Polish mobilization of 23 March 1939 and the Polish memorandum of 26 March 1939 containing a complete rejection of the German proposal on the one hand, and the proposed British guaranteepledge of 31 March 1939 on the other hand remains undecided, this appears justified with regard to the proposed "formal declaration" made by the British Government as early as 21 March in Warsaw, as well as in Paris and in Moscow. This "formal declaration" was to announce the opening of immediate discussions on measures of mutual resistance against any threat against any European state. Furthermore, the speech by Prime Minister Chamberlain on 17 March in Birmingham, and the speech of the British Foreign Minister Lord Halifax of 20 March in the House of Lords, reflected a point of view bound to encourage the Polish Government all the more towards stubbornness. As a matter of fact, the proposed step of "a mutual formal declaration" already proposed by the British Government to the Governments in Warsaw, Paris and Moscow, proved to be the opening of extended discussions whose purpose it was to place an iron ring around Germany. It was thus clear from the outset under such conditions bilateral negotiati ons between the German and the Polish Government promised but little success, in any case as long as those discussions lasted. In another Memorandum handed to the Polish Foreign Minister on 28 April 1939, already submitted by the Prosecution, the German Government nevertheless once more explained its attitude completely and established once more its readiness for further negotiations. Contents of this Memorandum, including proposals made in March 1939, were announced publicly by Adolf Hitler in his speech delivered in the Reichstag on 28 April 1939. April 1939, the Polish Government transmitted on 5 May 1939 a Note Verbale which has also been submitted by the Prosecution.
The contents of that Note Verbale contained even more emphatically a complete rejection of Germany's proposition for solving the problem of the Corridor and the Danzig question. Paris, Warsaw and Moscow for the purpose of establishing an alliance exclusively directed against Germany, did not proceed as desired. Nor was it possible for the French and British Military Commissions, sent to Moscow on 11 August 1939, to eliminate completely the difficulties arising from evidently far-reaching differences of opinion. It need not be established how important was the fact that Poland, which was to obtain a guarantee by England, France, and the Soviet Union, publicly refused to accept military assistance from the Soviet Union. It also remains uncertain whether it is correct what the Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov asserted during the emergency meeting of the supreme Soviet on 31 August 1939 to the effect that England had not only dissipated Poland's apprehensions, but that, on the contrary, had furthered them. It seems more important to examine the fundamental differences of opinion. well-known book written by the former British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson. In consideration of the fact that the Tribunal does not desire to have this quotation read, but that on the other hand during the taking of evidence this extract had been admitted, I shall confine myself merely to refer to it, and I shall proceed on Page 35, beginning with the second paragraph.
Meanwhile, the following actually occurred: 1939, the President of the Council of People's Commissars of USSR, Stalin made a speech in which be intimated that the Soviet Government considered it possible or desirable to reach a better understanding even with Germany. Hitler understood this hint perfectly well. Foreign Commissar Molotov expressed similarly himself in his speech before the Highest Soviet on 31 May 1939.
Thereupon the discussions between the German and the Soviet Governments were followed by the conclusion of a German-Soviet Trade and Credit Agreement. This Agreement was signed in Berlin on 19 August 1939. But already during these economic negotiations, questions of general political nature were discussed which, according to the Soviet Russian News Agency "Tass" of 21 August 1939, made known the desire of both parties to bring about the change of their policy and to ban war by the conclusion of a non-agression pact. This Non-aggression Agreement was signed in Moscow in the night from 23 to 24 August 1939; therefore, as shown by the presentation of evidence in this trial, the attack of German armios against Poland was ordered two days before.
Besides this Non-aggression Agreement, a "Secret Supplementary Protocol" was signed as an important part of the former. On the basis of the presentation of evidence, especially on the basis of the affidavit of ambassador and Chief of the legal department of the Foreign Office, Dr. Friedrich Gaus, on the basis of the testimony of State Secretary in the Foreign Office Baron von Weizsaecker, and on the basis of the statements of the defendants von Ribbentrop and Jodl, the following contents of the secret supplementary protocol can be considered as established: territories belonging to the Baltic States, Finland, Esthonia and Latvia should fall into the sphere of interest of the Soviet Union, whereas the territory of Lithuania should belong to the sphere of interest of Germany. interest was made in the manner, that the territories lying to the cast of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San should fall to sphere of interests of the Soviet Union, whereas the territories lying to the west of the demarcation line determined by these rivers should belong to the German sphere of interest.
In other respects, an agreement was reached concerning Poland that both powers would come to a mutual understanding about the final settlement of questions concerning this country.
With regard to the Southeast of Europe, the limits of spheres of interest of both sides were made in the manner, that the Soviet side stressed its interest in Bessarabia, whereas the German side declared a complete political disinterest in this territory. According to the testimony of several witnesses, but especially on the basis of the statements by Ambassador Dr. Gaus and State Secretary von Weizsaecker it is established that this secret agreement included in it a complete new settlement concerning Poland and the future fate of the Polish State.
The efforts to come anyhow to an understanding with Poland with regard to the question of Danzig and the Corridor made after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Agression agreement and of the Secret Supplementing Protocol belonging to it failed.
The Pact of Assistance which was made on 25 August 1939 between Great Britain and Poland did not prevent the outbreak of the war, but simply delayed it for a few days. I have no intention to go into particulars of the diplomatic negotiations which were conducted after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Agreement of 23 August 1939, so that an agreement can still be obtained. One thing, however, can be said with certainty: Should the onesided guarantee declaration of England of 31 March 1939 show that it raised the already existing stubbornness of the Polish Government against the German offers, then an Assistance Pact with Great Britain would operate quite certainly against a readiness to negotiate on the part of the Polish Government. The failure of the negotiations which were carried out between Germany and Poland can surprise all the less, when one bears in mind that the testimony of the witness Dahlerus before this Tribunal. Had not this witness confirmed that the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Lipski, declared on 31 August 1939 that he is not interested in discussing the proposals of the German Government? He based this negative attitude on the statement that in case of war, a revolution will break out in Germany and the Polish Army will march towards Berlin. Government to conclude the treaty with Poland and which possibly intimated at a rift in the German-Italian alliance and at symptom of deterioration in the German State structure -- and here I refer to the testimonies of the witnesses Dahlerus and Gisevius facts. Poland, it was at first the question of a localized conflict between two European states. But when Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, this conflict expanded into a European war, into a war, which as all modern wars between great powers indicated from its very beginning the tendency of developing into a world war because of the presently insufficient international organization and the complete collapse of the system of collective security.
This war was to bring immeasurable suffering for all humanity, and when on 8 May 1945 the European war found its end with Germany's unconditional surrender, it left behind a Europe in ruins.
Adolf Hitler did not live to see Germany's collapse and unconditional surrender. Twenty-two former leaders of National Socialist Germany stand before the bar of the Tribunal in order to answer charges of having committed crimes against the peace, against the rules of warfare, and against humanity in the execution of a common plan. between the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, the provisional Government of France, and the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, is the basis of this trial. The present Tribunal was created pursuant to this agreement, the composition, competency, and tasks of which were established by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which is a considerable part of the agreement concluded by the four mentioned Governments on 8 August 1945. does not only contain the regulations dealing with its composition competence, and tasks; besides those, it includes - and these are the most important parts of the Charter - the regulations of material-jurididal contents. This applies above all to Article 6, which contains the definitions of crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, with all the characteristic facts of the case. Paragraph 3 of Article 6 of the Charter, which enumerates the characteristics of the so-called conspiracy in detail, has to be considered above all as the penal facts of the case.
Furthermore, Articles 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter are to be considered as material-juridical regulations. Tribunal. It deals principly with the contents of the statement made by the defense at the beginning of this trial on the 21st of November; and therefore, I need not read them. supported the seizure of power of the so-called Nazi conspirators, the strengthening of their control over Germany, and furthermore the furthering of the military, economic, and psychological preparations for war. He, moreover, is charged with having participated in the political planning and preparation of wars of agression and of wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances, and in the preparations and planning of the foreign political schemes of the so-called Nazi conspirator
THE PRESIDENT: This ought to be a convenient time to break off.
(A recess was taken)
DR. SEIDL: Your Honor: conspiracy. According to it, all the defendants and various other persons have participated for a number of years prior to 8 May 1945 in the planning and execution of a common plan as leaders, organizers, instigators, and collaborators. This plan aimed at and brought about the commitment of crimes against the peace, of crimes against laws of warfare, and against humanity. It is asserted that the defendants planned, prepared, unleashed, and directed wars of aggression, and committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in the execution of this common plan. crimes against the peace, against the rules of warfare, and against humanity the indictment contains four of them. In the indictment the common plan or conspiracy is made an individual and independent count of the charge, without the Charter bringing forth sufficient reasons for this. It may be left undecided whether conspiracy is considered a particular type of crime according to Anglo-American law. In view of the fact that the Charter rejects the use of both Anglo-American and continental law, but has established its own standards of law, and these "sui generis", only the text and spirit of the Chanter itself is decisive. 3, of the Charter, regarding the outlining of execution of a plan for the perpetration of a crime against peace, against the customs of war, or against humanity, it cannot be subject to any doubt that there cannot be an independent state of criminality as stated in Count 1 of the indictment under the heading of Concerted Plan or Conspiracy. In all events, not according to the principle of the provisions of the Charter. indictment it is necessary first to answer count 1 of the indictment: or conspiracy the National Socialist "German Labor Party" of which Adolf Hitler had become the leader in 1921, and which the defendant Rudolf Hess also joined as early as 1921. Even the indictment does not, apparently, claim that the party program of the NSDAP was actually criminal in itself.
It appears all the less necessary to probe further into this question, as in the subsequent routine of political life the party program has not by any means played the part which could probably be supposed. Moreover, the appraisal of evidence has definitely revealed, as far as the position and rise of the NSDAP is concerned, that up to 20 January 1933 the National Socialist Partywas a party alongside other parties; that it has fought with the sane legitimate means as other parties for the attainment of its objectives; and that not least among the factors of its rise is that Germany experienced, in 1932 - 1933, as a consequence of the reparations policy of the victor powers in 1919, an economic and social decline of uncommon magnitude; and that, finally, on 30 January 1933, the Party, as the strongest, was entrusted with the formation of the Government in application of the provisions of the Reich Constitution and its leader, Adolf Hitler, was nominated Reich Chancellor. parties, openly fought for the principles it represented, and the Prosecution could not admit in evidence a single argument which allowed the conclusion to be drawn that by using illegal means the Party and its leaders had been participators in a common plan aiming at launching a war of aggression. In fact, one has to keep in mind only the political, economic, and military condition of Germany in the first years after the end of World War I in order to recognize how mistaken the acceptance of such a plan aiming at starting a war is for that time. The conception put forward by the indictment reveals not only an entirely false idea of the economic, political, and military conditions which Germany faced as a consequence of the peace settlement by Versailles, but this conception also discloses complete failure to appreciate the intrinsic virtue of any policy. by the Reich President Von Hindenburg on 30 January 1933 as Reich Chancellor, it was necessarily out of the question for him and his Government, in which other parties participated, to start drafting a common plan aiming at a war of aggression, being not abreast with political, and above all, economic conditions. The problems which the GermanReich Cabinet faced at that time resulted directly from the fact that up to 7,000,000 unemployed people in Germany had to be put to work.
As the witness Dr. Lammers stated, the elimination of economic and social distress actually was the most important question at the first Cabinet session. There was no question at all of a common plan aiming at launching a war of aggression and, in fact, it is inconceivable that in the circumstances at that time even one member of the Government could consider such an idea in some concrete shape. Furthermore, it has been established through the testimony of Dr. Lammers and other witnesses, that the subject matter of the first cabinet meeting and the resolutions there passed are contained in the governmental declaration of 1 February 1933, made known to the German people in the form of a manifesto of the German Government. imposed on Germany through the Versailles Treaty was the first aim of the conspiracy charged by the Prosecution. I have already expressed my opinion on that question. The final refusal of the victor powers to disarm in their turn, according to their pledge, has at least accorded the German Reich the right to obtain an equalization of armament through its own rearmament. This was not done in secrecy by any means, but in public, through the announcement of the reintroduction of the Draft Law on 16 March 1935. The Prosecution has not been able to show evidence for its assertion that this law was connected with, and was part of, the common plan aimed at bringing about a war of aggression. The exclusive purpose of the law was rather to reestablish Germany's right to equality at least for that question, sixteen years after the end of the First World War. In that connection brief reference is appropriate to a document which the Prosecution produced, together with nine other documents, so-called key documents, and which first of all serve the purpose of establishing the proof for existence of the common plan claimed in the indictment. This is the written record on a discussion at the Reich Chancellory of 5 November 1937, USA-25, 386-PS. Hitler's statements, but a report of Colonel Hossbach which was drafted by the latter 5 days later, viz, on 10 November 1937. I have no intention of entering any further into the contents of this document. I refer here to the statements which other defense counsel have made on this question.
I only mention that when addressing this speech to the Commanders-in-Chief and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hitler had a chronological plan in view which reveals no conformity whatever with the subsequent events. In these circumstances the existence of a determined and well-outlined plan by Hitler himself even seems very unlikely. Only one conclusion can, with certainty, be drawn from the contents of this document: namely, that until 5 November 1937 Hitler himself only thought of on amicable settlement of the territorial problems raised by the Versailles Treaty. For this reason, therefore, there can have been no question of a common plan aiming at the launching of a war of aggression -- at least, up to this time.
This document, however, is still worthy of notice for another reason: The report begins with the Fuehrer's assertion "that the subject of today's conference is of such importance that its discussion in other states should belong to the Forum of the Government Cabinet. He (The Fuehrer) however, considering the importance of the matter, refrained from making it the subject of discussion in a full session of the Reich Cabinet". First of all, it can be left undecided in how far other questions from 1937 on were still dealt with by the Reich Cabinet in Cabinet sessions, or in the so-called circulation procedure; in the administrative procedure or in the legislative way. The conclusion can, however, be drawn with certainty by reason of the total outcome of the presentation of evidence and in particular by reason of witness Dr. Lammers' statements and other witnesses, but also from a great number of documents submitted by the Prosecution itself that at the latest, from 5 November 1937 on, all problems concerning the question of war and peace were no longer dealt with by the Government as State Authority, nor by another larger circle of collaborators remaining almost the same, but exclusively by Adolf Hitler himself.
In all probability this situation already existed in the year 1933. of several defendants in the witness box who, for example, were informed of the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland in the same way as any other citizen, i.e., by means of the press and radio. sions were taken by Adolf Hitler alone after 5 November 1937, and particularly after the so-called Fritsch crisis and the change of the Reich War Ministry into the High Commandof the Wehrmacht which it involved. According to witness Dr. Lammers's statements, general conferences between the Reich Government, the Supreme Party Directorate and the Generals never took place According to the statement of this witness and others, it was rather that a closer connection never existed between these three institutions. Indeed, not a single one of the documents submitted by the Prosecution reveals anything which might cause us to admit the existence of an independent collaboration between the Reich Government, the Surpeme Party Directorate and the Reich War Ministry or afterwards the High Command of the Whermacht and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Branches and their Chiefs of Staff. On the contrary : If a positive conclusion can really be drawn from the presentation of evidence, it is that the power was concentrated exclusively in the hands of Adolf Hitler, that the Reich Government, the Supreme Party Directorate and the Wehrmacht received their orders and directives only from him; that it was Hitler's own policy to prevent a working and independent combination of these institutions. or military nature, only those offices were included which had directly to do with the task to be carried out. It is clear from all the documents submitted by the Prosecution that, as a rule, at the conferences presided over by Hitler, there was no question of conferences as is customary in parliamenttary Democracies, but they were essentially only concerned with the issuing of orders. tion to Adolf Hitler made by nearly all the defendants ;
nor is it necessary to define an attitude towards the statements on the attitude assumed b a whole series of other witnesses regarding Adolf Hitler's position in the German Governmental system. One thing can be said with certainty : At the latest, from 5 November 1937, on, Hitler's position was so commanding and his treatment of all decisive political and military questions so free of doubt that for this reason alone, there could be no grounds left for the acceptance of a common plan.
The defendant Rudolf Hess, though the Fuehrer's Deputy and the Highest political leader for Party matters, did not contribute to nor take part in any of the conferences or any other important political or military decisions characterized by the Prosecution as being essential to prove the existence of a common plan, just as little as he contributed to or took part in the conference of the Fuehrer in the Reich Chancellory on 5 November 1937 (USA 25 The same holds good, for example, for the next exhibit USA 26 (338 PS) submitted by the Prosecution.
This is the case of the most important case "Gruen" Czechoslovakia. Without having to enter any further into the details of this document, it can be said without more ado that it deals only with what is entirely the work of the General Staff, which was originally intended as a draft, and afterwards elaborated into a real operational plan. This operational plan was not put into action, the documents referring to case Grune, on the contrary, concluding with direction No. 1 of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, which refers to the occupation of the Sudeten German areas separated from Cezchoslovakia by virtue of the Munich Agreement f 29 September 1938. In these circumstances, it is superfluous to deal further with the letter of the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Fuehrer's Deputy of 27 September 1938, which is also contained in the documents for the Gruen case and refers to the carrying out of mobilization measures which were to be effected without the issuing of a mobilization order or a corresponding code word. 14301 same way for Document USA 27 (L-79). This is another so-called key document having as subject the instruction of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Branches and the Chiefs of the General Staff by the Fuehrer in the new Reich Chancellory on 23 May 1939.
Without intending to enter into the importance or the value of this document as evidence, the Fuehrer's speech closed with the order to set up a small Reserach Staff in the High Command of the Wehrmacht; this document shows clearly that no common plan in the shape asserted by the Prosecution can have existed, especially not between the defendants now facing their trial. Not a single Minister or official of civil administration took part in this conference at the fuehrer's Headquarters --which in reality was not a conference but an insturction and issuance of orders. refer to one and the same subject, namely to Adolf Hitler's speech addressed to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht on 22 August 1939. The following documents are in question : USA 38 (L-3), USA 29 (PS 798) and USA 30 (PS 1014). I will not enter any further into the value of these documents as evidence, although it is obvious that these cannot be equivalent documents, and though it is quite clear that a corresponding reproduction to some extent of Adolf Hitler's expositions is out of the question. None of these document reveal their authorship. Moreover, the statements differ considerably one from another as far as volume and contents are concerned. tler's statements. And here again the conclusion is most worthy of notice, a conclusion Which throws some light upon the situation at that time and defines the event Which made it possible for Hitler to make such a speech to the Commanders-in-Chief. Quote : "I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the English offer. Russia is not interested in the maintenance of Poland and then Stalin knows it means the end of his regime, it being immaterial whether his soldiers come off victorious or vanquished. Litvinow's solution was decisive. I gradually changed Russia's attitude in this matter. In connection with the commercial treaty we engaged in political talks. Proposal for a non-aggression pact. Then came a general proposition from Russia Four days ago I took a special step which caused Russia to signify her willingness to conclude it, yesterday. The personal contact with Stalin is established. Von Ribbentrop will conclude the Treaty the day after tomorrow. Poland is now in the position I wanted her in ....." "End of quotation. Besides the Commanders-in-Chief, no minister or leader of the Party, specifically not the defendant Rudolf Hess, attended this speech of the Fuehrer.
The same holds good for Document 789-PS (USA 23). The subject of this document is a discussion with the Fuehrer on November 23 rd 1939. It appears from this document that here again only the commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht were assembled to receive the Fuehrer's directions for the imminent operations in the West.
The next key document is Exhibit USA 31 namely, directive No. 21 for the Barbarossa case. This was a question of a directive by the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht which had an exclusively military character and was intended only for the there of the Wehrmacht. Any participation by civilian administrative offices or of the Party, even in the person of the highest political leader, namely, the defendant Rudolf Hess, is excluded from the frist by the nature of this directive.
It appears also from document USA 32 (2718 PS) the subject of which is a file memo on the result of a conference on 2 May 1941 about the Barbarossa case, that neither the deputy of the Fuehrer nor any other political leader took part in this conference.
The last so-called key document to discuss is USA 33 (1881 PS) an account by Ambassador Schmidt of the conversation between the fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on April 4th 1941. By the very nature of this conference there could be as a matter of course, no question of any participation in it by the defendant Rudolf Hess or by any other political leader of the party. However, something else appears from this document namely, the fact that it is not only false to talk about a common plan within Germany aiming at a war of aggression but, even more that this, that no kind of close political or military cooperation existed between the so called Axis powers, in any case as far as the relations between Germany and Japan are concerned. key document which the prosecution itself has characterized as particularly relevant as to the existence of a so-called common plan ? Without wanting to express a view as to the material relevance of these documents, in any case it is established by these notes that the defendant Hess was not present at any of these conferences or when these orders were issued.
If, in appraising this circumstance, one considers the further fact that the defendant Rudolf Hess was the Fuehrer's deputy and therefore the highest political leader, and that furthermore, after September 1st, 1939, he was designated as the Fuehrer's successor after the defendant Hermann Grering, the there would not seem to be in fact any place for the assumption of a common plan in the form asserted by the prosecution. of the United States Army to the Secretary of War for the period from July 1st 1943, to June 30th 1945. I quote : "The proofs at hand show that Hitler's original intention was to create a Greater German Reich that would dominate Europe by absorbing the Germanic peoples in the countries bordering on the German Reich and by strengthening these new boundaries. for the achievement of this aim Hitler pursued a policy of opportunism by which he succeeded in occupying the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia without military resistance. "No proof has yet been found that the German High Command had an over-all strategic plan. The High Command did fundamentally approve Hitler's policy, but his impetuous strategy outran Germany's military capacities and finally led to Germany's defeat. The history of the German high command since 1938 is full of constant personal conflicts in which Hitler's personal orders increasingly prevailed against military judgment. The first clash occurred in the year 1933 and ended in the mismissal of von Blomberg, von Fritsch and Beck, and in the elimination of the last important conservative influence on German foreign policy, "The campaign in Poland, France, Norway and the Netherlands resulted in serious dissensions between Hitler and the generals, with regard to details in the execution of the strategic plans.
In every case, the general staff favored an orthodox form for the offensive, whereas Hitler was for an unorthodox attack, the objectives of which lay deep in enemy territory. In every case, Hitler's idea prevailed and the really amazing success of each of these successive campaigns raised Hitler's prestige to a point where one no longer dared to oppose his views. His military self-confidence became boundless after the victory in France, and henceforth he began to criticise and disparage his generals' way of thinking even in the presence of junior officers. So the result was that no opposition was brought forward by the general staff when Hitler made his fateful decision to advance against the danger threatening in the east.
"By Italy's entrance into the war, Mussolini intended to realize his strategic plans for the expansion of his empire under the cover of the German military successes. Field Marshal Keitel states that the Italian declaration of war was in contradiction with the declarations made to Germany. Both Keitel and Jodl agree that it was not desired. From the beginning Italy was nothing but a burden for the German war potential. Because of her dependence for oil and coal, Italy was a constant source of friction in the economic field. Mussolini's one-sided campaign against Greece and his attack on Egypt forced the Germans into the Balkan campaign, as well as into the African campaign and led to an overstraining of the German forces which became one of the chief factors of the German defeat.
"Moreover, there is no evidence whatsoever of a strategic planning between Germany and Japan. The German general staff recognized the fact that Japan was obligated by her neutrality pact with Russia, but hoped that Japan would tie up strong, British and American land, sea and air forces in the Far East . . . . " on the witness stand are essentially the same as the statements of the American chief of staff, so that further details on this point are superfluous. It may be considered as proven that not once did a complete agreement exist among the most intimate circle of Adolf Hitler's associates on the measures to be taken in the political and military field, whereby, first of all, the constitutionally established relationship of rank between the officers of the armed forces and the head of the state and supreme commander need not be considered.
One sees: that the existence of a common plan aiming at war cannot be accepted even in the case of that group of persons for whom it first seemed most likely. to be the appropriation of the territories which Germany had lost as a result of the World War of 1914-1918. The preamble to the Treaty of Versailles provides for the possibility of a revision of the Treaty. Going beyond this, the demand for the reunion of Austria to the German Reich and the annexation of the Sudeten German regions cannot in itself be concluded to rest on the existence of a plan which was to have been realized at the proper moment by the use of violence or by way of war. As a matter of fact, by a disregard of the right of self-determination of nations, these territories had already been prevented, in the year 1919 from annexing themselves to the German Reich. On this question I can refer to the statements I made at the beginning. Actually, the annexation of Austria took place -- this can perhaps be said, as a result of the presentation of evidence --under circumstances which cannot be described as warlike and which permit the conclusion that the greater part of the Austrian population approved the annexation. Concerning the Sudeten-German question, it suffices here to refer to the Munich agreement between Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy by which the reunion of the Sudeten-Germans with the Reich was settled. annexation of additional territories on the European continent which should serve the conspirators as "Lebensraum." The indictment is very unclear in this point and lacks every substance. But in fact the question of the so-called "Lebensraum" is a problem which is completely independent of the National Socialist ideology and is determined bythe size of the area and number of inhabitants. Every German Government had to and must deal with this question. If any argumentby Hitler found a lasting response in the German people, it was the demand made by him for an appropriate share of the German people in the material wealth of the world.
This demand appears to be all the more justified, as the proportion between the size of the area and the number of inhabitants was more unfavorable for the German people than for any other people. most important sources of raw materials are distributed and that certain raw material are completely monopolized. It is certain that the bitterness about the unjust distribution of the material wealth of the world had to increase in the German people, as not only every reasonable revision was rejected, but moreover it was said by the opposite side in an unmistakable manner that the nations were divided into two classes, namely the "haves" and the "have-nots." In fact, this classification could be felt as nothing else than ridicule. Moreover, even alter 1933 there was no unanimous opinion about the possible solutions concerning the removal of the difficulties resulting from the need for space. So as, for instance, the defendant Rudolf Hess belonged precisely to those who wanted to solve the problem of "Lebensraum" by the acquisition of colonies if possible. For instance, in a big speech in Stettin, on 21 March 1936: "The natural way to make more food available for the people of Germany, to improve our living standard, is to supplement it by having colonies. Therefore, the Fuehrer by stating his willingness to return to the League of Nations, connected with this the expectation that the question of colonies would be submitted to examination. The Fuehrer knows, that a people without a sufficient area, without a sufficient food basis, a hungry people must in the long run become a center of unrest because of its instinct of self-preservation against which the most ingenious statesman is powerless. For hunger is a natural instance which cannot be subdued either by warnings or by others. Our desire for colonies is therefore only the desire for a pacification of Europe for a long time, and therefore the question of the allocation of colonies to Germany is part of the Fuehrer's big proposal of pacification...." of the world which contradicts all economic reason and the political tensions which shake the peace of the world again and again, cannot simply be overlooked. which may be considered as actually established: As I have already stated, article 6, paragraph 3, of the Statute is not the standardization of an own and independent state of criminality, but the expansion of the criminal responsibility of the leaders instigators, and participants who have taken part in the drafting or in the execution of a common plan for the committing of a crime mentioned in paragraph 2. According to the mentioned regulation, these persons are to be responsible not only for the acts which they themselves have committed, but they also are to take upon themselves the penal consequences for all acts which were committed by any person in the execution of such a plan.
the peace is defined as follows: "The planning, the preparation, the initiation, or tie execution of a war of aggression or of a war which violates international treaties; the conclusion of agreements or the giving of assurances, or the participation in a common plan or in a conspiracy for the execution of one of the above-mentioned acts." that the criminal responsibility of the participant in the draft of a common plan is limited to acts which "have been committed by any person in execution of such a plan", the crime against the peace is according to article 6, paragraph 2a, of the Statute already completed with the "conclusion of agreements or the giving of assurances or the participation in a common plan or in a conspiracy for the execution of a plan which has as its aim the preparation or initiating or execution of a war of aggression." In contrast to article 6, paragraph 3, it is here not necessary that an act of execution is actually committed.