THE PRESIDENT: Well, then you are saying that as far as you know it was not Carried out until the time you retired?
THE WITNESS: Yes, and more I cannot say, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: I an only trying to find out what you did say. The witness may now retire. Witness, did you want to say anything more?
THE WITNESS: No, Mr. President.
DR. LATERNSER: As my second witness I am going to call field Marshal von Mannstein.
ERICH VON MANNSTEIN, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name, please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: and will withold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sis down. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Field Marshal, what was the last position you held?
Q How did you achieve that position? from Hitler.
Q The remaining Supreme Commanders were appointed in a similar way, weren't they? In which capacity? joined the Reich ministry for the Armed Forces, there I joined the First Department of the Troop Department.
Q Was the General Staff an elite of the armed forces? tactical abilities they were selected and also on the strength of their character. They were not influencing the army as their views were exactly the same as the views of all ether officers, as to the question of dictating the tone of the armed forces, there cannot any question of that. The Navy did not have a General Staff. As far as the Air Force was concerned, as far as I can judge, the General Staff officers may have played a smaller part, like Milch, Udet, and so forth, but to begin with the Armed Forces did not have a Wehrmacht General Staff, As far as dictating the tone within the armed forces goes, one can hardly speak of that.
was it, shall we say, the spiritual influence of the army? ious departments did deal with certain questions as far as they concerned the leading of troops and the employment of troops. As far as all other spheres of influence were concerned on the other hand, they were in the hands of the various departments or the Army Inspectorates and there they were under the General Staff. As far as the actual life of the troops was concerned, that was dealt with in these departments I mentioned.
Q But then surely the General Staff passed an opinion? ment, questions of training and equipment, naturally. But the chiefs of the departments were on exactly the same level as the chiefs of the troop departments, and where important personnel questions arose, this was dealt with entirely outside the General Staff.
Q. Was the chief of the General Staff the decisive adviser of Hitler, or was it the supreme commander of the Army and Air Force? Who was he?
A. One cannot possibly say that the Chief of the General Staff was the decisive adviser of Hitler. The Chief of the General Staff differed in the Armed Forces of the Third Reich entirely from the same position as it had previously been occupied by the Chief of the General Staff at the time of the Kaiser. In those days the Chief of the General Staff was immediately sub ordinate to the Kaiser, that is to say, he could report direct to him. In the Armed Forces of the Third Reich on the other hand, and even the Weimar Republic that was entirely different. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army, for instance, was nothing other than the adviser of the Supreme Commander of the Army regarding matters of military tradition. Between him and Hitler there was, first of all the Supreme Commander of the Army and then also, as long as we had a Minister of War, Blomberg, also the Reich Minister of War, Therefore, as far as the question of the Chief of the General Staff advising the Supreme Commander of the Army he shared his work with the Chiefs of the Departments, that is to say, the Personnel Department, the Equipment Department and the Defense Department, who were all subordinate.
Q. Was there a special service channel for the General Staff?
AA special service channel for the General Staff did not exist. To the contrary. That was distinctly disallowed towards the end of the First World War. Something similar was developing at the time when Ludendorff in practice was having complete control of military matters and when he was always addressing himself to the General Staff Chiefs who were his subordinate, instead of addressing himself to the Chief Commanders themselves. This association of the military leadership was made by Lieutenant General von Beck and a special service channel of the General Staff seems therefore to exist.
Q. And what about the privilege of announcing these opinions?
A. In the old army, every Chief of the General Staff had the right, if he was of an opinion different than that of his commander, to express that opinion, although, of course, he had to carry out the order from his commanding officer.
In the Armed Forces of the Third Reich on the other hand that was discontinued and expressly discontinued, at that, something which happened with the agreement of the Chief of the; General Staff, General Beck.
Q. Was the OKW shall be say, the central brain of the Armed Forces?
A. The OKW of course in the form in which it if, now being mentioned, only came into being in 1938 as a working staff for Hitler. Before that, Blomberg was Minister of War in the Reich and in his position as a Minister he was holding a position which was dealing with all matters effecting the Armed Forces which he represented to both the State and the Party. In his hands, also, there was the distribution of funds for the various sectors of the Armed Forces, and a rearmament capacity far sectors of the Armed Forces. Gradually, no doubt, Blomberg was trying to achieve a more outstanding leadership for the Armed Forces but in that connection he was soon getting into considerable difficulties, particularly with the OKH, for the reason that in the opinion of the OKH, Blomberg was being too lenient with the Party. He then attempted himself, shall we say, tactical leadership staff, but that was only in his station. Afterwards once his departure and subsequently she Armed Forces leadership Staff was created under Hitler but it seems to be regarded as head of the throe General Staffs of the Armed Forces; it was nothing other that the Tactical Leadership Staff of the Fuehrer.
Q. Did the three commanders of the armed forces branches meet with the General Staff? Did they have meetings in the OKW in order to achieve their aims?
A. Naturally the three branches of the armed forces were in agreement with the OKW that the national clement should be kept up. Furthermore, there was a sort of national Order, equality, and most of all superiority for Germany which they considered their task. They went about that. Once hardly speak of a unified formation of a will. As an example I should like to say, for instance, that if the army had one basic thought, one principal thought, it was that under no circumstances could Germany once again fight a war on two fronts.
The Navy, in my opinion, always had the one leading thought, never to get into war with England. But Goering, as the reigning head of the Air Forces, might have wanted that. Personally, that I cannot judge. But I don't suppose that he was interested in jeopardizing the position of the Third Reich and his own position in a renewed war. As far as the OKW is concerned, if it formed a will at all, it did not, in my opinion, have the possibility to seriously bring that will into effect on Hitler.
Q What was the significance of the Schliefen Union, its aims? the general staff. Apart from that, general staff officers and leaders of the young armed forces were in it, too. They met once a year on the occasion of a meal; and then there was a so-called meeting during which there was a budget produced; and that was really the principal aim. Then, of course, it had a Council of Honor, which usually had to occupy itself with certain ideas result from Ludendorf's attitude toward Hindenburg.
We didn't go to those meetings any more; and apart from that we didn't come under this Council of Honor. Any political or military aims on the part of this club did not exist. You mustn't consider it as being a club where intellectual schooling or training was being carried out. OKW and the General Staff?
A The bulk of them, according to their position, weren't interrelated at all. Only part of them belonged to the OKW, Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, Winter. and only the chief of the General Staff belonged to the General Staff as chief the staff of the Army Air Force, who changed frequently. I think there are five of these. All the others neither belonged to the General Staff nor the OKW.
Q But what are these leaders otherwise? are in every country. whole group with a uniform formation of will? agreed; that is, in a matter of course. Also they agreed regarding the view of the necessity of Germany's being strong because it was surrounded by three neighbors from whom one might, after all, expect one thing or another. Over and above that, however, such a uniformity of thought cannot be talked about; it cannot be talked of. I want to say that horizontally speaking the three branches of the armed forces were on the same level; and each branch of the armed forces had different military thoughts and aims which quite often worked against each other.
into four steps, shall we say, which, according to the importance in order, were this way. The highest step was the Fuehrer and his working staff, the OKW. From that level there was the entire military and political responsibil. which, according to military principles, can always lie only in the hands of the highest leader. of the armed forces. They were responsible for the militarization of that ranch of the armed forces which was under their command. There, in that sphere of command, they of course had entire responsibility. If Hitler's sphere of command left them in their military sphere, then they were of course to a certain extent his advisers. commanders of army groups: and then below that, Stop 4, the commanders of armies, the commanders of army groups were responsible for the leadership of the operations which they were to carry cuts and the same partial responsibility for their armies was in the hands of the army commander below them, who were carrying out the function of the ran in the step itself. far as false ideas were concerned, to Hitler, the Fuehrer because in between there was the step of the supreme commander which received orders and had to obey them. That is, in military life at all times the relations are those of one who gives orders and one who carries them cut.
Q What was the responsibility which you have described? What is the possibility regarding anyone's attitude towards Hitler's plans?
A To state views about Hitler's plans was quite out of the question for the third and fourth groups because they would only learn of the acts when it appeared in the shape of an order. If in individual cases the supreme commander was called to a conference with Hitler, then here again it was the announcement of a decision already arrived at which couldn't be altered. These supreme commanders of the armed force branches could of course when they were previously ordered by Hitler, of which I can't judge individual instates, state their views, their opinions.
As far as they might have agreed with that that is written on yet another page. general staff. Wasn't it for that reason that these military leaders were forming a unity? general staff. In the case of the army, the masses of the 94 officers of the army who are supposed to belong to the so-called opposition, of them 74 had been general staff officers; 20 on the honored Wehrmacht. In the case of the air force, there were, as far as I know, only 9 out of 17 ex-members of the general staff; and the navy, of course, didn't have one. Uniformity, let's say, as far as it existed at all, was therefore due to the fact that they had the same military training, the same military career, but no more. these 139 officers on the other -- that made a difference?
A Yes, of course that made a difference. They were the military leaders, the commanders of the general staff, and not the OKW, in the main, the bulk; and as far as a uniform organization is concerned, you can neither call that ideally speaking nor materially speaking nor practically speaking nor theoretically speaking.
Q But then certain SS leaders are also amongst that group. Wasn't it the fourth branch of the armed forces?
A No, it certainly was not a part of the armed forces. Quite certainly a large portion of the loaders of the Waffen-SS and in the war were matters of the unity of the Waffen-SS incorporated in the army because naturally considering the opposing will of the Fuehrer and Himmler, it was revolution. The uniformity of the Waffen-SS during the war time fought very bravely next to our comrades; but the fourth branch of the armed forces were quite to the contrary. Himmler stopped everything which would have made for any type of influence exerted on them by the armed forces. That individual loaders of the SS were incorporated amongst the group must be described as good raste, considering Himmler's personality because if there ever had been a deadly enemy of the army, it was Himmler.
Q Why do you say Himmler was a deadly enemy of the army? of the army; and particularly the generals of the army were pursued by him wit his hatred and his libel. That is my opinion. I knew it about myself at any rate from very reliable sources. I knew that it was very much due to Himmler who was using violent libel against the nation. As far as the other leaders are concerned, I only know that some of the Reich ministers who were dismissed from their work were very much in our favor. That's pretty clear. in the interests of the Reich?
A The party was working in the political sphere; and we were working in the sphere of the influence of the soldier. A joint plan of the party and the armed forces is something that can't possibly be expected because the prerequisites were lacking. First of all as one of the most important prerequisites there was a lack of very mutual basic attitude. Many methods of the party, as is known, did not appeal to us at all; and even on such princip*-* questions as the question of the differences of opinion one can hardly say that there is lacking the intellectual basis for a uniform plan.
which again and again contributed to influencing the armed forces, and I can well say that we officers were always fighting a continuous battle against the influences of the party gaining power over our soldiers, by which the soldierly element which we represented would have been moved a side. Then the third reason is that our plan under Hitler would have been out of the question. If anyone would make any plan, it was Hitler alone, and below him no one was allowed to make plans. Quite apart from that, in the political and practical life of the third Reich one sector never knew what the other was doing, what the tasks were they had. There again, uniformity is quite out of the question. There was, therefore, a lack of all the necessary prerequisites of such a uniform plan.
Q What was the capacity you have in the General Staff of the Army? I was from 1929 to 1932 employed as a first general staff officer, shall we say, when I worked in the first department. Then in 1935 I became the chief of the operation of the army, and in 1936 I became headquartermaster Number 1. That is to say, deputy of the chief of the general staff of the army. under your command?
A Yes, the operational department came under my orders. So did the occupational department and various ether ones. had to deal with the employment of troops in the event of war? of rearmament? the seizure of power, was the most primitive security against an unprovoked attacked on the part of even one of our neighbors. After all, since all our neighbors had certain designs on German territories, we had to suspect such a possibility at all times. We were perfectly aware of the fact that at best we could stand up to such an attack for a few weeks and put up resistance, but that we did want to achieve. In order to prevent that, for instance, in the event of an attack by Poland, the occupation of Upper Silesia would create a Fait Accomplit.
We wanted to make sure we could go on fighting until the League of Nations would interfere. Practically speaking, we were relying upon the League of Nations, and we could only do that if we ourselves would under no circumstances whatsoever be called the attackers. We knew at all timrs, therefore, that we had to avoid everything which might be considered a violation of the Treaty of Versailles or a provocation. For that reason we in the first department had formed a special group of officers who had the right -- whenever the OKH were issuing orders, they had to make sure that no such violations were contained therein or took place. chief quartermaster No. 1?
A Yes. The first mobilization plan we had on the first of April, 1930, when it became valid. It was the transformation of the army of 100,000 men into a state of war. That was the plan for that. That mobilization was then dealt with annually after 1930.
Q Until then?
Q were there plans for a march? and until 1935. In 1935 the first plan for forming up was being dealt with, the so-called "red" forming up, which was the forming up along the Rhine. That is western frontier, and the defense or forming up of the Czechoslovakian and Polish borders. And then there was a second forming up plan, called "green" which was being worked on in 1937 that -
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, by "forming up" do you mean deployment? what do you call a forming up plan? You mean deployment?
THE WITNESS: By a "forming up plan" I understand a plan according to which troops, in the event of the threat of a war, were being got ready along the frontiers, a plan, therefore, for the event of a political concentration being threatened, whether it would be to war -- whether this accumulation might be the basis's from which a war might be started, that isn't actually contained in the forming up plan. The forming up plan merely states where the troops are to be accumulated, where and for what, and in the event of war what would be the first tasks for army groups.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Were those all the forming up plans, those you have just described? had experienced. The forming up plan white, which was Poland, was not worked on during my time. It must have been worked on in 1939.
Q Then did you leave the OKH as chief quartermaster No. 1? General von Fritsch was removed. existence?
A No. Only the forming up plan red existed, which was a defensive securing of the Polish borders in the event of war. reference to the reestablishment of Germany's position in 1935? At that time you were in the OKH?
A No. I was chief of the Internal staff, but I know from my knowledge of the general staff that that declaration surprised all of us completely at the time. I personally, and my commanding general in Berlin, only heard of it over the radio. The general staff, had it been asked, would have considered 21 divisions as the size of an army which we considered suitable and advisable for that time. The question of 36 divisions was due to a spontaneous decision made by Hitler. it planned to be in preparation for a war?
A No. We didn't demand the military occupation. First of all, we didn't consider -- we didn't plan it for a preparation for a war. To the contrary, at the time the occupation was carried out it was the chief of the department and I myself who had to draft the orders for that organization. Since we were completely surprised by the decisions, I had only one afternoon to do it, because the following morning the generals in question were already arriving to receive their orders. I know that at that time the Reichminister of War and Colonel General von Fritsch were stating their objections, because they warned Hitler against the one-sided solution of such a question. That warning is the first source, in my opinion, for the distrust which the Fuehrer increasingly had for the various generals.
On one occasion, a conference between us two, he himself admitted to me once that that was so. And particularly Blomberg at that time when France was mobilizing thirteen divisions, already had suggested that the three battalions which we had pushed across the Rhine to the western bank should be withdrawn again. The intentions we had for the fortification of the Rhineland afterwards were purely defensive. The western wall was planned, just as was the Maginot line, as a wall, if possible, insurmountable in the event of attack. Austria? Surely you are wellinformed about that. Fuehrer together with General Book, the chief of the general staff. It was about eleven o'clock in the morning. Hitler announced that he had decided that the Austrian question was to be solved on the basis of the plebiscite, the result of which -- the intentions for a plebiscite had been announced on the part of Schuschnigg the day before. He demanded arbitration and our suggestions regarding our march into Austria, should this be necessary. The chief of the general staff thereupon suggested that the course which we need for the march would be complete mobilization on Bavaria, and the Panzer division would have to be mobilized first, but that such a mobilization, in fact, such a measure altogether was in no way prepared, since the political loaders had never given even as much as a hint that such instructions might be received. It would be necessary, therefore, to improvise everything.
but then he realized that if he wanted to march in at all, troops would have to be mobilized, and he granted the point, and he said that the following Saturday -- the day before the planned plebiscite -- he would have to march in if he wanted to march in at all and that the order for the mobilization of those corps had to be givens till on that same day if the mobilization of the forces on the border was to be completed in good order.
The conference started at about 11 o'clock in the morning and went on until about one o'clock, and in the afternoon at six o'clock the orders had to be ready to go out. They came out twenty minutes late, and I had to draft the orders for the forming-up myself, so that I had four or five hours altogether to do it in. Before that, such a thing had not been thought of at all. The so-called Case Otto has nothing at all to do with this entire affair. to the troops in that case, had just a few fours from the moment when you know nothing until the moment you had to issue the order? of war, know anything at all about the conference which Hitler held on 7 November 1935?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal would like to know what you are saying the Plan Otto was for. What was the plan made for?
A We in the army did not have a completed plan called Otto. I only know that that was a code word for some measures of the OKW for the event of a restoration attempt on the part of the Hapsburgs in Austria in connection with Italy. That possibility was always pending, and I want to supplement my statement by saying that at the time when Hitler gave us the orders for Austria it had been his chief worry, not so much that there might be interference on the part of the Western Powers, but only the worry as to how Italy would behave, because Italy was always under the same roof with Austria and the Hapsburgs, it appeared.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, are you telling the Tribunal that you do not know whether the Plan Otto was a plan for the German army or part of it to march into Austria? me when I read the interrogation record of Jodl. The question of a plan of march into Austria, such a plan did not exist in the OKH because I had to prepare these orders within a few hours after the conference with Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but if the Plan Otto was not a plan for the march into Austria, what was it for? on the part of the OKW connected with the question of the restoration of the Hapsburgs in Austria, but we ourselves did not introduce any measures as far as I can remember that were connected with it. I do not even know whether I myself was familiar and occupied myself with the code name at the time at all. It may be so, but I do not know now.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on. BY DR. LATERNSER: What was the purpose of that conference? What ware the contents?
A That conference was something quite unusual. The Fuehrer had ordered to appear before him the chiefs of those armies which, in the event of a march into Czechoslovakia, would have to march up along the border, but he did not order the Supreme Commanders to appear, as would have been natural -only, shall we say, the younger generation of chiefs. Possibly he knew from the memorandum of Colonel General Beck and its submission by Colonel General Brauchitsch that the commanding generals were turning down any type of policy which might lead to a war and that was why he ordered us to come along, in order to convince us of the necessity and the correctness of his decision. questions and discussion afterwards. He had been mistaken insofar as the chiefs of the General Staff, too, were raising objections regarding the possibility of interference on the part of the Western Powers and of a war that might arise from it. It was one of the most unpleasant and serious clashes between the Fuehrer and General von Beckelstein with reference to that question.
After that, whenever such meetings took place, there was not a single occasion when questions or discussions were permitted by him. rehearsals, militarily speaking, for a war? mobilized, and the mobilization of those corps on the occasion of the march into Austria was demonstrating to us that nothing had advanced sufficiently to carry out a reasonable mobilization, and if a war had occurred, neither our western border nor our Polish border could have been effectively defended by us, and, no doubt, if Czechoslovakia had defended itself, we would have got stuck in the fortifications, so that in practice we did not have the means to break through. A military rehearsal is certainly out of the question. It was a question of trying the political nerves, yes. did you have the impression that an aggressive was was being planned? South when the plans for the Polish campaign were drawn up. When I received the plans for the forming-up, that was definitely a forming up for an attack, but there were various important points which indicated that there was not an intention of aggression. there suddenly started the strongest fortifications of the eastern border. Not only thousands of workers, but entire divisions were employed to build these fortifications, and the entire material from the Czech fortifications was dragged over there and used up. Part of the most fertile land in Silesia was taken up by those fortifications, and that, of course, would indicate anything but an aggressive intention. on an entirely peacetime basis. I myself, while I was divisional commander at the time, remained on the parade square with my division in the exercise ground on the Luder -- far away, therefore, from that part of the country where my division would have to be drawn up.
in which he assured the Poles of assistance, and since Hitler, on every occasion during the time I was in the OKH, always and repeatedly stated that he would never allow a war on two fronts to happen, one could not possibly consider that, in view of that promise, he would indulge in a policy of risk. effect --information which was confirmed by practice afterwards -- that the Poles in the Province of Posen were proposing to draw up their troops for an advance toward Galicia. We failed to understand the entire situation, but in fact that was the way the Poles drew up their troops at a later stage. The probability of a war might be listed therefore, and most probably, due to the possibility that the Poles could look to Britain for assistance and if the political negotiations should reach a crisis, the Poles might on their part do something careless and attack themselves, and then, of course, a war would have happened quite certainly. that Hitler would initiate an aggressive war against Poland. The conference at Obersalzburg, for instance, on 22 August did not give me the impression, cither, that unconditionally a war would start -- an impression that my supreme commander, Field Marshal von Runstedt, and I had until 31 August or 1 September of that year, since an order to march in given on the 25th had been withdrawn
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1000 hours, 10 August 1946.)
BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW): west? was obviously no longer possible, there was no other way out than an offensive in the West in order to end the war in that way. Yugoslavia?
A No. Of the starting of these campaigns I only heard over the radio.
Q How did you as a military leader regard the war against Russia? part. In my opinion, there was, in fact, no other way out for Hitler -- no other way out of the situation into which he had brought Germany. After having not dared to invade Britain in the autumn of 1940, he knew, in my opinion, that the Soviet Union was a very great threat in 1940 and 1941 -a threat which would become real as soon as we would finally tie our forces in the fight against Britain. The only chance of extricating, ourselves from that situation would have been a landing in England in the autumn of 1940 but that was a risk which Hitler did not want to take. Supreme Commander of the General Staff of the Army, in the most important military decisions such as, for instance, a war against the Soviet Union, was by-passed by Hitler?
A In my opinion the explanation the following: Politically we generals had not had any say for a Long time, because the political objections raised by the generals on the occasion, for instance, of the Rhineland and the march into Czechoslovakia, had turned out to be immaterial and Hitler had been right.
Hence, he no longer listened to the political opinions expressed by the OKH. opinion that the offensive in the West, from the point of view of the soldier, was absolutely inevitable. The OKH was of a different opinion. On that score, the OKH, in my opinion, adopted the wrong military attitude. There again Hitler turned out to be right, and it became quite apparent from his behavior that after that he thought that he knew more than the soldiers, so that on the decisive questions concerning the fight against the Soviet Union he would no longer listen to the OKH.
Q You have heard of the Commissar Order, have you not?
Q What attitude did you adopt with reference to that order? between my soldierly conceptions and my duty to obey. Actually, I ought to obeyed, but I told myself that as a soldier I could not possible cooperate in a thing like that, and I told both the commander of the army group under which came at the time, as well as the commander of the armored group that I would not carry out such an order, which was against the honor of a soldier. In practice, the order was, in fact, not carried out. My divisional commanders, who had received the order independently from me in the Reich, shared my view, and, apart from that, the Commissars, as good fighters, defended themselves to the last and often shot themselves before being taken prisoner or removed their badges of rank and could not be identified by the troops. The troops, who within themselves disliked the order intensely, certainly did not look for Commissars amongst the prisoners. and the commander of the armored group. Who were they? Who were these general and commanding the armored group was Colonel General Hoeppner.
Q And what was their attitude with reference to these orders?