):
Q. Witness, do you know von Papen intimately, from the period when you were active in the Foreign Office and particularly when you were active as State Secretary in the Foreign Office?
A. I know von Papen since several years before 1933, but privately. Then I lost sight of him for some time and reestablished closer contact when I became State Secretary in the German Foreign Office, after which I had concurrent official contact with him and contact which went past that type of contact.
Q. Did you, particularly in the last period of your activities as State Secretary, receive reports from him currently, reports which he sent from Ankara, when he was ambassador, to Berlin.
A. Wherever he didn't send these reports directly to von Ribbentrop, which may have been possible -- I don't know -- I received them through official channels.
Q. Do you remember that von Papen started to be active as ambassador in Ankara in April 1932, after he had twice before refused, that he took on that position on the day that Italy occupied Albania, by which a danger of war arose in the southeast?
A. At that time I wasn't State Secretary and I had no political function, so that details aren't exactly known to me from that period, but today I have the impression that he took on that position aftern the Italians had occupied Albania. He, himself, told me later on that at that time the danger did exist, that the Italians would advance fruther into the Balkans, causing a possible conflict with Turkey, as a result of which world peace could have been endangered. For that reason, he said he decided at the time to accept that position but which day that was exactly, I cannot today tell you.
Q What can you say, generally speaking, about von Papen's attitude?
active to preserve peace by every means. He certainly considered that it would be the worst disaster for Germany and the world if war were to break out.
Q Were von Papen's efforts during the war towards establishing peace, with the aim of foregoing any annexations no matter what the military situation was, and reestablishing the sovereignty of occupied territories? In other words, was he working for a reasonable settlement for the achieving of a bearable status for all European states? working for the reestablishment of peace and for the reestablishment of full sovereignty for all countries, and he always wanted to avoid any interferences or offenses or material damage being inflicted on any other countries.
Q Was that attitude of von Papen's prevalent even at the time of the greatest German military successes?
Q Were these continuous personal efforts of von Papen's to establish peace held against him by Hitler, and was he the uncomfortable outsider in that connection? I do know that generally speaking Papen was critized by Hitler and other persons as a man who was following, shall we say, weak lines. ible as long as Hitler and the Party were in power in Germany, and that the necessary credit for negotiating with foreign countries was therefore lacking. to von Papen about the whole subject, and thoroughly, since at that time I had just become State Secretary. At that time he voiced the opinion which you have just mentioned and he stated it very clearly. He said that he was quite clear about the fact that with Hitler and the methods which were being employed, no peace could be achieved with foreign countries.
Q And my last question, Witness: The Indictment accuses von Papen of being an unscrupulous opportunist. You, Witness, know the accused from reports and from the official contact the defendant had with your department over an innumerable number of years. Did you, on the strength of that knowledge, gather the impression that this description, this characterization, of von Papen is correct, or can you say, on the strength of these reports and this contact, that von Papen has appeared to you as a man who always tells the truth, even when that truth can be quite uncomfortable to his superiors, and even when the voicing of that truth can lead to personal danger for him?
A I certainly do say that is so. I think the best evidence of it is that von Papen was eventually eliminated from the position of Vice Chancellor and had to leave his position in the government, that he became a private person, and that only when the emergency was worst was he consulted. In my opinion, von Papen only placed himself at the disposal of the Germans because he was of the opinion that, "I have still got a certain amount of duty; I am a good Catholic and I am representing a direction which is against all inhumane touches, and I must therefore use my personal weight against any influence from that direction." Hitler and Papen, but from my liaison officer with Hitler I often heard that von Papen, in his smooth way, often told Hitler a number a things which nobody else could have told him. I believe that through his manner he prevented quite a number of things, at least during a certain period. BY DR. NELTE: (Counsel for the defendant Keitel) terrible bombing attack on Dresden, intended to issue an order according to which thousands of prisoners of war should be killed as a reprisal. recollect it correctly, namely that all you have said about this matter is information from, or based on information from Herr von Ribbentrop?
Q What do you know from your own personal knowledge?
man to Hitler called me on the telephone and told me that Goebbels had proposed to Hitler that 10,000 or more British and American prisoners of war should be shot as a reprisal, and that Hitler was prepared to follow that suggestion. I immediately reported it to von Ribbentrop, and he went there at once and told me after half an hour that the order had been withdrawn.
that connection at all.
Q You don't know, therefore, who was theoriginatore of that order?
Q Or who suggested it? the information which I received.
Q Through von Ribbentrop, do you mean?
Q In other words, Herr Hewel?
Q And you know nothing about any participation of military men?
A Nothing at all; nothing at all. BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and OKW):
Q Witness, I have only one question. Did you, as State Secretary, or did the Foreign Office consult the OKW or the Supreme Command of the Navy and did you inform them about current matters?
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the British prosecution wish to cross examine? BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE: against the persecution of the churches, was against the persecution of Jews, and did not know what was going on in the concentration camps. You have told us that he was not a typical Nazi. What are the qualities of a typical Nazi? fanatically with all the doctrines of National Socialism and recognizes them. Von Ribbentrop, as I said, followed Hitler personally, but as far as the entire prospect of ideas was concerned, he knew comparatively little, unusually little, and never concerned himself With it.
He never spoke in meetings, never participated in large rallies, and therefore knew extremely little about the people and the feelings and atmosphere connected with them. churches?
A I didn't understand that question.
Q I will repeat it. By a typical Nazi, do you mean a man who was engaged in persecution of the churches? and didn't state any of his personal opinions in connection with that affair. extermination of Jews?
A That I wouldn't like to say either. That was limited to a certain circle of people. A large number of fanatics knew nothing about those atrocities and cruelties and would have condemned them had they been properly informed of them.
Q I understand you to say that you knew nothing of them yourself. Is that so?
A That I did not know anything? papers and particularly since I had contact with the opposition I have heard about a number of matters connected with concentration camps. In all those cases, as far as I was capable of doing so, I intervened. But regarding the things which I have heard now here, I knew nothing at all.
Q Now, I want to ask you about another matter. You have told us that Ribbentrop had no responsibility in the occupied territories. Your words were that the Foreign Office lost responsibility at that moment at which the German bayonet crossed the frontier. Is that right? frontier the Foreign Office lost the sole right to negotiate with foreign governments everywhere. That over and above that, in most countries, the Foreign Office did not have the right to carry out diplomatic observations and that it no longer had any competency to do so. That applied particularly to Norway and the Eastern territories. there and that direct relations with occupied territories were withdrawn, is that right? longer had the sole right to negotiate with governments, since now there was either a civil administration in those countries or a military government. There were field command departments and military administrations and now those departments on their own approached foreign governments and their executive organs in all the countries concerned. Consequently you cannot say anymore that the Foreign Office had the sole right to negotiate with those governments. But in countries like Norway and the East we had no officials of ours at all and Hitler had issued the order that as far as the other countries were concerned, namely Holland, Belgium and so on and so forth, we would have to withdraw our observers too. We did not do so, however. Ribbentrop, did you not?
Secret State Police by the impounding of politically important documents and securing and seizure of public property; further of private and above all Jewish artistic property on the basis of instructions especially given for the matter. Isn't that right? nothing to do with political affairs. But, Mr. Prosecutor, if I understood your question right, then you are of the opinion that the Secret State Police and the German executive organs in France were under our jurisdiction. That is quite incorrect.
Q You are not answering the question. I asked you if the Minister Abetz had not got those duties. persecutions. No orders of that kind went through myhands.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: I ask the witness to be shown document 3614PS. February.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the PS number?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: It is 3614-PS.
(witness handed document.) BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE: to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW). It reads:
"The Fuehrer has appointed Ambassador the former Minister Abetz and after my report has decreed as follows:
"1. Ambassador Abetz has the following tasks in France:--" witness, reads:
"Advising the Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police by the impounding of politically important documents.
"7. Securing and seizure of public property; further of private and above all Jewish artistic property on the basis of instructions specially given for the matter."
Then the concluding paragraphs:
"The Fuehrer has hereby expressly ordered that Ambassador Abetz is exclusively responsible for the handling of all political questions in occupied and unoccupied France. Insofar as his functions should touch military interests, Ambassador Abetz will act only in agreement with the military Commander in France.
"Ambassador Abetz is attached to the Military Commander in France as his Commissioner. His seat remains Paris as heretofore. He receives instructions for his tasks from me and is responsible exclusively to me on these matters.
"(Signed) Ribbentrop".
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, the Tribunal would like to know why this witness told them that Ambassador Abetz did not have the task of confiscating property. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Why did you say that? prohibition for him to get mixed up in French foreign affairs. Therefore, he could only address the French Government and the French Government could carry out by means of their executive officials something which would represent an action on the part of the French Government but never a confiscation carried out by Abetz. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q That is not an answer to the question. The question is why, when you were asked whether Abetz had the task of advising the Secret Field police and the Secret State police by the impounding of politically important documents, did you say no? State Secretary until May 1943 and that is an order from August, 1940. But here we are concerned merely with a directive addressed to Ambassador Abetz.
Q At this time you were Ribbentrop's personal adjutant, were you not?
A I was adjutant, but not political secretary. I was -
Q You were adjutant? technical matters and at that time I had never presented him one single political report. But I should remark, if I may, on this occasion that this document here is an instruction addressed to Ambassador Abetz and that instruction was put out of date by the actual conditions. acting in political matters?
AAmbassador Abetz was ambassador until May, 1945. Therefore, from 1943 to 1945 I had continuous correspondence with him and during that time Ambassador Abetz continually fought against those measures which were taken by the Gestapo and carried through by them. That was a bitter struggle and he was personally threatened in a number of matters. You can talk about consultations but whether people obeyed him Since he had no powers, that is another question altogether.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you kindly observe the light in front of you. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE: only applies after 1943? 1943.
Q Now, I want to turn to the question of Jews. You have told us that you and Ribbentrop by adopting a policy of delay prevented the holding of the Anti-Jewish Congress in 1944, is that right? Jews?
Q And so was the defendant Ribbentrop?