"B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite NO.
"The general increase of living standards, compared with thirty to forty years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand and an increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used for covering the increased demand, therefore they represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could not be avoided." I interpolate, that if I understand him he means by that, no autarchy; we must participate in world trade and commerce.
"The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increase catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.
"Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationalisation is impossible in a continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but not a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally.
"Participation in world economy. There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do not offer any guarantee for practical execution.
It must be considered on principle that since the World War, (1914-18), as industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonies again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonisation; in Japan and Italy economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, and economic need will also drive Germany to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.
"The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. There is a pronounced military weakness in those states who base their existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are dominated by Britain, it is more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in wartime.
The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living spree, an endeavor which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in Geneva and in satisfied states. Should the security of our food situation be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is not a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material-producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two generations. What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root (I interpolate, there is a German word "Volksstamm", racial root) has for this purpose the most favorable foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all times-- Roman Empire British Empire-- has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.
(Whereupon at 1130 a short recess was taken).
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, after the somewhat jumbled discussion which I have just read of geopolitical economic theory and of the need for expansion and "Lebensraum", Adolph Hitler, in those horse-back notes, posed the question--and I quote:
"The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.
"German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strong points overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in Europe.
"England is not in a position to code any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian ownership, a return of East Africa can no longer be expected. Any resistance on England's part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are not in British hands, for example, Angola. French favors would probably be of the same nature.
"A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well armed. The Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakeable." Meaning, I take it, the British Empire.
"Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy.
Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of ago which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient Rome.
"Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possession only allied with other states and not by its own power. How could England alone, for example, defend Canada against attack by America, or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by Japan?
"The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect:
"(a) Ireland's struggle for independence.
"(b) Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her half measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilize the non-fulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon against Britain.
"(c) The weakening of the British position in the Far East by Japan.
"(d) The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which--by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius--expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the Abyssinian War is a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the Mohammedan World.
"It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland, is nine to one, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must not allow the level of our population to become too low." I take it he meant by that: "Keep the population of occupied territories low in comparison with ours."
"France's position is more favorable than that of England. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments, whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless, we have to take the following into our political consideration as power factors:
"Britain, France, Russia and the adjoining smaller states.
"The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great for Silesia, and Bismarck's wars against Austria and France had been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870 had prevented Austria from participating in the war.
If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions 'when' and 'how'. In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases."
I interpolate: The Tribunal will recall the specific allegation in the Indictment that at this meeting there emerged three different plans, any of which might be utilized.
"Case 1. Period 1943-45: After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The rearming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers' Corps, are practically concluded." but he is contemplating the period 1943-1945.
"Our material equipment and armaments are modern; with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of 'special weapons' cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.
"In comparison with the rearmament, which will have been carried out at the time by other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943-45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do not possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a 'point of weakness in the regime.! Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly.
Whilst other "What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45 no one knows today.
It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.
"On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice but to act.
If solve the German space problem no later than 1943-45.
The necessity for "Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an internal "Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against Czechoslovakia cannot 'proceed' against Germany.
"For the improvement of our military political position it must be from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards.
In the case of Czechoslovakia would declare war on the same day as France.
However, Czechoslovakia's desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened.
Its actual "Once Czechoslovakia is conquered -- and a mutual frontier, Germany conflict could more easily be relied upon.
Our agreements with Poland remain valid only as long as Germany's strength remains unshakeable; should "Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943 to '45, then the behaviour in the following manner:
"The Fuehrer believes personally, that in all probability England day be cleaned up by Germany.
The difficulties in the British Empire war against Germany.
The British attitude would certainly not remain without influence on France's attitude.
An attack by France, without stagnate along our Western fortifications.
Without England's support, it would have as a consequence, the enmity of Great Britain.
Naturally of our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria.
It must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia's defence measures will of years.
Although the population of Czechoslovakia, in the first carried out.
The annexation of the two States to Germany, militarily "No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part of Italy; however,, it cannot be judged today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question, since it would depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.
"The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland's attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious Germany, with Russia in the rear.
"Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this needs to be taken into consideration at all, in view of Japan's attitude.
"Should Case 2 occur - paralysation of France by a Civil War - then the situation should be utilised at any time for operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany's most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.
"The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from the existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur, he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.
"Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the war in Spain, the Fuehrer does not see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by France, (the English text says France -- it means Franco) a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view, a one hundred per cent victory by France is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should France be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula, it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the Balearic Isles can not be tolerated either by France or by England and could lead to a war by France and England against Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in white (that is France's) hands, could participate on the side of Italy's enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via Germany. The Fuehrer believes that Italy's military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against France on the Western frontier and carry out operations against France from Libya, against the North African French colonial possessions. discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper Italy would be extremely difficult, and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany, France will have, at its disposal, solely the metropolitan fighting forces."
"French lines of communication by the Italian fleet --" must mean "Fresh lines --" or something in that connection.
"If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be assumed that England -being at war with Italy -- would not decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British support, a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be anticipated.
"The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made independent of the course of the Italian-French-English war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military operations by these three States. The Fuehrer was also not thinking of military agreements with Italy, but in complete independence and by exploiting this unique favorable opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the 'speed of lightning', the German words being, 'blitzartig schnell'.
"Fieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with Italy would not bind the French Army to such an extent that it would not be in a position to commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von Fritzch estimated the French forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against Italy to be in the region of twenty divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications -- which was pointed out particularly by Generalfieldmarshal von Blomberg -- the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement.
With regard to our offensive in a Southeasterly direction, Fieldmarshal von Blomberg drew special attention to the strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which had assumed the character of a Maginot Line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.
"Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions, he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on the 10 November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuehrer, who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to statements by Generalfieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch regarding England and France's attitude, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain's non-participation and that consequently he did not believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict, already mentioned, lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence operations against Czechoslovakia immediately.
If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then Germany would. for thetime being, have to side with this attitude.
"In view of the information given by the Fuhrer, Generaloberst Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain, The Fuehrer agreed to this, insofar as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.
"The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.
"(Signed) Hoszbach", and there are other notations.
In this connection I invite the Court's attention to the allegation in Paragraph 3 (a) of Section IV F of the Indictment, on page 7 of the printed English text, relating to a meeting of an influential group of Nazi conspirators on November 1937, the document just introduced and read into evidence is the specific evidentiary support for that allegation. The Anschluss with Austria, under military pressure from the Nazis, occurred in March 1938. We shall give you detailed evidence concerning that in due course. So will we, as to details of the aggression against Czechoslovakia, including the pressure on Czechoslovakia that resulted in the Munich Pact of September 1938, and the violation of that Pact itself by Germany, on March 15, 1939. There is much of interest in the secret documents relating to those aggressions. Tribunal one more captured document, which reveals in all its nakedness the truth concerning the deliberateness of the aggressions against Czechoslovakia. This document consists of a file kept by Colonel Schmundt, Hitler's adjutant. The file was found by one of the units of the 327 Glider Infantry, in a collar of the Platterhof, OberSalzburg, near Berchtesgaden. The file represents a work-file of originals and duplicates, incidental to the preparations for the annexation of Czechoslovakia.
I should like to ask the Tribunal to examine, particularly, the photostat of the original German of this file. We have copies of those photostats. Something in physical form is lost in transcribing a translation. The picture of the original file, including pictures of the telegrams, give a sense of the reality of the evidence that is lost in the transcribed translation. The file is numbered Document No. 388 PS, in our numbered series of documents.
I thought perhaps I might read the German title. It is "Grundlagen zur Studie Gruen", that is the main plan for "Case Green", Green being a codeword for the aggression against Czechslovakia.
I offer the entire file in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 26 and will ask that photostats be passed up to the Court. I offer the file, if the Tribunal please, with, of course, the understanding and realization that only such parts of it as I read of it will immediately go into evidence; but we shall refer to other parts from time to time later, in the presentation of the case. The material in this file will be dealt with in greater detail at a later point in my presentation. However, at this point, I desire to call attention to Item No. 2 in the file.
Item No. 2 is dated 22 April 1938. It is the second sheet of the English translation. It is a summary, prepared by Schmundt, the adjutant, of a discussion on 21 April, 1938 between Hitler and the defendant Wilhelm Keitel. This item, like the other items in the file, relates to "Case Green". As I said, "Case Green" was a secret code word for the planned operations against Czechoslovakia. This meeting occurred within approximately one month following the successful annexation of Austria. In the carrying out of the conspiracy, it became necessary to revise the "plan Green", to take into account the changed attitude, as a result of the bloodless success against Austria. I shall now read Item 2 of this file.
"Berlin, 22 April 1938.
"Bases of the Dissertation on "Gruen."
"Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General Keitel of 21 April:
"A. Political Aspect.
"1). Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.
"2). Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.
"3). Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (for example. assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration.)
"Military Conclusions.
"1). The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities (2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one since "Gruen" will have taken security measures.
"2). The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail - which is unavailable, but should be cut down as far as possible - must not impede a lightning-swift blew at the time of the action.
"3). 'Separate thrusts' are to be carried out immediately with a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of reads, composition of the columns according to their individual tasks.) Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.
"The Air Force is to support the individual columns (for example divebombers; sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)
"4). Politically, the first four days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished Facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils) and demoralize 'Gruen.'
"Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pilsen, Prague.)
"5). If possible, separation of transport movement 'Rot' from 'Gruen'," 'Rot' was the code name for their then plan against the West. "A simultaneous strategic concentration 'Rot' can lead 'Rot' to undesired measures. On the other hand, it must be possible to put 'Case Rod' into operation at any time.
"C. Propaganda.
"1).Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland.)
"2). Loaflets with throats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).
"( initialled by Schmundt)." noted particularly paragrapg 3, under the heading "Political Aspect", which reads as follows: "Lightening-swift action as the result of an incident (example: Assassination of German ambassador as an up-shot of an anti-German demonstration)." The document as a whole, establishes that the conspirators were planning the reation of an incident to justify to the world their own aggression against Czechoslovakia. It establishes, I submit, that consideration was being given to assassinating the German ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident.
This is alleged in Paragraph 3, (c) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, appearing at Page 8 of the printed English text of the Indictment. case, when this particular allegation was reached, the defendent Goering shook his head slowly and solemnly in the negative. I can well understand that he would have shaken his head, if he believed the allegation of the Indictment to be untrue. In the course of Justice Jackson's opening address, when this same matter was referred to, the defendent Goering again solemnly shook his head. On this allegation the Prosecution stands on the evidence just submitted, the denials of the defendent Goering, notwithstanding. recess?
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn now until 2 o'clock, (Whereupon, at 12:
30 o'clock p.m. the Tribunal recessed until 2 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)
Tribunal, in the matter of: The United States of America,
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, as I suggested earlier, the next phase of the aggression was the formulation and execution of the plan to attack Poland and with the resulting initiation of aggressive war in September 1939. This is covered by paragraph 4 (a) and (b) of Section IV of the indictment appearing on Page 9 of the printed English text. of the Adjutant Schmundt has provided us with a document in his own Handwriting, which lets the cat out of the bag. That may be a troublesome colloquialism to translate. I don't know. The document consists of minutes of a conference held on 23 May '39. The place of the conference was the Fuehrer's Study in the Now Reich Chancellery. The Defendant Goering was present.
(The Defendant Frick at this point made a statement in German, which was not translated.)
MR. ALDERMAN: I think one of the defendants indicated I had referred to the wrong year. My notes show 23 May 1939. That is shown by the original document.
THE PRESIDENT: Which document are you referring to?
MR. ALDERMAN: That is document L79. As I said, the Defendant Goering was present. The Defendant Raeder was present. The Defendant Keitel was present. The subject of the meeting was, and I quote: "Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims." This document is of historical importance, second not even to the political will and testament of the Fuehrer, recorded by Adjutant Hoszbach.
THE PRESIDENT: Could the Marshal of the Court shut the window which is creating a draft here?
MR. ALDERMAN: The original of this document when captured found its way through the complicated channels across the Atlantic to the United States. There it was found by members of the staff of the American prosecution, by then taken to London, and thence to Nuernberg. The "L" on the identifying number indicates that it is one of the documents which was assembled in London and brought from there here. We think the document is of unquestioned validity. Its authenticity and its accuracy as a record of what transpired at the meeting of 23 May 1939, stands admitted by the Defendant Keitel in one of his interrogations. As I say, the number is document L79 in our numbered series. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit United States 27. cally and as bearing on the issues now presented to the Tribunal that I feel obliged to read most of it. At the top:
"Top Secret "To be transmitted by officer only "Minutes "of a Conference on 23 May 39 "Place:
The Fuehrer's Study, Now Reich Chancellery. "Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.
"Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Admiral Raeder. Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Adml. Schniewindt, Col.(G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.)Warlimont, Lt.-Col. (G.S.)Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), Lieut-Commd. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).