Q And what connection did General Milch have with these experiments? Did he make the arrangements for them? and Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff which has been shown me here on the occasion of previous interrogation. from the correspondence that's been submitted. or stations for biological research? and that's all I know and nothing else, that is to say, such experiments which came into the sphere of influence of the Reich Medical Officer-SS and nothing could be ascertained about that.
Q One last question. You said that after the arrest of Dr. Rascher that there were; no more illegal experiments that were connected with the Institute. Do you know of any others that were not connected with the Institute?
A That refers to the previous question. It is intimately connected with it, One did hear, for instance, of the work of Professor Schilling; but they never became known to me in detail.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
LT. COMMANDER HARRIS: May it please the Tribunal, during the examination of the witness, Dr. -
THE PRESIDENT: You are not wanting me to keep the witness, are you?
LT. COMMANDER HARRIS: No, sir. During the examination of the witness, Dr. Best, the Tribunal kindly agreed to permit the Prosecution to introduce another document, which at that time was not available, and with the permission of the Tribunal at this time I should like to offer it. The document is 4051 PS and becomes USA 924. This document has been shown to the witness Best in the presence of the counsel for the Gestapo, Dr. Merkel, and the witness has identified it. The document shows not only that the witness Best had knowledge of the program of counter-terror carried on in Denmark, but that he himself decreed acts of counter-terrorism to be taken, and that on one occasion he ordered the execution of a student.
During the examination of Dr. Best the Tribunal will recall a series of documents, USA Exhibits 911 to 915 inclusive, which were offered to show the the Gestapo murdered a French general. At that time we had only the photostatic copies of these documents, and I told the Tribunal that we would try to obtain the originals, We now have the originals in our possession, and they are being substituted for the photostatic copies. the time that this alleged murder was supposed to have taken place, that a French General, General Mesny, was killed, and he said he did not know that. The French Prosecution has given us the documentary proof that General Mesny was killed at that time under circumstances which prove conclusively that this murder was accomplished in conformity with the plans which have heretofore been shown, and to that end I now offer as document next in order 4069 PS, which becomes USA 925. This document is certified by the delegation of the Ministry of Justice of France. the International Red Cross Committee, Geneva, dated 5 April, 1945, to Madame Mesny. I wish to emphasize the fact that this document is dated long before the present time and was written at a time when the other documents which the Tribunal has the benefit of were, of course, entirely unknown.
Legation in Berlin, had sent certain information concerning General Mesny, and I should just like to respectfully invite your attention to the second paragraph of his report, where he states that the Generals Flavigny, de Boisse, and Buisson had been transferred from Oflag IV B in Koenigstein to Oflag IV C in Colditz. "The Generals Mesny and Vauthier have also left Koenigsten in a private car for Colditz. According to a communication from Commandant Prawill, General Mesny was shot near Dresden while trying to escape." That was the report which the International Red Cross sent to Madam Mesny. the second document, which is dated 29 April, 1945, and which was written by General Buisson to the Minister of War concerning the case of General Mesny, General Buisson states in this letter as follows:
"On 18 January 1945 --" and parenthetically I refresh the recollection of the Tribunal that the last document which we offered was dated 12 January 1945 showing that at that time all plans for this murder had been completed. To continue with the document -- "the following six officers, all generals, from the camp of Koenigstein, Oflag IV B, were picked out and told to leave the Camp on 19 January in the morning, for an unknown destination. First car, Generals Daine and de Boisse." de Boisse was the General whom it was first intended to murder, as shown by the document, and if you remember, it was decided that General de Boisse would not be killed because his name had been discussed too often over the telephone, and therefore another general was to be substituted for him. So you see General de Boisse was in the first car.
"Second car, Generals Flavigny and Buisson. Third car, Generals Mesny and Vauthier. On 19 January, if the first car left at the appointed time, the other two did not, as both their order of departure and the times were changed. Second car, 7 a.m. General Mesny alone, for according to information given General Buisson through the German interpreter Rosenberg, an order had arrived from the German High Command during the night, cancelling General Vauthier's departure. Third car, Generals Flavigny and Buisson. The orders for the journey were draconian, destination unknown; it was strictly forbidden to make any stop on the way; the door handles were taken off the cars; there was a German officer in each car with an automatic pistol on his knees and his finger on the trigger.
"Upon our arrival in Colditz, the reprisal camp, towards noon on 19th January, we noticed the absence of General Mesny, who had not arrived; we thought he had been sent to another camp, although his luggage was in the truck with that of the four other generals. On January 29th, in the morning, Commandant Prawitt, head of Oflag IV-C came into the rooms of the French Generals and made the following announcement: 'I inform you officially that General Mesny was shot yesterday in Dresden while trying to escape. He was buried in Dresden with military honors by a detachment of the Wehrmacht.'" this comment, and it should be remembered that when he wrote this letter he, or course, had no knowledge of the plot as we know it today. He says, "Two facts remain obscure in the sombre tragedy: 1, the transport of General Mesny alone, the choice of General Vauthier; then the cancelling of the order seems very suspicious to us, given the attitude of the general, who was a volunteer for work in Germany, and whose transfer to a reprisal camp seemed inexplicable, 2, General Mesny, whose eldest son is in a camp for political deportees in Germany, said to me several times during the course of our conversations, 'If up to 1944 I always tried to prepare my escape, I gave up trying altogether afterwards, even if I had every chance of succeeding. First of all, the end of the war is only a question of weeks; moreover, and especially, I should be much too afraid that my flight would cost my eldest son his life.' An hour before his departure from Koenigstein on January 19th, General Mesny repeated those words to me again."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I wonder if Your Lordship will allow me to mention a point before Dr. Laternser commences. As a result of the general evidence given before the Commission and the announcement that a number of summarizing affidavits will be tendered by certain organizations, the Prosecution have secured eleven affidavits of general scope made by state ministers, local counsellors and officials, and a publisher of a newspaper, dealing with the same matter as the summarized, affidavits which the defense.
are about to submit. That could of course, be put in cross examination to the witness for the SA who would be called, but I suggest for the consideration of the Tribunal that at this stage of the trial it would probably be more convenient if they were simply offered after the counsel for the organization have dealt with their documents. German copies to the counsel for the defense at once so that they would have an opportunity of considering them. Otherwise, of course, I should reserve them to be put in cross examination and preserve the element of surprise. that that was the more convenient course than occupying more time in cross examination at this stage when so many facts are known.
DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW): Mr president, I did not understand Sir David's suggestion, and I beg to have it repeated so that , if possible, the Defense Counsel can define their attitude in regard it.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you put it again?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: My Lord, I have eleven affidavits which were tall from various Gentlemen, including ex-state ministers of the Social Democratic Party and other non-Nazi parties, local officials, and one publisher of a never paper. They are designed to deal generally with the matters which have been given before the Commission and which are going to be dealt with, as I under stand, in the summarized affidavits, the affidavits summarizing the large quantity of affidavits. time in putting the contents of these affidavits to the witnesses for the SA, witness Juetner and others who would probably deal with most of the points, I should offer them after the Defense Counsel have offered their documents, a in order that the Defense Counsel would not be predudiced in any way, I suggest that, if that course were adopted, I should give them copies of these affidavit in German at once so that they would have an opportunity of seeing the contend at this stage of the trial in cross examination.
THE PRESIDENT: That seems to the Tribunal to be a convenient course and to give the German Defense Counsel a longer period in which to study the affidavits.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: I will do that, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. How, Dr. Laternser.
DR. LATERNSER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall call as my from witness Field Marshal von Brauchitsch.
GENERAL TAYLOR: Might I make a brief observation before the witness comer
THE PRESIDENT: Marshal, keep the witness out for a moment.
GENERAL TAYLOR: My Lord, I wanted to make a very brief observation concerning the scope of the testimony of the witness von Brauchitsch.
The other two witnesses that Dr. Laternser is calling--Fieldmarshal von Mannstein and Runstedt--were called in the first instance by Dr. Laternser and have testified before the Commissioner on practically every question relating to the General Staff and the High Command.
That will appear from the summaries of their evidence which, I think, are in the hands of the Court.
The case of the witness von Brauchitsch is somewhat different. The witness von Brauchitsch signed two affidavits which the Prosecution offered and which are in the record before the Tribunal as US Exhibits 532 and 535. Those affidavits relate exclusively to the question of the composition and organization of the General Staff and High Command group. Dr. Laternser only within the scope of those affidavits. No other matters were touched upon before the Commissioner. I now understand that Dr. Laternser proposes to examine the witness von Brauchitsch before the Tribunal on a great varies or at least, several other matters other than those covered in the affidavits. von Brauchitsch covers other matters other than those in the affidavits, he become a witness for the Defense and the Prosecution may possibly, though not necessarily have to cross examine him on those distinct matters. is going to talk about matters other than those that Mannstein and Runstedt have covered at length, it would be entirely fair and expeditious to confine the testimony of von Brauchitsch to the matters of the affidavits, unless, as I say, it is proposed that von Brauchitsch discuss matters which Runstedt and Mannstein are not going to cover.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal wishes you to go on and examine Fieldmarshal von Brauchitsch. They hope that insofar as his evidence covers the same ground as the other two witness that you are proposing to call, you will be as short as possible.
DR. LATERNSER: In that case, I shall now call Fieldmarshal von Brauchitsch as my first witness.
9 Aug M LJG 10-1a Haynes follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name, please? Can you hear now?
A Now I can hear. Walter von Brauchitsch.
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. LATERNSER: at the end? Army? General von Fritsch in the position of Supreme Commander of the Army. When you took over the office, did Fritsch inform you about the statements of intentions made by Hitler on 5 November 1937? tions? of the General Staff of the Army, inform you abort it? on the occasion of taking over that position of Supreme Commander of the armed Forces would have been necessary, would it not?
A In my view, most certainly.
9 Aug M LJG 10-2a Haynes of 5 November 1937? hearing from Hitler before the occupation of Austria? Austria?
A No; at least I do not know of one.
Q Was that interference a surprise to you? It is not correct, as the witness Gisevius said, that I was called away, The fact is that I was not in Berlin at all, I was on a duty journey and away from there. It was only after my return that I board of the instructions which had been given.
Q Were you not objecting to it? also afraid that from this interference further conflict would arise. meet you and congratulate you after the order for the march into Austria had been rescinded in the course of the 11 March? preciated by me. I was in the Reichchancellory, and it is guite possible that Papen may have congratulated no on that occasion. over heard in political affairs?
Q. Well, then, was there a plan for a military interference in that case?
A You mean Austria?
Fieldmarshal Keitel to use his entire influence in order that in no case should the agreement he infringed? had since May 1938, no longer handled the business of the people of the general staff. Is that correct?
A That is an error. General Beck, until the first of September 1938, handled the business of the General Staff in its entirety. with in this courtroom, and to which I shall not refer for that reason. In that memorandum, he spoke against the occupation of the Sudetenland. He war: against a war at two fronts. What did you do with that memorandum? measures. General Beck had composed a memorandum in which we reached the military conclusion that a war on behalf of Europe would have to lead to a world conflict. Since I consider these kinds of thought perfectly basic, I have the opportunity to present them to the Commanding General. There was another reason why I ordered those generals to appear in Berlin -- the discussion of the internal questions of the Army. They agreed that memorandum was later to be given to Hitler. There was an excited argument about it.
Q When, approximately was that?
Q On what occasion did Colonel General Adams get his discharge?
A In August, a conference at the Fuehrer's headquarters, a conference with the officers of the General Staff was ordered. During that conference Colonel General Adams, who was Group Commander at Wiesbaden at that time, expressed thoughts similar to those contained in the memorandum. That was the first thing which might have occasioned Ms release. However his release was not carried out until October of 1938, after a report given by General Adams. On that occasion Colonel Adams was expressing his views. occupied?
AAs far as I was concerned, I gave no instructions at all. Hitler at that time had ordered that the troops stationed in the Army District, in the vicinity, should be especially prepared. it not?
A No. A plan did not exist. It was just what Hitler ordered later was going to be the practice.
Q But then gradually the situation came to a head. Did you in. 1939 warn Hitler against the war? I had very serious worries against Hitler, and against the German Nation's will I thought we might glide into a war.
For that reason in July, 1939, during report which I made to Hitler, I once again pointed to that memorandum. Furthermore, I went down to express that all the gains gotten by peaceful mean were being gambled or might be gambled array by Hitler. Hitler would not allo any discussion as it was his habit to do, but he merely replied to me that the was an affair for political leaders which was not any of my business. the Chief of Staff of the SA? I mentioned the same objections which I have just toldyou about, and therefore, need not repeat them, the foreign office? supreme command of the Army in any way.
Q What about the other leading political forces? importance. Did you, at that time, gain the impression that the war was decid upon?
A No. There are a number of clear impressions and maintained it that there were no intentions of the war. May I point out to you that since the autumn of 1939, negotiations were in progress with Poland in order to clear up the questions which were pending.
Hitler had spoken before the Reichstag about that problem. On occasion he caressed the views that there was the sole question that required clearing up. In previous speeches he had express the view that the building up of the armed forces was only carried out in order to protect their own homeland. At the end of December'38, or during the firs days of January, 1939, he gave the following order. It was receive by the Supreme Commander of the Army. Until 1945 the Army will carry out the propose. building up program. Any preparation for a march of plan of aggression was prohibited. At the meeting of the 23 of May, 1939, Hitler said literally, "I should have to be an idiot if for the reason of Poland I would glide into a war like those incapable people of 1914. I went down to order that re-aragment during the period which had been planned, that is, the years of 1942 and 1943 should continue. That, as far as I was concerned, was subsequent to an order which I had received at the beginning of the year. Finally, he ordered that commissions were to be appointed in order to investigate all the other proglems which had been touched upon. All the accumulation of fact was, as far as I was concerned the clearest proof. In the case of Poland, there was once again, merely a policy supported by military measures. just spoken, pronounce any objections of any kind?
A That was not a conference. It was an address, a speech of the Fueh to his subordinates. A discussion about it did not take place at all. you voiced any objections of any kind? Poland?
A No. Never. happen? To this you have to add the facts that the trade agreement signed with the Sovi Union, in my view would infant Poland, in this way:
That they would agree to negotiations. I add to that this further: That the isolationists which Hitler mentioned would also lead to negotiations. The decisive point was that Hitler was that the negotations with Poland would continue. 22 of August, the way you saw it? objections raised by me before Hitler. Secondly, it was in my view, Hitler's intention that the competence of the leaders we had been ordered there in the policy which he was pursuing had been strengthened, that they should be completely convinced of the logic of his intentions.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn.
(The Court recessed uhtil 1400 hours.)
(The Tribunal reconvened at 1400 hours, 9 August 1946)
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the defendant Hess is absent. BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the OKW and the General Staff)
Q. Field Marshal, this morning we had reached the period of tension just before the outbreak of the war. On August 25, 1938, the frist order for marching was drawn. In those days, did Hitler give you any report to the effect that negotiations would continue ?
A. He personally gave me the order for the rescinding of the order to march in. and on that occasion he told me that negotiations with Poland were still in progress.
Q. In contrast to the previsou occupying of foreign areas, all preparations before the Polish campaign had been drawn up with a serious idea in mind. Did the result lead you to believe that actually there would be a war then ?
A. No, for the following reasons: As to the Sudeten crisis, Hitler had heard from the various military leaders that military preparations had not been taken seriously by them, for the preparations in their scope were not commensurate with the seriousness of the task at hand. Of course, it is a matter of course that if in political negotiations you wish to threaten with military might and means of might, there must be the absolute impression of seriousness so far as the negotiations are concerned and your own people are concerned. had pressed for preparations with the idea that they were to be considered and taken seriously.
A second point, however, was to be added. On Hitler's order, a time schedule had been set up in which the various periods of time, the various phases, were set down exactly.
Only on his express order could a new phase be gone into, and from this also I could see that he wanted to accommodate matters to political procedures.
Q. At the beginning of the Polish campaign did you know that an agreement with the Soviet Union had been reached, setting up a line of demarcation ?
A. No, I had no idea of that at all.
Q. After the conclusion of the hostile action, had you provided for military administration in Poland ? why didn't this take place ?
A. The high command of the army had made preparations and directions to this effect, that as soon as possible, the appeasement of the occupied areas be brought about. At the beginning of October, I learned about excesses against the Poles, carried out by personalities who were not under the jurisdiction of the Army. I reported these matters to the OKW and took the next occasion to tell Hitler personally and report to him on these matters personally. I asked him to see to it that matters like that be prevented once and for all. Hitler did not take any notice of this suggestion of mine. the military commander in chief of Poland, and in the second half of October he was charged with the entire sphere of the administration. The army relinquished this authority.
Q. As to the campaign against Poland, didn't tensions arise between the OKW and Hitler, and if so, what were the reasons ?
A. There were constant conflicts with the leadership of the Party, and the referred to the most varied points of origin. It would take me too far afile to enumerate all of them, but I should like to stress just two points. retained in the Army under all circumstances, and the second point applied to the influence which the leadership of the Party demanded on complaints. The third point was the decree green and the foreign women problem, which matter I answered in the form of a decree given to the Army.
Q. Now I should like to put a new questions relating to the time before the western offensive. offensive against the western priers ?
A. In no way was an offensive like that planned. On the basis of the order which I just mentioned previously , all preparations had been prohibited and thereupon, as far as on expensive measures were concerned, no special measures had been taken I advance. All directives and all directions which were issued after the Polish campaign, applying to the troops which were being sent to the West, were purely of a defensive nature.
Q. From whom did the plan to attack emanate? Who issued it?
A. On the 27th of September, 1939, Hitler made his decision to attack in the West, and he announced it publicly. He demanded that the necessary preparations be made, which would have to be concluded by the 12th of November.
Q. What position did you and the OKH take with reference to this plan?
A. England and France had declared war on Germany. Both powers had not taken advantage of the greatest moment of weakness on the part of Germany in September. Therefore, it was questionable to me now, at a time when the Western Front was being strengthened, whether they would assemble for a winter offensives and beyond that, I personally was in doubt whether these two powers seriously desired to wage war. I believed that in view of the reception which Chamberlain had in London after the Munich Agreement, and Daladier in Paris, the receptions which both of them he met with in their home cities, there would be no inclination toward a was at all. the part of the Allies up until that time would, in the eyes of the world, not weigh so heavily on the balance. Since the year 1914 I fully appreciated the violations of neutrality, and this was a recollection which had been seared into my consciousness. In my opinion, this would apply in this case to the one that would be the first to cross the border. We had looked into the question very acrefully in theOKH of whether the crossing of the border for reasons of ground operations would be necessary as the first step. We had reached the conviction that this did not apply and was not the case, but that we, if it was necessary at all, could take the second part.
Q. Did you call Hitler's attention to the fact that in the event of an offensive in the West, the countries of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg would be drawn into hostile activities?
A. I took the very next opportunity at which I could talk with Hitler alone after the 27th of September, 1939. I used this opportunity to tell him my opinion. However, he was not open to any discussion, and remained steadfast in his well-known opinion.
Q. Did you try to prevent the western offensive from being carried through
A. Before as well as afterwards, I was convinced that it would have to be possible to eliminate this entire war for once and all politically, and not deal with it. It considered it madness that Europe once more would have to torture herself and tear herself to pieces instead of working together with a common task and by peaceful means to promote development.
The Wehrmacht, according to the principle of "Sine Pace Semper Bellum", was in line with this. The German soldiers of every rank had been trained with the thought of defending their homeland and protecting their country. They did not think about wars of aggression or conquest, or the expansion of German domination over other peoples. only in a political manner, if the sincere will to do it that way existed. Any and all political developments, of course, need time; and I was only concerned with providing this time or these political negotiations, matters upon which I had no influence, however. I asked on the 5th of November, 1939, to be granted an audience with the Fuehrer. I know that I would be able to use only purely political reasons, and I did this with the consent of the army.
Hitler listened to my statements quietly. Then he flew into a rage, so that any farther conversation was quite impossible. So I left. On the evening of the same day, the order was issued to attack on the 12th of November, and the order of the 7th of November was rescinded.
Q. Did you not even use the alibi of poor weather in order to gain time and to postpone matters?
A. I pointed out the fact that if we were to march in at all, on account of the difficult terrain, only if we had an extended period of good weather would this be possible. But above all the use of the Luftwaffe was dependent on a long period of good weather.
Q. And after the address of Hitler to the generals on the 23rd of November, 1939, which has been discussed here quite frequently, how did you offer your resignation? How did that come about?
A. On the 23rd of November, in, the evening, one more, I was ordered to appear before the Fuehrer.
In a lengthy discussion with him alone, he once more raised all the accusations against the army. In the course of this conversation, I offered to resign, which offer he rejected by saying that I was to do my duty just like every other soldier. Through these incidents a breach had occurred which had to be glossed over painstakingly, but which was never completely mended.
Q. To what extent, in your capacity is commander-in-chief of the army, did you participate in the plan to occupy Norwar and Denmark?
A. I was in no way connected with it.
Q. Did you participate in the preparation and carrying through of this?
A. No.
Q. Then the campaign in the West started. At that time, what was your relationship with Hitler?
A. As I have already mentioned before, if was difficult. In the course of the campaign in the West, this was a series of smaller and larger differences. I should like to cite but one. This concerned the stopping of the German Panzers before Dunkirk, This was a matter which brought about a serious conflict. It was a result of that that the mass of English personnel of the British Expeditionary Force escaped to England across the Channel.
Q. On the part of the OKH, after the conclusion of the campaign in the West, were measures for demobilization worked on, or were they suggested?
A. At that time, two measures were taken. A commission for demobilization was established, and secondly a number of generals were asked whether they wished to remain in the army after the conclusion of the peace.
Q. And what was your collaboration in the decision to intervene in Greece and Yugoslavia?
A. I did not participate in any way in these decisions. When, with the chief of the General Staff, General Halder, I was ordered by the Fuehrer to appear before him, he received us with the words, "I have decided to destroy Yugoslavia". And then he cited the reasons for his decision. I believe they are well know already.
Q. At that time, was there a plan for any interference in Yugoslavia or Greece?
A. No, neither a plan nor any preparation. We did not even have maps
Q. And where were you to get these divisions from? From all parts of Germany?
A. The divisions had to be brought in from all parts of Germany and the Occupied Countries.