Hitler's own eloquence in a secret speech delivered to all supreme commanders on 23 November 1939, at 1200 hours, is sufficient to characterize this phase of the Nazi conspiracy. This document comes to hand as a captured document found in the OKW files -- OKW is Ober Kommand of the Wehrmacht, the High Command of the Army, Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces -- and was captured at Flensbeerg. The document is numbered 789-PS in our numbered series of documents. original of this document in the condition in which it was captured, and I wish to offer the document in evidence and have it given the proper serial number as the United States Prosecutors exhibit. The serial number, I understand, is United States Exhibit 23. I would ask that the German text of the orignal be handed to the interpreters, the German interpreters. by the presiding justice,although I have offered the entire document, it is a very long speech, and I shall not read into the record the entire speech. Of course the presiding judge said defense counsel may insert any other parts of it as they wish. more than half of the first page in the English text. I am advised that the German original is marked with a blue pencil at the point where I shall stop reading. I will read the English translation:
"November 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Fuehrer, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Fuehrer gives the following speech:
"The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea of the world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of our armed forces was only possible in connection with the ideological" -- the German word is "weltanschaulich" -- "education of the German people by the Party." German word, weltanschaulich. I take it that ideological is about as close a translation as we can get, but the word means more than that. It means a whole attitude towards the world, the way of looking on the world.
"When I started my political task" -- I am quoting again --" in 1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough observation of the events of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief in the midst of setbacks which were not spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has had the last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had a clear recognition of the probable course of historical events, and the firm will to make brutel decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I after long internal conflict become a politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a new system, of selection. I wanted to educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 years I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many setbacks. When I came to power in 1953, a period of the most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the armed forces. First reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism.
While reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second task: to release Germany from its international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be pointed out: secession from the League of Nations and denunciation of the disarmament conference. It was a hard decision. The number of prohets who predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of believers was very small. I was supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions.
After that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 the introduction of cumpulsory armed servive. After that militarization of the Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in me was very small. Then beginning of the fortification of the whole country especially in the west.
"One year later, Austria came" -- I suppose he meant Austria went -"this step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was mot possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten - German territory. That was only partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate, and with that basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the east and then in the west, or vice - versa". of Adolf Hitler's speeches. In one sentence he combines guidance by providence with the making of brutal decisions. He constantly speaks of how very few people were with him, and yet the mass of the German people were with him. But he does give a brief summary of the gist of what is contained in the allegations of our Indictment, to which I have invited your attention: The organization of the mass of the people, then extending to the armed forces, and the various brutal decisions that he did make about which history knows.
That long document contains other material of great interest. It may be that we shall advert to other portaions of it later. At this point, however, I have simply asked the Court to focus attention to the matter I have just read and its bearing on the development of the conspiracy during the period 1933 to 1936.
ations for war in which the Nazi conspirators were engaged during this period. I refer to a top secret letter dated 24 June 1935, from General von Brauchitsch to the Supreme Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. Attached to that letter is a copy of a secret Reich's Defense law of 21 may 1935, and a copy of a decision of the Reichcabinet of 21 May 1935 on the council for the defense of the Reich.
These documents were captured in the OKW files at Fechenheim. This group of documents is numbered 2261 -PS in our numbered series of documents. It seems to us one of the most significant evidences of secret and direct preparations for aggressive war.
I gave expression to a typographical error. That was General von Blomberg instead of Brauchitsch.
I have the original of these documents. I ask that they be admitted into evidence as Exhibit, USA, 24. signed "von Blomberg, Berlin, 24 June 1935,"Top Secret" headed "The Reichs Minister of War and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, No. 1820/35 Top Secret L II a."
"To : The Supreme Commander of the Army "In the appendix I trans mit one copy each of the law for the defense of the Reich of the 21 May 1935, and of a decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 concerning the Reich's defense council.
The publication of the Reich's defense law is temporarily suspended by order of the Fuehrer and Reich chancellor.
"The Fuehrer and the Reichschancellor has nominated the President of the directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht to be 'plenipotentiary general for war economy."
"I request that the copies of the Reich's defense law needed within the units of the armed forces be ordered before 1 July 1935 at armed forces office (L) where it is to be established with the request that the law should only be distributed down to Corps Headquarters outside of the Reichministry of war.
"I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more."
That is signed by "von Blomberg." Underneath that is an indorsement "Berlin, 3 September 1935; No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a. To DefenseEconomic Group G-3, copy transmitted (signed) Jodl." to as the Reich's defense law of 21 May 1935, or: rather it was enacted by the Reichscabinet, and it starts with the statement:
" The Reichs Cabinet has enacted the following law that is hereby made public." defense, mobilization, appointment of this plenipotiary-general for war eceonomy, with plenipotentiary authority for the economic preparation of the war, and a Part III providing for setting of penalties.
The law is signed "The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, Adolf Hitler; the Reichsminister of war, von Blomberg; The Reichsminister of the Interior, Flick," one of the defendants. At the bottom of it there is this note. That is on Sheet 4 of the original German, I think:
"Note on the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935.
"The publication of the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935 will be suspended. The law became effective 21 May 1935.
"The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, Adolf Hitler."
*---* Nov-M-4 public, the publication was suspended by Adolf Hitler; although the law became effective immediately. cabinet of 21 May 1935 on the Council for the Defense of the Realm which deals largely with organization for economic preparation for the war and which I think was discussed by my colleague, Mr. Dodd, last week. stone of war preparations of the Nazi conspirators. The relationship of the defendant Schacht to this preparation is made transparently clear by this captured document. spiracy, 1933 to 1936. lation and execution of plans to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, in that order. This is the phase of the aggression covered by paragraphs 3(a), (b), and (c) of section IV(F) of the Indictment, appearing at pages seven to eight of the printed English text of the Indictment. ments which have come to hand is a document which we have come to know as the Hoszbach notes of a conference in the Reichs Chancellery on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours, in the course of which Hitler outlined to those present the possibilities and necessities of expanding their foreign policy, and requested, I quote, "That his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament." And so with this document we shall present to the Tribunal and to the public the last will and testament of Adolph Hitler as he contemplated that last will and testament on 5 November 1937. The document comes to hand through the United States Department of State, and it is authenticated by the seal of the Secretary of State of the United States (indicating). It is numbered Document No. 386-PS in our numbered series of documents. I offer it in evidence as U. S. Exhibit No. 25.
minutes of this meeting, then Colonel Hoszbach, was the Fuehrer's adjutant. I note also the presence in this conspiratorial meeting of the defendant Erich Raeder. The defendant Constantin von Neurath was present. The defendant Hermann Wilhelm Goering was present. The minutes of this meeting reveal a crystallization towards the end of 1937 in the policy of the Nazi regime. Austria and Czechoslovakia were to be acquired by force. They would provide lebensraum (living room) and improve Germany's military position for further operations. While it is true that actual events unfolded themselves in a somewhat different manner than that outlined at this meeting, in essence the purposes stated at the meeting were carried out. The document destroys any possible doubt concerning the Nazis' premeditation of their crimes against peace. This document is of such tremendous importance that I feel obliged to read, it in full into the record.
"Berlin, 10 November 1937. Notes on the conference in the Reichskanzlei on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours.
"Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor;
"The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. Blomberg;
"The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr v. Fritsch;
"The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h.c. Raeder;
"The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst Goering;
"The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v. Neutath;
"Oberst Hoszbach (the adjutant who took the minutes).
"The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today's conference was of such high importance, that its detailed discussion would certainly in other states take place before the Cabinet in full session. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided not to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences of his four and a half years in government; he desired to explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy and in the interests of a far-signted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament."
The Fuehrer then stated: "The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space. The German nation comprises eightyfive million people, which, because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form a homogeneous European racial body, the like of which can not be found in any ether country. On the other hand it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. If there have been no political consequences to meet the demands of this racial body for living space then that is the result of historical development spread ever several centuries and should this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation (the German word used there is not "nation"; it is "Volkstum") at its present high level.
An arrest of the deterioration of the German element in Austria and in Czechoslovakia is just as little possible as the preservation of the present state in Germany itself." the German because to me the sentence seems meaningless.
"Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about one to three generations.
"Before touching upon the question of solving the need for living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce and industry.
"Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict NationalSocialist State policy, which is the basis; (that is the basis of autarchy) assuming this can be achieved the results are as follows:
"A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but not total autarchy can be attained:
"1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials autarchy is feasible.
"2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be cored by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can not.
"3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.
"4. Edible fats -- possible.
"B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite NO.
"The general increase of living standards, compared with thirty to forty years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand and an increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used for covering the increased demand, therefore they represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could not be avoided." I interpolate, that if I understand him he means by that, no autarchy; we must participate in world trade and commerce.
"The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increase catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.
"Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationalisation is impossible in a continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but not a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally.
"Participation in world economy. There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do not offer any guarantee for practical execution.
It must be considered on principle that since the World War, (1914-18), as industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonies again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonisation; in Japan and Italy economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, and economic need will also drive Germany to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.
"The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. There is a pronounced military weakness in those states who base their existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are dominated by Britain, it is more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in wartime.
The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living spree, an endeavor which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in Geneva and in satisfied states. Should the security of our food situation be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is not a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material-producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two generations. What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root (I interpolate, there is a German word "Volksstamm", racial root) has for this purpose the most favorable foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all times-- Roman Empire British Empire-- has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.
(Whereupon at 1130 a short recess was taken).
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, after the somewhat jumbled discussion which I have just read of geopolitical economic theory and of the need for expansion and "Lebensraum", Adolph Hitler, in those horse-back notes, posed the question--and I quote:
"The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.
"German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strong points overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in Europe.
"England is not in a position to code any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian ownership, a return of East Africa can no longer be expected. Any resistance on England's part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are not in British hands, for example, Angola. French favors would probably be of the same nature.
"A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well armed. The Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakeable." Meaning, I take it, the British Empire.
"Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy.
Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of ago which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient Rome.
"Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possession only allied with other states and not by its own power. How could England alone, for example, defend Canada against attack by America, or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by Japan?
"The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect:
"(a) Ireland's struggle for independence.
"(b) Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her half measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilize the non-fulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon against Britain.
"(c) The weakening of the British position in the Far East by Japan.
"(d) The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which--by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius--expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the Abyssinian War is a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the Mohammedan World.
"It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland, is nine to one, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must not allow the level of our population to become too low." I take it he meant by that: "Keep the population of occupied territories low in comparison with ours."
"France's position is more favorable than that of England. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments, whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless, we have to take the following into our political consideration as power factors:
"Britain, France, Russia and the adjoining smaller states.
"The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great for Silesia, and Bismarck's wars against Austria and France had been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870 had prevented Austria from participating in the war.
If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions 'when' and 'how'. In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases."
I interpolate: The Tribunal will recall the specific allegation in the Indictment that at this meeting there emerged three different plans, any of which might be utilized.
"Case 1. Period 1943-45: After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The rearming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers' Corps, are practically concluded." but he is contemplating the period 1943-1945.
"Our material equipment and armaments are modern; with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of 'special weapons' cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.
"In comparison with the rearmament, which will have been carried out at the time by other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943-45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do not possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a 'point of weakness in the regime.! Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly.
Whilst other "What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45 no one knows today.
It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.
"On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice but to act.
If solve the German space problem no later than 1943-45.
The necessity for "Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an internal "Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against Czechoslovakia cannot 'proceed' against Germany.
"For the improvement of our military political position it must be from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards.
In the case of Czechoslovakia would declare war on the same day as France.
However, Czechoslovakia's desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened.
Its actual "Once Czechoslovakia is conquered -- and a mutual frontier, Germany conflict could more easily be relied upon.
Our agreements with Poland remain valid only as long as Germany's strength remains unshakeable; should "Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943 to '45, then the behaviour in the following manner:
"The Fuehrer believes personally, that in all probability England day be cleaned up by Germany.
The difficulties in the British Empire war against Germany.
The British attitude would certainly not remain without influence on France's attitude.
An attack by France, without stagnate along our Western fortifications.
Without England's support, it would have as a consequence, the enmity of Great Britain.
Naturally of our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria.
It must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia's defence measures will of years.
Although the population of Czechoslovakia, in the first carried out.
The annexation of the two States to Germany, militarily "No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part of Italy; however,, it cannot be judged today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question, since it would depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.
"The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland's attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious Germany, with Russia in the rear.
"Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this needs to be taken into consideration at all, in view of Japan's attitude.