A When von Hindenberg put the condition I here mentioned, that Mr. von Neurath would have to become Foreign Minister the Fuehrer was very wellsatisfied with this condition and agreed readily.
He was satisfied with this appointment for the reason that he saw this task was in good hands; that von Neurath would keep good connections and von Neurath made every effort to do so. January, 1937, during which Hitler gave a Golden Party decoration to those who were not members of the Party? a decoration such as the bestowing of an order and these gentlemen were not to be taken into the Party or were not to have obligations toward, the Party just because they received this decoration?
A I would not put it just that way. The Fuehrer said simultaneously since it was the anniversary of the taking ever of power it was his intention to show his confidence to those members of the Reichscabinet and these who did not belong to the Party and he would like to show it in that way and I believe he used the words, "I would ask you to take this Party emblem." At that time he mentioned as far as he was concerned that he considered it an order and that he intended to, and which he later did do, develop this order further. The first level of this order was to be the Golden Party emblem. Simultaneously he stepped up to the various ministerss and gave them this emblem. He neither emphasized herewith that they should or should not consider themselves members of the Party nor did he emphasize that they were not Party members. acceptance he would commit himself with certain clerical circles. The Fuehrer hesitated for a minute and said, "You do not wish to do that?" Then von Elz said, "I do not wish to express myself that way. I just wanted to add a reservation to my taking this emblem." The Fuehrer was taken aback, turned around and left the room.
because of this. I left immediately after the Fuehrer and followed him and felt as all the other gentlemen that it was rather strange on the part of the Fuehrer since membership in the Party was not the topic of conversation. In addition, and this is very important, the Fuehrer had the plan to divide the Ministry of Transportation and to resurrect the old Postal Ministry and to take the expert of railroads, Dortmueller into the Ministry of Transportation. The Fuehrer had told me this previously and left it to me to tell von Elz this gradually and in a diplomatic way.
At this point I said, "von Elz, your behaviour is impossible and I believe the only thing for you to do is to resign at this point." He said, "I do not mean it that way" and he did not wish to resign. I was equally abrupt with him as he was and asked him to resign that same evening since Secretary Meissner told me to see him again and that it was expedient for him to leave the cabinet and resign immediately. Then I made the remark as to the postal authorities and the railroads which I have made. the evening, told von Neurath about the marching of troops into Austria and told him the reasons for this move and asked that the Foreign Ministry be informed of that because he himself was leaving? Ribbentrop was not present. Since the Fuehrer had given the Reich leadership to me I had asked him to ask von Neurath to put him knowledge of foreign matters at my disposal. Von Neurath was asked to come to the Reichschancellory I believe it was in the evening. I rather read scope the Fuehrer told him what you have just outlined. It was as follows: for it was to be expected that some foreign political matters would occur, such as pretests and notes, which would come in during the absence of the Fuehrer. As long as the Foreign Minister was not present and since I was not versed in diplomatic matters and notes I needed such advice. Foreign Minister but just in his absence was to serve as an adviser to you?
A He was not the deputy of the Foreign Minister; that would not have been in keeping with his position and his rank. The deputy of the Foreign Minister was the acting State Secretary; I believe it was Mackensen. He was the one who signed all correspondence and so forth and in the absence of the Foreign Minister was only at my disposal in such foreign political matters as were expected to come up in the absence of the Foreign Minister. from the British Ambassador and which was addressed to von Neurath in which the British Ambassador protested against the marching in of German troops?
A That is not extraordinary or unusual. On the evening of the marching in of the troops I personally, as I have already said, conversed with the British Ambassador and told him on that occasion that the Fuehrer was going to Austria the next day; that I would administer the Reich and for that purpose would consult von Neurath as a foreign political adviser whom I had requested. Henderson had made hints that there would be protests forthcoming. Therefore, I wished to inform the British Ambassador the evening before and from this piece of information we can see that he then turned to von Neurath, since I had emphasized to him that -- "If you come around with your notes of protest I personally cannot do very much in that connection." answer to the protest, notify you by telephone of this procedure and did he ask you whether you would sanction and sign this reply as the deputy of Hitler?
A That, of course, is so because I was the Deputy Head of State. He had to show me the reply and it is also a matter of course that I told him, "Sign the note for as Deputy Head of State I cannot sign diplomatic notes in that capacity."
BY DR. SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Political Leadership Corps):
know of the intentions as for as foreign relations were concerned? How far in advance were they informed by the Fuehrer?
A Political leaders is a very comprehensive concept. It includes everyone from the Reichsleiter to the Blockleiter or Zellenleiter, and as to informing the entire body as far as foreign political matters are concerned, such an informing never took place and it could not take place since the Fuehrer made no utterances except the public ones which he made over the radio to the entire people. one body to discuss political intentions which the Fuehrer had and which he had not already made public. He may have told one or the other of the political leaders who, at the same time, had another position of state, or who was close to him in another way. He might have told such a man of his intention as a personal matter, but I would have to really think about that, in which case it was so.
However, he never spoke to them in general. Retrospectively, after events had taken place, he spoke to the Gauleiters and referred to matters which had taken place, and talked about the political intentions which he, of course, had laready realized at that time.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions. BY DR. HORN (Counsel for the defendant von Ribbentrop): plans and intentions in his capacity as Foreign Minister?
A I do not knew the exact details. In general, I can say the same principle applies, that only those people and officers who were responsible for carrying out the policies were initiated into the plans. Just how much the Fuehrer told von Ribbentrop on occasion about military plans, I did not know. all policies, including foreign policies?
A That is a matter of course. Foreign policy especially was the Fuehrer's own realm.
By that I mean to say that foreign policy on the one hand, and leadership of the Wehrmacht on the other hand had the greatest interest of the Fuehrer and we re his main work.
foreign policy? already stated, in both of these directions. the 30th of August, 1939? he knew that I had it in my pocket, but generally he prohibited any such publication in that he prohibited the one who was to have given it, and that was von Ribbentrop, from making it public or giving it out, so that I had this memorandum against the express wish of the Fuehrer. I transmitted it, andmy transmitting it was a tremendous risk, and I beg of you not to misunderstand me, I assume this responsibility. personalities had on Hitler. Do you knew any facts from which we might conclude that von Ribbentrop had no influence on Hitler? something which is very hard to define. I would like to confide myself to the question at hand, the influence of Ribbentrop on the Fuehrer. or influenced him in any way, that is what he certainly did not have. However, as to arguments of an objective nature set forth about his intentions and how they might, in a decisive way, influence him to do something or not to do it as far as foreign political matters were concerned, or influence him to change his ideas, their influence was dependent on the strength of theargument and of the facts. I cannot answer for the role that anything like that played for I was not present at 99 per cent of the conversations between the Fuehrer and von Ribbentrop.
As to influence in the sense that von Ribbentrop could have said, "Do this," or "Don't do it", I do not consider that he had such influence. If the Fuehrer was convinced of any matter, Ribbentrop never had any influence.
Q Do you know any facts or observations which might point to a con-
spiracy in the upper circles of the government?
A "Conspiracy" may be variously interpreted. In the sense that men would secretly and in the dark have talked about secret plans, that, of course, never took place. As to conspiracy in the sense that the Fuehrer had comprehensive conferences and as a result of these conferences decided to do certain things, you may mention a conspiracy only in that connection, and I beg of you again not to misunderstand me. Through the years, as to those conversations which took place, say, between '41 and '45 between the Fuehrer and myself could have conspired. No one else is concerned. part of Germany toward the Western Hemisphere. What do you know about those facts?
A The Western Hemisphere? Do you mean America? and the American continent there are, as far as I recall from my geographical background, 6,000 kilometers of water. With the smallness of the German fleet and the continuous lack of ability to cover this distance, the threatening of the American continent was never spoken of. On the contrary, we were always afraid of the danger from the other side and would have been very glad if we had not had to worry about such a danger. in the line of propaganda, we were accused of economic penetration in that direction. If you consider these financial conditions which Germany had before the war and during the war, and compare Germany's conditions with those of Britain or America, we can conclude the impotency of that attitude. With the very little foreign exchange and the tremendous difficulty of export which we had, we could never compete or endanger them. If that had been the case, the altitude ofthe South American countries would have been different. The mark was not the determining factor there, but the dollar.
DR. HORN: Thank you.
BY DR. SIEMER (Counsel for the defendant Raeder):
number 1809-PS. In this diary there are two entries concerned with the first half of 1940, to which I would like to refer, and on which I would like to have your attitude. These two entries concerned Russia at a time when Germany and Russia were on friendly terms. the substance of the intentions which are contained in these entries sound rather fantastic, and that is why I would like to have your attitude as the Commas in Chief of the Luftwaffe.
I would like to quote the first entry dated the 13th of February 1940:
"Have learned from Admiral Canaris that the echelon Reivel is to be put to use against the Caucasus with bulk from Bulgaria. The Air Force must explain with whom this false idea originated." quote verbatim:
"Fuehrer rejects request of the Luftwaffe to set up a listening post in theCaucasus." the Luftwaffe, had in connection with these plans and what facts were at the basis of your thoughts and plans.
A If the entry was on the basis of intelligence or reports by Canares, who was the chief of foreign counter-intelligence and if they were entered by Jodl in connection with the special intelligence corps, Brobillion, I would like to say that because of his connection with this corps, to whom he gave counterintelligence or espionage tasks, and this squadron which I wanted to have especially secret but he heard of this.
I told the high command of the Wehrmacht what the intentions of this squadron was. My intention -- and I had personally decreed my intention was a very definite and clear one -- the expression that it was to do reconnaissance in the Caucasus, Syria and Turkey would have been much more correct. But this mistake may have happened in the report being transmitted by Canares. I had received more and more reports or intelligence that in the direction of Asia Minor there were to be enterprises against both Russian oil fields of the Caucasus, in the region of Baku, and so that the transporting of oil to Germany would be interrupted. the bringing in of Roumanian and other oil, and the oil on the basis of trade agreement was coming in from Russia and the Caucasus. At that time we dad not have any synthetic oil and if there had been any disturbance in one of the importing centres my Luftwaffe would have been damages very heavily. In this connection I had to be extraordinarily alert, following the reports which I had regarding the disturbing of the oil situation in the Caucasus, I had the situation checked and found that in Syria there was an army under General Weygand which had the name, "Orient Army," but I was interested more in the grouping of flight squadrons in the Syrian area, not only French but English squadrons, and besides as a member -- as far as the intentions were, to establish French-British squadrons. I received these reports through confidential information in Turkey because there had been negotiations with Turkey, that is, regarding flying over Turkey, to bomb Baku, to damage the Russian oil fields, and to eliminate them as factors of help to Germany. myself informed as to what was going on in Syria byitself. There was no purpose in knowing that aircraft were massing there at that point, and at that time. It was no theatre of war. There was no damage from Germany. On the contrary, it could have been understandable if all British and French aircraft had been in those countries, because they were needed there.
Then if my intelligence observed that the airdromes in Syria were reinforced and that reinforcements were always taking place in Turkey, this was an emphasis on the alleged intentions.
If and when I was cognizant of these facts I had to call the attention of these matters to the Fuehrer,that there was danger to Germany from Russia, and the same purpose was served by the second entry, not in the Caucasus but to erect them near the Caucasus. It was intended to have secret radio stations in the direction of the general flight line, Syria, the Caucasus, Baku, East Turkey, to have two or three of these stations to determine whether in these directions preparations and flight by French-British aircraft was being carried out, that is, whether intelligence or reconnaisance on the oil fields was being carried, so that we might have a clear picture in this direction.
At that time I did not have the conclusive and final proof in my hands. I kept everything back on my desk, concerned myself only with the things concerned with my own sector of the Luftwaffe and waited until I could get a clear picture of the whole situation. Later, after the French campaign was concluded, there was a confirmation of those intentions through the finding of confidential reports and reports on the council of war between England and France,that my intelligence had been exactly correct and that an extensive bombardment of the total Russian field was planned and to have it done with lightning rapidity, so that the elimination of the Roumanian oil fields was also planned, the intention had been communicated to the Roumanian Government but it had been prevented. Britain and France generally and that the intelligence you received was to the effect that the attacks on the oil fields were to be direct against the then neutral Russia, as well as against Germany, because all oil supplies would be out off? BY DR. BOEHM (Counsel for the S.A.): leader in the SA?
A I was not Reichsfuehrer of the SA. There was no such position or such title.
a varying and small decree in Wurttemburg.
Q For how long were you commandant? of such people of orders -- how was your influence before 1923 and then after 1923? What influence did you have? concerned, or the informing -- before1923 and after 1923? absolute, that is, I gave my instructions direct. After 1923 I had no intervention and no interference with the SA and did not doit.
Q How was it before 1923? Was the relation before 1923 the same as after? of the SA and had the authority to give instructions. After 1923 I had no more authority to give instructions or orders. After 1936 I believe I was connected with the SA in an honorary capacity, but without giving any orders; I had no occasion to give any orders. SA people, and you said that they were always ready to make great sacrifices. What was the visible nature of these sacrifices? being reimbursed, gave their free time to the party; that they did without family life or recreation, so that in the period of our difficult time, when we had trouble at meetings, they were always at the disposal of the party. And I considered this a sacrifice, for the members of the SA were workers and very small people who had very little time, which they really needed for recreation; but they were always ready in every way to serve the party and to serve the ideal of the party.
Q Did these people receive material promises?
were Communist provokers who came into the SA? Is it correct that into the SA?
A That was a very strange matter. After the taking over of organization of the Red Front entered the Party.
It was very easy a prerequisite which had existed before.
Anyone could have come into the SA without belonging to the Party.
At the same time the German in the SA.
I saw these people from my window and noticed that we were concerned with elements which did not belong.
I had some of the Schutzpolizei come up to check.
Ninety-eight per cent of the people
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Boehm, the Tribunal considers that this is in chief.
He has given us a long account of the SA in his examination in chief.
He has added nothing in the course of what he is now saying.
DR. BOEHM: According to the Prosecution, it is stated that the
THE PRESIDENT: That has nothing to do with what I said. It may be that the Prosecution may have said that.
Probably they have. What
DR. BOEHM: Yes, this may apply to my first three questions.
BY DR. BOEHM:
connection with the Versailles Treaty? Did you tell these people that a revolution was to be taken peacefully or by war?
A This question is unusually difficult to answer. If in 1923 language and talk about diplomacy.
They would not have understood me.
Every little SA man was not concerned with the "how" of things.
That was the problem of the leadership. I didn't say, "I will obligate myself never to have a war for you," that we are completely a with Versailles for a protest.
But, on the other hand, I did not say either we want to march in war during the next few years.
In reality I did not tell them anything.
I said that they would have to be would do would be right.
Every SA man knew from my speeches and from is, the leadership of the SA as well as each individual member; that and the laws of humanity?
is pictured. It is impossible that anyone can say, "Listen, we wish to dominate and subjugate all other states," and that anyone can attention to any law of war.
I cannot imagine that anyone but an The SA in no form was ever politically informed.
The SA was told, "You will march tomorrow or the day after; you will distribute leaflets and pamphlets," and other things.
frequently excesses on the part of the SA. Were measures of to the decrees of the SA leadership?
leading officers. In an organization of a million young people there cities, as I mentioned just a little while ago.
There will always be membership?
leadership of the SA. I don't believe so, however.
against excesses of individuals?
A In the beginning it wasn't the case. By that I mean, on the contrary, that the police took orders in this direction.
They had wasn't of the Party, Admiral (Retired) von Lewitzon, intervened very
Q How was it later on? I believe you just said, "In the beginning it wasn't so."
Was it different later when the police were prohibited from acting against the SA?
A No, it is not to be taken that way. The excesses of individual men were always curbed by the police.
Many SA men were other states had, were SA members used only, or wasn't it that all system were examined and investigated and used accordingly?
people were no longer used. But that was a very small percentage, in comparison with the total number of police.
The Schutzpolizei were people who were uniforms.
They were increased, and voluntary applications came from all sides.
Of course the relatives of the had to take special adaptability tests that were given them.
Some of shovel snow, to clean up bomb damage, and so forth?
power, and they were used in the activities just set forth. During It was to be a melting pot of the various veterans' organizations, the Fuehrer and Sauckel, were taken into the SA reserve in a body?
these riding clubs were taken into the SA?
or at any time, informed of the decisions taken in the Cabinet?
the SA was to be considered. The answer is, of course, no.
trained by them in special schools. Do you have any knowledge of that?
train officers for the Wehrmacht. In addition, it seems to me that as far as the needs of the Wehrmacht were concerned.
It would have the SA trained officers.
The training of officers was done by the Q Some men seem to have been trained.
Can you tell me where these men were trained and for what purpose?
Do you knew anything about Fuehrer schools?
A Yes, there were fuehrer schools for every organization. Every organization had its schools where these were trained who in their eyes were to have leading positions. I can only imagine that the Prospectuion is perhaps confusing -- or perhaps wish to say that some of the SA leaders had preliminary military training; that is, they were trained in the reading of charts, but that is beyond the scope of my knowledge.
Q May I ask you to tell me the connection of the "Feldherrnhalle" to the SA and the Wehrmacht? There was a regiment by the name of "Feldherrnhalle." can you tell me the connection:
AAfter the SA had various "Standarten" from the Fuehrer, these units were really military units, as for instance, the "Leibstandarte", the Body Unit. The SA leadership requested to be granted one unit which it might army such as with rifles, so that it might use this unit as a parade unit, and this unit was called "Feldherrnhalle". The SA leader Luetze suggested to the Fuehrer that he make me the head of this unit, as a position of honor. We considered it a position of honor to be the head of such a unit. When I saw this unit for the first time -- I believe at a Party rally at Nurnber - it impressed me especially because there were many selected and very nice looking young men. I saw this beautiful unit I dissolved this unit and took it into the Luftwaffe and made my first paratrooper unit, so that after a brief existence, this unit was a regiment of the Luftwaffe. quite some time before the SA leader undertook to have another unit by the same none, "Feldherrnhalle", and he made this unit very much smaller, and they stood guard for the top SA leadership, and he did not make me the leader of this unit a second time. SA gruppenfuehrer and other information which I had through reading, the "Feldherrnhalle" was not armed until it came into the Luftwaffe. Is that correct?
A No, that is not correct. I do not believe I can say under oath, but I believe they received rifles shortly before they were taken into the Luftwaffe, just rifles, but as I said before, I can not tell you exactly.
Prosecution mentioned this point -- I would like to emphasize that this regiment was a paratrooper unit which was used in the action "Gruen" and had been Intended to be used. Since this "Aktion Gruen" -- that is, the Sudetenland -- was Solved peacefully, after the occupation of the Sudetenland, we had maneuvers and had the men jump, but purely for purposes of maneuvers, and this was the landing at Freudeuthal which the Prosecution has mentioned. At that time they landed in blue uniforms, and, as could be easily seen, they were a regiment of the Luftwaffe. As a matter of courtesy, I attended this demonstration. it came to the deployment of manpower? in a tactical or any other way. They were never used in combat. It may be that toward the end in the "Volkssturm", perhaps a few SA men were. Sudetenland and the Czech state, that they were operating with the Wehrmacht?
A That case was handled by the Austrian SA. They were used as auxiliary police. The Austrian Legion, which was in the Reich was, according to my express orders and according to the express wish of Seyss-Inquart, held back and not used and was used only after the absolute consolidation of the Austrian situation and was returned home. How far units of the SA were used in the Sudetenland after the zone was given over to Germany, I do not know. I heard that Sudeten Germans were involved who had to flee prior to that time and who were now returning. When the Czechoslovakian state was occupied, I can not see that closed SA units would have had any part in the marching in of our troops. the intention of the SA leadership, they might be used for the execution of penal measures?
Q Could the members of the SA know that according to the intention of the SA leadership, they might possibly be used to commit crimes?
you have already answered that question. Were the members of the SA cognizant of the aims of the SA? Did they know them at any time, or could they be known to them, or should they have been known to them? Or could these men have known that the intention of the SA or of the leadership might be that crimes would have to be done -- things which are considered by the Prosecution as crimes against humanity and against the peace?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken) DR. BOEHM: Mr. President, I should like you to permit me to ask a few more basic questions, namely, the question of honorary leadership in the SA.
BY DR. BOEHM: down to sturmfuehrers. Witness, I should like you to tell me what significance these honorary leadership posts had, particularly in regard to permission to issue orders to the SA, and altogether what its influence could be. sort of standard. They had a loose representative function, that is to say, they functioned and represented, the SA at Party meetings. They were by no means active members of the SA and were not informed of any internal activities of the SA. Their function was purely decorative. BY DR. MERKEL (Counsel for the Gestapo) created by you, was a national-socialist fighting organization or was it rather an administrative organization such as the criminal police or other state organications? support the police that then existed. At this time there was not even the slightest connection with the Party; the Party had no influence or command-control or any other such thing over the Gestapo. It was exclusively a state institution. The members who were present in it already or who later came into it were ordinary state officials. far as you know? as it was expanded and tock in elements of the SS. But these elements had to pass an examination, then they became officials and remained officials. Then I heard Inter that nothing changed so far as this official character of the members was concerned, but gradually in the course of the years officials, whether they wished it or not, had to take on some rank in the SS; so that leading Gestapo officials who until the year 1939 or 1940 had nothing to do with the SS and who and come from the previous time, that is to say, from previous Weimar police, nevertheless, they remained officials, that is to say, the Gestapo was an insti tution composed of officials.
of power in his capacity as police president, also had something to do with the leadership of the criminal police in Bavaria? of all police president of Munich very shortly, one or two weeks, then he called himself police commissar of Bavaria; and after a month or six weeks I don't know what he called himself, what his title was, but de fact he became chief of police of all German countries, with the exception of Prussia. the SS. Did this happen voluntarily or was some cohersion put on them in order to bring about this membership?
A I heard this only from individual officials whom. I had known before and who knew about this. They were not taken into the SS, but they received an official rank in the SS. It was Himmler's idea that the SS and Gestapo, both of which he was the leader, that they should be amalgamated. What the individual instances were I can not say. Perhaps I did not state this exactly correctly before, but I did to the best of my knowledge. police that existed at that time were taken into the state police. Was this done after their voluntary application or were they commanded to do so? -- simply transferred in individual cases? -- or were they agreeable to it? police were simply incorporated into the Gestapo; rather in this sector, they were, because there was a political police representative there in opposition to us and that situation had to be removed. Subsequently new people came in and the number was considerably enlarged. These new officials were taker, from the other police departments; criminal, political, and other; and as I have already stated were in part brought in from the outside after careful scrutiny of their political orientation. Now, to what extent actual replacements took place, -Mueller, for instance, was replaced, -- that I do not know. I do not believe that there were many such replacements, since I had nothing to do with the Gestapo after I had once established its general policy.