AAs far as I was concerned, I gave no instructions at all. Hitler at that time had ordered that the troops stationed in the Army District, in the vicinity, should be especially prepared. it not?
A No. A plan did not exist. It was just what Hitler ordered later was going to be the practice.
Q But then gradually the situation came to a head. Did you in. 1939 warn Hitler against the war? I had very serious worries against Hitler, and against the German Nation's will I thought we might glide into a war.
For that reason in July, 1939, during report which I made to Hitler, I once again pointed to that memorandum. Furthermore, I went down to express that all the gains gotten by peaceful mean were being gambled or might be gambled array by Hitler. Hitler would not allo any discussion as it was his habit to do, but he merely replied to me that the was an affair for political leaders which was not any of my business. the Chief of Staff of the SA? I mentioned the same objections which I have just toldyou about, and therefore, need not repeat them, the foreign office? supreme command of the Army in any way.
Q What about the other leading political forces? importance. Did you, at that time, gain the impression that the war was decid upon?
A No. There are a number of clear impressions and maintained it that there were no intentions of the war. May I point out to you that since the autumn of 1939, negotiations were in progress with Poland in order to clear up the questions which were pending.
Hitler had spoken before the Reichstag about that problem. On occasion he caressed the views that there was the sole question that required clearing up. In previous speeches he had express the view that the building up of the armed forces was only carried out in order to protect their own homeland. At the end of December'38, or during the firs days of January, 1939, he gave the following order. It was receive by the Supreme Commander of the Army. Until 1945 the Army will carry out the propose. building up program. Any preparation for a march of plan of aggression was prohibited. At the meeting of the 23 of May, 1939, Hitler said literally, "I should have to be an idiot if for the reason of Poland I would glide into a war like those incapable people of 1914. I went down to order that re-aragment during the period which had been planned, that is, the years of 1942 and 1943 should continue. That, as far as I was concerned, was subsequent to an order which I had received at the beginning of the year. Finally, he ordered that commissions were to be appointed in order to investigate all the other proglems which had been touched upon. All the accumulation of fact was, as far as I was concerned the clearest proof. In the case of Poland, there was once again, merely a policy supported by military measures. just spoken, pronounce any objections of any kind?
A That was not a conference. It was an address, a speech of the Fueh to his subordinates. A discussion about it did not take place at all. you voiced any objections of any kind? Poland?
A No. Never. happen? To this you have to add the facts that the trade agreement signed with the Sovi Union, in my view would infant Poland, in this way:
That they would agree to negotiations. I add to that this further: That the isolationists which Hitler mentioned would also lead to negotiations. The decisive point was that Hitler was that the negotations with Poland would continue. 22 of August, the way you saw it? objections raised by me before Hitler. Secondly, it was in my view, Hitler's intention that the competence of the leaders we had been ordered there in the policy which he was pursuing had been strengthened, that they should be completely convinced of the logic of his intentions.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn.
(The Court recessed uhtil 1400 hours.)
(The Tribunal reconvened at 1400 hours, 9 August 1946)
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the defendant Hess is absent. BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the OKW and the General Staff)
Q. Field Marshal, this morning we had reached the period of tension just before the outbreak of the war. On August 25, 1938, the frist order for marching was drawn. In those days, did Hitler give you any report to the effect that negotiations would continue ?
A. He personally gave me the order for the rescinding of the order to march in. and on that occasion he told me that negotiations with Poland were still in progress.
Q. In contrast to the previsou occupying of foreign areas, all preparations before the Polish campaign had been drawn up with a serious idea in mind. Did the result lead you to believe that actually there would be a war then ?
A. No, for the following reasons: As to the Sudeten crisis, Hitler had heard from the various military leaders that military preparations had not been taken seriously by them, for the preparations in their scope were not commensurate with the seriousness of the task at hand. Of course, it is a matter of course that if in political negotiations you wish to threaten with military might and means of might, there must be the absolute impression of seriousness so far as the negotiations are concerned and your own people are concerned. had pressed for preparations with the idea that they were to be considered and taken seriously.
A second point, however, was to be added. On Hitler's order, a time schedule had been set up in which the various periods of time, the various phases, were set down exactly.
Only on his express order could a new phase be gone into, and from this also I could see that he wanted to accommodate matters to political procedures.
Q. At the beginning of the Polish campaign did you know that an agreement with the Soviet Union had been reached, setting up a line of demarcation ?
A. No, I had no idea of that at all.
Q. After the conclusion of the hostile action, had you provided for military administration in Poland ? why didn't this take place ?
A. The high command of the army had made preparations and directions to this effect, that as soon as possible, the appeasement of the occupied areas be brought about. At the beginning of October, I learned about excesses against the Poles, carried out by personalities who were not under the jurisdiction of the Army. I reported these matters to the OKW and took the next occasion to tell Hitler personally and report to him on these matters personally. I asked him to see to it that matters like that be prevented once and for all. Hitler did not take any notice of this suggestion of mine. the military commander in chief of Poland, and in the second half of October he was charged with the entire sphere of the administration. The army relinquished this authority.
Q. As to the campaign against Poland, didn't tensions arise between the OKW and Hitler, and if so, what were the reasons ?
A. There were constant conflicts with the leadership of the Party, and the referred to the most varied points of origin. It would take me too far afile to enumerate all of them, but I should like to stress just two points. retained in the Army under all circumstances, and the second point applied to the influence which the leadership of the Party demanded on complaints. The third point was the decree green and the foreign women problem, which matter I answered in the form of a decree given to the Army.
Q. Now I should like to put a new questions relating to the time before the western offensive. offensive against the western priers ?
A. In no way was an offensive like that planned. On the basis of the order which I just mentioned previously , all preparations had been prohibited and thereupon, as far as on expensive measures were concerned, no special measures had been taken I advance. All directives and all directions which were issued after the Polish campaign, applying to the troops which were being sent to the West, were purely of a defensive nature.
Q. From whom did the plan to attack emanate? Who issued it?
A. On the 27th of September, 1939, Hitler made his decision to attack in the West, and he announced it publicly. He demanded that the necessary preparations be made, which would have to be concluded by the 12th of November.
Q. What position did you and the OKH take with reference to this plan?
A. England and France had declared war on Germany. Both powers had not taken advantage of the greatest moment of weakness on the part of Germany in September. Therefore, it was questionable to me now, at a time when the Western Front was being strengthened, whether they would assemble for a winter offensives and beyond that, I personally was in doubt whether these two powers seriously desired to wage war. I believed that in view of the reception which Chamberlain had in London after the Munich Agreement, and Daladier in Paris, the receptions which both of them he met with in their home cities, there would be no inclination toward a was at all. the part of the Allies up until that time would, in the eyes of the world, not weigh so heavily on the balance. Since the year 1914 I fully appreciated the violations of neutrality, and this was a recollection which had been seared into my consciousness. In my opinion, this would apply in this case to the one that would be the first to cross the border. We had looked into the question very acrefully in theOKH of whether the crossing of the border for reasons of ground operations would be necessary as the first step. We had reached the conviction that this did not apply and was not the case, but that we, if it was necessary at all, could take the second part.
Q. Did you call Hitler's attention to the fact that in the event of an offensive in the West, the countries of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg would be drawn into hostile activities?
A. I took the very next opportunity at which I could talk with Hitler alone after the 27th of September, 1939. I used this opportunity to tell him my opinion. However, he was not open to any discussion, and remained steadfast in his well-known opinion.
Q. Did you try to prevent the western offensive from being carried through
A. Before as well as afterwards, I was convinced that it would have to be possible to eliminate this entire war for once and all politically, and not deal with it. It considered it madness that Europe once more would have to torture herself and tear herself to pieces instead of working together with a common task and by peaceful means to promote development.
The Wehrmacht, according to the principle of "Sine Pace Semper Bellum", was in line with this. The German soldiers of every rank had been trained with the thought of defending their homeland and protecting their country. They did not think about wars of aggression or conquest, or the expansion of German domination over other peoples. only in a political manner, if the sincere will to do it that way existed. Any and all political developments, of course, need time; and I was only concerned with providing this time or these political negotiations, matters upon which I had no influence, however. I asked on the 5th of November, 1939, to be granted an audience with the Fuehrer. I know that I would be able to use only purely political reasons, and I did this with the consent of the army.
Hitler listened to my statements quietly. Then he flew into a rage, so that any farther conversation was quite impossible. So I left. On the evening of the same day, the order was issued to attack on the 12th of November, and the order of the 7th of November was rescinded.
Q. Did you not even use the alibi of poor weather in order to gain time and to postpone matters?
A. I pointed out the fact that if we were to march in at all, on account of the difficult terrain, only if we had an extended period of good weather would this be possible. But above all the use of the Luftwaffe was dependent on a long period of good weather.
Q. And after the address of Hitler to the generals on the 23rd of November, 1939, which has been discussed here quite frequently, how did you offer your resignation? How did that come about?
A. On the 23rd of November, in, the evening, one more, I was ordered to appear before the Fuehrer.
In a lengthy discussion with him alone, he once more raised all the accusations against the army. In the course of this conversation, I offered to resign, which offer he rejected by saying that I was to do my duty just like every other soldier. Through these incidents a breach had occurred which had to be glossed over painstakingly, but which was never completely mended.
Q. To what extent, in your capacity is commander-in-chief of the army, did you participate in the plan to occupy Norwar and Denmark?
A. I was in no way connected with it.
Q. Did you participate in the preparation and carrying through of this?
A. No.
Q. Then the campaign in the West started. At that time, what was your relationship with Hitler?
A. As I have already mentioned before, if was difficult. In the course of the campaign in the West, this was a series of smaller and larger differences. I should like to cite but one. This concerned the stopping of the German Panzers before Dunkirk, This was a matter which brought about a serious conflict. It was a result of that that the mass of English personnel of the British Expeditionary Force escaped to England across the Channel.
Q. On the part of the OKH, after the conclusion of the campaign in the West, were measures for demobilization worked on, or were they suggested?
A. At that time, two measures were taken. A commission for demobilization was established, and secondly a number of generals were asked whether they wished to remain in the army after the conclusion of the peace.
Q. And what was your collaboration in the decision to intervene in Greece and Yugoslavia?
A. I did not participate in any way in these decisions. When, with the chief of the General Staff, General Halder, I was ordered by the Fuehrer to appear before him, he received us with the words, "I have decided to destroy Yugoslavia". And then he cited the reasons for his decision. I believe they are well know already.
Q. At that time, was there a plan for any interference in Yugoslavia or Greece?
A. No, neither a plan nor any preparation. We did not even have maps
Q. And where were you to get these divisions from? From all parts of Germany?
A. The divisions had to be brought in from all parts of Germany and the Occupied Countries.
that the occupation of the Balkans was one of the prerequisites of the campaign against the Soviet Union ? Paulus. The Jugoslavian question was the direct consequence of the overthrow there. Before that time, just a little bit previous, Jugoslavia had joined the Tripartite pact and it was the result of the English landing in Greece and the catastrophic position of the Italians in Albania.
Q Now, let us turn to the Eastern campaign. That was your attitude with reference to the Trade Agreement with the Soviet Union ? with the Soviet Union and we had hailed it joyfully. In this stop we saw the prerequisite to the fact that from now on a period of mistrust would be concluded, and that, above and beyond that, Germany would be able to take up once more the position of a bridge, since she was situated as she was in the heart of Europe. tacking the Soviet Union ? the possibility of war with the Soviet Union would be considered ? fect that he was worried, that the attitude of Russia might change. Thereupon, I talked with the chief of the General Staff and told him that we would have to get hold of the data involved, for in this connection we had not done anything up until that time.
Q Were there any maps in existence ?
A Neither maps nor anything else. In the month of September, Hitler ordered that the question of Russia would have to be investigated and looked into. In my opinion, no decision to be carried through was in existence; in any event, it was not expressed.
All the work which was done was work for the General Staff and they were precautionary measures, measures which had to be taken everywhere in a case of that nature. conclusion of the Western campaign, have any connection with the Eastern campaign, and if so, what were the reasons for this transfer of divisions to the East ? er, and the reasons for it were quite different. The securing along the Russian-German demarcation line in Poland, in the main, was carried out by Zollgrenzschutz. Border incidents had been ascertained. The Zollgrenzschutz ( Border Protection) was needed in other spots very urgently. The SS intended to take over the border work of the Zollgrenschutz and for that reason they wanted to set up new units, but that I wanted to prevent. For these reasons Hitler was requested to have these divisions transferred from the West to the East; and in addition to that, we wanted to relieve France of the burden of many divisions which were stationed in France. 1941, have any misgivings about a war with the Soviet Union?
DR. LATERNSER: I refer to document 1872-PS, USA-134, My Lord. of Russia, we were concerned with the fact that if a war was to arise at all, it was to be a preventive war. In the conference I limited myself to the purely military misgivings and doubts. Colonel General Halder and I reported on these matters. Point I was the size of the Russian area which today cannot be bridged. The second point was the population density, and with that the large number of reserves which were trained and at their disposal, and the point of view and culture of the Russian population as compared with the year 1418, matters about which I could check myself when I was a guest of the Red Army in the year 1931.
Point 3 was the high arms potential on the part of Russia. According to our estimate, Russia at that time had at her command approximately 10,000 tanks, Panzers. Hitler must have given some thought to these problems, for he acted immediately and refuted the first two points; namely, bu saying that the position of the Soviets was very much in disfavor among the Russian population; that the system would collapse and everything would depend only on the decisiveness of the first successes. As far as the third point was concerned, the point of armament, he mentioned, on the basis of the figures that he always had at his command, which he kept in his head, that the armament of Russia could not be at the level which we imagined it to be. Exact prof, however, we did not have at our disposal. thought to the misgivings which you had? command about the plans with regard to Russia? order and subsequently, at the end of December, the first directive went to the Army groups. ler take at the beginning of the Russian campaign ? creased more and more. From the wealth of the incidents that took place, I should like to pick out but two. The Army had, in the areas occupied by it, once more restored the churches for services to be used by the population as far as possible. The German clergymen had been active at the request of the population. However, Hitler prohibited all of this, and now the remarkable picture arose that the clergymen of the Roumanian, Hungarian and Italian divisions could attend services but the Germans couldn't. The second point was the question about the operational carrying on or conduct of the war.
If you started a war, then the presetposition for the continuance of the war in the following year had to be set up, and in my opinion and that of the High Command, the area around Moscow--not the city itself--played a decisive role. It is a traffic center which is centralized there, and according to that, the presupposition for the setting up and distribution of reserves applied; there were numerous armament installations which made it possible to carry in armies. The OKH, therefore, was of the opinion that after the Dnieper-Smolensk line had been reached that then one would have to come into possession of the entire Moscow region. However, Hitler was of a different opinion. He put the decisive importance on Leningrad and that demanded the offensive at Kiev. A decision in this matter was taken by him and later, too late, the offensive in the Moscow region, because of weather conditions, was coming to be a failure. up certain matters of subordination. Do you know of an agree ment between the General Quartermaster of the Army, General Wagner, and Hoydrich concerning the use of the Einsatz groups? eral Wagner and the Chief of the SS Hauptamt, Heydrich, did take place. This conference was to regulate or settle those questions which were necessary in order that the youth, as decreed by Hitler, have commandoes in the operational area of the Army, to have those matters settled.
matter of crossing the boundaries with the questions economic welfare and supply, and the right to traverse highways and streets. I know nothing further about this, Nothing else was reported to me, and whether anything else was directed I don't know, but the only thing that might have been of concern was that perhaps the question was discussed that if commandos of that nature would be sent into combat at the front lines, then they would be under the command of the military commander, and all directives for these commandos took place according to official channels from the Reichsfuehrer SS the Army Groups, and the request of the Army liaison commands had been given them but they had only the task of informing these commandos about the purpose of the operation as far as it applied to them. In this decree of the O.K.W. it says, regarding the purpose and, the task of these commandos : It is intended that the occupied territories, as soon as possible, will be made into political states and in order to prepare the measures, these commandos are to be used, If there is anything else., I was not informed.
Q. Did General Wagner report to you that through these Einsatz Groups, many directives would be carried out?
A. No.
Q. The witness SS Schellenberg was interrogated here, and he stated that he was of the conviction that the O.K.W. new of mass directives and had reported this to the commanders in chief through official channels.
A. He is speaking of a conviction, not of a certainty, and this conviction is not right.
Q. How was this matter ?
A. The subordination of the Einsatz Commandos as I have mentioned was set up in such a way that all orders emanated solely from the Reichsfuehrer SS. They were not subordinated to the Army in any way.
Q. How about supply ? Were they subordinated to the Army in that way?
A. No, not even in that way. They were dependent to receive their suppli from the Army for there was no other way of supplying them.
Q. Do you know of official reports ? Did you receive them from these Einsatz Groups ?
A. No.
Q. Now, the matter of the Waffen SS will have to be cleared up as well. Just what was the subordination or the responsibility of the Waffen SS to the Army?
A. The Waffen SS was subordinated to the Army only for tactical purposed It was subordinated to the Army neither for discipline nor for judicial mat They had no influence whatsoever , the Army had no influence on demotions or promotions of people and so forth.
Q. To whom was the Waffen SS subordinate if it was outside of a tactical district ? That is , not a battle or operational area.
A. In any event, not the Army or O.K.W.
Q. And to whom was it subordinate in its home area?
A. The Reichsfuehrer SS.
Q. Was the Waffen SS paid out of the budget of the Wehrmacht?
A. Not from the budget of the Army.
Q. And the budget in the Luftwaffe would be less ?
A. Even as little as far as I am interested. The SS had its own budget it had its own armament office, clothing office, administrative office, etc,
Q. Between the Waffen SS division and the Wehrmacht there was only a tactical contact when this division was actually in combat ?
A. It was under the Army at the moment when it was used in the operations area, and in order to be transported off, it was put at the Army's disposal
Q. Would this presumption be true if I were to say that between a Waffen SS division and the Army, no close connection existed as if, for instance, an Italian or Spanish division would have been subordinate to the Army for an operational battle ?
A. That would have been similar.
Q. In general, what was the relationship of the leadership of the Waffen SS to that of the Army Luftwaffe or Navy ? Was that an enormous one ?
A. In a battle, yes, otherwise there was very little connection.
Q. Field Marshal, can you give us the circumstances under which Hitler issued the Commissar order ?
A. In March, 1941, Hitler had ordered the military leaders, in a rather lengthy address, that these were the reasons for the attitude toward Russia and he stated that in this case it was a battle or a fight which was of an ideological nature and that we could not fight with such chivalrous methods which the Army was used to carrying through; that he knew that the officer could not claim this opinion as their own, and that he was demanding the ab solute carrying through of the orders he had issued. And in connection with this, he issued the order dealing with the treatment to be accorded the commissars.
Q. What did you do in order to prevent the carrying through Of this order and to prevent excesses on the part of the troops in the East ?
A. After the conclusion of the conference after Hitler had left, some of the commanders-in-chief came to me and I remember particularly well that the commanders-in-chief of three Army Groups, von Rundstedt, von Bock, and von Leeb and another group of leaders came to me in a rather excited fashion over this matter said that the carrying out of this order would he impossible for them. I agreed with them and told them that as far as the OKH was concerned no order like that would be issued. I also told them that I would have to think things over as to what steps I would actually ha to take. In the meantime, I had come to know Hitler so well, to know that once he had reached a decision and as, in this case, he had made it public, that is, he had told it to the military leadership immediately thereupon, I kenw that under no circumstances would he be dissuaded from this position for anything in the world. I knew also that I had to give my hand over to the Army and had to agree with them when they said that they did not want to follow this order. For this reason I issued an order dealing with discipline.
Q. And what was the wordings the approximate wording of this order ?
A. It is not possible for me to give you the wording, however the conten of the order, briefly, were as follows: Discipline in the Army was to be carried through along the lines and regulations as applied in the past, and this was to be strictly observed. The attitude toward the population was to remain correct in every way, and no excesses were to be punished.
Q. Would an open refusal against Hilter be successful if you threatened to resign ?
A. As I have already said, no.
Q. Now, one more question dealing with the Eastern campaign. Did the German Army, in 1941, in its push through Russia, find considerable cestruction which the Soviet army had done itself when it retrested ?
A. The picture was quite as we expected it to be. From the time that applies to a century earlier, the lack of consideration in Russia for her own country was well known. There were numerous railroads which had been destroyed; other installations. It was mined in such a way that even though we worked for months they could hardly be used by us, and in the cities we met special commandos, Russians, who had the task, and who carried through the firing of the cities and the burning of them. In Kiev and other cities we found mines which had been prepared by them. ti mines which caused us considerable damage.
Q. Before the entry of Italy into the war, or before the declaration of war on America, were you advised in advance ?
A. No. Both incidents I regretted to a large extent.
Q. Were military agreements with Japan known to you ?
A. I do not even know them today.
Q. The record dealing with the testimony of Gisevius is known to you through the fact that I gave them to you for your perusal. Do you know the witness Gisevius ?
A. In April 1946, I learned of the existence of Mr. Gisevius for the first time from the papers. In the papers I read that he was to appear as a witness I would have read the particulars anyway because the name was kn own to me a Dr. Gisevius, in the 90's, was a personal physician of mine.
Q. But the witness gave various and quite detailed statements about your person and especially to the effect that he talked with you about a general Putsch. What can you say about that ?
A. I believe that anyone who knows me but a little bit would laugh at the thought that I, together with a young person who is entirely strange to me, would speak about plans of a Putsch against thehead of the state. I can try to reconstruct the picture from the records and from these writings, I received the impression that this is a combination which is without any background and I believe that a man is involved here who believes that the entire earth is revolving about his alone.
Q. Gisevius further stated that the generals had enriched themselves. Is that ture ?
A. I don't quite know in which way.
Q. Did you yourself receive any donations ?
A. No.
Q. Fieldmarshal, you furnished two affidavits to the prosecution, USA Exhibit No. 1532 and affidavit No. 4, USA Exhibit 535; both of them with the date of the 7th of November 1945. At that time were you under arrest ?
A. Two American officers had asked me to tell them about the organization of the army and so forth.
Q. Fieldmarshal, I believe you misunderstood me. I asked you whether at the time that you deposed these affidavits whether you were under arrest ?
A. Please sir what was that -- please ? you were under arrest at the time ?
A. Since the 19th of October of the previous year, I have been in the prison at Nurnberg here under arrest.
Q. And about these affidavits, who set down these statements ?
A. They were drafted by two American officers.
Q. And who demanded who asked you for these statements ?
A. That, I don't know, the names weren't mentioned.
Q. Were you told for what purpose these statements were to be put ?
A. No. On the basis of the conferences which took place prior to that, I assumed that they were to serve for the purpose of information dealing with organization and was to be used by experts.
Q. Did you make any alterations ?
A. I undertook to make a series of alterations but I can't tell you how many.
Q. These statements, that is, in your opinion, of course, could they be misunderstood ?
A. Even after I had made the changes, in my opinion, they were clear, in connection with the conversation that had taken place previously. They were a series of conversations in Which I was told that we were not under oath as witnesses, a matter of which of course was of no consequence to me anyway but it was the purpose to inform about organization; the problems were discussed and locked at from different angles.
Q. In signing affidavit No. 2, which also contains a schedule or a draft this might not be correct or might be misunderstood ?
A. I pointed to the fact that this chart might be misunderstood and I received answers that matters very entirely cleared up and that it wasn't very important in the first place.
Q. Affidavit No. 1, USA Exhibit No. 531 which Colonel General Halder wigned on the same day, agrees word for word and completely with the exception of the last paragraph; you were interrogated commonly with Halder ?
A. Yes.
Q. You just mentioned a moment ago, in the signing of affidavit No. 2, y pointed to the fact that the chart was incorrect. Now, I shall have this chart presented to you and I should like to ask you just what is wrong in it ?
A. This chart may bring about misunderstandings.
THE PRESIDENT: Hadn't you better ask the witness -- if he is your witness -- whether there is anything wrong about the affidavit ?