A short time before already the position of those Italian forces was expected to become hopeless, because by the landing of British troops in Greece it could be expected that as soon as they could come to the aid of the Greeks the Italian Army would not only have to withdraw from Greece, where they were standing only shortly inside-the border, but also from Albania, and that then British troops would be in dangerous proximity of Italy and of that part of the Balkans which was economically important for us. time the fate of the Italian Balkan Army would have been decided. Only quickest action could prevent a two-fold danger. First, a catastrophe befalling our Italian ally; and, second, the gaining of a foothold by British troops in the Balkans and a starting position in the expected conflict with Russia. is to say, the troops which should advance on Greece in order to push their British divisions back into the Mediterranean and in order to help the Italian ally, were turned to the right after short and speedy preparations and they were thrown into the flank of the Yugoslav deployment. short time, which was easily possible, and transferred to the airfields in the southeast area, also to support the attack. Only by such quick action, and duo to the fact that we were already prepared for it by the Plan Marietta, Germany was in a position to stave off an extraordinary danger for the entire position in the Balkans and in the southeast area at that moment. Politically and militarily, it would have been a capital crime for the German interests if in that case the Fuehrer had not decided as he did.
Q What targets did the Air Force attack in Yugoslavia first? forces at the outbreak of this war and that their tasks were to be performed at the sane time at great speed and with the greatest possible effect, in order to assure their original task, which was the piercing of the Metaxas line in the north of Greece, and that this could be done in time before British troops, which had already been landed near Athens, could come to the support of the Greek troops along the Metaxas line.
part of the German forces attack that line, while the other part had to throw itself upon the Kugoslav Army, and with insufficient forces had to obtain in the shortest possible time the elimination of that army. Otherwise, it was not only possible that the destruction of the Italian Army could have taken place, but the German Army, thus divided, with part of their forces in Yugoslavia -- the support by Bulgaria came much later -- and with the other forces trying to force the Metaxas line to avoid the British deployment there, that in this dividing of forces the German Army could come into a very difficult and critical and maybe disastrous military situation. Therefore, in this case it had to be used with the greatest effect, in order to see to it that the Yugoslav action of deployment against Germany should be stopped as quickly as possible. Ministry of War in Belgrade, particularly the railroad station, which in Belgrade, in view of the snail number of their lines, was especially important. And then there were several other important centers--the general staff building, etc., because at that time the entire headquarters, politically and militarily, was still located in Belgrade. At that moment everything was still concentrated there, and tie bombing of that nerve center proved to be of the greatest consequence in paralyzing the resistance. reasons: warning. In fact, however, none of the leading personalities in Yugoslavia had the least doubt that Germany would attack. One recognized that because one had feverishly prepared for mobilization. The attacks of the German Army, therefore, were prepared at a time which was before the bombing of Belgrade. But even if we assumed that the air force had made the first attack and then the army, that is, without warning, then still the actions of Yugoslavia had had called for it.
The extraordinary danger of the military situation for us -- we stood in the middle of the most serious struggle and we had to secure the Balkans in both directions. The aims -- and I repeat that, as I remember very well -- the targets were the enemy Ministry of War, the railroad station, the general, staff building, and one or the other ministries. The city, of course, since these buildings were, inside the city, was also hit.
Q During the last days we had repeatedly heard about the serial attacks on Warsaw, Coventry and Rotterdam.
Were these attacks made beyond military necessity? about part of that. But from these statements I can realize again, and it is a matter of course that a commander of an army, an army croup or an air force in the long run can only see a certain sector. As Supreme Commander of the Air Force, however, I am in a position to describe the whole picture, since I, after all, was also the responsible man who gave the orders and following my orders and my point of view the chiefs of the fleets received their instructions and directives as to what they had to do. first morning of the attack on Poland a large number of Polish cities, I believe the British Prosecutor mentioned their names, had been attacked. I do not remember their names anymore. In my directives for the first day of the attack on Poland I said specifically the first target should be the destruction of the enemy air force. Once that had been achieved the other targets could be attacked without difficulty. Therefore, there was an order to attack the following airfields and I am certain withouthaving the names before me that eighty per cent of the names of places mentioned are cities or towns near which there were airfields. a limited measure were important railroad crossings. I point that out because shortly before the last and decisive attack on Warsaw the French military attache in Poland sent a report to his government which we are in a position to submit here and which we found later in Paris, from which it can be seen that even this enemy declared the German Air Force had, in Poland, exclusively attacked military targets -- exclusively and that was underlined. is the wrong expression because it went quickly. Before the surrounding of Warsaw they were first, the airfield Oketche, where the enemy airplanes were concentrated and the railroad station, one of the most strategic railroad stations in Poland. But these were not the decisive attacks which were talked about. But after Warsaw was encircled it was asked to surrender. That surrender was refused, was rejected and I remember and remind you of the proclamation which urged the entire civilian population to offer resistance, not only military but also civilian, which is against international law.
Still we tried again. We dropped leaflets at first, not tombs, in which we urged the population to cease fighting. Secondly, when the commanding officer insisted on his point of view we urged the civilian population to evacuate the city before the bombing. send a messenger and we agreed and waited but no messenger ever came. We did achieve that the diplomatic corps and all neutrals could leave Warsaw along a road which we were to designate and that was done. forced to attack the city most severely when no surrender took place, we thought first to shell the fortifications and then the batteries which had been established within the city. That was the attack on Warsaw.
Rotterdam -- in Rotterdam the situation was entirely different. In order to terminate the campaign in the Netherlands as quickly as possible and to avoid further bloodshed and since we had basically no matters of dispute with the Dutch, I had ordered the use of the use of the parachute division in the back of the troops deployed against us. First of all, in order to capture the three most important bridges, one near Mordeik across the Rhine, the other near Dortrecht and the third near Rotterdam, That paved the way to the roar of the main line of deployment and if that would prove successful the Dutch Army could only hold on for a few days. This use of my parachute division proved entirely successful. Rotterdam got into difficulty. It was surrounded by Dutch troops. Everything hinged on the fact that the railroad bridge and the road bridge should fall into our hands without destruction because then only the last possibility to get at the rear of the Dutch troops would be available. While the main part was in the southern part of Rotterdam a few spearheads of the parachutists had crossed two bridges and fought severely. One was in the railroad station north of the river and the second within a number of buildings of the well-known butter or margerine factory which covered the road bridge. This spearhead held its position in spite of heavy attacks. crossed the Mordeik and Dortrecht bridges and here I would like to correct a mistake which arose during the interrogation of Field Marshal Kesselring by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe.
Lt. General Schmidt belonged to this group which came from the outside, the armored group and he led them. General Student was the leader of the parachute division inside of Rotterdam. That explains the fact that there were negotiations for capitulation with the commander of the troops coming from the outside and secondly, negotiations with the commander of the parachute troops within the city and these two negotiations were considered as one later. could be seen whether it would come to a capitulation or not, and that has only to do with Rotterdam, then the group to the north of the two bridges wasin a very precarious position. Support across the two bridges was extremely difficult. They were under heavy fire, flanking machine gun fire and I could still draw a diagram of the situation. There was also artillery fire taking place so that a few individuals, and I remember the situation very well, were proceeding hanging by their hands from the bridge in order to get across and not be hit by the fire. on the road leading to the north and who were harassing our spearheads it was ordered they be bombed since the parachute troops had no artillery and bombing represents the only artillery of parachutists. I had assured my parachutists before theventure that they would under all circumstances receive the protection by bombers against heavy shelling. There groups of my squadrons were used. The cry for help came from the broadcast station which the paratroopers had established in Rotterdam, which did not function as well as was mentioned here, and from the signals which the plans picked up such as arrows and signs which showed the reconnaissance flyers where the artillery shelling came from, northwest, south.
Thereupon, I ordered the Air Force to use one squadron. The squadron started in three groups, about 25 to 36 planes.
When the first group arrived, as far as I know the negotiations had started, but with no clearly visible results. In spite of that, red flares went up. The first group did not recognize the flares and threw their bombs as ordered, just into that area which was designated. If I remember the figure correctly, there were 36 twin-motored planes which could only have thrown 50-kilo bombs. The second and third groups recognized the red flares, turned around, and did not drop their bombs. The wireless connection went from Rotterdam to my headquarters, Airfleet 2, to division squadron ground position, and from there there was a connection to the planes. That was in May 1940, when generally the wireless connection between ground crow and planes was a fairly good one, but not to be compared with the splendid communications which were marked out later in the course of the war. directly to the planes, that the signals which had been agreed upon had to be used, that is to say, the red flares which were recognized by groups two and three, but not by group one. That can best be seen by the fact that all the buildings which were built of stop and concrete are still standing, but the wood buildings were destroyed. The great extent of that fire was because of structures with large amounts of fats and oils. Secondly, I want to point out -- I want to emphasize this -- that the fire could have been limited. place at 6:00 o'clock in the evening, and I know that well, because during these negotiations there was still shooting going on and the General of the Paratroopers, Student, went to the window during the negotiations and was hit in the head by a bullet, which resulted in serious injury. two generals and their negotiations, one from the outside, the other one from the inside of Rotterdam.
Coventry. From the 6th of September to November, only after repeated warnings to the English Government, and after the Fuehrer had reserved for him self the right to give the order for reprisal attacks on London and had hesitated for a long time, and after German cities which had no military targets had been bombed again and again, then only London was designated as a target for attack.
From the 6th and 7th of September -- the first attack was on the 6th of September in the afternoon -- the German Air Force pounded continuously on London. Although this may have been for reasons of retaliation and political pressure, I still did not consider it an attainable goal. first World War that the people of London can take it and that we could not break their military resistance in this manner. It was important for me, first of all, to prevent an increase of the power of resistance of the British Air Force. As a soldier or, in other words, as Supreme Commander of the German Air Force, the matter of importance to me was to break the enemy air force. designation of Coventry for the target, and that because, according to my information, in and around Coventry there was located a main part of the aircraft industry. Birmingham and Coventry were the most important targets. I decided on Coventry because there the most targets could be hit within the smallest area. the plans and checked them, and at the first opportunity as far as the weather was concerned, a moonlit night, I ordered the attack and gave directives to repeat it until decisive results should be achieved against the British aircraft industry, and then to switch to the next target, Birmingham, and the large motor industry near Bristol and south of London. city's being seriously hit was because of the fact that the industry was widely dispersed over the city, with the exception of two works which were outside of the city, and again in this case a great expansion of damage was achieved by fire. If we look at German cities today, we can see what fire can do. Japan. Were you present at these negotiations?
A I myself did not take part in the negotiations. I can say very little about negotiations with Japan because from a military point of view I had very little to do and seldom met with the Japanese, During the entire war, only once, and for a short time, I received a delegation of Japanese officers, attaches.
Therefore, I cannot say anything about collaboration with Japan. We had made an agreement to exchange war experiences, but that went through the various offices and I had nothing to do with it definitely. Russia necessary? to get into a conflict with Russia under certain circumstances late in fall 1940, in Berchtesgaden. Russian Foreign Minister Molotov? and Molotov. Mr. Molotov, however, paid a visit to me and we discussed the general situation. I know about the conversation with Molotov, however, because the Fuehrer told me everything about it, and it was just that conversation which increased the Fuehrer's suspicion that Russia was getting ready for an attack upon Germany, and that came from discussions during that conversation and demands which Mr. Molotov made then.
They were: First of all, a guarantee to Bulgaria, and a pact of assistance with Bulgaria, such as Russia had made with the three Baltic states. that Russia, which had signed a peace with Finland a short time ago, could attack Finland again and not have to be satisfied with the results of the previous agreement. Bessarabia.
These were the points which were discussed with the Fuehrer. There was also a hint to the Foreign Minister about securing interests at the exit of the Baltic.
The Fuehrer viewed these demands in a different light. Although Russia was especially justified about demands concerning Finland, he still believed that in connection with other reports which ha had received about the Russian state of preparedness, Russia wanted to improve her position in Finland in order to overrun Germany from the north and to get into closest proximity with the Swedish ore mines, which would be of great importance to Germany.
Bulgarian area, it was not absolutely certain, clear, to the Fuehrer that this pressure would not continue in the south, the Dardanelles, or in an eastern direction, but in a western direction, that is to say, that here also Russia would move on the southern flank of Germany and by getting control of the Roumanian oil fields make Germany absolutely dependent on Russia as far as delivery of oil was concerned. In these demands he saw, somewhat camouflaged assurances to gain positions against Germany. He hinted that guarantees concerning the exit of the Baltic was incompatible for Germany at that time. menaced, and already in his discussion with me the Fuehrer had told me why he was considering preparing against the Russian push. The information as to feverish preparations in the area -- nearly accurate -- acquired by Russia in Poland, Lithuania, Bessarabia made him very suspicious. along the entire Eastern border. Further reports came that Russia at the very moment, if Germany would be menaced in the West by British invasion or if Germany should decide on an invasion against England, could attack us in the back. His arguments were strengthened by the fact that shortly before, and against all precedents which we had seen before in Russia, German engineers -- and I believe also artisans -- suddenly were shown the tremendous Russian Industry in the field of aviation, aircraft and tanks. These reports. about the surprisingly high production of these industries strengthened the Fuehrer's conviction and he was so much convinced of it that he said if England -- and that was his political way of thought -- if England continues to refuse any arrangement with us, although she is now fighting alone against us, they must have some ace up their sleeve. facts: first, that increased support by the United States could be expected, at least in the technical field, the armament field. And then still more far-reaching, and secondly -- which he considered more plausible -- that at that time already Churchill had reached an agreement with Russia in that direction, and pointed out that here sooner or later it was come to a clash.
He gave the following calculations: it was necessary to break Russian preparations by quick and strong blows and to weaken the Russian forces so that they would not represent a danger in the rear, when Hitler had to be prepared to fight the British and Americans on the continent. to me. extraordinarily.
Q What was your attitude toward an attack on Russia at that time? later asked the Fuehrer's permission to state my point. It came too surprising for me. Then in the evening I told the Fuehrer the following; start any way against Russia. law or similar reasons. My point of view was decided by political and military reasons only. First, since the coming to power I believe that probably of all leading men in Germany, I considered the conflict with Russia the most threatening menace to Germany. I knew -- and many others like myself -- that in Russia for over ten years an exceedingly strong rearmament and training had taken place, that the standard of living had been lowered on all other fields in favor of rearmament. The shipments of German industry and examinations of shipments from American, British and other industries showed that they contained only such machines that were urgently needed for a rearmament program of the industry. One could even estimate the speed and the extent of the Russian armament program from these shipments. Russian armament in my opinion would have been directed against other sources of danger. But since we had come to power, of course, the political and philosophical contrasts made an important and dangerous role. I understood that such contrasts do not necessarily have to lead to conflicts between states, because the national and political interests will always be stronger and greater than all philosophical contrasts, or even agreements.
But here also I discerned a menace, because what should these tremendous Russian rearmings have to do at a time when Germany was open to a menace of that kind? oversaw a menace threatening from Russia; I still would ask him to rather let this menace continue to exist and, if it was at all possible, to try to direct the interests of Russia against England. And I told him "At present we fight against one of the greatest powers, the British Empire. Though you, my Fuehrer, are not of this opinion, I have to contradict, because I am definitely of the opinion that sooner or later the second great world power, the United States, will march against us, and that will not depend on the reelection of President Roosevelt. The ether candidate will not be able to prevent it. We will be in a struggle against two of the largest powers. It was your masterpiece to make possible at the beginning of the war that there be fighting on one front only, and you have always pointed out that this was important, that in case of a clash with Russia at this time, the third great power would be thrown into the struggle against Germany. We would be alone, isolated again, against practically the entire world. The other nations do not count. And again on two fronts."
He replied, "I do not misunderstand your argument. I do not overlook the Russian menace, any more than anybody else, but if we succeed now in executing our plans in the fight against the British Empire and if we are successful, Russia will not let her attack break loose; only if we should get stuck in a serious struggle in the West, I am of the opinion that the Russian menace will increase."
balance the Polish crisis was given in order to assure that Germany could come to this conflict, because thereby the German-French-British conflict was caused, and it was definitely in the Russian interest to precipitate this conflict and to do it with such advantages as they have done. Russian armaments will only be completed in the year 1942, 1943 or even as late as 1944. Until then, it would have to be possible for us to achieve with respect to England, if not a peace based on victory at least an arrangement. This, however, was only possible if decisive successes could be achieved against England, and at that time the German Air Force with all its power was attacking England. If the German Air Force would have to form a new front, and to deploy for the attack of Russia, considerable numbers, more than half, would have to be thrown to the East, and practically any energetic attack on England could not be carried out any more. All the sacrifices up to that time would have been in vain, England would be given a chance to re-establish and reorganize its aircraft industry which had been shattered. with a deployment of that kind against Russia, my plan which I had submitted to the Fuehrer to attack England in Gibralter and Suez would have to be dropped. The attack on Gibralter by the Air Force was so methodically prepared that according to all expectations no failure could be thought of. The British Air Forces on the small air field north of the Rock were irrelevant. The attack of my paratroopers on the Rock would have been a success. The simultaneous capture of the other side, the African side, and then a push on Casablanca and Dakar would have assured at least that a deployment of American forces such as did happen later on in North Africa would have been impossible, and how far it would have been possible later by arrangements to use islands such as the Cutbert Islands was still to be seen.
It is clear that it would have meant that we could sit on that point of North Africa with planes or U-Boats and harass all convoys coming from North or South Africa, from such favorable positions.
And if the Mediterranean was closed it would not be difficult by pushing across Tripoli to bring the attack against Suez to a successful conclusion. of Gibraltar, North Africa down to Dakar, Suez and possibly in the south, and it was in the south of Seuz, could have been possible with small forces-a number of divisions on the one and the other side, and all the uncertainty of the long Italian coast-line would have been excluded from danger of attack. after the conclusion of such an undertaking to re-examine the military and political situation concerning Russia, and if this basis could be achieved, any favorable position against the United States would have been given to us.
I explained all these reasons in the greatest detail and pointed out again andagain that we had here a relatively secure case which we would lose, as against an insecure one, and that this would have led much rather to an arrangement with England at a time at which one and the other was standing on either side of the Channel armed to the teeth. These were my reasons to delay the date of the attack against Russia, and I also pointed out that if we would be successful in this venture, the Russian armaments could have been channeled possibly into other political directions. I emphasize, however, that the Fuehrer at first had made only general preparations and he told me at that time that he would reserve a decision for the attack and that the final decision was only taken after the Simowitsch Putsch.
.THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(A recess was taken from 1525 to 1540 hours) BY DR. STAHMER: and in paragraph five states the following:
"The Fuehrer is concerned with war against the United States and it is concerned with the occupation of Atlantic Islands."
What can you say to that? been submitted to me. It is concerned with a letter which the Deputy of the Luftwaffe in the OKW, Lt. Colonel von Falkenstein, gave to the chief of my general staff. It is a study of those points which I have just set forth -- occupation of Gibraltar and North Africa and perhaps also the Atlantic Islands -- first of all, bases for combat against England; and secondly, in case -- and I underline "in case" -- in case America should enter the war, to have a better flanking position against their convoys. At that period of time, as far as I was concerned, without having conversed with the Fuehrer, had made research into the execution of enterprises of this nature and this material is, therefore, inconsequential.
Q In this connection, I have a further question. It had been stated that an organization of plans for the year 1950 had been executed.
A This question may be answered briefly. I am familiar with this document, for on two or three occasions it has been mentioned by the prosecution. If, when an expert of the general staff of the powers represented were called in, he would say that this document is of small value. It is a study by the general staff, by the subordinate divisions, in order to work out the best schemes for a leadership organization. It was concerned with whether the leadership should be subordinated to certain offices or whether corps should be formed, whether squadrons should consist of fighters and bombers or whether it should consist of bombers only. These questions were always dealt with either in time of peace or in war, independent of other considerations, that these works are always carried on and they may sometimes be in the possibility of later strategy. In this case, the man who made the study assumed a situation around or up to 1950; he envisaged a two-front war which was not too far beyond possibility -- a war with England and France on the west and Russia in the East -- and the conditions were that Austria and Poland were in our hands. This study never reached my hands. I have just become acquainted with it now, although that is insignificant -- for the study was made in my department and since it was made in my department, it must have been made at my direction. Organization leadership and other considerations were always carried on.
but when inconsequential for political consideration should not be considered in the course of this proceeding. allegedly before this staff of officers in which you said that you had an Air Force, and if a point of hourship came, it should be a mission of vengeance against the opponent, and as to the opponent there should be no question that he was already lost, but nevertheless he should do battle. I shall have this speech submitter to you and I would like to know your attitude you are taking, and what purposes are to be served?
A This quotation has been used by the prosecution twice; first in the beginning, and secondly, just the other day, in the cross-examination of Field Marshal Milch, and we are concerned with the speech which appeared in the book. The speech is called "Comradeship", and the comradeship in this speech is the duty to remember in the comradeship you are willing to sacrifice. This speech was addressed to thousands of Reich officers on the date they took their oath, on the 20th of May in 1936. were being commissioned officers, I told them about the concept of comradeship, the duty and the very willingness to sacrifice. This quotation has been torn from my context. I request the Tribunal that I may read the preceding paragraph, so that the whole may be seen in its entirety, and I would like to picture the atmosphere in showing you that I had thousands of young enterprising officers of the Luftwaffe before me, and that I had imbued them with the belligerent spirit. "This is not concerned with the war of attack, but I have prepared you to be brave soldiers" and the quotationswhich have been taken from this document are as follows: "I demand of you nothing impossible. I do not demand of you to be a model. I would like you to be generous and magnanimous. I understand that you are committed to pranks, otherwise you would not be youth, and you may sometimes do pranks which seem crimes, and I will punish you rightly for it, but that is not the decisive factor, the decisive factor is love and honor, that you will be obedient, that you will be men. You may add to that as much as you wish, but once you are in the plane you must be men, determined to meet swift resistance, that is what I demand of you; to be brave and venturesome", and then the following paragraph which has just been read.
" I am of the opinion that you have a weapon of vengeance towards the opponent, but be not concerned with vengeance", but the vengeance corps is a technical expression in German, which does not mean to me what it seems to mean to you. I wish to say something else in this connection, although I do not wish to read anything further. The words which I might use would be entirely untenable, because you have to consider before whom I spoke. In view of the use of that expression in the economic and political preparation, I understand it is with the military consideration which we are concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Stahmer.
THE WITNESS: I would like to say I was commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, and made all the necessary preparations which were necessary for the preparation of a campaign of that nature; that consent, or refusal, or disagreement were not concerned.
DR. STAHMER: Your Honor, I cannot hear. Please continue.
THE WITNESS: From the military point of view the necessary preparations were of course taken. When you are concerned with a new strategic undertaking in which each and every officer had to take care of his military duty, the Luftwaffe in due course received this from me in that vein. I do not feel that the High Tribunal would be interested in the details of how I was concerned with the deployment of my Air Force in a decisive war in which you had to act heavily right from the beginning, and from the first to beat the enemy Air Force, and to destroy it completely. Independent of the purely military consideration and economic preparation, which according to the experience of the prior war, such as Poland, or in the west, these consideration seem essential, and doubly so in the case against Russia. However, in this case we had a completely different construction of economic life from that which we had found in the other countries on the Continent. In this case there was state economy and state ownership. Private economy was not in existence. I was charged with this idea, of course, since the fact existed, and since as plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan I directed the whole economy and decreed matters accordingly.
accordingly for this deployment, and even more so since we had to expect that if a push through Russia would take place large parts of her economic system would be destroyed. From these economic mobilization measures the Green Brief Case resulted. I am of the opinion in each future, as well as the past war of the other side, together with a military and political mobilization, there would have to be an economic mobilization of both sides, otherwise a very unfortunate system would arise. The Green Brief Case, the Gruene Mappe case,had been cited repeatedly, but excerpts had been quoted from the context, and in order to save time I do not wish to quote at length passages from this Green Brief Case that might agree later on when the documents are quoted; but if I were to summarize, and if I were to read that Green Brief Case from the beginning to the end, the High Tribunal would see that in this case a very expedient and important work is involved, especially for an army which was to penetrate into an area which had a completely different economic system. now, perhaps, a sentence or phrase if cited alone, as has been done, would give the wrong picture. Altogether, preparations and other measures were laid down in this work. If economy was obtained from the State, and then you have a hostile contact with this State , there should be a continuance of this economy for your own purposes. But in order to save time I will not read the points which would exonerate me, for on the whole I have stated and wish to explain, that as a matter of course and a matter of duty we would have used Russia for our purposes, the same as Russia is doing now in the area which Russia is occupying in Germany, but the only differentiation is that we would not have dismantled the entire Russian economy up to the last bolt and screw, as it is being done, and those measures result in the course battle. I will take complete responsibility for this document.
Q There has been as a matter of record Document No. 2718-PS, and this has been seized with a note of a conference with the state secretary regarding the case Barbarossa, and, first of all, a state of war can be carried on only if a whole army in the third year can be fed out on the road, and, secondly, that many millions of people will have starved if we take things that are necessary, and we lost those things from the country.