(At this point there was a mechanical interruption.) My question was to this effect: Reich's Government, that is, after the taking ever of power, had he any influence at all on the decisions of the Reich's cabinet?
A He had no influence of any sort on the decisions of the Reich's cabinet, for his task was of a different nature. this case I am interested to knew from your lips whether, while exercising this function in any way aside from these of Mr. Goebbels, so far as propaganda policies were concerned, what his tasks were while he was in the Ministry. Secretary for the Press, that is, for checking over and treating press matters. But purely propaganda activities were carried on from the beginning by Goebbels. Funk was purely a press leader, and he was called in purely for organizational purposes in the Ministry. He was to bring in now members of the press, new papers to support the press, and his experience and knowledge along these lines were to be utilized.
Q Then, when Dr. Schacht retired from his office in November of 1937, Funk, in the year 1937, that is, November 1937, became his successor as Minister of Economics in the Reich? His appointment took place in November of 1937 but he entered the Ministry in February 1938 and assumed his official duties at that time. Can you tell us why that was so, and also who took care of the Ministryof Economics in the interim? the Ministry from November 1937 to February 1938. I directed the Ministry of Economics so that the development of other economic offices which had any connection with the Four Year Plan could be brought back into the Ministry of the Interior, so that I could still give directives to this Ministry.
to have the same trouble. Schacht had been relieved of the same office in November, 1937.
His successor as Plenipotentiary for Economics, Funk, was appointed in the year 1938. What were the reasons for that?
A That he was made General Plenipotentiary in 1938 was based on the reason that in 1938 he took over the Ministryof Economy.
According to the old regulations, the General Plenipotentiary for Economy was identical with the Ministry of Economy. At that period this was just a matter of form, and I said that from the minute when I took over the Four Year Plan actively, I personally, de facto, was the real General Plenipotentiary for Economy. some officers remained for purely prestige reasons, things which really do not have any significance any longer. The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan was the sole General Plenipotentiary for the entire German economy, since there sould be no two such men, and, as a matter of fact, one was just a figure on paper. it would be that Dr. Funk, in his capacity as General Plenipotentiary for Economy and as president of the Reichsbank, had to follow your directives as head of the Four Year Plan. to comply with my economic directives as far as the Ministry of Economy and the Reichsbank were concerned. That was the reason for the change, because I could not follow this procedure with Schacht, but from the beginning Funk understood my wishes. The directives whichFunk received in his capacity as Minister of Economy and president of the Reichsbank are my responsibility. before the Polish acmpaign, I believe around the 25th of October--which Funk sent to Hitler, in which he thanked the Fuehrer for something or other. In this letter Funk mentioned that he had prepared and executed certain measures, which inthe case of war would apply in civilian matters and in financial matters. You perhaps remember this letter, because it has been read already.
Q Now, do you remember when you entrusted Funk with these special duties? This letter is dated about the 25th of August 1939, and at what time were these duties given over to Funk by you? for mobilization, have to be continued and have to keep pace with the political situation, whether it is tense or not tense or just how the changes go, in the same way, as I mentioned in my concluding remarks yesterday, economy and natters of economy kept pace in the same way.
the duty of the president of the Reichsbank and of the economic factor also to take all preparations which would put me in the position in the event of a war to have the utmost security for the German people. The exact period I cannot tell you, for it seems to be a general basic directive which was always present. for the leadership of economy in occupied countries? The general directives he received from me would show just what directives he would have to interpret for his own purposes in the occupied countries. What further directives he gave out as having been transmitted from me I cannot say, but it was all my responsibility. special plenipotentiaries and organs who had to carry out your directives, excluding Funk?
A In a part of the occupied countries it was so. In other parts I used the existing offices in the occupied countries, and if I considered it necessary I issued directives to the Ministry of Economy, and they had to transmit and issue further orders in the countries concerned. the spring of 1940. Is it correct to say that during the course of the war, in increasingly large proportions, the spheres of jurisdiction of the Minister of Economy, and at the end the entire civilian production, were transferred so that at the end the Ministry of Economy was really a Ministry of Commerce? then Minister Todt was the head of it. This purely munitions ministry became an armament ministry, under Minister Speer. Gradually, more and more spheres of activity were transferred to this Ministry. The Ministry for Armament was at the head of economy, and everything else was subordinated to this ministry. There were some of the tasks transferred to the Armament Ministry from the Economic Ministry. The entire production was turned over to this ministry, and at the end the Ministry of Economy on a large scale was really a matter of form and had just subordinate departments left.
Q Now, I have a final question regarding Funk. The question is in connection with the matter of central planning, that is, in connection with the question of foreign workers.
I am interested in in knowing what you can tell me. Was Funk present at the meetings of this Central Planning Board at the end of November 1943, and never before that time? Do you know about that? interfered in the actual working. I cannot tell exactly when Funk entered into this Board, but as far as the securing of foreign labor is concerned he had nothing to do with that.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, if you will permit me, I have several questions for the Defendant von Schirach. BY DR. SAUTER: department of the "Flying HJ" were trained?
A The "Flying Hitler Jugent, HJ" were interested in air training, and after this training was completed these men were taken into the National Socialist Flier Corps, the former Reichs Luftsport Verband, and were then further trained in aircraftflying.
Q Then another question: As long as von Schirach was head of the Hitler Youth, did any conferences take place between you and him which concerned themselves with the question of military training, or pehraps a pre-military training, of youth in flying? Did you have any such conferences, or didn't you? tell you. Officicially there were no conversations, because the position was entirely clear. The Hitler Youth were interested in gliding, and after they had received preliminary training they were taken into the flying companies. half other participants. Among them were von Schirach, along with Buhle, Bopitz, Dietrich, and Gehrecke. For that reason I would like to put the following question to you: Was Schirach ever a member of the Reichs Cabinet, or what functions or rights did he have in this connection? Ministers. We differentiated between two kinds of sessions, regular Cabinet sessions and ministerial directors sessions. course of events, the Ministers and their State Secretaries. In some cases, from the special departments or ministries, ministerial directors or higher officials could be called in for short discussions. Then there were so-called top Reich offices, and among those was the leadership of the Reichs Jugend, the Reichs Youth.
If a question of this leadership was to be discussed in the Cabinet with the purpose of legislating, then Schirach as leader of the Youth Movement, if he had been informed on this matter, could request to be called into this meeting; and the Chief of the Reichs Chancellory could command him or ask him to come in for the reason that you have just mentioned. that I have just mentioned. I believe I took part in all of these sessions, and I know that von Schirach never took part. In contrast to that were the Council meetings in which only Reichs Ministers could be present without anyone else attending.
Q Then, I am referring to the period of time after the fall of Mussolini, when Badaglio took ever power of Government in Italy.
Do you remember, witness, that at that time, von Schirach sent a wire to you and made certain suggestions to you?
Q Please tell me about that. What did he suggest and what were his motives and purposes? Foreign Office and to replace Ribbentrop by von Papen.
Q Then, my last question for von Schirach. Do you remember, witness, another letter which the Defendant Schirach, and as far as I know, in the spring of 1943, wrote? It was a letter which had been motivated through a letter of Bormann's and so that you will know just which letter I have in mind, I will give you the connection in brief. Bormann at that time wrote to all Gauleiters and according to that, the Gauleiters were to report whether they had any connection abroad with foreign countries. Schirach knew at the time that this letter wasmeant only for him, for the other Gauleiters had no relatives in other countries. Schirach at that point wrote a letter which, as far as I know, had wrote, and which you intervened allegedly in favor of von Schirach. Please clarify this letter, what kind of letter it was, what endangered Schirach and what you and others did to prevent this danger to von Schirach? exactly. This letter of Bormann's was not directed to the Gauleiters to know whether they had connections with abroad. Bormann directed, according to a directive of the Fuehrer, a letter to all Gauleiters and it was not a matter of form and was not meant only for von Schirach. It was meant for all, and in that sphere of influence they were to check the political leaders to know whether one of their co-workers or political leaders, which were subordinate to them, had relatives or other connections abroad, so that through this, the individuals might have conscience conflicts so that their reliability might be questioned. It was a general directive of the Fuehrer and it was meant also for the Officer Corps and could not be applied solely to the case of Schirach. I was at headquarters when Schirach's letter arrived and gave Bormann's letter to the Fuehrer.
Schirach said, before he would take any steps towards his collaborators or subordinates, he would have to have a clarification on the part of the Fuehrer as far as his own person was concerned, and new in his letter mentioned his relatives abroad, some of whom were living in the United States of America, and these were relatives on his mother's side.
In his letter he also said that his connections with his relatives abroad was a very cordial one and he wanted to know whether, among these prevailing conditions, he could regain as a Gauleiter and whether his position was still tenable to the Fuehrer. At that time the Fuehrer had not been kindly disposed to von Schirach for several months and had already considered retiring him from his office. At this opportunity he said -- and that is how I came into possession of this letter -- he gave me this latter and said "Schirach seems to make plans for saving himself in the future. I have mistrust of him;" then very definitely, in the presence of Bormann, I told the Fuehrer that such mistrust was entirely unfounded; that I could not see his position as far as von Schirach was concerned, and von Schirach had done the only decent thing he could do before he had taken steps to dismiss any of his subordinates; that he had wanted to clarify his awn position, Since his position was known, and that I did not think von Schirach had ulterior motives in writing the letter. rather strange suggestions for proceedings against Schirach seemed to have been made? basis of this letter, on the strength of this letter, and he tried to give this letter an entirely different interpretation and wished to motivate the Fuehrer to call him, call von Schirach back and to eliminate him, but just how far the suggestion of Himmler went, I do not know, or whether he meant to have him apprehended. I heard about these things from other sources later on.
DR. SAUTER: Your Honor, I have no further questions.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Dr. Kranzbuehler, counsel on behalf of Doenitz.
BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q Reich Marshal, when did you get to know my client? Admiral and Commander of the U-Boats, I met him during the war, in fact, I remember that was in 1940, and I met him at a conference in my special train, I believe, in France.
Q Were you concerned with military or political questions? for the future could do reconnaissance for U-Boats in the Atlantic and the then Admiral Doenitz complained that reconnaissance was too weak and it was only sporadic and requested me urgently to strengthen same and as far as I remember, to have reconnaissance increased by 30%. further conference with him? plane (emergency sea plans) plans to save flyers who have been Shot down in the Channel? who had to land in the Channel, in the English Channel, as the decree shows, and that decree applied to German flyers as well as Allied flyers.
Q Can you describe these planes? the Red Cross.
Q Were they armed?
Q And how were these emergency planes treated by the British? were any number of cases in which, while they were doing acts of mercy, they were shot down. These cases came to be increasingly larger and more numerous and I said it would be more expedient not to use the Red Cross as a mark any longer, to have these planes armed and to try and save our comrades from the ocean nevertheless.
We had tremendous losses in these sea emergency planes work.
Q Were emergency buoys established in the Channel to save people?
A Emergency buoys were established in large numbers. There were cables to which the fliers who had been shot down could cling, and foodstuffs and water and other materials were put on these buoys also. There were also small rafts which the fliers could board. There he found food, drink, first-aid kits, and blankets.
Q These emergency buoys, how were they treated by the British?
A They were treated differently. Some remained; other were destroyed.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I have no further questions. BY DR. EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): flict between the Fuehrer and General-Colonel Jodl?
Q Do you know that at that time Jodl was to be replaced?
A The conflict arose through the crisis in the Caucasus. The Fuehrer accused Jodl that no concentrated push had been used in the region of Tuaxe; that he had instead taken a different route through passes, and this operation near Elbros the Fuehrer did not consider. Jold said that this matter had been discussed with him and that it had been approved by him. The Fuehrer attacked the commander-in-chief of this sector. Jodl covered for him. In this connection there was an extremely high tension. The Fuehrer told me that he wished to replace Jodl. The tension was so extreme that from this moment on, as far as I remember, the Fuehrer left the meeting place and from then even ate his meals alone, which had not been the custom before, and for a period of time would not shake the hand of this gentleman. It was just a minor incident in the great tension which took place.
As successor to Jodl, von Paulus was considered. The Fuehrer had special confidence in von Paulus. Just why this change was not made, I do not knew exactly. I assume that in this case, despite all tensions, the Fuehrer always decided that it was very hard for him to get used to new faces, and that he did not wish to make a change in his direct surrounding?
He preferred to continue working win men whom he did not like, if they had been in his immediate surroundings, rather than to change.
of Jodl grew, and at the end he had complete confidence in his tactical capacity. As far as personal relations were concerned, they were never especially close. denounce the Geneva Convention. Do you know what Jodl's attitude was at that time? gestion to the Fuehrer. This suggestion was contradicted by all of us with the utmost vehemence, but the Fuehrer for days might be inclined and always referred back to this matter to cancel this Convention, or to renounce it. His motives, strangely enough, were the following: that in the East there had been too many serious killings, and it was not easy for the troops. The Fuehrer was of the opinion that if the troops knew that in captivity the Geneva Convention would not protect them they would fight more strongly and would not react to the extensive hostile propaganda as to how well it would be for them to lay down their weapons, if they could not react to this propaganda. Jodl, of course, participated in preventing the Fuehrer from denouncing this agreement, that it would create great excitement among the German people and that it would create many cares for the men who were prisoners of war abroad.
Q There is a further question: Before the Norwegian campaign, Jodl entered in his diary, and I believe it has been mentioned on occasion here: The Fuehrer is interested in finding a motive. He is looking for an explanation. This is misquoted and is not correct. He was looking for a motivation. and very precise, and I can tell under oath that a coordination of the concept "motivation" or "explanation" is not proper at this point. The case was the following: telligence and authoratative reports, that Norway was to be occupied by the Allies, England and France.
I have already mentioned this point. I mentioned it several days ago.
In order to prevent this, the Fuehrer wanted to act first, and now he talked about this matter. The motivation of the English and French attack was clear to us, but we had no way of proving it to the outside, and he was now looking for a basis. But it would have been better for Jodl not to say at first that he preferred motivation. He should have said, as the Fuehrer meant, that he was locking for proof or evidence, which we had, and that to attach value and weight to this evidence was the problem. preparations for this step. In the case of Norway, the Fuehrer had not advised the foreign office of this step. I believe 24 of perhaps 48 hours in advance they were notified of this step. At this point he was not interested in telling them at all. He kept this plan of the utmost secrecy, and I remember that I, as commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, was initiated into this plan at a very late point. This was the second reason why he himself was concerned to find a motivation for the attack. These were the two reasons, and I would like to state again that matters would have been clarified if one had said "The Fuehrer is looking for evidence", rather than motivation. that the British has the intention to occupy Norway?
A Yes. We had that intelligence and those reports, but the final written evidence we received much later.
Q The Fuehrer did not doubt this?
A No one of us doubted this for a minute. Later we received these documents of evidence. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Defendant von Papen): regarding the formation of the Hitler government, which arose in 1933, and that you alone had the task? about the formation of a government with von Papen?
A For the first time I spoke with von Papen on a Sunday. It was a week before the government was formed.
Schroeder and had further negotiations until the 22nd of January, then these negotiations would have been taken through you and you would have known?
A Yes; that is correct, because the Fuehrer at that time was at Munich and I was the only authority at Berlin for the formation of this Government. Then, at the beginning if January, we did not know that within a reasonable length of time a government would have to be formed by us. Other negotiations were taking place, but they did not concern von Papen. the middle of January, because von Schleicher had no parliamentary backing, and that all of his efforts were frustrated because of a friction in the NSDAP, and Schleicher in this connection failed to have parliamentary backing? no parliamentary majority, and, when he tried to split that, Schleicher was excluded by the Fuehrer and had no following. After the frustration of this possibility to receive a majority, Schleicher had to rule without parliament, and that he could do only with extreme authority given to him by Hindenburg;
after he had told him previously that he would be able to get a majority and that he did not need this same authority which von Papen had requested.
The Reich President decided to do those things which I set forth the other day. Prussia on the 20th of April, for through the elections of March 1933 the NSDAP had had a majority in Prussia, and, therefore, the Lantag was to make you minister president? president which was to be elected at that time, but the fact is that in the Prussian Diet the NSDAP had the absolute majority. It made von Papen mention to the Fuehrer that he would agree that he, von Papen, would give the presidency of Prussia to me.
Q Now, I have a last question: You mentioned yesterday that as the Chief judge of the Luftwaffe you gave much clemency toward people in Belgium and France who had been adjudged. Is it correct that von Papen on occasions brought wishes of relatives of thosewho had been sentenced to you, and that he gave as the reason for the wishes that he was interested in a solidarity among people and did not wish to convict them even if they had been militarily correct, that poor relations would arise, and that you were interested in carrying out the wishes of von Papen? prominent name was concerned--that I received requests from von Papen, as to whether the person could not receive clemency, because the people who were concerned had aided flyers to escape. In these cases I respected the wishes of von Papen in large proportion. I do not remember the reasons. BY DR. BALLAS (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart):
Q May I be permitted to put several questions to the witness. We are concerned with the well-known telephone conversation of the 5thof March, 1938, between Berlin and Vienna, which took place at that time. Is it correct, witness, that Dr. Seyss-Inquart, in June of 1937, came to office and then visited you with State Secretary Keppler?
Q Did Dr. Seyss-Inquart, at that time, utter the opinion that the Austrian National Socialists should be entirely independent of the Reich Party of the same name?
working independently in the cabinet.
Q Tell me whether this is correct: The Austrian National Socialists in Austria were to have permission to keep relations between Austria and Germany and have an independent Austria? what was discussed. The main thesis of having Austria independent and yet on the side of Germany was repeatedly uttered by Seyss-Inquart, and, as I said the other day already, it seemed to me not extensive enough, because I knew the attitude of Seyss-Inquart. I must say frankly that I was a little distrustful of his attitude, and on the late afternoon of that day, when these telephone conversations took place to Vienna, as far as the annexation was concerned, matters would take their proper course. I would rather have sent someone else. I considered Keppler too soft. But the Fuehrer wished that if anyone had to be sent it should be Keppler.
Q Is it correct that Dr. Seyss-Inquart, among ethers, motivated his attitude in mentioning the advantage to Germany of having two states?
A That is exactly right. He did say that. I was of a completely different opinion. I would rather have the German attitude represented more strongly by one rather than by two, where we would not be certain that the others would be interested in cur interests. another telephonic or other communication with Seyss-Inquart, that is, aside from the prior mentioned telephone conversation?
AAs far as I recall that, I cannot say this with assurance. I talked with him or one of his men. These telephone conversations were on the 11th, a Friday. On Monday or Tuesday prior I talked with him or one of his men of the impression that had been created. I rememberthis, but I cannot say for certain under oath. tions between Vienna and Berl in in Larch of 1938. We see, first of all, that Dr. Dietrich and Keppler, who was in Vienna at the time, at the hour of 2154 in the evening, had the agreement of Seyss-Inquart with your wire, which he dictated before and which had been transmitted through Keppler. At that time, had the command for marching in been issued?
issued and had nothing to do with the wire as such, and it really mattered not atall whether he was in agreement. The Fuehrer and I had responsibility for the marching in.
Q Then the marching in would have occurred without the telegram?
A Yes. That is a matter of course.
Q What was the purpose of this wire? Was it to give a for eign political basis? 12th of March State Secretary Keppler, on the order of Dr. Seyss-Inquart, called Berlin not to carry through the marching in?
A I remember this wire very distinctly. I was unusually upset and enraged that a senseless telegram like that would disturb the rest of the Fuehrer, who wanted to go to Austria the next day. The attitude of the Fuehrer was blamed for putting through a telegram like that to the Fuehrer, and the wire should have been transmitted to me or because of me. I remember this wire and the utter impotence of this wire.
Q Then the Fuehrer declined? marching in had already started, and when a marching in of troops is once started it would take days to stop it. We might have halted the marching in at a certain point at the boundary, but it was not in cur interest, and from this point on Seyss-Inquart did not have the fate of Austria in his hand, but the Fuehrer and I.
Q I have two questions regarding the Netherlands. Is it correct that alongside of the decree of the Fuehrer, which was given on the 18th of May, that Dr. Seyss-Inquart was made Reich commissar of the Netherlands, that there was another decree which was not published but which subordinated Seyss-Inquart directly to you?
THE PRESIDENT: Put your questions more slowly.
have a special and independent office in the Netherlands? going to put the first question once more, because it did not come through. As far as this secret decree is concerned, I know nothing about it. It would have been senseless, for a Reich commissar in occupied territories could not be subordinate to me separately. But, if you are concerned with subordination in this direction, as far as economic matters were concerned, it was a matter of course that the Reich commissar, as well as other Reich officers, were under my jurisdiction, of course, in all matters of economy. you as to the details whether in occupied countries, and that means, of course, the Netherlands, here and there a direct representative of the Four Year Plan actually was there, or whether these directives were given through military offices or economic offices. As far as I can tell now, without referring to documents, in the Netherlands the situation was that the economic leader, Fischbeck (?), at the same time, which was logical, gave and executed the economic directives of the Four Year Plan. The Reich commissar or Reich commissioner would never have been in a position, as far as decrees from me were concerned, he could not have put them through. He could have mentioned them to me or to the Fuehrer, but there is no special connection in this regard.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 18 March 1946, at 1000 hours.)
THE PRESIDENT: Had Dr. Kubuschok finished his cross examination?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then were there any other defendants' counsel who wish to examine or cross examine?
DR. KRAUS: Dr. Kraus for Dr. Luedinghausen on behalf of the defendant von Neurath. I ask your permission to put the following questions. question. "What was to happen if the Czechs said, that the Czechs would not agree to German occupation of Sudetanland, and should that supposedly be answered in the affirmative, then who would force them?" Is that correct? discussion, and Ministerpresident Daladier said, in substance, what you have just said. I do not recall the exact words. I remember fairly exactly that he emphasized that from now ow a decision in that direction had been reached by the great powers, and it had been reached with the purpose of maintaining peace; from now on there could be no further assistance on the part of the Czechoslovakia to endanger the peace. If anything to the contrary should happen, neither England nor France would feel themselves duty bound if the Czechoslovakia people would not follow this advice; they would not consider themselves duty bound to help them.
Q Witness, as long as I recall, I saw Mr. von Neurath but briefly, very briefly when he was the German Ambassador to Denmark in 1919, and, besides that briefly at the time. Later I met him personally before the taking over of power, and spoke to him then but briefly, and that was my Q Did you know about his activities as Ambassador at London, did you knew anything about that?
A Yes. I knew of his activity and of his capacity there, but I knew about his activity even in the previous or prior days, that is, 1931 and 1932, before he was the foreign minister, when there was talk of a possible formation of a government, the name von Neurath was mentioned as a candidate even though he did not belong to the Party, or anything of a matter of foreign relation, his name was mentioned nevertheless; and, in this connection the basic reason for his being mentioned for this position as an Ambassador at England was the chief motivating factor of Hitler. For that reason this meant that Hitler, as well as myself, were of the opinion that the connections of von Nuerath as Ambassador were very cordial, so far as the British Government was concerned, and von Neurath had a very vital interest in that connection, and such a connection was very vital to Hitler.
Q Then I may assume that Mr. von Neurath was on cordial relations with London?
Q Can you tell me if Mr. von Neurath beyond that as Foreign Minister continued his cordial and peaceful relationships?