validity of this decree as there can be about any other so-called constitutional or basic state law issued by the Reichstag, the Reich Cabinet, the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense, or by Hitler himself.
Gentlemen of the Tribunal: assumed the full responsibility for all laws and decrees which he has signed in his capacity as the deputy of the Fuehrer, as Reichsminister and member of the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense. accusations which, as a sovereign state, merely concern the domestic affairs of the German Reich and have no bearing on the crimes against peace and crimes against the laws of war asserted by the Prosecution. I shall, therefore, now also only touch on such laws and constitutional and political measures which have some recognizable connection with the actual counts of the Indictment and the common plan or conspiracy asserted by the Prosecution. military, economic and psychological preparations for war and to have participated in the political planning and preparation of wars of aggression. As evidence for this assertion, the Prosecution pointed to the fact that the defendant Rudolf Hess, in his capacity as Reich Minister with Portfolio, cosigned the law of 16 March, 1935, for the reconstruction of the armed forces. This law reintroduced general conscription in Germany and stipulated that the German peace army was to be divided into 12 corp commands and 36 divisions. German people in connection with the publication of this law and which was placed ahead of the law in the Reichsgesetzblatt, appears to me no less important than the contents of this law. I refer to the contents of this proclamation which has been presented as an exhibit. this question which had not already previously been brought out by the democratic German government at the time of the Weimar Republic.
brief in connection with this question. With reference to the fact, however, that defense counsel for defendant von Neurath has already referred to this question in detail, I shall merely refer to his argument in this connection and I shall therefore forfeit, on my part, coming to that question in detail once again. fourth last line. 1935, is apparently not considered in the Indictment as a punishable offense in itself, but only as part of the general plan asserted by the Prosecution, which is claimed to have been intended to commit crimes against peace, against the rules of war and against humanity. Whether such a plan ever existed at all whether and to what extent the defendant Rudolf Hess was involved in it and what part the re-introduction of general military service may have played in both an objective and a subjective way, I shall take up in detail later. a war of aggression, the defendant Rudolf Hess is also accused of having, in his capacity as deputy of the Fuehrer, set up the foreign organization of the NSDAP, the National League for Germans Abroad, the German Eastern League, the German-American Bund and the German Foreign Institute. The documents submitted by the Prosecution in this connection are not able to furnish proof to the effect that the defendant Hess himself issued directives or orders to these organizations, which could have caused them to pursue activities similar to those of a fifth column. the contrary, proved that the defendant Hess, in particular, forbade these organizations and leader's in the most definite way to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. The Prosecution has not been able to prove in any way that the above named organizations had actually developed activities which were aimed at undermining the structure of foreign states from within.
the above-named organizations and establishments in more detail, all the more so that there is nothing at all tending to prove that there was any causal connection between the tasks and functions of these organizations and the events which later led to the outbreak of war in the year 1939.
took a decisive part in the occupation of Austria on 12 March 1938. I do not intend to enter into details of the history of the annexation and to consider from the legal point of view the facts which actually led to the annexation of Austria to the German Reich in the year 1938. by the Defense Counsel for the co-defendant Dr. Seyss-Inquart, and I shall now continue in my brief on page 23, beginning with paragraph two. the Party in the execution of the annexation, the evidence has shown here only that the annexation of Austria was an incident which did not have anything to do with the National Socialist Party in the Reich as such. It is sufficient to refer in this connection to the testimony of the defendant Goering and to that of Dr. Seyss-Inquart on the witness stand, which shows that the question of the annexation was solved exclusively by the Reich; that is, therefore, by state authority and not by the Party. by Document USA-61, PS 812, presented by the Prosecution. It deals in this case with the letter of the Gauleiter of Salzburg, Dr. Friedrich Rainer, to Reich Commissioner District Leader Josef Buerckel, and in which he states, among other things:
"Soon after the seizure of power in the Eastern Province, Klaussner, Globocnik and I flew to Berlin in order to give a report to the deputy of the Fuehrer, Party Comrade Rudolf Hess, about the incidents which led to the seizure of power." and the Party itself had been directly and decisively participating in the solution of the annexation question. I do not mention this in order to give reasons of justification or excuses on behalf of the defendant Rudolf Hess. The findings are rather made exclusively in the interests of the historical truth.
with eight and one half million Czechs and Slovaks, without being granted a decisive influence on the state. All attempts of this national group to receive autonomy within the Czechoslovakian state structure remained without success. When the question of annexation with regard to Austria was solved, it could not but happen that the future position of the Sudeten Germans, which after all consisted of three and one half million persons and whose membership in the German nation is beyond any doubt, was also subject to a test. annexation of the Sudetenland to the Reich in the actual and legal respect. In view of the fact that the Prosecution in the Trial Brief which it presented before the Tribunal against the defendant Hess treated the Sudeten German question and has also presented several documents as evidence, it appears necessary, in spite of all, to take a brief stand concerning them. Fuehrer at the meeting of the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP on 28 August 1938. The latter takes a stand in the Sudeten German question in only general statements and that under emphasizing the principle of nationalities and the right of self-determination of the nations. Also the remaining documents presented by the Prosecution, USA-126, USA-26, do not show on which a decisive participation of the defendant Rudolf Hess in the solution of the Sudeten German question could be based. annexation of the Sudetenland to the Reich cannot in itself be a charge of a criminal act according to international law. After all, the annexation of the Sudeten province was not carried out on the basis of a one-handed act of Germany or on the basis of a perhaps disputable agreement between the German Reich and the Czechoslovak Republic. The annexation, rather, took place on the basis of an agreement which had been concluded in Munich on 29 September 1938 between Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, France and Italy. In this Treaty exact and very detailed agreements were reached about the evacuation of the territory to be ceded and the step-by-step occupation by German troops. The final determination of the frontier was carried out by an international committee.
certainty that this is a treaty which had been concluded on the basis of a free agreement of will and that all those participating maintained the expectation that it eight provide the basis or at least a considerable prerequisite for an improvement of international relations in Europe.
I am now coming to another point of the Indictment. As well within the limits of the Indictment as a whole, as also in the personal accusation raised by the Prosecution against the defendant Rudolf Hess, the latter is accused of having participated in the outbreak of war and of being responsible for it. The defendant Rudolf Hess actually did take a stand in several speeches on the question of the Polish Corridor and one problem of the Free State of Danzig. In this case, however, the following still has to be stated: self-determination of the nations was violated -- after all, more than one million Germans came under Polish domination in this manner -- but in excess of this through the partition of the state territory of the German Reich into two areas completely separated from each other, a condition was established which was not only contrary to all economic common sense but which, in excess of this, had to become the cause for constant discord and incidents from the very first day on. Indeed, from the day of the signing of the Versailles peace treaty, the demand for a revision of the treaty, especially in the question of the Polish Corridor, has never been silenced at any hour. There was no party and no government in Germany which did not acknowledge and demand the necessity of a revision of the treaty, primarily in this point. It cannot be the subject of any doubt that, if Poland ought to have an independent access at all to the Baltic Sea under all circumstances, this problem could have been solved much more sensibly than by the establishment of the so-called Corridor and the thereby conditional partition of the German Reich into two areas which were completely separated from each other. Danzig on the basis of international law and state sovereignty. It is not necessary to regard the facts more closely in this ease, which in the course of time have led to constantly increasing difficulties and which in the end caused a situation which made a change of the position in regard to international law and state sovereignty of this purely German city necessary.
minority problem which was raised by the Polish Corridor and the establishment of a Free State of Danzig. The fact is that in the course of two decades, no less than approximately one million Germans were forced to leave their settlement area and especially under circumstances which could not remain without effect on the general political relations between the German Reich and the Polish Republic. It is also not as if the problems which have been raised here have been publicly discussed only since the coming into power of Adolf Hitler. including page 29 are to be eliminated. seizure of power through Adolf Hitler and his party, the questions caused by the Polish Corridor and the separation of Danzig from the Reich were subject to an examination anew. This was all the less avoidable since after the conclusion of the German-Polish Treaty in the year 1934, Poland's attempts to exclude the German element to a continually rising extent did not stop in any way. which were conducted by the German Reich with the Polish Republic, the aim of which was to find a modus vivendi under consideration of the justified interests of Poland. In any case, it appears important to me to keep the following facts in mind, and this seems to be essential for the reason that the Prosecution stated again and again that the German Government was obliged to do everything to clarify those questions and that, especially, the German Government was obliged to conduct negotiations and that the one thing that they should not have done was to start a war. The following statements are to show that it was indeed attempted to solve the problems throuh negotiations, the problems that could not be forgotten and which had to be brought to a solution. course of a conversation with the Polish Ambassador on 24 October 1938 the questions caused by the Corridor and the separation of the City of Danzig and suggested a solution which was to be based on the following foundation:
1. The Free State of Danzig returns to the German Reich.
2. An extra-territorial Reichsautobahn belonging to Germany and likewise an extra-territorial railroad with several tracks would be constructed across the Corridor.
3. Poland likewise obtains an extra-territorial road or Autobahn and railroad and a free port in the Danzig area.
4. Poland receives a guarantee of disposal for her goods in the Danzig area.
5. The two nations recognize their common frontiers (Guarantee) or the territories of both sides.
25 July A LJG 16-1 6. The German-Polish Treaty is being extended by 10 to 25 years.
7. Both countries include in their treaty a consulation clause. of the Polish Government to this proposal. The document is TC-73 No. 45, which describes the attitude of the Polish Foreign Minister Book of 31 October 1938 and his instructions to the Polish Ambassador Lipski in Berlin. In this document the German proposal is flatly turned down on the ground that "any attempt to incorporate the Free City of Danzig into the Reich would invariably lead to a conflict, and the resulting difficulties would not merely be of a local nature, but would prevent any possibility of Polish-German understanding in all its aspects." sador during another conversation between him and the Reich Foreign Minister on 19 November 1938. Asked about the Polish Government's attitude regarding the German proposition of an extra-territorial arterial motor road and an extra-territorial railway through the Corridor, the Polish Ambassador declared that he was not able to make an official statement. was very restrained and contained nothing incompatible with Polish honor or the vital interests of that State. One should be the more willing to admit this, as the creation of the Corridor and the separation of East Prussia from the Reich was really felt by the German people as the hardest of the territorial burdens of the Versailles Treaty. If, nevertheless, the Polish Government turned this proposal down, for reasons leaving hardly any prospect of finding a solution in subsequent negotiations, the conclusion could be drawn that at that time already Poland altogether lacked a sincere wish for an agreement, which would take into consideration Germany's legitimate interests. This impression was confirmed by the negotiations during the visit 25 July A LJG 16-2 of the Polish Foreign Minister Beck to Berlin, on 5 January 1939, and the return by the Reich Foreign Minister to Warsaw, on 21 January 1939.
If, in spite of this hostile attitude of Poland the Reich Foreign Minister repeated the proposition made on 24 October 1938 in another meeting with the Polish Ambassador on 21 March 1939, this must lead to the conclusion that the German Government was sincerely desirous of solving, by means of negotiation, the questions relative to the Corridor and the separation of Danzig. Thus it cannot be seriously denied that the German Government tried to solve the Danzig question and that of the Polish Corridor by negotiation and that it made very moderate proposals in that respect. partial mobilization of the Polish armed forces. It need not be defined as to what was the connection between the partial mobilization ordered by the Polish Government and the British proposal for consultation, dated 21 March 1939, and whether, incidental to the transmission of this consultation proposal in Warsaw, the declaration of guarantee of 31 March had already been promised or contemplated. There can be no doubt, however, that the partial mobilization of the Polish armed forces, as also admitted by the British Prime Minister Chamberlain in a declaration before the House of Commons on 10 July 1939, was bound to do anything but create favorable prerequisites for further negotiations. As a matter of fact, the subject of the memorandum of the Polish Government handed by the Polish Ambassador Lipski on 26 March 1939 was a complete to rejection of the German proposal. It was declared that extra-territoriality for the highways could not come into question, and that a reunion of Danzig with the Reich could not be considered. In the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Polish Ambassador, which followed the handing over of the Memorandum, the latter declared openly that it was his unpleasant duty to point out that to pursue further the German plans, particularly insofar as they had a bearing on the return of Danzig to the German 25 July A LJG 16-3 Reich, would be tantamount to a war with Poland.
Polish mobilization of 23 March 1939 and the Polish memorandum of 26 March 1939 containing a complete rejection of the German proposal on the one hand, and the proposed British guaranteepledge of 31 March 1939 on the other hand remains undecided, this appears justified with regard to the proposed "formal declaration" made by the British Government as early as 21 March in Warsaw, as well as in Paris and in Moscow. This "formal declaration" was to announce the opening of immediate discussions on measures of mutual resistance against any threat against any European state. Furthermore, the speech by Prime Minister Chamberlain on 17 March in Birmingham, and the speech of the British Foreign Minister Lord Halifax of 20 March in the House of Lords, reflected a point of view bound to encourage the Polish Government all the more towards stubbornness. As a matter of fact, the proposed step of "a mutual formal declaration" already proposed by the British Government to the Governments in Warsaw, Paris and Moscow, proved to be the opening of extended discussions whose purpose it was to place an iron ring around Germany. It was thus clear from the outset under such conditions bilateral negotiati ons between the German and the Polish Government promised but little success, in any case as long as those discussions lasted. In another Memorandum handed to the Polish Foreign Minister on 28 April 1939, already submitted by the Prosecution, the German Government nevertheless once more explained its attitude completely and established once more its readiness for further negotiations. Contents of this Memorandum, including proposals made in March 1939, were announced publicly by Adolf Hitler in his speech delivered in the Reichstag on 28 April 1939. April 1939, the Polish Government transmitted on 5 May 1939 a Note Verbale which has also been submitted by the Prosecution.
The contents of that Note Verbale contained even more emphatically a complete rejection of Germany's proposition for solving the problem of the Corridor and the Danzig question. Paris, Warsaw and Moscow for the purpose of establishing an alliance exclusively directed against Germany, did not proceed as desired. Nor was it possible for the French and British Military Commissions, sent to Moscow on 11 August 1939, to eliminate completely the difficulties arising from evidently far-reaching differences of opinion. It need not be established how important was the fact that Poland, which was to obtain a guarantee by England, France, and the Soviet Union, publicly refused to accept military assistance from the Soviet Union. It also remains uncertain whether it is correct what the Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov asserted during the emergency meeting of the supreme Soviet on 31 August 1939 to the effect that England had not only dissipated Poland's apprehensions, but that, on the contrary, had furthered them. It seems more important to examine the fundamental differences of opinion. well-known book written by the former British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson. In consideration of the fact that the Tribunal does not desire to have this quotation read, but that on the other hand during the taking of evidence this extract had been admitted, I shall confine myself merely to refer to it, and I shall proceed on Page 35, beginning with the second paragraph.
Meanwhile, the following actually occurred: 1939, the President of the Council of People's Commissars of USSR, Stalin made a speech in which be intimated that the Soviet Government considered it possible or desirable to reach a better understanding even with Germany. Hitler understood this hint perfectly well. Foreign Commissar Molotov expressed similarly himself in his speech before the Highest Soviet on 31 May 1939.
Thereupon the discussions between the German and the Soviet Governments were followed by the conclusion of a German-Soviet Trade and Credit Agreement. This Agreement was signed in Berlin on 19 August 1939. But already during these economic negotiations, questions of general political nature were discussed which, according to the Soviet Russian News Agency "Tass" of 21 August 1939, made known the desire of both parties to bring about the change of their policy and to ban war by the conclusion of a non-agression pact. This Non-aggression Agreement was signed in Moscow in the night from 23 to 24 August 1939; therefore, as shown by the presentation of evidence in this trial, the attack of German armios against Poland was ordered two days before.
Besides this Non-aggression Agreement, a "Secret Supplementary Protocol" was signed as an important part of the former. On the basis of the presentation of evidence, especially on the basis of the affidavit of ambassador and Chief of the legal department of the Foreign Office, Dr. Friedrich Gaus, on the basis of the testimony of State Secretary in the Foreign Office Baron von Weizsaecker, and on the basis of the statements of the defendants von Ribbentrop and Jodl, the following contents of the secret supplementary protocol can be considered as established: territories belonging to the Baltic States, Finland, Esthonia and Latvia should fall into the sphere of interest of the Soviet Union, whereas the territory of Lithuania should belong to the sphere of interest of Germany. interest was made in the manner, that the territories lying to the cast of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San should fall to sphere of interests of the Soviet Union, whereas the territories lying to the west of the demarcation line determined by these rivers should belong to the German sphere of interest.
In other respects, an agreement was reached concerning Poland that both powers would come to a mutual understanding about the final settlement of questions concerning this country.
With regard to the Southeast of Europe, the limits of spheres of interest of both sides were made in the manner, that the Soviet side stressed its interest in Bessarabia, whereas the German side declared a complete political disinterest in this territory. According to the testimony of several witnesses, but especially on the basis of the statements by Ambassador Dr. Gaus and State Secretary von Weizsaecker it is established that this secret agreement included in it a complete new settlement concerning Poland and the future fate of the Polish State.
The efforts to come anyhow to an understanding with Poland with regard to the question of Danzig and the Corridor made after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Agression agreement and of the Secret Supplementing Protocol belonging to it failed.
The Pact of Assistance which was made on 25 August 1939 between Great Britain and Poland did not prevent the outbreak of the war, but simply delayed it for a few days. I have no intention to go into particulars of the diplomatic negotiations which were conducted after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Agreement of 23 August 1939, so that an agreement can still be obtained. One thing, however, can be said with certainty: Should the onesided guarantee declaration of England of 31 March 1939 show that it raised the already existing stubbornness of the Polish Government against the German offers, then an Assistance Pact with Great Britain would operate quite certainly against a readiness to negotiate on the part of the Polish Government. The failure of the negotiations which were carried out between Germany and Poland can surprise all the less, when one bears in mind that the testimony of the witness Dahlerus before this Tribunal. Had not this witness confirmed that the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Lipski, declared on 31 August 1939 that he is not interested in discussing the proposals of the German Government? He based this negative attitude on the statement that in case of war, a revolution will break out in Germany and the Polish Army will march towards Berlin. Government to conclude the treaty with Poland and which possibly intimated at a rift in the German-Italian alliance and at symptom of deterioration in the German State structure -- and here I refer to the testimonies of the witnesses Dahlerus and Gisevius facts. Poland, it was at first the question of a localized conflict between two European states. But when Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, this conflict expanded into a European war, into a war, which as all modern wars between great powers indicated from its very beginning the tendency of developing into a world war because of the presently insufficient international organization and the complete collapse of the system of collective security.
This war was to bring immeasurable suffering for all humanity, and when on 8 May 1945 the European war found its end with Germany's unconditional surrender, it left behind a Europe in ruins.
Adolf Hitler did not live to see Germany's collapse and unconditional surrender. Twenty-two former leaders of National Socialist Germany stand before the bar of the Tribunal in order to answer charges of having committed crimes against the peace, against the rules of warfare, and against humanity in the execution of a common plan. between the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, the provisional Government of France, and the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, is the basis of this trial. The present Tribunal was created pursuant to this agreement, the composition, competency, and tasks of which were established by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which is a considerable part of the agreement concluded by the four mentioned Governments on 8 August 1945. does not only contain the regulations dealing with its composition competence, and tasks; besides those, it includes - and these are the most important parts of the Charter - the regulations of material-jurididal contents. This applies above all to Article 6, which contains the definitions of crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, with all the characteristic facts of the case. Paragraph 3 of Article 6 of the Charter, which enumerates the characteristics of the so-called conspiracy in detail, has to be considered above all as the penal facts of the case.
Furthermore, Articles 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter are to be considered as material-juridical regulations. Tribunal. It deals principly with the contents of the statement made by the defense at the beginning of this trial on the 21st of November; and therefore, I need not read them. supported the seizure of power of the so-called Nazi conspirators, the strengthening of their control over Germany, and furthermore the furthering of the military, economic, and psychological preparations for war. He, moreover, is charged with having participated in the political planning and preparation of wars of agression and of wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances, and in the preparations and planning of the foreign political schemes of the so-called Nazi conspirator
THE PRESIDENT: This ought to be a convenient time to break off.
(A recess was taken)
DR. SEIDL: Your Honor: conspiracy. According to it, all the defendants and various other persons have participated for a number of years prior to 8 May 1945 in the planning and execution of a common plan as leaders, organizers, instigators, and collaborators. This plan aimed at and brought about the commitment of crimes against the peace, of crimes against laws of warfare, and against humanity. It is asserted that the defendants planned, prepared, unleashed, and directed wars of aggression, and committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in the execution of this common plan. crimes against the peace, against the rules of warfare, and against humanity the indictment contains four of them. In the indictment the common plan or conspiracy is made an individual and independent count of the charge, without the Charter bringing forth sufficient reasons for this. It may be left undecided whether conspiracy is considered a particular type of crime according to Anglo-American law. In view of the fact that the Charter rejects the use of both Anglo-American and continental law, but has established its own standards of law, and these "sui generis", only the text and spirit of the Chanter itself is decisive. 3, of the Charter, regarding the outlining of execution of a plan for the perpetration of a crime against peace, against the customs of war, or against humanity, it cannot be subject to any doubt that there cannot be an independent state of criminality as stated in Count 1 of the indictment under the heading of Concerted Plan or Conspiracy. In all events, not according to the principle of the provisions of the Charter. indictment it is necessary first to answer count 1 of the indictment: or conspiracy the National Socialist "German Labor Party" of which Adolf Hitler had become the leader in 1921, and which the defendant Rudolf Hess also joined as early as 1921. Even the indictment does not, apparently, claim that the party program of the NSDAP was actually criminal in itself.
It appears all the less necessary to probe further into this question, as in the subsequent routine of political life the party program has not by any means played the part which could probably be supposed. Moreover, the appraisal of evidence has definitely revealed, as far as the position and rise of the NSDAP is concerned, that up to 20 January 1933 the National Socialist Partywas a party alongside other parties; that it has fought with the sane legitimate means as other parties for the attainment of its objectives; and that not least among the factors of its rise is that Germany experienced, in 1932 - 1933, as a consequence of the reparations policy of the victor powers in 1919, an economic and social decline of uncommon magnitude; and that, finally, on 30 January 1933, the Party, as the strongest, was entrusted with the formation of the Government in application of the provisions of the Reich Constitution and its leader, Adolf Hitler, was nominated Reich Chancellor. parties, openly fought for the principles it represented, and the Prosecution could not admit in evidence a single argument which allowed the conclusion to be drawn that by using illegal means the Party and its leaders had been participators in a common plan aiming at launching a war of aggression. In fact, one has to keep in mind only the political, economic, and military condition of Germany in the first years after the end of World War I in order to recognize how mistaken the acceptance of such a plan aiming at starting a war is for that time. The conception put forward by the indictment reveals not only an entirely false idea of the economic, political, and military conditions which Germany faced as a consequence of the peace settlement by Versailles, but this conception also discloses complete failure to appreciate the intrinsic virtue of any policy. by the Reich President Von Hindenburg on 30 January 1933 as Reich Chancellor, it was necessarily out of the question for him and his Government, in which other parties participated, to start drafting a common plan aiming at a war of aggression, being not abreast with political, and above all, economic conditions. The problems which the GermanReich Cabinet faced at that time resulted directly from the fact that up to 7,000,000 unemployed people in Germany had to be put to work.
As the witness Dr. Lammers stated, the elimination of economic and social distress actually was the most important question at the first Cabinet session. There was no question at all of a common plan aiming at launching a war of aggression and, in fact, it is inconceivable that in the circumstances at that time even one member of the Government could consider such an idea in some concrete shape. Furthermore, it has been established through the testimony of Dr. Lammers and other witnesses, that the subject matter of the first cabinet meeting and the resolutions there passed are contained in the governmental declaration of 1 February 1933, made known to the German people in the form of a manifesto of the German Government. imposed on Germany through the Versailles Treaty was the first aim of the conspiracy charged by the Prosecution. I have already expressed my opinion on that question. The final refusal of the victor powers to disarm in their turn, according to their pledge, has at least accorded the German Reich the right to obtain an equalization of armament through its own rearmament. This was not done in secrecy by any means, but in public, through the announcement of the reintroduction of the Draft Law on 16 March 1935. The Prosecution has not been able to show evidence for its assertion that this law was connected with, and was part of, the common plan aimed at bringing about a war of aggression. The exclusive purpose of the law was rather to reestablish Germany's right to equality at least for that question, sixteen years after the end of the First World War. In that connection brief reference is appropriate to a document which the Prosecution produced, together with nine other documents, so-called key documents, and which first of all serve the purpose of establishing the proof for existence of the common plan claimed in the indictment. This is the written record on a discussion at the Reich Chancellory of 5 November 1937, USA-25, 386-PS. Hitler's statements, but a report of Colonel Hossbach which was drafted by the latter 5 days later, viz, on 10 November 1937. I have no intention of entering any further into the contents of this document. I refer here to the statements which other defense counsel have made on this question.