DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I beg your pardon, I didn't understand you for I was listening to the wrong channel.
THE PRESIDENT: Hadn't you better ask him whether there is anything wrong in his affidavit ? He hadn't yet said there was anything wrong about that.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I shall turn to that presently, yes, in deed. In connection with this, first of all I wanted to ask the witness about this draft and the further questions, of course, will follow.
THE WITNESS: This chart may be misinterpreted, especially in so far as the lines are concerned and if you wish to show the hierarchy through this chart then, in my opinion, all the staffs of the OKW and the various branches of the Wehrmacht do not belong in this chart.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know now whether this witness is saying that there is anything wrong with this affidavit whether it is not ture.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Fieldmarshal, in affidavit No. 2, you used the word "gruppe" four times. Is this expression --
THE PRESIDENT: I said : "The Tribunal would like to know now whether this witness says there is anything untrue in his affidavits and we want to know it now. Do you understand this meaning of the word "now" ?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, indeed.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I will ask the witness myself. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Fieldmarshal von Brauchitsch, are you saying that there is anything wrong in your affidavits, your tw affidavits, which is inaccurate or untrue ?
A. No, nothing which is untrue but something which can be understood.
THE INTERPRETER: Something which is implied, I imagine, is what he means. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Soemthing which you mean might be lisleading ?
A. Various questions which might lead to error--- one thing is the chart and the second thing which might lead to error is the expression "gruppe" groups -- the expression, the word "gruppe" which I understand in the same way as a figure or number but nut as a collection of a series of officers in an organizational or spiritual way, for there existed between the various branches of the Whermacht no connection whatsoever --- rather, the connection here was at the top of the Wehrmacht, Adolf Hitler, and Hitler personally always played off one branch of the Whermacht against another and repeatedly.
in this way, he talked about the navy and the Luftwaffe and their commandersin-chief and I know that he did the same thing" about the army and myself. The expression "gruppe" can be misunderstood and is misleading in the formulations set down here. It was understandable only in the continuity with the conversations that we has before. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Fieldmarshal, this epxression, this word "gruppe" -groups, did you use this expression yourself when you talked with the prosecution ?
A. Well, I really can't tell that exactly. It is quite possible, for under the word "gruppe" I do not understand anything different than a number of people or a series but not anything organizational or something closely knit,
Q. In the sense that you just mentioned now, that was the sense that you wanted to clarify when you signed ?
A. Yes.
Q. Before then, that is, before this interrogation by the prosecution dealing with this point, had you used the word "gruppe"- groups, in connection with the highest military leadership ?
A. No, for a group like that didn't actually exist, neither in an organization nor in a spiritual way did it exist. In the German army we only know the organization -- division corps, army, or whatever the case might be. Now, I shall turn to my last question. Fieldmarshall at the end of the year 1941 you resigned, what were the reasons for your resignation ?
A. In the summer of 1941, the influence was growing stronger and stronger on the part of Hitler dealing with all questions of the army and the complete lack of influence of the OKH in all spheres of political and economic adminis tration of the Occupied Countries, and the inner-contradictions against the policy drafted by Hitler.
In the autumn of 1941, this tension increased still more and parallel with that, there were the constant battles with the leadership of the party, who wanted to make known its influence on the army more and more. As there was no possibility any longer of bringing about a change in any way and as hard as it was for me to make that decision to leave the army -- in which millions had lost their lives -- and to separate myself from this army, nevertheless I decided to take the decisive step. On the 7th of December 1941, I asked Hitler, when I was alone with him, to relieve me of my office. He answered me that he would have to think about this and that I was for the moment not to speak about this matter. On the 17th of December, when we were alone together, he told me that he had decided to take over command of the army himself and the reason he gave for doing this was, that the entire confidence which he was enjoying in the army, considering the seriousness of the winter offensive, that he would have to test this confidence he enjoyed in the army. On the 19th of December he again told me not to say anything and on the 19th I received the order: and on the 20th in the evening, I journeyed to my home and I didn't see Hitler after that, Hitler was the fate of Germany and this fate was inevitable and could not be stopped.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn, (a recess was taken).
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? BY GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR: ence to two affidavits. Can you hear me? Can the witness hear me? which you signed. Did you have full opportunity to make changes in those affidavits before you signed them? you. Did you, in fact, make changes in the affidavits before you signed them?
Q Did you make changes in the affidavits before you signed them? handed you? Is that sentence --
A Which part do you mean?
Q The very last sentence, page 2. Is that last sentence entirely in your handwriting?
Q And that last sentence, will you read it please? will you please read the last sentence in your own handwriting?
A "In the hands of those departments drawn in the sketch is in fact the direction of the entire Armed Forces."
Q Is that sentence as you read it, correct? understanding, Whereupon it was stated to me that it was a known fact. For that reason I referred the sketch to those departments of the hierarchy. tence as you have read, says, "In the hands of those departments drawn in the sketch is in fact the direction of the entire Armed Forces". There is no misunderstanding or qualification about that sentence, is there?
A General, only as far as I have pointed it out to you. The individual par mentioned on the sketch, as they have been drawn, did not belong, but belonged directly and not actually to them, and are all the parts of this working staff.
GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR: Your Honor, with respect to the questions concerni the Eastern Front, bear in mind that the witness, von Mannstein, who is next to be called, was on the Eastern Front and remained there toll 1944, while the wit. ness, von Brauchitsch, retired in 1941. The Prosecution prefers to reserve this question for the next witness, von Mannstein. With respect to the questions on aggressive warefare, referred to documents which are before the Tribunal for a long time, the American Prosecution sees nothing to be gained by putting them before this witness. Accordingly, the American Prosecution has no further questions for the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear that? Does the Chief Prosecution wish to ask any questions? BY GENERAL ALEXANDROV: did not really take place and that in any case if it did take place, you were not informed before of it?
Q Were you not aware of the plans?
A. The "Plan Green" was known to me but it referred to something quite different. The "Plan Green" was compiled earlier, based on the fact that a joint attack from Pratz, in Czecho-Slovakia, was to take place against German. I myself did not know the details of "Plan Green".
Q Put the "Plan Green" dealt with the seizure of Czechoslovakia, is that right? I request the plan called "Green" was a plan for the seizure and attacking of Czechs-Slovakia, was it not?
A. As far as I know, "Plan Green" was only connected with an attack without a declaration war on the part of Czecho-Slovakia, and was called "Green".
Q. In that case, I shall remind you of another document. Hitler's decree of 30 May 1938, the first copy of which was sent to you as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. This directive was issued for the purpose of fulfilling the plan. I shall read into the record, out of the second section of the decree, which states, "It is my decision that Czecho-Slovakia, in the nearest future, will have to be conquered thoroughly by means of one decisive military operationDo you remember this directive?
Have you known about it?
A. That directive I know, yes.
Q. It shows then that there was really a plan for seizure and invading Czecho-Slovakia, is that no so?
A. I don't understand the meaning of that question.
Q. I am asking you, was there actually, in reality, this "Plan Green" for seizing Czecho-Slovakia, or was there no such plan?
A. In May 1938, that idea of Hitler was commented to me for the first time. But you have to take in consideration in this connection that Hitler, as generall known, was always using the strongest possible expressions. I was extremely difficult to derive from his speeches, the actual, true will, which Hitler had.
Q The next question is this. Tell me, witness, by what means did you learn about conversations between General Wagner and Heydrich of the Security Police? How did you know that talks were taking place between those two men?
Q Was General Wagner subordinate to your office? office. came to your knowledge?
A I don't understand. were taking place with your knowledge? operation plans made by the SD as a result of such talks and that you did not know that such talks were carried on, but that all plans were made in close harmony with the anted forces?
A I shall repeat the testimony. There was an order of the OKW to the effect that the Reichsfuehrer SS was to appoint commando units and they were to prepare the necessary steps for the transfer of strength to the political state. Nothing more than that was ever known to me and General Wagner did not make a report to me. No other reports of any kind ever reached me. Had I received these reports, I would have, just as in the case of Poland, taken steps against them. I would not have watched and looked on, had I known of them. in close contact with the High Command of the Army? Did you know about that? meeting of the SD on October 15, 1941. The report of the operational group , I quote:
"Einsatzgruppe A has just reached the region of the concentration of the forces, as ordered on June 26, 1941. The northern army group consisted of the 16th to the 18th armies and the 4th Panzer Division has marched a day ahead of them. Our problem consisted of establishing liaison with the commanders in chief of these groups.
It night be noted that the relationship of the armies are the best and the closest. Frequently liaison is so close that operations can be planned almost individually, particularly with the Commando corps. From the very beginning in the campaign toward the east, it has been quite clear that the special work: of the Security Police will consist not only of work in the rear, but also work in the front lines and in lines around the front lines." between the Security Police and the Army? it.
Q You stated here that you decided not to follow Hitler's decrees about special treatment accorded to Soviet commissars. Did I understand you right?
Q What was Hitler's reaction to your disregard of his decree on this subject? you did not want to follow it? many Soviet commissars were annihilated in accordance with the decree, which you stated you ordered should not be followed? about it, I only received the report that the order had not been carried out.
Q Another question. When counsel for the defense asked you your reasons for leaving the army, you stated that you retired, even though you loved the army, because of a difference of opinion in Hitler's policy and because of those differences, you asked for and received the right to resign. Is that correct?
Q That means that those generals, who did not agree with Hitler's policy and his form of government, did have the right to resign and not follow his policy.
Is that correct?
A Unfortunately no. Hitler had explicitly ordered that no one was allowed to go away from his command. One could not go if one wanted to. In my case, I could because he needed a scapegoat, a scapegoat because of the failure of the Russian campaign. That expressed itself in the propaganda spread in Germany, in which I was blamed for these matters.
Q I have no more questions, Mr. President. BY DR. LATERNSER: statements of the cross-examination. In this Document No. 0180, which has just been quoted by the Russian Prosecutor, Colonel General Hoeppner, is being mentioned. Did you know Colonel General Hoeppner well?
A I have known him since 1914. We was my chief of staff in Prussia and I know him extremely well.
Q You surely knew his attitude then with regard to the use of force?
A General Hoeppner was a straightforward and honest soldier. He would refuse to do anything which would not be in keeping with his education and his method of being brought up.
Q Is Colonel General Hoeppner alive? was sentenced to death. Is that right? there was a connection. my testimony, that is in regard to my negotiation with General Wagner and Heydrich Namely, there was a question of cooperation taking place on the fighting front. Conditions in the north were extraordinarily difficult. Part of the Russians were behind them and then there were the difficulties of bringing up reinforcements and repairs. I can well imagine that these groups may have been used in repairs. I never received the reports about that.
Q Did you know General Wagner well?
Q What was his attitude in regard to this report?
A He committed suicide July 20, 1942. He was against the whole system and any measures which would have been a contradiction of rights, decency and humanity or any violations of the rule of the Hague and Geneva conferences. The conference with Heydrich would have been communicated to him, that is of the special action group.
Q He would have made a report to you?
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, did you read the evidence of the witness, Gisevius?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you telling the Tribunal that insofar as it refers to yourself, it is entirely untrue?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: I want to Ask you another question, When the Commissar order was communicated to you, before the war with the Soviet union was made, what orders did you give?
THE WITNESS: I had given the order, which I mentioned earlier. I tried to carry on discipline and see that correct treatment was to be accorded to the population on the part of the German soldiers. In other words, the perpetrators were to be punished.
THE PRESIDENTS: That is, do you say that you did not give any orders directly referring to the Commissar Order?
THE WITNESS: No, I could not, I did not receive the order directly, but I did give an order which unmistakably gave my views and convictions.
THE PRESIDENT: You gave your order in writing, did you?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you telling the Tribunal that you never knew during the last of 1941 that the Commissar order was being carried out?
THE WITNESS: Mr. President, I am not trying to hide facts. I am merely trying to say that I did not receive any reports on it and consequently could not say anything about it. When I made inquiries about it, I only received the information that the order was not carried out.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then you are saying that as far as you know it was not Carried out until the time you retired?
THE WITNESS: Yes, and more I cannot say, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: I an only trying to find out what you did say. The witness may now retire. Witness, did you want to say anything more?
THE WITNESS: No, Mr. President.
DR. LATERNSER: As my second witness I am going to call field Marshal von Mannstein.
ERICH VON MANNSTEIN, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name, please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: and will withold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sis down. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Field Marshal, what was the last position you held?
Q How did you achieve that position? from Hitler.
Q The remaining Supreme Commanders were appointed in a similar way, weren't they? In which capacity? joined the Reich ministry for the Armed Forces, there I joined the First Department of the Troop Department.
Q Was the General Staff an elite of the armed forces? tactical abilities they were selected and also on the strength of their character. They were not influencing the army as their views were exactly the same as the views of all ether officers, as to the question of dictating the tone of the armed forces, there cannot any question of that. The Navy did not have a General Staff. As far as the Air Force was concerned, as far as I can judge, the General Staff officers may have played a smaller part, like Milch, Udet, and so forth, but to begin with the Armed Forces did not have a Wehrmacht General Staff, As far as dictating the tone within the armed forces goes, one can hardly speak of that.
was it, shall we say, the spiritual influence of the army? ious departments did deal with certain questions as far as they concerned the leading of troops and the employment of troops. As far as all other spheres of influence were concerned on the other hand, they were in the hands of the various departments or the Army Inspectorates and there they were under the General Staff. As far as the actual life of the troops was concerned, that was dealt with in these departments I mentioned.
Q But then surely the General Staff passed an opinion? ment, questions of training and equipment, naturally. But the chiefs of the departments were on exactly the same level as the chiefs of the troop departments, and where important personnel questions arose, this was dealt with entirely outside the General Staff.
Q. Was the chief of the General Staff the decisive adviser of Hitler, or was it the supreme commander of the Army and Air Force? Who was he?
A. One cannot possibly say that the Chief of the General Staff was the decisive adviser of Hitler. The Chief of the General Staff differed in the Armed Forces of the Third Reich entirely from the same position as it had previously been occupied by the Chief of the General Staff at the time of the Kaiser. In those days the Chief of the General Staff was immediately sub ordinate to the Kaiser, that is to say, he could report direct to him. In the Armed Forces of the Third Reich on the other hand, and even the Weimar Republic that was entirely different. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army, for instance, was nothing other than the adviser of the Supreme Commander of the Army regarding matters of military tradition. Between him and Hitler there was, first of all the Supreme Commander of the Army and then also, as long as we had a Minister of War, Blomberg, also the Reich Minister of War, Therefore, as far as the question of the Chief of the General Staff advising the Supreme Commander of the Army he shared his work with the Chiefs of the Departments, that is to say, the Personnel Department, the Equipment Department and the Defense Department, who were all subordinate.
Q. Was there a special service channel for the General Staff?
AA special service channel for the General Staff did not exist. To the contrary. That was distinctly disallowed towards the end of the First World War. Something similar was developing at the time when Ludendorff in practice was having complete control of military matters and when he was always addressing himself to the General Staff Chiefs who were his subordinate, instead of addressing himself to the Chief Commanders themselves. This association of the military leadership was made by Lieutenant General von Beck and a special service channel of the General Staff seems therefore to exist.
Q. And what about the privilege of announcing these opinions?
A. In the old army, every Chief of the General Staff had the right, if he was of an opinion different than that of his commander, to express that opinion, although, of course, he had to carry out the order from his commanding officer.
In the Armed Forces of the Third Reich on the other hand that was discontinued and expressly discontinued, at that, something which happened with the agreement of the Chief of the; General Staff, General Beck.
Q. Was the OKW shall be say, the central brain of the Armed Forces?
A. The OKW of course in the form in which it if, now being mentioned, only came into being in 1938 as a working staff for Hitler. Before that, Blomberg was Minister of War in the Reich and in his position as a Minister he was holding a position which was dealing with all matters effecting the Armed Forces which he represented to both the State and the Party. In his hands, also, there was the distribution of funds for the various sectors of the Armed Forces, and a rearmament capacity far sectors of the Armed Forces. Gradually, no doubt, Blomberg was trying to achieve a more outstanding leadership for the Armed Forces but in that connection he was soon getting into considerable difficulties, particularly with the OKH, for the reason that in the opinion of the OKH, Blomberg was being too lenient with the Party. He then attempted himself, shall we say, tactical leadership staff, but that was only in his station. Afterwards once his departure and subsequently she Armed Forces leadership Staff was created under Hitler but it seems to be regarded as head of the throe General Staffs of the Armed Forces; it was nothing other that the Tactical Leadership Staff of the Fuehrer.
Q. Did the three commanders of the armed forces branches meet with the General Staff? Did they have meetings in the OKW in order to achieve their aims?
A. Naturally the three branches of the armed forces were in agreement with the OKW that the national clement should be kept up. Furthermore, there was a sort of national Order, equality, and most of all superiority for Germany which they considered their task. They went about that. Once hardly speak of a unified formation of a will. As an example I should like to say, for instance, that if the army had one basic thought, one principal thought, it was that under no circumstances could Germany once again fight a war on two fronts.
The Navy, in my opinion, always had the one leading thought, never to get into war with England. But Goering, as the reigning head of the Air Forces, might have wanted that. Personally, that I cannot judge. But I don't suppose that he was interested in jeopardizing the position of the Third Reich and his own position in a renewed war. As far as the OKW is concerned, if it formed a will at all, it did not, in my opinion, have the possibility to seriously bring that will into effect on Hitler.
Q What was the significance of the Schliefen Union, its aims? the general staff. Apart from that, general staff officers and leaders of the young armed forces were in it, too. They met once a year on the occasion of a meal; and then there was a so-called meeting during which there was a budget produced; and that was really the principal aim. Then, of course, it had a Council of Honor, which usually had to occupy itself with certain ideas result from Ludendorf's attitude toward Hindenburg.
We didn't go to those meetings any more; and apart from that we didn't come under this Council of Honor. Any political or military aims on the part of this club did not exist. You mustn't consider it as being a club where intellectual schooling or training was being carried out. OKW and the General Staff?
A The bulk of them, according to their position, weren't interrelated at all. Only part of them belonged to the OKW, Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, Winter. and only the chief of the General Staff belonged to the General Staff as chief the staff of the Army Air Force, who changed frequently. I think there are five of these. All the others neither belonged to the General Staff nor the OKW.
Q But what are these leaders otherwise? are in every country. whole group with a uniform formation of will? agreed; that is, in a matter of course. Also they agreed regarding the view of the necessity of Germany's being strong because it was surrounded by three neighbors from whom one might, after all, expect one thing or another. Over and above that, however, such a uniformity of thought cannot be talked about; it cannot be talked of. I want to say that horizontally speaking the three branches of the armed forces were on the same level; and each branch of the armed forces had different military thoughts and aims which quite often worked against each other.
into four steps, shall we say, which, according to the importance in order, were this way. The highest step was the Fuehrer and his working staff, the OKW. From that level there was the entire military and political responsibil. which, according to military principles, can always lie only in the hands of the highest leader. of the armed forces. They were responsible for the militarization of that ranch of the armed forces which was under their command. There, in that sphere of command, they of course had entire responsibility. If Hitler's sphere of command left them in their military sphere, then they were of course to a certain extent his advisers. commanders of army groups: and then below that, Stop 4, the commanders of armies, the commanders of army groups were responsible for the leadership of the operations which they were to carry cuts and the same partial responsibility for their armies was in the hands of the army commander below them, who were carrying out the function of the ran in the step itself. far as false ideas were concerned, to Hitler, the Fuehrer because in between there was the step of the supreme commander which received orders and had to obey them. That is, in military life at all times the relations are those of one who gives orders and one who carries them cut.
Q What was the responsibility which you have described? What is the possibility regarding anyone's attitude towards Hitler's plans?
A To state views about Hitler's plans was quite out of the question for the third and fourth groups because they would only learn of the acts when it appeared in the shape of an order. If in individual cases the supreme commander was called to a conference with Hitler, then here again it was the announcement of a decision already arrived at which couldn't be altered. These supreme commanders of the armed force branches could of course when they were previously ordered by Hitler, of which I can't judge individual instates, state their views, their opinions.
As far as they might have agreed with that that is written on yet another page. general staff. Wasn't it for that reason that these military leaders were forming a unity? general staff. In the case of the army, the masses of the 94 officers of the army who are supposed to belong to the so-called opposition, of them 74 had been general staff officers; 20 on the honored Wehrmacht. In the case of the air force, there were, as far as I know, only 9 out of 17 ex-members of the general staff; and the navy, of course, didn't have one. Uniformity, let's say, as far as it existed at all, was therefore due to the fact that they had the same military training, the same military career, but no more. these 139 officers on the other -- that made a difference?
A Yes, of course that made a difference. They were the military leaders, the commanders of the general staff, and not the OKW, in the main, the bulk; and as far as a uniform organization is concerned, you can neither call that ideally speaking nor materially speaking nor practically speaking nor theoretically speaking.
Q But then certain SS leaders are also amongst that group. Wasn't it the fourth branch of the armed forces?
A No, it certainly was not a part of the armed forces. Quite certainly a large portion of the loaders of the Waffen-SS and in the war were matters of the unity of the Waffen-SS incorporated in the army because naturally considering the opposing will of the Fuehrer and Himmler, it was revolution. The uniformity of the Waffen-SS during the war time fought very bravely next to our comrades; but the fourth branch of the armed forces were quite to the contrary. Himmler stopped everything which would have made for any type of influence exerted on them by the armed forces. That individual loaders of the SS were incorporated amongst the group must be described as good raste, considering Himmler's personality because if there ever had been a deadly enemy of the army, it was Himmler.
Q Why do you say Himmler was a deadly enemy of the army? of the army; and particularly the generals of the army were pursued by him wit his hatred and his libel. That is my opinion. I knew it about myself at any rate from very reliable sources. I knew that it was very much due to Himmler who was using violent libel against the nation. As far as the other leaders are concerned, I only know that some of the Reich ministers who were dismissed from their work were very much in our favor. That's pretty clear. in the interests of the Reich?
A The party was working in the political sphere; and we were working in the sphere of the influence of the soldier. A joint plan of the party and the armed forces is something that can't possibly be expected because the prerequisites were lacking. First of all as one of the most important prerequisites there was a lack of very mutual basic attitude. Many methods of the party, as is known, did not appeal to us at all; and even on such princip*-* questions as the question of the differences of opinion one can hardly say that there is lacking the intellectual basis for a uniform plan.