that the occupation of the Balkans was one of the prerequisites of the campaign against the Soviet Union ? Paulus. The Jugoslavian question was the direct consequence of the overthrow there. Before that time, just a little bit previous, Jugoslavia had joined the Tripartite pact and it was the result of the English landing in Greece and the catastrophic position of the Italians in Albania.
Q Now, let us turn to the Eastern campaign. That was your attitude with reference to the Trade Agreement with the Soviet Union ? with the Soviet Union and we had hailed it joyfully. In this stop we saw the prerequisite to the fact that from now on a period of mistrust would be concluded, and that, above and beyond that, Germany would be able to take up once more the position of a bridge, since she was situated as she was in the heart of Europe. tacking the Soviet Union ? the possibility of war with the Soviet Union would be considered ? fect that he was worried, that the attitude of Russia might change. Thereupon, I talked with the chief of the General Staff and told him that we would have to get hold of the data involved, for in this connection we had not done anything up until that time.
Q Were there any maps in existence ?
A Neither maps nor anything else. In the month of September, Hitler ordered that the question of Russia would have to be investigated and looked into. In my opinion, no decision to be carried through was in existence; in any event, it was not expressed.
All the work which was done was work for the General Staff and they were precautionary measures, measures which had to be taken everywhere in a case of that nature. conclusion of the Western campaign, have any connection with the Eastern campaign, and if so, what were the reasons for this transfer of divisions to the East ? er, and the reasons for it were quite different. The securing along the Russian-German demarcation line in Poland, in the main, was carried out by Zollgrenzschutz. Border incidents had been ascertained. The Zollgrenzschutz ( Border Protection) was needed in other spots very urgently. The SS intended to take over the border work of the Zollgrenschutz and for that reason they wanted to set up new units, but that I wanted to prevent. For these reasons Hitler was requested to have these divisions transferred from the West to the East; and in addition to that, we wanted to relieve France of the burden of many divisions which were stationed in France. 1941, have any misgivings about a war with the Soviet Union?
DR. LATERNSER: I refer to document 1872-PS, USA-134, My Lord. of Russia, we were concerned with the fact that if a war was to arise at all, it was to be a preventive war. In the conference I limited myself to the purely military misgivings and doubts. Colonel General Halder and I reported on these matters. Point I was the size of the Russian area which today cannot be bridged. The second point was the population density, and with that the large number of reserves which were trained and at their disposal, and the point of view and culture of the Russian population as compared with the year 1418, matters about which I could check myself when I was a guest of the Red Army in the year 1931.
Point 3 was the high arms potential on the part of Russia. According to our estimate, Russia at that time had at her command approximately 10,000 tanks, Panzers. Hitler must have given some thought to these problems, for he acted immediately and refuted the first two points; namely, bu saying that the position of the Soviets was very much in disfavor among the Russian population; that the system would collapse and everything would depend only on the decisiveness of the first successes. As far as the third point was concerned, the point of armament, he mentioned, on the basis of the figures that he always had at his command, which he kept in his head, that the armament of Russia could not be at the level which we imagined it to be. Exact prof, however, we did not have at our disposal. thought to the misgivings which you had? command about the plans with regard to Russia? order and subsequently, at the end of December, the first directive went to the Army groups. ler take at the beginning of the Russian campaign ? creased more and more. From the wealth of the incidents that took place, I should like to pick out but two. The Army had, in the areas occupied by it, once more restored the churches for services to be used by the population as far as possible. The German clergymen had been active at the request of the population. However, Hitler prohibited all of this, and now the remarkable picture arose that the clergymen of the Roumanian, Hungarian and Italian divisions could attend services but the Germans couldn't. The second point was the question about the operational carrying on or conduct of the war.
If you started a war, then the presetposition for the continuance of the war in the following year had to be set up, and in my opinion and that of the High Command, the area around Moscow--not the city itself--played a decisive role. It is a traffic center which is centralized there, and according to that, the presupposition for the setting up and distribution of reserves applied; there were numerous armament installations which made it possible to carry in armies. The OKH, therefore, was of the opinion that after the Dnieper-Smolensk line had been reached that then one would have to come into possession of the entire Moscow region. However, Hitler was of a different opinion. He put the decisive importance on Leningrad and that demanded the offensive at Kiev. A decision in this matter was taken by him and later, too late, the offensive in the Moscow region, because of weather conditions, was coming to be a failure. up certain matters of subordination. Do you know of an agree ment between the General Quartermaster of the Army, General Wagner, and Hoydrich concerning the use of the Einsatz groups? eral Wagner and the Chief of the SS Hauptamt, Heydrich, did take place. This conference was to regulate or settle those questions which were necessary in order that the youth, as decreed by Hitler, have commandoes in the operational area of the Army, to have those matters settled.
matter of crossing the boundaries with the questions economic welfare and supply, and the right to traverse highways and streets. I know nothing further about this, Nothing else was reported to me, and whether anything else was directed I don't know, but the only thing that might have been of concern was that perhaps the question was discussed that if commandos of that nature would be sent into combat at the front lines, then they would be under the command of the military commander, and all directives for these commandos took place according to official channels from the Reichsfuehrer SS the Army Groups, and the request of the Army liaison commands had been given them but they had only the task of informing these commandos about the purpose of the operation as far as it applied to them. In this decree of the O.K.W. it says, regarding the purpose and, the task of these commandos : It is intended that the occupied territories, as soon as possible, will be made into political states and in order to prepare the measures, these commandos are to be used, If there is anything else., I was not informed.
Q. Did General Wagner report to you that through these Einsatz Groups, many directives would be carried out?
A. No.
Q. The witness SS Schellenberg was interrogated here, and he stated that he was of the conviction that the O.K.W. new of mass directives and had reported this to the commanders in chief through official channels.
A. He is speaking of a conviction, not of a certainty, and this conviction is not right.
Q. How was this matter ?
A. The subordination of the Einsatz Commandos as I have mentioned was set up in such a way that all orders emanated solely from the Reichsfuehrer SS. They were not subordinated to the Army in any way.
Q. How about supply ? Were they subordinated to the Army in that way?
A. No, not even in that way. They were dependent to receive their suppli from the Army for there was no other way of supplying them.
Q. Do you know of official reports ? Did you receive them from these Einsatz Groups ?
A. No.
Q. Now, the matter of the Waffen SS will have to be cleared up as well. Just what was the subordination or the responsibility of the Waffen SS to the Army?
A. The Waffen SS was subordinated to the Army only for tactical purposed It was subordinated to the Army neither for discipline nor for judicial mat They had no influence whatsoever , the Army had no influence on demotions or promotions of people and so forth.
Q. To whom was the Waffen SS subordinate if it was outside of a tactical district ? That is , not a battle or operational area.
A. In any event, not the Army or O.K.W.
Q. And to whom was it subordinate in its home area?
A. The Reichsfuehrer SS.
Q. Was the Waffen SS paid out of the budget of the Wehrmacht?
A. Not from the budget of the Army.
Q. And the budget in the Luftwaffe would be less ?
A. Even as little as far as I am interested. The SS had its own budget it had its own armament office, clothing office, administrative office, etc,
Q. Between the Waffen SS division and the Wehrmacht there was only a tactical contact when this division was actually in combat ?
A. It was under the Army at the moment when it was used in the operations area, and in order to be transported off, it was put at the Army's disposal
Q. Would this presumption be true if I were to say that between a Waffen SS division and the Army, no close connection existed as if, for instance, an Italian or Spanish division would have been subordinate to the Army for an operational battle ?
A. That would have been similar.
Q. In general, what was the relationship of the leadership of the Waffen SS to that of the Army Luftwaffe or Navy ? Was that an enormous one ?
A. In a battle, yes, otherwise there was very little connection.
Q. Field Marshal, can you give us the circumstances under which Hitler issued the Commissar order ?
A. In March, 1941, Hitler had ordered the military leaders, in a rather lengthy address, that these were the reasons for the attitude toward Russia and he stated that in this case it was a battle or a fight which was of an ideological nature and that we could not fight with such chivalrous methods which the Army was used to carrying through; that he knew that the officer could not claim this opinion as their own, and that he was demanding the ab solute carrying through of the orders he had issued. And in connection with this, he issued the order dealing with the treatment to be accorded the commissars.
Q. What did you do in order to prevent the carrying through Of this order and to prevent excesses on the part of the troops in the East ?
A. After the conclusion of the conference after Hitler had left, some of the commanders-in-chief came to me and I remember particularly well that the commanders-in-chief of three Army Groups, von Rundstedt, von Bock, and von Leeb and another group of leaders came to me in a rather excited fashion over this matter said that the carrying out of this order would he impossible for them. I agreed with them and told them that as far as the OKH was concerned no order like that would be issued. I also told them that I would have to think things over as to what steps I would actually ha to take. In the meantime, I had come to know Hitler so well, to know that once he had reached a decision and as, in this case, he had made it public, that is, he had told it to the military leadership immediately thereupon, I kenw that under no circumstances would he be dissuaded from this position for anything in the world. I knew also that I had to give my hand over to the Army and had to agree with them when they said that they did not want to follow this order. For this reason I issued an order dealing with discipline.
Q. And what was the wordings the approximate wording of this order ?
A. It is not possible for me to give you the wording, however the conten of the order, briefly, were as follows: Discipline in the Army was to be carried through along the lines and regulations as applied in the past, and this was to be strictly observed. The attitude toward the population was to remain correct in every way, and no excesses were to be punished.
Q. Would an open refusal against Hilter be successful if you threatened to resign ?
A. As I have already said, no.
Q. Now, one more question dealing with the Eastern campaign. Did the German Army, in 1941, in its push through Russia, find considerable cestruction which the Soviet army had done itself when it retrested ?
A. The picture was quite as we expected it to be. From the time that applies to a century earlier, the lack of consideration in Russia for her own country was well known. There were numerous railroads which had been destroyed; other installations. It was mined in such a way that even though we worked for months they could hardly be used by us, and in the cities we met special commandos, Russians, who had the task, and who carried through the firing of the cities and the burning of them. In Kiev and other cities we found mines which had been prepared by them. ti mines which caused us considerable damage.
Q. Before the entry of Italy into the war, or before the declaration of war on America, were you advised in advance ?
A. No. Both incidents I regretted to a large extent.
Q. Were military agreements with Japan known to you ?
A. I do not even know them today.
Q. The record dealing with the testimony of Gisevius is known to you through the fact that I gave them to you for your perusal. Do you know the witness Gisevius ?
A. In April 1946, I learned of the existence of Mr. Gisevius for the first time from the papers. In the papers I read that he was to appear as a witness I would have read the particulars anyway because the name was kn own to me a Dr. Gisevius, in the 90's, was a personal physician of mine.
Q. But the witness gave various and quite detailed statements about your person and especially to the effect that he talked with you about a general Putsch. What can you say about that ?
A. I believe that anyone who knows me but a little bit would laugh at the thought that I, together with a young person who is entirely strange to me, would speak about plans of a Putsch against thehead of the state. I can try to reconstruct the picture from the records and from these writings, I received the impression that this is a combination which is without any background and I believe that a man is involved here who believes that the entire earth is revolving about his alone.
Q. Gisevius further stated that the generals had enriched themselves. Is that ture ?
A. I don't quite know in which way.
Q. Did you yourself receive any donations ?
A. No.
Q. Fieldmarshal, you furnished two affidavits to the prosecution, USA Exhibit No. 1532 and affidavit No. 4, USA Exhibit 535; both of them with the date of the 7th of November 1945. At that time were you under arrest ?
A. Two American officers had asked me to tell them about the organization of the army and so forth.
Q. Fieldmarshal, I believe you misunderstood me. I asked you whether at the time that you deposed these affidavits whether you were under arrest ?
A. Please sir what was that -- please ? you were under arrest at the time ?
A. Since the 19th of October of the previous year, I have been in the prison at Nurnberg here under arrest.
Q. And about these affidavits, who set down these statements ?
A. They were drafted by two American officers.
Q. And who demanded who asked you for these statements ?
A. That, I don't know, the names weren't mentioned.
Q. Were you told for what purpose these statements were to be put ?
A. No. On the basis of the conferences which took place prior to that, I assumed that they were to serve for the purpose of information dealing with organization and was to be used by experts.
Q. Did you make any alterations ?
A. I undertook to make a series of alterations but I can't tell you how many.
Q. These statements, that is, in your opinion, of course, could they be misunderstood ?
A. Even after I had made the changes, in my opinion, they were clear, in connection with the conversation that had taken place previously. They were a series of conversations in Which I was told that we were not under oath as witnesses, a matter of which of course was of no consequence to me anyway but it was the purpose to inform about organization; the problems were discussed and locked at from different angles.
Q. In signing affidavit No. 2, which also contains a schedule or a draft this might not be correct or might be misunderstood ?
A. I pointed to the fact that this chart might be misunderstood and I received answers that matters very entirely cleared up and that it wasn't very important in the first place.
Q. Affidavit No. 1, USA Exhibit No. 531 which Colonel General Halder wigned on the same day, agrees word for word and completely with the exception of the last paragraph; you were interrogated commonly with Halder ?
A. Yes.
Q. You just mentioned a moment ago, in the signing of affidavit No. 2, y pointed to the fact that the chart was incorrect. Now, I shall have this chart presented to you and I should like to ask you just what is wrong in it ?
A. This chart may bring about misunderstandings.
THE PRESIDENT: Hadn't you better ask the witness -- if he is your witness -- whether there is anything wrong about the affidavit ?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I beg your pardon, I didn't understand you for I was listening to the wrong channel.
THE PRESIDENT: Hadn't you better ask him whether there is anything wrong in his affidavit ? He hadn't yet said there was anything wrong about that.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I shall turn to that presently, yes, in deed. In connection with this, first of all I wanted to ask the witness about this draft and the further questions, of course, will follow.
THE WITNESS: This chart may be misinterpreted, especially in so far as the lines are concerned and if you wish to show the hierarchy through this chart then, in my opinion, all the staffs of the OKW and the various branches of the Wehrmacht do not belong in this chart.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know now whether this witness is saying that there is anything wrong with this affidavit whether it is not ture.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Fieldmarshal, in affidavit No. 2, you used the word "gruppe" four times. Is this expression --
THE PRESIDENT: I said : "The Tribunal would like to know now whether this witness says there is anything untrue in his affidavits and we want to know it now. Do you understand this meaning of the word "now" ?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, indeed.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I will ask the witness myself. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Fieldmarshal von Brauchitsch, are you saying that there is anything wrong in your affidavits, your tw affidavits, which is inaccurate or untrue ?
A. No, nothing which is untrue but something which can be understood.
THE INTERPRETER: Something which is implied, I imagine, is what he means. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Soemthing which you mean might be lisleading ?
A. Various questions which might lead to error--- one thing is the chart and the second thing which might lead to error is the expression "gruppe" groups -- the expression, the word "gruppe" which I understand in the same way as a figure or number but nut as a collection of a series of officers in an organizational or spiritual way, for there existed between the various branches of the Whermacht no connection whatsoever --- rather, the connection here was at the top of the Wehrmacht, Adolf Hitler, and Hitler personally always played off one branch of the Whermacht against another and repeatedly.
in this way, he talked about the navy and the Luftwaffe and their commandersin-chief and I know that he did the same thing" about the army and myself. The expression "gruppe" can be misunderstood and is misleading in the formulations set down here. It was understandable only in the continuity with the conversations that we has before. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Fieldmarshal, this epxression, this word "gruppe" -groups, did you use this expression yourself when you talked with the prosecution ?
A. Well, I really can't tell that exactly. It is quite possible, for under the word "gruppe" I do not understand anything different than a number of people or a series but not anything organizational or something closely knit,
Q. In the sense that you just mentioned now, that was the sense that you wanted to clarify when you signed ?
A. Yes.
Q. Before then, that is, before this interrogation by the prosecution dealing with this point, had you used the word "gruppe"- groups, in connection with the highest military leadership ?
A. No, for a group like that didn't actually exist, neither in an organization nor in a spiritual way did it exist. In the German army we only know the organization -- division corps, army, or whatever the case might be. Now, I shall turn to my last question. Fieldmarshall at the end of the year 1941 you resigned, what were the reasons for your resignation ?
A. In the summer of 1941, the influence was growing stronger and stronger on the part of Hitler dealing with all questions of the army and the complete lack of influence of the OKH in all spheres of political and economic adminis tration of the Occupied Countries, and the inner-contradictions against the policy drafted by Hitler.
In the autumn of 1941, this tension increased still more and parallel with that, there were the constant battles with the leadership of the party, who wanted to make known its influence on the army more and more. As there was no possibility any longer of bringing about a change in any way and as hard as it was for me to make that decision to leave the army -- in which millions had lost their lives -- and to separate myself from this army, nevertheless I decided to take the decisive step. On the 7th of December 1941, I asked Hitler, when I was alone with him, to relieve me of my office. He answered me that he would have to think about this and that I was for the moment not to speak about this matter. On the 17th of December, when we were alone together, he told me that he had decided to take over command of the army himself and the reason he gave for doing this was, that the entire confidence which he was enjoying in the army, considering the seriousness of the winter offensive, that he would have to test this confidence he enjoyed in the army. On the 19th of December he again told me not to say anything and on the 19th I received the order: and on the 20th in the evening, I journeyed to my home and I didn't see Hitler after that, Hitler was the fate of Germany and this fate was inevitable and could not be stopped.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn, (a recess was taken).
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? BY GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR: ence to two affidavits. Can you hear me? Can the witness hear me? which you signed. Did you have full opportunity to make changes in those affidavits before you signed them? you. Did you, in fact, make changes in the affidavits before you signed them?
Q Did you make changes in the affidavits before you signed them? handed you? Is that sentence --
A Which part do you mean?
Q The very last sentence, page 2. Is that last sentence entirely in your handwriting?
Q And that last sentence, will you read it please? will you please read the last sentence in your own handwriting?
A "In the hands of those departments drawn in the sketch is in fact the direction of the entire Armed Forces."
Q Is that sentence as you read it, correct? understanding, Whereupon it was stated to me that it was a known fact. For that reason I referred the sketch to those departments of the hierarchy. tence as you have read, says, "In the hands of those departments drawn in the sketch is in fact the direction of the entire Armed Forces". There is no misunderstanding or qualification about that sentence, is there?
A General, only as far as I have pointed it out to you. The individual par mentioned on the sketch, as they have been drawn, did not belong, but belonged directly and not actually to them, and are all the parts of this working staff.
GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR: Your Honor, with respect to the questions concerni the Eastern Front, bear in mind that the witness, von Mannstein, who is next to be called, was on the Eastern Front and remained there toll 1944, while the wit. ness, von Brauchitsch, retired in 1941. The Prosecution prefers to reserve this question for the next witness, von Mannstein. With respect to the questions on aggressive warefare, referred to documents which are before the Tribunal for a long time, the American Prosecution sees nothing to be gained by putting them before this witness. Accordingly, the American Prosecution has no further questions for the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear that? Does the Chief Prosecution wish to ask any questions? BY GENERAL ALEXANDROV: did not really take place and that in any case if it did take place, you were not informed before of it?
Q Were you not aware of the plans?
A. The "Plan Green" was known to me but it referred to something quite different. The "Plan Green" was compiled earlier, based on the fact that a joint attack from Pratz, in Czecho-Slovakia, was to take place against German. I myself did not know the details of "Plan Green".
Q Put the "Plan Green" dealt with the seizure of Czechoslovakia, is that right? I request the plan called "Green" was a plan for the seizure and attacking of Czechs-Slovakia, was it not?
A. As far as I know, "Plan Green" was only connected with an attack without a declaration war on the part of Czecho-Slovakia, and was called "Green".
Q. In that case, I shall remind you of another document. Hitler's decree of 30 May 1938, the first copy of which was sent to you as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. This directive was issued for the purpose of fulfilling the plan. I shall read into the record, out of the second section of the decree, which states, "It is my decision that Czecho-Slovakia, in the nearest future, will have to be conquered thoroughly by means of one decisive military operationDo you remember this directive?
Have you known about it?
A. That directive I know, yes.
Q. It shows then that there was really a plan for seizure and invading Czecho-Slovakia, is that no so?
A. I don't understand the meaning of that question.
Q. I am asking you, was there actually, in reality, this "Plan Green" for seizing Czecho-Slovakia, or was there no such plan?
A. In May 1938, that idea of Hitler was commented to me for the first time. But you have to take in consideration in this connection that Hitler, as generall known, was always using the strongest possible expressions. I was extremely difficult to derive from his speeches, the actual, true will, which Hitler had.
Q The next question is this. Tell me, witness, by what means did you learn about conversations between General Wagner and Heydrich of the Security Police? How did you know that talks were taking place between those two men?
Q Was General Wagner subordinate to your office? office. came to your knowledge?
A I don't understand. were taking place with your knowledge? operation plans made by the SD as a result of such talks and that you did not know that such talks were carried on, but that all plans were made in close harmony with the anted forces?
A I shall repeat the testimony. There was an order of the OKW to the effect that the Reichsfuehrer SS was to appoint commando units and they were to prepare the necessary steps for the transfer of strength to the political state. Nothing more than that was ever known to me and General Wagner did not make a report to me. No other reports of any kind ever reached me. Had I received these reports, I would have, just as in the case of Poland, taken steps against them. I would not have watched and looked on, had I known of them. in close contact with the High Command of the Army? Did you know about that? meeting of the SD on October 15, 1941. The report of the operational group , I quote:
"Einsatzgruppe A has just reached the region of the concentration of the forces, as ordered on June 26, 1941. The northern army group consisted of the 16th to the 18th armies and the 4th Panzer Division has marched a day ahead of them. Our problem consisted of establishing liaison with the commanders in chief of these groups.
It night be noted that the relationship of the armies are the best and the closest. Frequently liaison is so close that operations can be planned almost individually, particularly with the Commando corps. From the very beginning in the campaign toward the east, it has been quite clear that the special work: of the Security Police will consist not only of work in the rear, but also work in the front lines and in lines around the front lines." between the Security Police and the Army? it.
Q You stated here that you decided not to follow Hitler's decrees about special treatment accorded to Soviet commissars. Did I understand you right?
Q What was Hitler's reaction to your disregard of his decree on this subject? you did not want to follow it? many Soviet commissars were annihilated in accordance with the decree, which you stated you ordered should not be followed? about it, I only received the report that the order had not been carried out.
Q Another question. When counsel for the defense asked you your reasons for leaving the army, you stated that you retired, even though you loved the army, because of a difference of opinion in Hitler's policy and because of those differences, you asked for and received the right to resign. Is that correct?
Q That means that those generals, who did not agree with Hitler's policy and his form of government, did have the right to resign and not follow his policy.
Is that correct?
A Unfortunately no. Hitler had explicitly ordered that no one was allowed to go away from his command. One could not go if one wanted to. In my case, I could because he needed a scapegoat, a scapegoat because of the failure of the Russian campaign. That expressed itself in the propaganda spread in Germany, in which I was blamed for these matters.
Q I have no more questions, Mr. President. BY DR. LATERNSER: statements of the cross-examination. In this Document No. 0180, which has just been quoted by the Russian Prosecutor, Colonel General Hoeppner, is being mentioned. Did you know Colonel General Hoeppner well?
A I have known him since 1914. We was my chief of staff in Prussia and I know him extremely well.
Q You surely knew his attitude then with regard to the use of force?
A General Hoeppner was a straightforward and honest soldier. He would refuse to do anything which would not be in keeping with his education and his method of being brought up.
Q Is Colonel General Hoeppner alive? was sentenced to death. Is that right? there was a connection. my testimony, that is in regard to my negotiation with General Wagner and Heydrich Namely, there was a question of cooperation taking place on the fighting front. Conditions in the north were extraordinarily difficult. Part of the Russians were behind them and then there were the difficulties of bringing up reinforcements and repairs. I can well imagine that these groups may have been used in repairs. I never received the reports about that.
Q Did you know General Wagner well?
Q What was his attitude in regard to this report?
A He committed suicide July 20, 1942. He was against the whole system and any measures which would have been a contradiction of rights, decency and humanity or any violations of the rule of the Hague and Geneva conferences. The conference with Heydrich would have been communicated to him, that is of the special action group.
Q He would have made a report to you?
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, did you read the evidence of the witness, Gisevius?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you telling the Tribunal that insofar as it refers to yourself, it is entirely untrue?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: I want to Ask you another question, When the Commissar order was communicated to you, before the war with the Soviet union was made, what orders did you give?
THE WITNESS: I had given the order, which I mentioned earlier. I tried to carry on discipline and see that correct treatment was to be accorded to the population on the part of the German soldiers. In other words, the perpetrators were to be punished.
THE PRESIDENTS: That is, do you say that you did not give any orders directly referring to the Commissar Order?
THE WITNESS: No, I could not, I did not receive the order directly, but I did give an order which unmistakably gave my views and convictions.
THE PRESIDENT: You gave your order in writing, did you?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you telling the Tribunal that you never knew during the last of 1941 that the Commissar order was being carried out?
THE WITNESS: Mr. President, I am not trying to hide facts. I am merely trying to say that I did not receive any reports on it and consequently could not say anything about it. When I made inquiries about it, I only received the information that the order was not carried out.