The Fuehrer agreed to this with one condition, that he himself would like to see at least the reproductions of these objects which I wanted, and in many cases it occurred that he wished to earmark these paintings for himself, that is, not for himself but his museum, and that I had to give them back; but from the beginning, I wanted to have a clear preparation or a clear differentiation that those objects which I wanted to have for my own galleries, wanted to buy the things for this gallery, I was willing to pay for those objects; therefore, I established for that an export of art, and a Frenchman, a professor, whose name I don't recall. He was a Frenchman, who had been in Germany, and a man to whom I never talked to before. This man was to estimate the value of these objects. I would then utter my view whether I was interested, whether the price was too high, or whether I would not want to buy the paintings or whether I would wish to buy them and pay the price.
A part of this collection was treated in such a way, but part of this collection was transported back and forth, that is, they were sent to the Fuehrer.
They did not remain with me and after we had reached some understanding, payment was to take place. In this document, in this decree, which I called a "preliminary decree" and which the Fuehrer would have had to approve, I emphasized that all those objects which were to be paid for, that is, things which were not of museum value, were to be sold at auction to French or German businesses or people who were interested and that the monies taken in this way was to go to the families of French people killed in the war. Then I inquired repeatedly where I was to send this money and that in collaboration with French officers, a bank account could and should be established for this purpose. In order to establish this account, the amount of money was always available at my bank even until the end and one day when I inquired again into this matter, I received an answer which surprised me. The answer was that the Reichsschatzmeister was not interested in these monies. I at once wrote on this matter and my secretary can verify this by oath, that I could not understand how the treasurer, the Reichsschatzmeister of the Party, how he was concerned and that I wanted to know the French authorities to whom I could have this account transferred and in this case, the Party, that is, the Party Treasurer, had no authority to dictate to me whether I should pay or not, whether I was myself desirable of making the payment then after this, after France had been occupied, I demanded to know just where I could have these monies transferred. In summarizing and concluding, I wish to stave that I considered these things confiscated for the Reich, as according to the decree, and I believed myself to be justified in purchasing some of these objects, especially since I told not only some of the officials but some of the other people and have never concealed the matter that these objects of art, about the ones I mentioned and already in my possession, were to be used and collected in the gallery of my own desire, which I have already mentioned. straight also. Among these confiscated paintings were some of the modern school -- pictures which I personally did not like and do not like but, as I was told, these pictures were desired in French commercial channels and in answer to that, I stated that as for as I am concerned, even these pictures may be estimated as to value, may be purchased, so that they may be exchanged against old masters, the ones that I an interested in.
I never exerted any pressure in this direction or in this connection, I was only interested as to whether the price that was asked of me was too high and then I was not interested in the offer or I was interested in the offer. I was chiefly interested in whether the offer was sincere and real, but I wish to state again that this was a matter of exchange and I did not use any pressure. After I purchased these objects, I used some of them as well as some of my own and which I had in my prior possession, and used then for general museum trading. That means, one museum was interested in one picture and I was interested, for my gallery, in another picture which was in the possession of the museum and then we traded, and these trading measures often took place with art dealers of foreign countries but not only pictures and objects of art were concerned. I offered in the open market in Germany, Italy, and in other countries, and purchased other objects of art or some that I had in my possession. At this opportunity, I would like to add that independently of the buying, I would like purchasing of these confiscated objects. I, also, in France and other countries, before and after the war, that is, during the war, I would like to say, that on the open market I bought both objects of art and I may add that the situation was as follows, that if I came to Rome, or Florence, or perhaps Paris, or into the Dutch countries, if the people had known in advance that I was coming, in the very shortest time I would have had a dearth of offers, of written offers of every circle, that is, art dealers and private, and that these offers were always present.
There were several misleading offers of some objects that were real and genuine, however, and I was interested, and in the open market I purchased a number of art objects in the course of the year, and professionally did I buy such from private people of whom I had offered some private purchasers.
the beginning I was cheated as soon as it was known that I was interested, and fifty to one-hundred percent were added to the price, and this is the price I had to pay in answer to this question. measures to protect these things? to those especially in the hands of the State museums. Sofar as these State Museums were concerned, I did not confiscate a single article, or in any way remove a single article, There were two trading mediums with the De Louvre on an entirely voluntary basis, and in that case I traded a figurine which is known in art as "La Belle Allemagne." The statue of "La Belle Allemagne" had originated in Germany, and another figurine I had, which had been in my possession for many years, I traded this figure in my possession and other objects or pictures for that statute. protect objects of art wherever destruction was concerned, and to protect them against bombings, and against the rigors of battle, and I remember that when the Directors of the Louvre told me that most of the things had just been put into the rooms of the Loire Castle, then I was concerned when increasing bomb attacks came, and that upon their request, and if they wish it, and if it were necessary, I would advise them to put these articles into safe keeping, and then they told me they had not the transport facilities. international monuments, churches, and anything that is not portable, and in this connection I would like to say, perhaps at no time or another did I issue an order which because of purely military consideration brought about the innercontradiction within myself. I had told flyers repeatedly and strongly, and that under no conditions that all Gothic or other Cathedrals of the French cities were to be protected, and were not to be attacked. They were not to be attacked, even if the mortality and units of troops were concentrated, and, I decreed that if the attack had to be made by the precise Stuka unit which were to be used, that every Frenchman who was present at the time would have to agree that curies, pictures or articles, for instance, in Anions, Chartre, and other cities, that the Cathedrals should be protected, and windows had to be taken cut, and put in safe keeping, but the houses surrounding the Cathedrals were the victims of the attack That was without exception.
That just a small city of Bouvais, where a large Cathedral had been spared of historical value, where the historical value had been determined, they were spared, and contrast that to the scene which later on took place in Germany, and I say the French Government repeatedly appreciated that, and told me of their appreciation in this respect, I have no other comment on that point. black market in France?
A Colonel Veltjens was a colonel in the Reserves. He was a flyer in the first World War, and had entered business after the first World War. Therefore, he was not in the capacity of a colonel, but of a business man. He was not only functioning in the operation of the black market in France, but of Belgium and Holland, and it came about in the following manner.
In a certain period during the occupation it was reported to me that certain things in which I was interested in the direction of war economy had been and were being obtained only in the black market. I then knew the concept of the black market which I learned for the first time. I knew that copper, tin, and other vital metals might be avialable, but they had been buried in the mines of Holland, and had been concealed in other countries, also, but if money were available these objects could be resurrected, but on the basis of confiscatory Decree, which was their view, the raw material would be available to us. At that time, and at every other time, I was interested only in final victory, and that my intents was governed by this determination which was more important to my being able of copper and tin to purchase, as, for example, to get them at any price, no matter what the price might be, rather than not to have them. I did not even have an idea or opinion that the high prices might not be justified, but I told the government it makes no difference what the influence is in it, the Gentian armaments is interested and is in need at all times to get these things, that that is the most important. How you can get them by any means does not matter. If you get them through confiscation, that is all the better. If we are to pay a good deal of money to get them that way, then you will have to do that. The unpleasant thing was that other officers without my knowledge, as the French prosecution showed quite correctly, that the other occupants tried to get the same material also. This rivalry was within our own group, and I now gave Veltjens the sole authority to be the only one to go arena the people to get these materials and n this basis I authorized Veltjens to control these activities, and to eliminate other opponents who were interested in getting the same material; that we might aim, although it is very hard, to combat the black market activities, and we can see that is the only way of doing this thin ugh many reasons. Afterwards, even Veltjans and his organization had been prohibited in the black market, to prevent it, and on special request of Minister President Laval, but even with that can say we could not do away with the black market, and to this end and source, as confirmation of my view, the French prosecution showed that the black market source was too prolonged; that is is still providing after the war and so far as I knew how it is still flourishing in Germany.
These are things which during and after a war arises, and still arises during strict measures due itself to the great demand, and of no supply.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, The Tribunal understands from you that the witness would probably -- that the defendant would, probably finish his examination in chief at midday today. Tell me how how much longer you think the defendant will be with his testimony.
MR. STAHMER: I had counted on being able to conclude my questioning, but there were several interruptions, and I hope to conclude during the course of the afternoon.
THE PRESIDENT: There was no interruption with the exception of that one interruption with reference to Justice Jackson's objection to reprisals. There was no other interruption that I remember.
DR. STAHMER: Yes, there was after the technical disturbance. Your Honor, to which I am referring.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the Tribunal will sit tomorrow morning from ten to one.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours)
BY DR. STAHMER:
Q What were the reasons that led to the attack on Yugoslavia?
Yugoslavian Government. It was part of my foreign policy undertaken but also to come to a close understanding politically.
This was intervene frequently and at times also with Italy.
My intervention into anything but friendly relations.
It is regrettable that Prime directed into the war.
At the time when the signing of that agreement in Greece, also to Greece.
In spite of that agreement we had a pact heard about the background power, the Putsch.
A short time later we the purpose of their undertaking had been.
The new Yugoslav Government in that direction.
Before the Simowitsch incident it is probable that, At the same time, it was evident that Yugoslavia, under the new government, only tried to gain time for her deployment, because during the very same night of the putsch the official orders for mobilization were issued to the Yugoslav Army.
would stick to the agreement, the maneuver was easily to be understood. The situation was the following: if I remember correctly, in October or September 1940. Germany had not been informed of this venture. The Fuehrer was informed by myself, and I had only found out about the incident, and then probably through the foreign office, and immediately he turned back his train on the way from France to Berlin in order to meet the Duce at Florence. why the Fuehrer wanted to talk to him and, if I can remember correctly, the order to the Italian Army to march from Albania to Greece was issued sooner by about 48 hours. It is a fact that the Fuehrer, in his concern to prevent an expansion of the conflict in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean unde all circumstances, wanted to urge the Duce to forego such plans, which were not necessary but only taken for reasons of prestige.
When the meeting took place at 10 o'clock in the morning and the Fuehrer had mentioned this point of view, Mussolini declared that since 6 o'clock on that morning the Italiantroops had already been advancing through Greece and, in his opinion, would shortly reach Athens. circumstances, also, the relations to Turkey would be seriously endangered, and again an area of war would be created, and he did not mention at that time that finally Italy would have to call Germany for help. Thus was the situation at the beginning of the attack against Yugoslavia. unfavorable situation. Thus, only a part of the Yugoslav Army could succeed to get behind the Italian position. Then Italy would not only be eliminated there, but a considerable part of the Italian forces would have been destroyed.
A short time before already the position of those Italian forces was expected to become hopeless, because by the landing of British troops in Greece it could be expected that as soon as they could come to the aid of the Greeks the Italian Army would not only have to withdraw from Greece, where they were standing only shortly inside-the border, but also from Albania, and that then British troops would be in dangerous proximity of Italy and of that part of the Balkans which was economically important for us. time the fate of the Italian Balkan Army would have been decided. Only quickest action could prevent a two-fold danger. First, a catastrophe befalling our Italian ally; and, second, the gaining of a foothold by British troops in the Balkans and a starting position in the expected conflict with Russia. is to say, the troops which should advance on Greece in order to push their British divisions back into the Mediterranean and in order to help the Italian ally, were turned to the right after short and speedy preparations and they were thrown into the flank of the Yugoslav deployment. short time, which was easily possible, and transferred to the airfields in the southeast area, also to support the attack. Only by such quick action, and duo to the fact that we were already prepared for it by the Plan Marietta, Germany was in a position to stave off an extraordinary danger for the entire position in the Balkans and in the southeast area at that moment. Politically and militarily, it would have been a capital crime for the German interests if in that case the Fuehrer had not decided as he did.
Q What targets did the Air Force attack in Yugoslavia first? forces at the outbreak of this war and that their tasks were to be performed at the sane time at great speed and with the greatest possible effect, in order to assure their original task, which was the piercing of the Metaxas line in the north of Greece, and that this could be done in time before British troops, which had already been landed near Athens, could come to the support of the Greek troops along the Metaxas line.
part of the German forces attack that line, while the other part had to throw itself upon the Kugoslav Army, and with insufficient forces had to obtain in the shortest possible time the elimination of that army. Otherwise, it was not only possible that the destruction of the Italian Army could have taken place, but the German Army, thus divided, with part of their forces in Yugoslavia -- the support by Bulgaria came much later -- and with the other forces trying to force the Metaxas line to avoid the British deployment there, that in this dividing of forces the German Army could come into a very difficult and critical and maybe disastrous military situation. Therefore, in this case it had to be used with the greatest effect, in order to see to it that the Yugoslav action of deployment against Germany should be stopped as quickly as possible. Ministry of War in Belgrade, particularly the railroad station, which in Belgrade, in view of the snail number of their lines, was especially important. And then there were several other important centers--the general staff building, etc., because at that time the entire headquarters, politically and militarily, was still located in Belgrade. At that moment everything was still concentrated there, and tie bombing of that nerve center proved to be of the greatest consequence in paralyzing the resistance. reasons: warning. In fact, however, none of the leading personalities in Yugoslavia had the least doubt that Germany would attack. One recognized that because one had feverishly prepared for mobilization. The attacks of the German Army, therefore, were prepared at a time which was before the bombing of Belgrade. But even if we assumed that the air force had made the first attack and then the army, that is, without warning, then still the actions of Yugoslavia had had called for it.
The extraordinary danger of the military situation for us -- we stood in the middle of the most serious struggle and we had to secure the Balkans in both directions. The aims -- and I repeat that, as I remember very well -- the targets were the enemy Ministry of War, the railroad station, the general, staff building, and one or the other ministries. The city, of course, since these buildings were, inside the city, was also hit.
Q During the last days we had repeatedly heard about the serial attacks on Warsaw, Coventry and Rotterdam.
Were these attacks made beyond military necessity? about part of that. But from these statements I can realize again, and it is a matter of course that a commander of an army, an army croup or an air force in the long run can only see a certain sector. As Supreme Commander of the Air Force, however, I am in a position to describe the whole picture, since I, after all, was also the responsible man who gave the orders and following my orders and my point of view the chiefs of the fleets received their instructions and directives as to what they had to do. first morning of the attack on Poland a large number of Polish cities, I believe the British Prosecutor mentioned their names, had been attacked. I do not remember their names anymore. In my directives for the first day of the attack on Poland I said specifically the first target should be the destruction of the enemy air force. Once that had been achieved the other targets could be attacked without difficulty. Therefore, there was an order to attack the following airfields and I am certain withouthaving the names before me that eighty per cent of the names of places mentioned are cities or towns near which there were airfields. a limited measure were important railroad crossings. I point that out because shortly before the last and decisive attack on Warsaw the French military attache in Poland sent a report to his government which we are in a position to submit here and which we found later in Paris, from which it can be seen that even this enemy declared the German Air Force had, in Poland, exclusively attacked military targets -- exclusively and that was underlined. is the wrong expression because it went quickly. Before the surrounding of Warsaw they were first, the airfield Oketche, where the enemy airplanes were concentrated and the railroad station, one of the most strategic railroad stations in Poland. But these were not the decisive attacks which were talked about. But after Warsaw was encircled it was asked to surrender. That surrender was refused, was rejected and I remember and remind you of the proclamation which urged the entire civilian population to offer resistance, not only military but also civilian, which is against international law.
Still we tried again. We dropped leaflets at first, not tombs, in which we urged the population to cease fighting. Secondly, when the commanding officer insisted on his point of view we urged the civilian population to evacuate the city before the bombing. send a messenger and we agreed and waited but no messenger ever came. We did achieve that the diplomatic corps and all neutrals could leave Warsaw along a road which we were to designate and that was done. forced to attack the city most severely when no surrender took place, we thought first to shell the fortifications and then the batteries which had been established within the city. That was the attack on Warsaw.
Rotterdam -- in Rotterdam the situation was entirely different. In order to terminate the campaign in the Netherlands as quickly as possible and to avoid further bloodshed and since we had basically no matters of dispute with the Dutch, I had ordered the use of the use of the parachute division in the back of the troops deployed against us. First of all, in order to capture the three most important bridges, one near Mordeik across the Rhine, the other near Dortrecht and the third near Rotterdam, That paved the way to the roar of the main line of deployment and if that would prove successful the Dutch Army could only hold on for a few days. This use of my parachute division proved entirely successful. Rotterdam got into difficulty. It was surrounded by Dutch troops. Everything hinged on the fact that the railroad bridge and the road bridge should fall into our hands without destruction because then only the last possibility to get at the rear of the Dutch troops would be available. While the main part was in the southern part of Rotterdam a few spearheads of the parachutists had crossed two bridges and fought severely. One was in the railroad station north of the river and the second within a number of buildings of the well-known butter or margerine factory which covered the road bridge. This spearhead held its position in spite of heavy attacks. crossed the Mordeik and Dortrecht bridges and here I would like to correct a mistake which arose during the interrogation of Field Marshal Kesselring by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe.
Lt. General Schmidt belonged to this group which came from the outside, the armored group and he led them. General Student was the leader of the parachute division inside of Rotterdam. That explains the fact that there were negotiations for capitulation with the commander of the troops coming from the outside and secondly, negotiations with the commander of the parachute troops within the city and these two negotiations were considered as one later. could be seen whether it would come to a capitulation or not, and that has only to do with Rotterdam, then the group to the north of the two bridges wasin a very precarious position. Support across the two bridges was extremely difficult. They were under heavy fire, flanking machine gun fire and I could still draw a diagram of the situation. There was also artillery fire taking place so that a few individuals, and I remember the situation very well, were proceeding hanging by their hands from the bridge in order to get across and not be hit by the fire. on the road leading to the north and who were harassing our spearheads it was ordered they be bombed since the parachute troops had no artillery and bombing represents the only artillery of parachutists. I had assured my parachutists before theventure that they would under all circumstances receive the protection by bombers against heavy shelling. There groups of my squadrons were used. The cry for help came from the broadcast station which the paratroopers had established in Rotterdam, which did not function as well as was mentioned here, and from the signals which the plans picked up such as arrows and signs which showed the reconnaissance flyers where the artillery shelling came from, northwest, south.
Thereupon, I ordered the Air Force to use one squadron. The squadron started in three groups, about 25 to 36 planes.
When the first group arrived, as far as I know the negotiations had started, but with no clearly visible results. In spite of that, red flares went up. The first group did not recognize the flares and threw their bombs as ordered, just into that area which was designated. If I remember the figure correctly, there were 36 twin-motored planes which could only have thrown 50-kilo bombs. The second and third groups recognized the red flares, turned around, and did not drop their bombs. The wireless connection went from Rotterdam to my headquarters, Airfleet 2, to division squadron ground position, and from there there was a connection to the planes. That was in May 1940, when generally the wireless connection between ground crow and planes was a fairly good one, but not to be compared with the splendid communications which were marked out later in the course of the war. directly to the planes, that the signals which had been agreed upon had to be used, that is to say, the red flares which were recognized by groups two and three, but not by group one. That can best be seen by the fact that all the buildings which were built of stop and concrete are still standing, but the wood buildings were destroyed. The great extent of that fire was because of structures with large amounts of fats and oils. Secondly, I want to point out -- I want to emphasize this -- that the fire could have been limited. place at 6:00 o'clock in the evening, and I know that well, because during these negotiations there was still shooting going on and the General of the Paratroopers, Student, went to the window during the negotiations and was hit in the head by a bullet, which resulted in serious injury. two generals and their negotiations, one from the outside, the other one from the inside of Rotterdam.
Coventry. From the 6th of September to November, only after repeated warnings to the English Government, and after the Fuehrer had reserved for him self the right to give the order for reprisal attacks on London and had hesitated for a long time, and after German cities which had no military targets had been bombed again and again, then only London was designated as a target for attack.
From the 6th and 7th of September -- the first attack was on the 6th of September in the afternoon -- the German Air Force pounded continuously on London. Although this may have been for reasons of retaliation and political pressure, I still did not consider it an attainable goal. first World War that the people of London can take it and that we could not break their military resistance in this manner. It was important for me, first of all, to prevent an increase of the power of resistance of the British Air Force. As a soldier or, in other words, as Supreme Commander of the German Air Force, the matter of importance to me was to break the enemy air force. designation of Coventry for the target, and that because, according to my information, in and around Coventry there was located a main part of the aircraft industry. Birmingham and Coventry were the most important targets. I decided on Coventry because there the most targets could be hit within the smallest area. the plans and checked them, and at the first opportunity as far as the weather was concerned, a moonlit night, I ordered the attack and gave directives to repeat it until decisive results should be achieved against the British aircraft industry, and then to switch to the next target, Birmingham, and the large motor industry near Bristol and south of London. city's being seriously hit was because of the fact that the industry was widely dispersed over the city, with the exception of two works which were outside of the city, and again in this case a great expansion of damage was achieved by fire. If we look at German cities today, we can see what fire can do. Japan. Were you present at these negotiations?
A I myself did not take part in the negotiations. I can say very little about negotiations with Japan because from a military point of view I had very little to do and seldom met with the Japanese, During the entire war, only once, and for a short time, I received a delegation of Japanese officers, attaches.
Therefore, I cannot say anything about collaboration with Japan. We had made an agreement to exchange war experiences, but that went through the various offices and I had nothing to do with it definitely. Russia necessary? to get into a conflict with Russia under certain circumstances late in fall 1940, in Berchtesgaden. Russian Foreign Minister Molotov? and Molotov. Mr. Molotov, however, paid a visit to me and we discussed the general situation. I know about the conversation with Molotov, however, because the Fuehrer told me everything about it, and it was just that conversation which increased the Fuehrer's suspicion that Russia was getting ready for an attack upon Germany, and that came from discussions during that conversation and demands which Mr. Molotov made then.
They were: First of all, a guarantee to Bulgaria, and a pact of assistance with Bulgaria, such as Russia had made with the three Baltic states. that Russia, which had signed a peace with Finland a short time ago, could attack Finland again and not have to be satisfied with the results of the previous agreement. Bessarabia.
These were the points which were discussed with the Fuehrer. There was also a hint to the Foreign Minister about securing interests at the exit of the Baltic.
The Fuehrer viewed these demands in a different light. Although Russia was especially justified about demands concerning Finland, he still believed that in connection with other reports which ha had received about the Russian state of preparedness, Russia wanted to improve her position in Finland in order to overrun Germany from the north and to get into closest proximity with the Swedish ore mines, which would be of great importance to Germany.