"Should Case 2 occur - paralysation of France by a Civil War - then the situation should be utilised at any time for operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany's most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.
"The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from the existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur, he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.
"Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the war in Spain, the Fuehrer does not see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by France, (the English text says France -- it means Franco) a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view, a one hundred per cent victory by France is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should France be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula, it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the Balearic Isles can not be tolerated either by France or by England and could lead to a war by France and England against Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in white (that is France's) hands, could participate on the side of Italy's enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via Germany. The Fuehrer believes that Italy's military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against France on the Western frontier and carry out operations against France from Libya, against the North African French colonial possessions. discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper Italy would be extremely difficult, and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany, France will have, at its disposal, solely the metropolitan fighting forces."
"French lines of communication by the Italian fleet --" must mean "Fresh lines --" or something in that connection.
"If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be assumed that England -being at war with Italy -- would not decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British support, a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be anticipated.
"The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made independent of the course of the Italian-French-English war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military operations by these three States. The Fuehrer was also not thinking of military agreements with Italy, but in complete independence and by exploiting this unique favorable opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the 'speed of lightning', the German words being, 'blitzartig schnell'.
"Fieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with Italy would not bind the French Army to such an extent that it would not be in a position to commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von Fritzch estimated the French forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against Italy to be in the region of twenty divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications -- which was pointed out particularly by Generalfieldmarshal von Blomberg -- the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement.
With regard to our offensive in a Southeasterly direction, Fieldmarshal von Blomberg drew special attention to the strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which had assumed the character of a Maginot Line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.
"Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions, he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on the 10 November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuehrer, who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to statements by Generalfieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch regarding England and France's attitude, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain's non-participation and that consequently he did not believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict, already mentioned, lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence operations against Czechoslovakia immediately.
If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then Germany would. for thetime being, have to side with this attitude.
"In view of the information given by the Fuhrer, Generaloberst Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain, The Fuehrer agreed to this, insofar as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.
"The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.
"(Signed) Hoszbach", and there are other notations.
In this connection I invite the Court's attention to the allegation in Paragraph 3 (a) of Section IV F of the Indictment, on page 7 of the printed English text, relating to a meeting of an influential group of Nazi conspirators on November 1937, the document just introduced and read into evidence is the specific evidentiary support for that allegation. The Anschluss with Austria, under military pressure from the Nazis, occurred in March 1938. We shall give you detailed evidence concerning that in due course. So will we, as to details of the aggression against Czechoslovakia, including the pressure on Czechoslovakia that resulted in the Munich Pact of September 1938, and the violation of that Pact itself by Germany, on March 15, 1939. There is much of interest in the secret documents relating to those aggressions. Tribunal one more captured document, which reveals in all its nakedness the truth concerning the deliberateness of the aggressions against Czechoslovakia. This document consists of a file kept by Colonel Schmundt, Hitler's adjutant. The file was found by one of the units of the 327 Glider Infantry, in a collar of the Platterhof, OberSalzburg, near Berchtesgaden. The file represents a work-file of originals and duplicates, incidental to the preparations for the annexation of Czechoslovakia.
I should like to ask the Tribunal to examine, particularly, the photostat of the original German of this file. We have copies of those photostats. Something in physical form is lost in transcribing a translation. The picture of the original file, including pictures of the telegrams, give a sense of the reality of the evidence that is lost in the transcribed translation. The file is numbered Document No. 388 PS, in our numbered series of documents.
I thought perhaps I might read the German title. It is "Grundlagen zur Studie Gruen", that is the main plan for "Case Green", Green being a codeword for the aggression against Czechslovakia.
I offer the entire file in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 26 and will ask that photostats be passed up to the Court. I offer the file, if the Tribunal please, with, of course, the understanding and realization that only such parts of it as I read of it will immediately go into evidence; but we shall refer to other parts from time to time later, in the presentation of the case. The material in this file will be dealt with in greater detail at a later point in my presentation. However, at this point, I desire to call attention to Item No. 2 in the file.
Item No. 2 is dated 22 April 1938. It is the second sheet of the English translation. It is a summary, prepared by Schmundt, the adjutant, of a discussion on 21 April, 1938 between Hitler and the defendant Wilhelm Keitel. This item, like the other items in the file, relates to "Case Green". As I said, "Case Green" was a secret code word for the planned operations against Czechoslovakia. This meeting occurred within approximately one month following the successful annexation of Austria. In the carrying out of the conspiracy, it became necessary to revise the "plan Green", to take into account the changed attitude, as a result of the bloodless success against Austria. I shall now read Item 2 of this file.
"Berlin, 22 April 1938.
"Bases of the Dissertation on "Gruen."
"Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General Keitel of 21 April:
"A. Political Aspect.
"1). Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.
"2). Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.
"3). Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (for example. assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration.)
"Military Conclusions.
"1). The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities (2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one since "Gruen" will have taken security measures.
"2). The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail - which is unavailable, but should be cut down as far as possible - must not impede a lightning-swift blew at the time of the action.
"3). 'Separate thrusts' are to be carried out immediately with a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of reads, composition of the columns according to their individual tasks.) Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.
"The Air Force is to support the individual columns (for example divebombers; sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)
"4). Politically, the first four days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished Facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils) and demoralize 'Gruen.'
"Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pilsen, Prague.)
"5). If possible, separation of transport movement 'Rot' from 'Gruen'," 'Rot' was the code name for their then plan against the West. "A simultaneous strategic concentration 'Rot' can lead 'Rot' to undesired measures. On the other hand, it must be possible to put 'Case Rod' into operation at any time.
"C. Propaganda.
"1).Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland.)
"2). Loaflets with throats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).
"( initialled by Schmundt)." noted particularly paragrapg 3, under the heading "Political Aspect", which reads as follows: "Lightening-swift action as the result of an incident (example: Assassination of German ambassador as an up-shot of an anti-German demonstration)." The document as a whole, establishes that the conspirators were planning the reation of an incident to justify to the world their own aggression against Czechoslovakia. It establishes, I submit, that consideration was being given to assassinating the German ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident.
This is alleged in Paragraph 3, (c) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, appearing at Page 8 of the printed English text of the Indictment. case, when this particular allegation was reached, the defendent Goering shook his head slowly and solemnly in the negative. I can well understand that he would have shaken his head, if he believed the allegation of the Indictment to be untrue. In the course of Justice Jackson's opening address, when this same matter was referred to, the defendent Goering again solemnly shook his head. On this allegation the Prosecution stands on the evidence just submitted, the denials of the defendent Goering, notwithstanding. recess?
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn now until 2 o'clock, (Whereupon, at 12:
30 o'clock p.m. the Tribunal recessed until 2 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)
Tribunal, in the matter of: The United States of America,
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, as I suggested earlier, the next phase of the aggression was the formulation and execution of the plan to attack Poland and with the resulting initiation of aggressive war in September 1939. This is covered by paragraph 4 (a) and (b) of Section IV of the indictment appearing on Page 9 of the printed English text. of the Adjutant Schmundt has provided us with a document in his own Handwriting, which lets the cat out of the bag. That may be a troublesome colloquialism to translate. I don't know. The document consists of minutes of a conference held on 23 May '39. The place of the conference was the Fuehrer's Study in the Now Reich Chancellery. The Defendant Goering was present.
(The Defendant Frick at this point made a statement in German, which was not translated.)
MR. ALDERMAN: I think one of the defendants indicated I had referred to the wrong year. My notes show 23 May 1939. That is shown by the original document.
THE PRESIDENT: Which document are you referring to?
MR. ALDERMAN: That is document L79. As I said, the Defendant Goering was present. The Defendant Raeder was present. The Defendant Keitel was present. The subject of the meeting was, and I quote: "Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims." This document is of historical importance, second not even to the political will and testament of the Fuehrer, recorded by Adjutant Hoszbach.
THE PRESIDENT: Could the Marshal of the Court shut the window which is creating a draft here?
MR. ALDERMAN: The original of this document when captured found its way through the complicated channels across the Atlantic to the United States. There it was found by members of the staff of the American prosecution, by then taken to London, and thence to Nuernberg. The "L" on the identifying number indicates that it is one of the documents which was assembled in London and brought from there here. We think the document is of unquestioned validity. Its authenticity and its accuracy as a record of what transpired at the meeting of 23 May 1939, stands admitted by the Defendant Keitel in one of his interrogations. As I say, the number is document L79 in our numbered series. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit United States 27. cally and as bearing on the issues now presented to the Tribunal that I feel obliged to read most of it. At the top:
"Top Secret "To be transmitted by officer only "Minutes "of a Conference on 23 May 39 "Place:
The Fuehrer's Study, Now Reich Chancellery. "Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.
"Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Admiral Raeder. Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Adml. Schniewindt, Col.(G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.)Warlimont, Lt.-Col. (G.S.)Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), Lieut-Commd. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).
"Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.
"The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:
"1) Analysis of the situation.
"2) Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from the situation.
"3) Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.
"4) Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from those consequences.
"Secrecy Is the first essential for success.
"The Fuehrer's observations are given in systematised form below.
"Our present situation must be considered from two points of view:
"1) The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939;
"2) The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.
"In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously.
"Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.
"Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.
"This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany's demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as 'Encroachments'. The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force.
"A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.
"Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years' time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.
"We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.
"The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.
"After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:
"The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions."--I suppose they were those in the concentration camps-- "Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.
"The demarkation of frontiers is of military importance.
"The Pole is no 'supplementary enemy'. Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.
"Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas.
Over and above the natural fertility, thoroughgoing German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.
"There is no other possibility for Europe.
"Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember - blockade.
"If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record harvests we shall be able to rely even less in time of war than in peace.
"The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labour.
"The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.
"Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.
"It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.
"The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.
"There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision:
"To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity".
"We cannot expect a repitition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland, The success of the isolation will be decisive.
"Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers (France and England).
"If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France.
"Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland - beginning with an attack on Poland - will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time.
"The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics.
"Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan's own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.
"Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautious trent is apparent in Press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland.
Should Russia take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become closer.
"If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and-death struggle.
"What will this struggle be like?"
"England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the duration of cur resistance.
"The Dutch and Belgium air bases will be occupied by armed forces. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications in order finally to force them into cooperation.
"Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure.
"Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a now defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.
"The war with England and France will be a life-and-death struggle.
"The idea that we can got off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 million human beings.
"Question: Short or long war?
"Every country's armed forces or government must aim at a short war.
The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10-15 years duration.
"History has always shown that the people have believed that wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar weaknesses.
"England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power.
"England is the driving force against Germany. (Literally: England is the motor driving against Germany.)" I suppose that is the French "force mobile"."Her strength lies in the following:
"1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organisers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure and bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher, "2. World power in itself.
It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies, this power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit.
"3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force.
"England's weakness;
"If in the World War 1 we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of this war (that war, I take it). It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet. Landings had to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.
"The moment England's food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate.
The import of food and fuel depends on the fleet's protection.
"If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed immediate capitulation will be the result.
"There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to rely entirely on the element of surprise.
"Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by:
1) Disclosure outside the limit of the military circles concerned.
2) More chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise.
3) Human failings.
4) Weather conditions.
"The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time, the tension cannot be endured for long. It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.
"This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action.
1) An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow right at the start. Consideration of right and wrong or treaties do not enter into the matter. This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland.
2) In addition to the surprise attack, preparation for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for England are eliminated.
"The army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a succesful war against England will have been secured.
"England can then be blockaded from western France at close quarters by the air Force, while the Navy with its submarines extend the range of the blockade.
"Consequencies;
"England will not be able to fight on the Continent:
"Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will out all her life-lines :"Germany will not bleed to death on land.
"Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations.
World war I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative:
"1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different.
"2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously, and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defense countermeasures.
"3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.
"4. Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, has taken the most important positions,industrial production will cease in flow in to the bottomless pit of the Army's battles, and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.
"The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.
"Study to this end is of the utmost importance.
"The aim will always be to force England to her knees.
"A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.
"This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be true of the latter, for instance, as long as the English Fleet had no available counter-measures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.
"Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive. Its place must be taken by the ele ments of surprise and by masterly handling. more in detail with military plans and preparations. I think it unnecessary to read further. supports the allegations in Paragraph 4 (a) of Section IV (F) of the indictment, appearing on Page 9 of the printed text, relating to the meeting of 23 May 1939. We think it leaves nothing unproved in these allegations.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr.Alderman, perhaps you ought to read the last page and the last five lines, because they refer in terms to one of the defendants.
MR. ALDERMAN: I didn't read these, Mr. President, simply because I am convinced that they are mistranslated in the English translation.
I will be glad to have them read in the original German.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you are of that opinion.
MR. ALDERMAN: We could get it from the original German.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that the English translation is wrong?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better inform us then if it is wrong.
MR. ALDERMAN: Did you have reference to the last paragraph headed "Working principles"?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the one after that.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. Might I ask that the German interpreter read that, as it can be translated into the other languages. It is on Page 16 of the original.
BY THE INTERPRETER: "Page 16.
"Purpose:
"1. Study of the entire problem.
"2. Study of the events.
"3. Study of the means needed.
"4. Study of the necessary training.
"Men with great powers of imagination and high technical training must belong to the staff, as well as officers with sober sceptic powers of understanding.
"Working principles:
"1. No one is to take part in this who does not have to know of it.
"2. No one can find out more than he must know.
"3. When must the person in question know it at the very latest? No one may know anything before it is necessary that he know it.