Bulgarian area, it was not absolutely certain, clear, to the Fuehrer that this pressure would not continue in the south, the Dardanelles, or in an eastern direction, but in a western direction, that is to say, that here also Russia would move on the southern flank of Germany and by getting control of the Roumanian oil fields make Germany absolutely dependent on Russia as far as delivery of oil was concerned. In these demands he saw, somewhat camouflaged assurances to gain positions against Germany. He hinted that guarantees concerning the exit of the Baltic was incompatible for Germany at that time. menaced, and already in his discussion with me the Fuehrer had told me why he was considering preparing against the Russian push. The information as to feverish preparations in the area -- nearly accurate -- acquired by Russia in Poland, Lithuania, Bessarabia made him very suspicious. along the entire Eastern border. Further reports came that Russia at the very moment, if Germany would be menaced in the West by British invasion or if Germany should decide on an invasion against England, could attack us in the back. His arguments were strengthened by the fact that shortly before, and against all precedents which we had seen before in Russia, German engineers -- and I believe also artisans -- suddenly were shown the tremendous Russian Industry in the field of aviation, aircraft and tanks. These reports. about the surprisingly high production of these industries strengthened the Fuehrer's conviction and he was so much convinced of it that he said if England -- and that was his political way of thought -- if England continues to refuse any arrangement with us, although she is now fighting alone against us, they must have some ace up their sleeve. facts: first, that increased support by the United States could be expected, at least in the technical field, the armament field. And then still more far-reaching, and secondly -- which he considered more plausible -- that at that time already Churchill had reached an agreement with Russia in that direction, and pointed out that here sooner or later it was come to a clash.
He gave the following calculations: it was necessary to break Russian preparations by quick and strong blows and to weaken the Russian forces so that they would not represent a danger in the rear, when Hitler had to be prepared to fight the British and Americans on the continent. to me. extraordinarily.
Q What was your attitude toward an attack on Russia at that time? later asked the Fuehrer's permission to state my point. It came too surprising for me. Then in the evening I told the Fuehrer the following; start any way against Russia. law or similar reasons. My point of view was decided by political and military reasons only. First, since the coming to power I believe that probably of all leading men in Germany, I considered the conflict with Russia the most threatening menace to Germany. I knew -- and many others like myself -- that in Russia for over ten years an exceedingly strong rearmament and training had taken place, that the standard of living had been lowered on all other fields in favor of rearmament. The shipments of German industry and examinations of shipments from American, British and other industries showed that they contained only such machines that were urgently needed for a rearmament program of the industry. One could even estimate the speed and the extent of the Russian armament program from these shipments. Russian armament in my opinion would have been directed against other sources of danger. But since we had come to power, of course, the political and philosophical contrasts made an important and dangerous role. I understood that such contrasts do not necessarily have to lead to conflicts between states, because the national and political interests will always be stronger and greater than all philosophical contrasts, or even agreements.
But here also I discerned a menace, because what should these tremendous Russian rearmings have to do at a time when Germany was open to a menace of that kind? oversaw a menace threatening from Russia; I still would ask him to rather let this menace continue to exist and, if it was at all possible, to try to direct the interests of Russia against England. And I told him "At present we fight against one of the greatest powers, the British Empire. Though you, my Fuehrer, are not of this opinion, I have to contradict, because I am definitely of the opinion that sooner or later the second great world power, the United States, will march against us, and that will not depend on the reelection of President Roosevelt. The ether candidate will not be able to prevent it. We will be in a struggle against two of the largest powers. It was your masterpiece to make possible at the beginning of the war that there be fighting on one front only, and you have always pointed out that this was important, that in case of a clash with Russia at this time, the third great power would be thrown into the struggle against Germany. We would be alone, isolated again, against practically the entire world. The other nations do not count. And again on two fronts."
He replied, "I do not misunderstand your argument. I do not overlook the Russian menace, any more than anybody else, but if we succeed now in executing our plans in the fight against the British Empire and if we are successful, Russia will not let her attack break loose; only if we should get stuck in a serious struggle in the West, I am of the opinion that the Russian menace will increase."
balance the Polish crisis was given in order to assure that Germany could come to this conflict, because thereby the German-French-British conflict was caused, and it was definitely in the Russian interest to precipitate this conflict and to do it with such advantages as they have done. Russian armaments will only be completed in the year 1942, 1943 or even as late as 1944. Until then, it would have to be possible for us to achieve with respect to England, if not a peace based on victory at least an arrangement. This, however, was only possible if decisive successes could be achieved against England, and at that time the German Air Force with all its power was attacking England. If the German Air Force would have to form a new front, and to deploy for the attack of Russia, considerable numbers, more than half, would have to be thrown to the East, and practically any energetic attack on England could not be carried out any more. All the sacrifices up to that time would have been in vain, England would be given a chance to re-establish and reorganize its aircraft industry which had been shattered. with a deployment of that kind against Russia, my plan which I had submitted to the Fuehrer to attack England in Gibralter and Suez would have to be dropped. The attack on Gibralter by the Air Force was so methodically prepared that according to all expectations no failure could be thought of. The British Air Forces on the small air field north of the Rock were irrelevant. The attack of my paratroopers on the Rock would have been a success. The simultaneous capture of the other side, the African side, and then a push on Casablanca and Dakar would have assured at least that a deployment of American forces such as did happen later on in North Africa would have been impossible, and how far it would have been possible later by arrangements to use islands such as the Cutbert Islands was still to be seen.
It is clear that it would have meant that we could sit on that point of North Africa with planes or U-Boats and harass all convoys coming from North or South Africa, from such favorable positions.
And if the Mediterranean was closed it would not be difficult by pushing across Tripoli to bring the attack against Suez to a successful conclusion. of Gibraltar, North Africa down to Dakar, Suez and possibly in the south, and it was in the south of Seuz, could have been possible with small forces-a number of divisions on the one and the other side, and all the uncertainty of the long Italian coast-line would have been excluded from danger of attack. after the conclusion of such an undertaking to re-examine the military and political situation concerning Russia, and if this basis could be achieved, any favorable position against the United States would have been given to us.
I explained all these reasons in the greatest detail and pointed out again andagain that we had here a relatively secure case which we would lose, as against an insecure one, and that this would have led much rather to an arrangement with England at a time at which one and the other was standing on either side of the Channel armed to the teeth. These were my reasons to delay the date of the attack against Russia, and I also pointed out that if we would be successful in this venture, the Russian armaments could have been channeled possibly into other political directions. I emphasize, however, that the Fuehrer at first had made only general preparations and he told me at that time that he would reserve a decision for the attack and that the final decision was only taken after the Simowitsch Putsch.
.THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(A recess was taken from 1525 to 1540 hours) BY DR. STAHMER: and in paragraph five states the following:
"The Fuehrer is concerned with war against the United States and it is concerned with the occupation of Atlantic Islands."
What can you say to that? been submitted to me. It is concerned with a letter which the Deputy of the Luftwaffe in the OKW, Lt. Colonel von Falkenstein, gave to the chief of my general staff. It is a study of those points which I have just set forth -- occupation of Gibraltar and North Africa and perhaps also the Atlantic Islands -- first of all, bases for combat against England; and secondly, in case -- and I underline "in case" -- in case America should enter the war, to have a better flanking position against their convoys. At that period of time, as far as I was concerned, without having conversed with the Fuehrer, had made research into the execution of enterprises of this nature and this material is, therefore, inconsequential.
Q In this connection, I have a further question. It had been stated that an organization of plans for the year 1950 had been executed.
A This question may be answered briefly. I am familiar with this document, for on two or three occasions it has been mentioned by the prosecution. If, when an expert of the general staff of the powers represented were called in, he would say that this document is of small value. It is a study by the general staff, by the subordinate divisions, in order to work out the best schemes for a leadership organization. It was concerned with whether the leadership should be subordinated to certain offices or whether corps should be formed, whether squadrons should consist of fighters and bombers or whether it should consist of bombers only. These questions were always dealt with either in time of peace or in war, independent of other considerations, that these works are always carried on and they may sometimes be in the possibility of later strategy. In this case, the man who made the study assumed a situation around or up to 1950; he envisaged a two-front war which was not too far beyond possibility -- a war with England and France on the west and Russia in the East -- and the conditions were that Austria and Poland were in our hands. This study never reached my hands. I have just become acquainted with it now, although that is insignificant -- for the study was made in my department and since it was made in my department, it must have been made at my direction. Organization leadership and other considerations were always carried on.
but when inconsequential for political consideration should not be considered in the course of this proceeding. allegedly before this staff of officers in which you said that you had an Air Force, and if a point of hourship came, it should be a mission of vengeance against the opponent, and as to the opponent there should be no question that he was already lost, but nevertheless he should do battle. I shall have this speech submitter to you and I would like to know your attitude you are taking, and what purposes are to be served?
A This quotation has been used by the prosecution twice; first in the beginning, and secondly, just the other day, in the cross-examination of Field Marshal Milch, and we are concerned with the speech which appeared in the book. The speech is called "Comradeship", and the comradeship in this speech is the duty to remember in the comradeship you are willing to sacrifice. This speech was addressed to thousands of Reich officers on the date they took their oath, on the 20th of May in 1936. were being commissioned officers, I told them about the concept of comradeship, the duty and the very willingness to sacrifice. This quotation has been torn from my context. I request the Tribunal that I may read the preceding paragraph, so that the whole may be seen in its entirety, and I would like to picture the atmosphere in showing you that I had thousands of young enterprising officers of the Luftwaffe before me, and that I had imbued them with the belligerent spirit. "This is not concerned with the war of attack, but I have prepared you to be brave soldiers" and the quotationswhich have been taken from this document are as follows: "I demand of you nothing impossible. I do not demand of you to be a model. I would like you to be generous and magnanimous. I understand that you are committed to pranks, otherwise you would not be youth, and you may sometimes do pranks which seem crimes, and I will punish you rightly for it, but that is not the decisive factor, the decisive factor is love and honor, that you will be obedient, that you will be men. You may add to that as much as you wish, but once you are in the plane you must be men, determined to meet swift resistance, that is what I demand of you; to be brave and venturesome", and then the following paragraph which has just been read.
" I am of the opinion that you have a weapon of vengeance towards the opponent, but be not concerned with vengeance", but the vengeance corps is a technical expression in German, which does not mean to me what it seems to mean to you. I wish to say something else in this connection, although I do not wish to read anything further. The words which I might use would be entirely untenable, because you have to consider before whom I spoke. In view of the use of that expression in the economic and political preparation, I understand it is with the military consideration which we are concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Stahmer.
THE WITNESS: I would like to say I was commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, and made all the necessary preparations which were necessary for the preparation of a campaign of that nature; that consent, or refusal, or disagreement were not concerned.
DR. STAHMER: Your Honor, I cannot hear. Please continue.
THE WITNESS: From the military point of view the necessary preparations were of course taken. When you are concerned with a new strategic undertaking in which each and every officer had to take care of his military duty, the Luftwaffe in due course received this from me in that vein. I do not feel that the High Tribunal would be interested in the details of how I was concerned with the deployment of my Air Force in a decisive war in which you had to act heavily right from the beginning, and from the first to beat the enemy Air Force, and to destroy it completely. Independent of the purely military consideration and economic preparation, which according to the experience of the prior war, such as Poland, or in the west, these consideration seem essential, and doubly so in the case against Russia. However, in this case we had a completely different construction of economic life from that which we had found in the other countries on the Continent. In this case there was state economy and state ownership. Private economy was not in existence. I was charged with this idea, of course, since the fact existed, and since as plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan I directed the whole economy and decreed matters accordingly.
accordingly for this deployment, and even more so since we had to expect that if a push through Russia would take place large parts of her economic system would be destroyed. From these economic mobilization measures the Green Brief Case resulted. I am of the opinion in each future, as well as the past war of the other side, together with a military and political mobilization, there would have to be an economic mobilization of both sides, otherwise a very unfortunate system would arise. The Green Brief Case, the Gruene Mappe case,had been cited repeatedly, but excerpts had been quoted from the context, and in order to save time I do not wish to quote at length passages from this Green Brief Case that might agree later on when the documents are quoted; but if I were to summarize, and if I were to read that Green Brief Case from the beginning to the end, the High Tribunal would see that in this case a very expedient and important work is involved, especially for an army which was to penetrate into an area which had a completely different economic system. now, perhaps, a sentence or phrase if cited alone, as has been done, would give the wrong picture. Altogether, preparations and other measures were laid down in this work. If economy was obtained from the State, and then you have a hostile contact with this State , there should be a continuance of this economy for your own purposes. But in order to save time I will not read the points which would exonerate me, for on the whole I have stated and wish to explain, that as a matter of course and a matter of duty we would have used Russia for our purposes, the same as Russia is doing now in the area which Russia is occupying in Germany, but the only differentiation is that we would not have dismantled the entire Russian economy up to the last bolt and screw, as it is being done, and those measures result in the course battle. I will take complete responsibility for this document.
Q There has been as a matter of record Document No. 2718-PS, and this has been seized with a note of a conference with the state secretary regarding the case Barbarossa, and, first of all, a state of war can be carried on only if a whole army in the third year can be fed out on the road, and, secondly, that many millions of people will have starved if we take things that are necessary, and we lost those things from the country.
Do you know about this substance of this conversation , and do you know about the note?
I got to know this document when it was submitted to me here. It seems to we insecure.
We can not tell elearly just who was present at the meeting, what was talked about, and who had the responsibility for the nonsense that is expressed therein. It is a matter of course, but in the framework of the many expert conferences which took place many things were discussed and said which are entirely nonsensical and appear such. of there had been no war with Russia. Conditions were notas they seemed to be in this quotation, "In order to feed the German Army we would have to attack Russia." before the attack on Russia the German Army was fed and would have been fed thereafter. But if we had to march into Russia and march through, of course it was a matter of course that the army would be fed from the territory at hand in the country. one march in its larger scale and in its larger proportions, can not prove that many, many millions on the other side can therefore starve; for a soldier cannot eat so much on one hand while on the other it would not be sufficient for numbers three times that much. As a matter of fact and de facto, the population of Russia did not starve. Of famine there was the sphere of possibility, however, but not because the German Army was to be fed out of Russia, but because through the destruction of agricultural implements; through the transporting away of other agricultural implements; and through the destruction of seed. was partially destroyed by the retreating Russian troops, and this harvest could not be brought in in large proportions; and great dangers existed for fall and spring cultivating of the field, for implements and seed were not present. or transported everything away, but because Germany was very much obliged to use her on materials, that is, machines of an agricultural nature, and brought everything of that nature along, including seed. And the troops were not fed out of the country but received their supplies from Germany, and this had to be done so.
Beyond this hay had to be brought from Germany. Only through the greatest efforts of organization and administration and in cooperation with the local population slowly a balance could be met on the agricultural sector, and a surplus was achieved for Germany.
mentioned, In this connection, Leningrad was a fortress which was besieged, and in the history of war there isno similar example that thebesieger would supply the beleaguered city with foodstuffs so that they could resist longer and more strongly. The history of wars has always shown that blockaders will do everything to force capitulation by a cutting of foodstuffs and other supplies. Neither under international law or on the basis of historical law should we feed fortresses which were resisting us.
Q And what part did the Luftwaffe have in the attack on Leningrad?
A The Luftwaffe air defense of Leningrad was very weak. The north sector of our attack was very poorly supplied with air defense. We had several tasks. At notime was there a concentrated attack byour air force on Leningrad, like we had made on other cities, or attacks which had been made on German cities. The Fuehrer not once but repeatedly, in the presence of other gentlemen at briefing sessions, accused me that apparently the German Luftwaffe didn't dare go into Leningrad. I replied, "So long as my Luftwaffe is ready to go into the hell of London it will be equally prepared to go into the much less-defended area of Leningrad, but I lacked the means, and besides you must not give me too many tasks for my air force in the north of the front, such as the routing of supplies through the Ladoga Sea and other considerations." Bayniaby, and other targets which had Soviets stationed there. Force was interested in destroying museums, and he said that under oath.
But a later witness which was not under oath -- and I don't exactly remember the names -- was under the impression that my Luftwaffe was especially interested in using his cathedrals as a target.
I would like to call to your attention in this connection -- and it may even be comprehended by non-experts -- St. Petersburg was at the very front of the fighting, and it was not important to attack it so much, for heavy and light artillery was quite sufficient to attack the city. state property? question, and that was that much destruction allegedly took place in Russia, and moving pictures were shown to this effect which, impressive as they may be but not impressive to a German -- for they showed only a modest proportion of the destruction which we suffered in our own cities. But I would like to point out that much of this destruction took place in the course of battle; that it was not intentional; not for the purpose of destroying by artillery or from the air. And historical cities were involved; cities of art were involved when the battle was raging. highly honored, and we would not intend to harm any of their monuments and we never had any such intentions. it only such property that was confiscated. As far as I know, yes. Private property is mentioned in the official reports. So far as the winner of 1941 and 1942 there might have been in the matter of furs or perhaps fur boots, and some soldiers took some of these smaller articles from the people. But on the whole there was no private property, and as such could not be confiscated. I personally can speak only of a small fragment, and by that I mena the surroundings of the City of Winitza and the city of Winitza itself. my headquarters were at that city when I was there. I repeatedly visited the city and the outlying peasant estates, because I was interested in life there, and I saw poverty of such huge extent that I can not understand just what we should have or could have taken there. This is just an insignificant but constructive example; empty marmelade jars, empty tin cans, empty cigar boxes or cigarette boxes -- that the peasants were anxious to get these insignificant articles and were interested in trading eggs, for the peasants were interested in these articles and considered then very desirable.
concerned and learned personally and from Germans there were no theatres destroyed. I know just one theatre at the Winitza. I had visited the artists who were appearing there and I saw the ballet. I procured material, dresses, and allied materials for them because they were completely out of those things. concerned, there I attended the dedication of the largest church which for years prior to that time had been a powder magazine, and under the German administration was reinstated as a church.
The clergy requested me to be present at this dedication, but I had to decline because I do not belong to theOrthodox Church.
store in the Winitza that was completely empty. tioned by the French Prosecution? destroyed industry everywhere that this accusation is incorrect and that for our own purposes we had to reconstruct industry. I would like to call attention to the dam of Dnieper Potrowsk as the determining factor for the electrification of the upper region. earth policy, the policy that had been decreed by Russia and which had been executed by Russia. This scorch earth policy created a very curious situation, and it took much effort on our part to meet the situation. Therefore, from the economic point of view, we had much reconstruction to do. that over and beyond that which took place in the course of battle, there were parts of cities that had been mined and at the proper time went into the air, and, of course, had many German victims. I can cite Odessa and Kiev as special examples.
NowI am coming to the question of Camp Dora. This is the first time that I have had knowledge of this concept. Of course, I know of the subterranean works which were near Nordhausen. I personally never visited them, but they had been established quite early. Production was carried on there. lieve that they are exaggerated. Of course, I knew that subterranean works did exist, and I was interested in having material manufactured for the Luftwaffe, and I can not see that subterranean works should be of an especially serious or perhaps a destructive character. I had one important subterranean work at Kala for Luftwaffe armament. German workers, to a large part, were there; some Russian workers and some Russian prisoners of war were there, and I personally saw what was going on and found everyone in good spirits, and saw that they received additional rations and brought cigarettes and other things to them.
internees were not put into existence. That I requested inmates of concentration camps for the armament of the Luftwaffe is correct and it is to be taken as a matter of course. I was not aware of the inner workings of the concentration camps. I knew that many Germans were in concentration camps. Some of them had refused to join the Army, who were politically unreliable, who had been punished in other ways. During times of war, such conditions existed in other countries also, and, as in other countries, everyone had to work in Germany. Women were taken into the labor front, including those who had never worked before in their lives. In my own home, parachutes were manufactured. Everyone had to participate in this work, and I could not see why, if the rest of the German population were working, the inmates of prisons and concentration camps should not also work and be put to use for the work essential to the war.
concerned, from what I know today, it was better for them to work in the aerial armament works than perhaps in their own concentration camps. course, and that they worked for armament purposes is a matter of course, but that that work would mean destruction is a new concept. It may be that it might be envisaged, but I for my part was interested in having these people work rather than having them destroyed and to have them produce value, and I was interested in having them do the same work as the German people did -that is, aerial accessories. I was not interested in having them destroyed. those batteries which were in certain localities and were permanently stationed there. We were concerned in this case with volunteers. These were chiefly Russian prisoners of war, but not entirely so, so far as I remember. think alike. Certain East battalions were made up of volunteers, and a large number of volunteers arose when the announcements for flak batteries were made. We had an entire division of volunteers -- Russian prisoners-of-war -who were ready to fight against their own country. I was not especially impressed with these people, but during war, you take what you can get, and the other side did the same thing. The volunteers were ready to go into the flak work because there their work was less; their supplies were better, and whatever other reasons they may have had I do not know, but if a local German flak battery in, say the year 1944 or 1945, were to be looked at, I will admit that it created a rather strange impression. There were young men -people of fifteen to eighteen -- old men between fifty-five and sixty, some women, some volunteers of all nations, but they shot, and that was the deciding thing.
A I already mentioned this. In the Four Year Plan in 1938 there was a general plenipotentiary for the labor frnt.
It was decreed in the year 1936. In the year 1942, after he had been ill and had beenrepresented by somebody else, through the direct calling of a new general plenipotentiary for the labor front. It was told me by the Fuehrer. I was surprised I had not been consulted. At that time the fuehrer had acted independently in the matter of all problems. He did so in this. The labor problem became increasingly more difficult from day to day. It had been suggested to him to put in a new man, but a Gauleiter of a different name who came from Silesia, but the Fuehrer decided on the Gauleiter from Thuringia, Sauckel. He made him plenipotentiary. This order was countersigned by Lammers, not by myself, but these are just inconsequential remarks. He was formally taken into the Four Year Plan, for the Four Year Plan had the general authority for all things of the economy. Even Goebbels, a plenipotentiary for total war with which I was not connected in any way, was taken into the authority for the Four Year Plan, and the authority of the Four Year Plan had grown up gradually. from the Fuehrer, for the Fuehrer increasingly acted more independently. I hailed the appointment of Sauckel for I considered him one of the calmest Gauleiters and was convinced that he would give his full attention to the task. The connection of the offices of the Four Year Plan was kept, and when important measures were concerned, Sauckel and the officers of the Four Year Plan worked together.
Sauckel himself lectured to me on several occasions after he had visited with the Fuehrer, and told me of those reports which he sent to the Fuehrer.
If not in detail, on the whole I was informed.
Q In March of 1944, 75 English fliers, Stalag Luft 3, escaped. As you no doubt knew, 50 of these officers after their recapture were shot by the SD. Did this order for shooting come through you, and didyou know about this measure? attention, unfortunately, at a later period of time. When the attempt at escape of the 75 or 80 English flier officers occurred in the last third of March, I was at that time on leave, as I can prove. I heard, one or two days later, about this escape. these escapees had been brought back into the camp, I assured that in this case the sane would apply. couldn't give me the exact figure at the time, of these escaped fliers had been shot, and knowledge of this was in the Luftwaffe, and there had been conversations and reprisals were expected. I asked from whom he had had his information. He said he knew only that a part of the escaped men had been recaptured by the guards in the vicinity of the camp and had been done to those men. On the other hand, those who had been recaptured at a greater distance from the camp, he knew only about their fate that part of them had been shot. a definite figure, and said that he had received this order from the Fuehrer. I called his attention to the fact that this was really impossible, and that the English officers had been duty bound to try one or two escapes and that we were fully cognizant of this fact. He said he had contradicted the Fuehrer in this matter, but that the Fuehrer had insisted absolutely, and the Fuehrer had said that these attempts at escape were endangering security not understand such measures, and if he had received such orders he would please inform me before carrying them through so that I would have the possibility to prevent such orders from being carried through if possible.