We had tremendous losses in these sea emergency planes work.
Q Were emergency buoys established in the Channel to save people?
A Emergency buoys were established in large numbers. There were cables to which the fliers who had been shot down could cling, and foodstuffs and water and other materials were put on these buoys also. There were also small rafts which the fliers could board. There he found food, drink, first-aid kits, and blankets.
Q These emergency buoys, how were they treated by the British?
A They were treated differently. Some remained; other were destroyed.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I have no further questions. BY DR. EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): flict between the Fuehrer and General-Colonel Jodl?
Q Do you know that at that time Jodl was to be replaced?
A The conflict arose through the crisis in the Caucasus. The Fuehrer accused Jodl that no concentrated push had been used in the region of Tuaxe; that he had instead taken a different route through passes, and this operation near Elbros the Fuehrer did not consider. Jold said that this matter had been discussed with him and that it had been approved by him. The Fuehrer attacked the commander-in-chief of this sector. Jodl covered for him. In this connection there was an extremely high tension. The Fuehrer told me that he wished to replace Jodl. The tension was so extreme that from this moment on, as far as I remember, the Fuehrer left the meeting place and from then even ate his meals alone, which had not been the custom before, and for a period of time would not shake the hand of this gentleman. It was just a minor incident in the great tension which took place.
As successor to Jodl, von Paulus was considered. The Fuehrer had special confidence in von Paulus. Just why this change was not made, I do not knew exactly. I assume that in this case, despite all tensions, the Fuehrer always decided that it was very hard for him to get used to new faces, and that he did not wish to make a change in his direct surrounding?
He preferred to continue working win men whom he did not like, if they had been in his immediate surroundings, rather than to change.
of Jodl grew, and at the end he had complete confidence in his tactical capacity. As far as personal relations were concerned, they were never especially close. denounce the Geneva Convention. Do you know what Jodl's attitude was at that time? gestion to the Fuehrer. This suggestion was contradicted by all of us with the utmost vehemence, but the Fuehrer for days might be inclined and always referred back to this matter to cancel this Convention, or to renounce it. His motives, strangely enough, were the following: that in the East there had been too many serious killings, and it was not easy for the troops. The Fuehrer was of the opinion that if the troops knew that in captivity the Geneva Convention would not protect them they would fight more strongly and would not react to the extensive hostile propaganda as to how well it would be for them to lay down their weapons, if they could not react to this propaganda. Jodl, of course, participated in preventing the Fuehrer from denouncing this agreement, that it would create great excitement among the German people and that it would create many cares for the men who were prisoners of war abroad.
Q There is a further question: Before the Norwegian campaign, Jodl entered in his diary, and I believe it has been mentioned on occasion here: The Fuehrer is interested in finding a motive. He is looking for an explanation. This is misquoted and is not correct. He was looking for a motivation. and very precise, and I can tell under oath that a coordination of the concept "motivation" or "explanation" is not proper at this point. The case was the following: telligence and authoratative reports, that Norway was to be occupied by the Allies, England and France.
I have already mentioned this point. I mentioned it several days ago.
In order to prevent this, the Fuehrer wanted to act first, and now he talked about this matter. The motivation of the English and French attack was clear to us, but we had no way of proving it to the outside, and he was now looking for a basis. But it would have been better for Jodl not to say at first that he preferred motivation. He should have said, as the Fuehrer meant, that he was locking for proof or evidence, which we had, and that to attach value and weight to this evidence was the problem. preparations for this step. In the case of Norway, the Fuehrer had not advised the foreign office of this step. I believe 24 of perhaps 48 hours in advance they were notified of this step. At this point he was not interested in telling them at all. He kept this plan of the utmost secrecy, and I remember that I, as commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, was initiated into this plan at a very late point. This was the second reason why he himself was concerned to find a motivation for the attack. These were the two reasons, and I would like to state again that matters would have been clarified if one had said "The Fuehrer is looking for evidence", rather than motivation. that the British has the intention to occupy Norway?
A Yes. We had that intelligence and those reports, but the final written evidence we received much later.
Q The Fuehrer did not doubt this?
A No one of us doubted this for a minute. Later we received these documents of evidence. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Defendant von Papen): regarding the formation of the Hitler government, which arose in 1933, and that you alone had the task? about the formation of a government with von Papen?
A For the first time I spoke with von Papen on a Sunday. It was a week before the government was formed.
Schroeder and had further negotiations until the 22nd of January, then these negotiations would have been taken through you and you would have known?
A Yes; that is correct, because the Fuehrer at that time was at Munich and I was the only authority at Berlin for the formation of this Government. Then, at the beginning if January, we did not know that within a reasonable length of time a government would have to be formed by us. Other negotiations were taking place, but they did not concern von Papen. the middle of January, because von Schleicher had no parliamentary backing, and that all of his efforts were frustrated because of a friction in the NSDAP, and Schleicher in this connection failed to have parliamentary backing? no parliamentary majority, and, when he tried to split that, Schleicher was excluded by the Fuehrer and had no following. After the frustration of this possibility to receive a majority, Schleicher had to rule without parliament, and that he could do only with extreme authority given to him by Hindenburg;
after he had told him previously that he would be able to get a majority and that he did not need this same authority which von Papen had requested.
The Reich President decided to do those things which I set forth the other day. Prussia on the 20th of April, for through the elections of March 1933 the NSDAP had had a majority in Prussia, and, therefore, the Lantag was to make you minister president? president which was to be elected at that time, but the fact is that in the Prussian Diet the NSDAP had the absolute majority. It made von Papen mention to the Fuehrer that he would agree that he, von Papen, would give the presidency of Prussia to me.
Q Now, I have a last question: You mentioned yesterday that as the Chief judge of the Luftwaffe you gave much clemency toward people in Belgium and France who had been adjudged. Is it correct that von Papen on occasions brought wishes of relatives of thosewho had been sentenced to you, and that he gave as the reason for the wishes that he was interested in a solidarity among people and did not wish to convict them even if they had been militarily correct, that poor relations would arise, and that you were interested in carrying out the wishes of von Papen? prominent name was concerned--that I received requests from von Papen, as to whether the person could not receive clemency, because the people who were concerned had aided flyers to escape. In these cases I respected the wishes of von Papen in large proportion. I do not remember the reasons. BY DR. BALLAS (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart):
Q May I be permitted to put several questions to the witness. We are concerned with the well-known telephone conversation of the 5thof March, 1938, between Berlin and Vienna, which took place at that time. Is it correct, witness, that Dr. Seyss-Inquart, in June of 1937, came to office and then visited you with State Secretary Keppler?
Q Did Dr. Seyss-Inquart, at that time, utter the opinion that the Austrian National Socialists should be entirely independent of the Reich Party of the same name?
working independently in the cabinet.
Q Tell me whether this is correct: The Austrian National Socialists in Austria were to have permission to keep relations between Austria and Germany and have an independent Austria? what was discussed. The main thesis of having Austria independent and yet on the side of Germany was repeatedly uttered by Seyss-Inquart, and, as I said the other day already, it seemed to me not extensive enough, because I knew the attitude of Seyss-Inquart. I must say frankly that I was a little distrustful of his attitude, and on the late afternoon of that day, when these telephone conversations took place to Vienna, as far as the annexation was concerned, matters would take their proper course. I would rather have sent someone else. I considered Keppler too soft. But the Fuehrer wished that if anyone had to be sent it should be Keppler.
Q Is it correct that Dr. Seyss-Inquart, among ethers, motivated his attitude in mentioning the advantage to Germany of having two states?
A That is exactly right. He did say that. I was of a completely different opinion. I would rather have the German attitude represented more strongly by one rather than by two, where we would not be certain that the others would be interested in cur interests. another telephonic or other communication with Seyss-Inquart, that is, aside from the prior mentioned telephone conversation?
AAs far as I recall that, I cannot say this with assurance. I talked with him or one of his men. These telephone conversations were on the 11th, a Friday. On Monday or Tuesday prior I talked with him or one of his men of the impression that had been created. I rememberthis, but I cannot say for certain under oath. tions between Vienna and Berl in in Larch of 1938. We see, first of all, that Dr. Dietrich and Keppler, who was in Vienna at the time, at the hour of 2154 in the evening, had the agreement of Seyss-Inquart with your wire, which he dictated before and which had been transmitted through Keppler. At that time, had the command for marching in been issued?
issued and had nothing to do with the wire as such, and it really mattered not atall whether he was in agreement. The Fuehrer and I had responsibility for the marching in.
Q Then the marching in would have occurred without the telegram?
A Yes. That is a matter of course.
Q What was the purpose of this wire? Was it to give a for eign political basis? 12th of March State Secretary Keppler, on the order of Dr. Seyss-Inquart, called Berlin not to carry through the marching in?
A I remember this wire very distinctly. I was unusually upset and enraged that a senseless telegram like that would disturb the rest of the Fuehrer, who wanted to go to Austria the next day. The attitude of the Fuehrer was blamed for putting through a telegram like that to the Fuehrer, and the wire should have been transmitted to me or because of me. I remember this wire and the utter impotence of this wire.
Q Then the Fuehrer declined? marching in had already started, and when a marching in of troops is once started it would take days to stop it. We might have halted the marching in at a certain point at the boundary, but it was not in cur interest, and from this point on Seyss-Inquart did not have the fate of Austria in his hand, but the Fuehrer and I.
Q I have two questions regarding the Netherlands. Is it correct that alongside of the decree of the Fuehrer, which was given on the 18th of May, that Dr. Seyss-Inquart was made Reich commissar of the Netherlands, that there was another decree which was not published but which subordinated Seyss-Inquart directly to you?
THE PRESIDENT: Put your questions more slowly.
have a special and independent office in the Netherlands? going to put the first question once more, because it did not come through. As far as this secret decree is concerned, I know nothing about it. It would have been senseless, for a Reich commissar in occupied territories could not be subordinate to me separately. But, if you are concerned with subordination in this direction, as far as economic matters were concerned, it was a matter of course that the Reich commissar, as well as other Reich officers, were under my jurisdiction, of course, in all matters of economy. you as to the details whether in occupied countries, and that means, of course, the Netherlands, here and there a direct representative of the Four Year Plan actually was there, or whether these directives were given through military offices or economic offices. As far as I can tell now, without referring to documents, in the Netherlands the situation was that the economic leader, Fischbeck (?), at the same time, which was logical, gave and executed the economic directives of the Four Year Plan. The Reich commissar or Reich commissioner would never have been in a position, as far as decrees from me were concerned, he could not have put them through. He could have mentioned them to me or to the Fuehrer, but there is no special connection in this regard.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 18 March 1946, at 1000 hours.)
THE PRESIDENT: Had Dr. Kubuschok finished his cross examination?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then were there any other defendants' counsel who wish to examine or cross examine?
DR. KRAUS: Dr. Kraus for Dr. Luedinghausen on behalf of the defendant von Neurath. I ask your permission to put the following questions. question. "What was to happen if the Czechs said, that the Czechs would not agree to German occupation of Sudetanland, and should that supposedly be answered in the affirmative, then who would force them?" Is that correct? discussion, and Ministerpresident Daladier said, in substance, what you have just said. I do not recall the exact words. I remember fairly exactly that he emphasized that from now ow a decision in that direction had been reached by the great powers, and it had been reached with the purpose of maintaining peace; from now on there could be no further assistance on the part of the Czechoslovakia to endanger the peace. If anything to the contrary should happen, neither England nor France would feel themselves duty bound if the Czechoslovakia people would not follow this advice; they would not consider themselves duty bound to help them.
Q Witness, as long as I recall, I saw Mr. von Neurath but briefly, very briefly when he was the German Ambassador to Denmark in 1919, and, besides that briefly at the time. Later I met him personally before the taking over of power, and spoke to him then but briefly, and that was my Q Did you know about his activities as Ambassador at London, did you knew anything about that?
A Yes. I knew of his activity and of his capacity there, but I knew about his activity even in the previous or prior days, that is, 1931 and 1932, before he was the foreign minister, when there was talk of a possible formation of a government, the name von Neurath was mentioned as a candidate even though he did not belong to the Party, or anything of a matter of foreign relation, his name was mentioned nevertheless; and, in this connection the basic reason for his being mentioned for this position as an Ambassador at England was the chief motivating factor of Hitler. For that reason this meant that Hitler, as well as myself, were of the opinion that the connections of von Nuerath as Ambassador were very cordial, so far as the British Government was concerned, and von Neurath had a very vital interest in that connection, and such a connection was very vital to Hitler.
Q Then I may assume that Mr. von Neurath was on cordial relations with London?
Q Can you tell me if Mr. von Neurath beyond that as Foreign Minister continued his cordial and peaceful relationships?
A When von Hindenberg put the condition I here mentioned, that Mr. von Neurath would have to become Foreign Minister the Fuehrer was very wellsatisfied with this condition and agreed readily.
He was satisfied with this appointment for the reason that he saw this task was in good hands; that von Neurath would keep good connections and von Neurath made every effort to do so. January, 1937, during which Hitler gave a Golden Party decoration to those who were not members of the Party? a decoration such as the bestowing of an order and these gentlemen were not to be taken into the Party or were not to have obligations toward, the Party just because they received this decoration?
A I would not put it just that way. The Fuehrer said simultaneously since it was the anniversary of the taking ever of power it was his intention to show his confidence to those members of the Reichscabinet and these who did not belong to the Party and he would like to show it in that way and I believe he used the words, "I would ask you to take this Party emblem." At that time he mentioned as far as he was concerned that he considered it an order and that he intended to, and which he later did do, develop this order further. The first level of this order was to be the Golden Party emblem. Simultaneously he stepped up to the various ministerss and gave them this emblem. He neither emphasized herewith that they should or should not consider themselves members of the Party nor did he emphasize that they were not Party members. acceptance he would commit himself with certain clerical circles. The Fuehrer hesitated for a minute and said, "You do not wish to do that?" Then von Elz said, "I do not wish to express myself that way. I just wanted to add a reservation to my taking this emblem." The Fuehrer was taken aback, turned around and left the room.
because of this. I left immediately after the Fuehrer and followed him and felt as all the other gentlemen that it was rather strange on the part of the Fuehrer since membership in the Party was not the topic of conversation. In addition, and this is very important, the Fuehrer had the plan to divide the Ministry of Transportation and to resurrect the old Postal Ministry and to take the expert of railroads, Dortmueller into the Ministry of Transportation. The Fuehrer had told me this previously and left it to me to tell von Elz this gradually and in a diplomatic way.
At this point I said, "von Elz, your behaviour is impossible and I believe the only thing for you to do is to resign at this point." He said, "I do not mean it that way" and he did not wish to resign. I was equally abrupt with him as he was and asked him to resign that same evening since Secretary Meissner told me to see him again and that it was expedient for him to leave the cabinet and resign immediately. Then I made the remark as to the postal authorities and the railroads which I have made. the evening, told von Neurath about the marching of troops into Austria and told him the reasons for this move and asked that the Foreign Ministry be informed of that because he himself was leaving? Ribbentrop was not present. Since the Fuehrer had given the Reich leadership to me I had asked him to ask von Neurath to put him knowledge of foreign matters at my disposal. Von Neurath was asked to come to the Reichschancellory I believe it was in the evening. I rather read scope the Fuehrer told him what you have just outlined. It was as follows: for it was to be expected that some foreign political matters would occur, such as pretests and notes, which would come in during the absence of the Fuehrer. As long as the Foreign Minister was not present and since I was not versed in diplomatic matters and notes I needed such advice. Foreign Minister but just in his absence was to serve as an adviser to you?
A He was not the deputy of the Foreign Minister; that would not have been in keeping with his position and his rank. The deputy of the Foreign Minister was the acting State Secretary; I believe it was Mackensen. He was the one who signed all correspondence and so forth and in the absence of the Foreign Minister was only at my disposal in such foreign political matters as were expected to come up in the absence of the Foreign Minister. from the British Ambassador and which was addressed to von Neurath in which the British Ambassador protested against the marching in of German troops?
A That is not extraordinary or unusual. On the evening of the marching in of the troops I personally, as I have already said, conversed with the British Ambassador and told him on that occasion that the Fuehrer was going to Austria the next day; that I would administer the Reich and for that purpose would consult von Neurath as a foreign political adviser whom I had requested. Henderson had made hints that there would be protests forthcoming. Therefore, I wished to inform the British Ambassador the evening before and from this piece of information we can see that he then turned to von Neurath, since I had emphasized to him that -- "If you come around with your notes of protest I personally cannot do very much in that connection." answer to the protest, notify you by telephone of this procedure and did he ask you whether you would sanction and sign this reply as the deputy of Hitler?
A That, of course, is so because I was the Deputy Head of State. He had to show me the reply and it is also a matter of course that I told him, "Sign the note for as Deputy Head of State I cannot sign diplomatic notes in that capacity."
BY DR. SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Political Leadership Corps):
know of the intentions as for as foreign relations were concerned? How far in advance were they informed by the Fuehrer?
A Political leaders is a very comprehensive concept. It includes everyone from the Reichsleiter to the Blockleiter or Zellenleiter, and as to informing the entire body as far as foreign political matters are concerned, such an informing never took place and it could not take place since the Fuehrer made no utterances except the public ones which he made over the radio to the entire people. one body to discuss political intentions which the Fuehrer had and which he had not already made public. He may have told one or the other of the political leaders who, at the same time, had another position of state, or who was close to him in another way. He might have told such a man of his intention as a personal matter, but I would have to really think about that, in which case it was so.
However, he never spoke to them in general. Retrospectively, after events had taken place, he spoke to the Gauleiters and referred to matters which had taken place, and talked about the political intentions which he, of course, had laready realized at that time.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions. BY DR. HORN (Counsel for the defendant von Ribbentrop): plans and intentions in his capacity as Foreign Minister?
A I do not knew the exact details. In general, I can say the same principle applies, that only those people and officers who were responsible for carrying out the policies were initiated into the plans. Just how much the Fuehrer told von Ribbentrop on occasion about military plans, I did not know. all policies, including foreign policies?
A That is a matter of course. Foreign policy especially was the Fuehrer's own realm.
By that I mean to say that foreign policy on the one hand, and leadership of the Wehrmacht on the other hand had the greatest interest of the Fuehrer and we re his main work.
foreign policy? already stated, in both of these directions. the 30th of August, 1939? he knew that I had it in my pocket, but generally he prohibited any such publication in that he prohibited the one who was to have given it, and that was von Ribbentrop, from making it public or giving it out, so that I had this memorandum against the express wish of the Fuehrer. I transmitted it, andmy transmitting it was a tremendous risk, and I beg of you not to misunderstand me, I assume this responsibility. personalities had on Hitler. Do you knew any facts from which we might conclude that von Ribbentrop had no influence on Hitler? something which is very hard to define. I would like to confide myself to the question at hand, the influence of Ribbentrop on the Fuehrer. or influenced him in any way, that is what he certainly did not have. However, as to arguments of an objective nature set forth about his intentions and how they might, in a decisive way, influence him to do something or not to do it as far as foreign political matters were concerned, or influence him to change his ideas, their influence was dependent on the strength of theargument and of the facts. I cannot answer for the role that anything like that played for I was not present at 99 per cent of the conversations between the Fuehrer and von Ribbentrop.
As to influence in the sense that von Ribbentrop could have said, "Do this," or "Don't do it", I do not consider that he had such influence. If the Fuehrer was convinced of any matter, Ribbentrop never had any influence.
Q Do you know any facts or observations which might point to a con-
spiracy in the upper circles of the government?
A "Conspiracy" may be variously interpreted. In the sense that men would secretly and in the dark have talked about secret plans, that, of course, never took place. As to conspiracy in the sense that the Fuehrer had comprehensive conferences and as a result of these conferences decided to do certain things, you may mention a conspiracy only in that connection, and I beg of you again not to misunderstand me. Through the years, as to those conversations which took place, say, between '41 and '45 between the Fuehrer and myself could have conspired. No one else is concerned. part of Germany toward the Western Hemisphere. What do you know about those facts?
A The Western Hemisphere? Do you mean America? and the American continent there are, as far as I recall from my geographical background, 6,000 kilometers of water. With the smallness of the German fleet and the continuous lack of ability to cover this distance, the threatening of the American continent was never spoken of. On the contrary, we were always afraid of the danger from the other side and would have been very glad if we had not had to worry about such a danger. in the line of propaganda, we were accused of economic penetration in that direction. If you consider these financial conditions which Germany had before the war and during the war, and compare Germany's conditions with those of Britain or America, we can conclude the impotency of that attitude. With the very little foreign exchange and the tremendous difficulty of export which we had, we could never compete or endanger them. If that had been the case, the altitude ofthe South American countries would have been different. The mark was not the determining factor there, but the dollar.
DR. HORN: Thank you.
BY DR. SIEMER (Counsel for the defendant Raeder):
number 1809-PS. In this diary there are two entries concerned with the first half of 1940, to which I would like to refer, and on which I would like to have your attitude. These two entries concerned Russia at a time when Germany and Russia were on friendly terms. the substance of the intentions which are contained in these entries sound rather fantastic, and that is why I would like to have your attitude as the Commas in Chief of the Luftwaffe.
I would like to quote the first entry dated the 13th of February 1940:
"Have learned from Admiral Canaris that the echelon Reivel is to be put to use against the Caucasus with bulk from Bulgaria. The Air Force must explain with whom this false idea originated." quote verbatim:
"Fuehrer rejects request of the Luftwaffe to set up a listening post in theCaucasus." the Luftwaffe, had in connection with these plans and what facts were at the basis of your thoughts and plans.
A If the entry was on the basis of intelligence or reports by Canares, who was the chief of foreign counter-intelligence and if they were entered by Jodl in connection with the special intelligence corps, Brobillion, I would like to say that because of his connection with this corps, to whom he gave counterintelligence or espionage tasks, and this squadron which I wanted to have especially secret but he heard of this.
I told the high command of the Wehrmacht what the intentions of this squadron was. My intention -- and I had personally decreed my intention was a very definite and clear one -- the expression that it was to do reconnaissance in the Caucasus, Syria and Turkey would have been much more correct. But this mistake may have happened in the report being transmitted by Canares. I had received more and more reports or intelligence that in the direction of Asia Minor there were to be enterprises against both Russian oil fields of the Caucasus, in the region of Baku, and so that the transporting of oil to Germany would be interrupted. the bringing in of Roumanian and other oil, and the oil on the basis of trade agreement was coming in from Russia and the Caucasus. At that time we dad not have any synthetic oil and if there had been any disturbance in one of the importing centres my Luftwaffe would have been damages very heavily. In this connection I had to be extraordinarily alert, following the reports which I had regarding the disturbing of the oil situation in the Caucasus, I had the situation checked and found that in Syria there was an army under General Weygand which had the name, "Orient Army," but I was interested more in the grouping of flight squadrons in the Syrian area, not only French but English squadrons, and besides as a member -- as far as the intentions were, to establish French-British squadrons. I received these reports through confidential information in Turkey because there had been negotiations with Turkey, that is, regarding flying over Turkey, to bomb Baku, to damage the Russian oil fields, and to eliminate them as factors of help to Germany. myself informed as to what was going on in Syria byitself. There was no purpose in knowing that aircraft were massing there at that point, and at that time. It was no theatre of war. There was no damage from Germany. On the contrary, it could have been understandable if all British and French aircraft had been in those countries, because they were needed there.
Then if my intelligence observed that the airdromes in Syria were reinforced and that reinforcements were always taking place in Turkey, this was an emphasis on the alleged intentions.
If and when I was cognizant of these facts I had to call the attention of these matters to the Fuehrer,that there was danger to Germany from Russia, and the same purpose was served by the second entry, not in the Caucasus but to erect them near the Caucasus. It was intended to have secret radio stations in the direction of the general flight line, Syria, the Caucasus, Baku, East Turkey, to have two or three of these stations to determine whether in these directions preparations and flight by French-British aircraft was being carried out, that is, whether intelligence or reconnaisance on the oil fields was being carried, so that we might have a clear picture in this direction.
At that time I did not have the conclusive and final proof in my hands. I kept everything back on my desk, concerned myself only with the things concerned with my own sector of the Luftwaffe and waited until I could get a clear picture of the whole situation. Later, after the French campaign was concluded, there was a confirmation of those intentions through the finding of confidential reports and reports on the council of war between England and France,that my intelligence had been exactly correct and that an extensive bombardment of the total Russian field was planned and to have it done with lightning rapidity, so that the elimination of the Roumanian oil fields was also planned, the intention had been communicated to the Roumanian Government but it had been prevented. Britain and France generally and that the intelligence you received was to the effect that the attacks on the oil fields were to be direct against the then neutral Russia, as well as against Germany, because all oil supplies would be out off? BY DR. BOEHM (Counsel for the S.A.): leader in the SA?
A I was not Reichsfuehrer of the SA. There was no such position or such title.
a varying and small decree in Wurttemburg.
Q For how long were you commandant? of such people of orders -- how was your influence before 1923 and then after 1923? What influence did you have? concerned, or the informing -- before1923 and after 1923? absolute, that is, I gave my instructions direct. After 1923 I had no intervention and no interference with the SA and did not doit.
Q How was it before 1923? Was the relation before 1923 the same as after? of the SA and had the authority to give instructions. After 1923 I had no more authority to give instructions or orders. After 1936 I believe I was connected with the SA in an honorary capacity, but without giving any orders; I had no occasion to give any orders. SA people, and you said that they were always ready to make great sacrifices. What was the visible nature of these sacrifices? being reimbursed, gave their free time to the party; that they did without family life or recreation, so that in the period of our difficult time, when we had trouble at meetings, they were always at the disposal of the party. And I considered this a sacrifice, for the members of the SA were workers and very small people who had very little time, which they really needed for recreation; but they were always ready in every way to serve the party and to serve the ideal of the party.