Most revealing is the tolerance with which he made the continued publication of the "Frankfurter Zeitung" possible.
Otherproofs along that line which are also submitted with my document Book II are not negligible, and in the case of Fritzsche certainly cannot simply be passed over with the comment that with his other hand he "cold-bloodedly" abandoned others to death. even to the seeming demands of what paraded as idealism, or for the sake of an oath he had taken. point to brighter spots, namely, those which have bearing on him as the representative of propaganda.
Was he a liar -- and even perhaps a notorious liar? That Goebbels was one is made clear by the revelations of this Trial. And as it was wrongly assumed that Fritzsche was his right-hand man, the implication was of course that Fritzsche had the same attributes. The assumption may be clearly refuted. It is my conviction that,.had not Goebbels sought evasion of responsibility in death, we should not now see Fritzsche in the prisoners dock here as representative of the Propaganda Ministry. The further assumption that all collaborators of Goebbels must have been wittingly at the service of his lies is unjustified. It would only be justified if it had been established here that Fritzsche was in a position to grasp everything including the real and most deep-lying connections. But that could only be determined in this Trial. Fritzsche remained entangled in error like millions of other Germans. Glaring abuses were to be seen everythwere. Fritzsche was not unaware of them. Indeed, he has declined to be characterized before this Tribunal as an opponent of Nazism. He has, however, claimed to have opposed abuses in so far as he could recognize them. This entitles him to be put on a better moral plane. adoration of power and success and inaccessible to criticism. Of course, it was a sin, indeed the grievous sin against the spirit, to have served the system. The decisive point is, however, whether he was in a position to detect more than mere abuses. Falsehood nevertheless was already built into the foundation and anything built upon that was bound to be untruthful. It was not only the "thousand door Ministry", as it was once called, that was poisoned. The real reason why everything in Germany was poisoned by falsehood could best be detected by these who lived in a purer atmosphere. perhaps with better taste than many others. He had occasion to claim here -and this is no mere empty phrase -- that he has always acted fairly and honorably in every respect in his professional work. Dr. Scharping too has emphasized this in his affidavit. Is this not an indication that he really did not detect that the whole foundation upon which his work was built up was hollow and deceptive? Had he been a professional liar, he would not have made a point of doing fine and honest work, that of checking foreign reports and of seeking, in everything that affected him, a truthful basis for the press and radio.
Did they mean to imply thereby that he was particularly qualified as a liar? Actually, his career -- however modest it was really compared to that of Hitler's other auxiliaries -- has quite another foundation which has also been clearly stated here. He only made headway because he was qualified as a journalist and technician; not because he was particularly good at lying but because he talked better than many others.
As proved by the affidavits of Dr. Scharping and Frau Krueger, Fritzsche lived on a modest scale. During his activity in the Propaganda Ministry he has gathered no riches, possessed no luxurious dwelling; and neither asked nor received any gift. It therefore does not appear astonishing that those who not only heard his voice on the Radio but also knew him personally should have particularly emphasized his human qualities. Dr. Scharping declares in his affidavit: It was a distinction to be allowed to work with him. Is it in keeping with human experience that an impostor should win such consideration? I believe human esteem can only be won by an honest character. Those who are in daily intercourse with a person can find out whether he is a liar or not. And if his speech does not betray him, then his eyes will. cooperated in the propaganda of the Third Reich is nevertheless honest and a lever of Truth. The most immediate explanation is probably that which can be taken from Fritzsche's own remark which I repeat here: He said he felt -- and this may well be significant for the verdict if not for history -- that he was deceived by Hitler too! German people as well. To what extent he is himself responsible to the German people for his persistent and ultimate exhortation to carry on the war to the very end is not a matter to be decided here. an evil cause, or it my be that he did not turn from the State leadership for the sole reason that he wished to share the cup of bitterness with the German nation to the last dregs.
But guilty in the sense of the accusation brought against him before the Tribunal he is not. I request his acquittal.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 2:00 o'clock.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the defendants Streicher and Raeder are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: The following is the order on the procedure to be followed in the cases against the organization:
First: The Tribunal draws the attention of counsel for the organization to the Order of July 1st, which directed that any of the evidence taken on commission, which counsel for the Defense, or the Prosecution, wish to use, should be offered in evidence and thus become part of the record, subject to any objections. It will be convenient to the Tribunal, if it is desired, to offer the whole of the evidence at the outset of the proceedings.
Paragraph 2: The Counsel for the Defense will then put in their Document Books, subject to any objections.
Paragraph 3: The witnesses for the Defense will then be called and examined by Defense Counsel, who will bring out the matters they regard as important, given in evidence before the Commission, and any new relevant matters, Each organization will be deatl with in turn, and the whole of the evidence for that organization, both examination and cross-examination, heard before dealing with the next organization.
Paragraph 4: Counsel for each organization will then make his closing speech, dealing with the evidence given before the Tribunal, and making the necessary references to the documents introduced in evidence. He will also draw the attention of theTribunal to the matters contained in the evidence given before the Commissioners, and in the summaries of the affidavits which he deems important and which he wishes the Tribunal specially to consider.
5. The Counsel for the prosecution will reply when all the speeches of the Defense Counsels have been made.
6. The Tribunal is of the opinion that the closing speeches of Counsel for the prosecution and the Defense, ought to be short, not exceeding one-half day in each case. If this time is thought to be exceeded, a special application must be made to the Tribunal, stating the grounds for such extension of time, not later than Monday next, July 29th.
That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: I call on Doctor Seidl for the defendant, Hess.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Honorable Judges. Before beginning with the final plea for the defendant, Hess. I beg the permission of the Tribunal to represent the Defense Counsel for Defendant Goering, and submit on his behalf, two exhibits, which have been allowed by the Tribunal, and they refer to the Catin case, that is to say, the question of the matter of 11,000 Polish Officers in the neighborhood of Smolensk. The first is Exhibit Goering Number 60, an extract from the German white Book. It is the post-mortem examination conducted by the Italian Professor Palmieri and the post-mortem examination conducted by the Bulgarian Professor Borotin, that is Exhibit Goering Number 60. The second is Goering Exhibit Number 61, which is also an extract from the German White Book, which refers to the case of Catin. It is the record of the International Commission of Medical Officers on 30 April 1940. Mr. President, Honorable Judges: When the German people, having lost the first world war, set out in 1919 to rebuild their existence according to Democratic principles, they found themselves facing difficulties which were caused not merely by the war itself and the material loss resulting therefrom. The defendant Rudolph Hess was among the first comrades in arms around Hitler who time and again reminded the German people of the great dangers which would of necessity arise for Germany's domestic and world economy because of the reparations policy of the victor states of 1919. The consequences of that policy were bound to be all the more devastating for Germany when in 1923 France proceeded to military occupation of the Ruhr territory, the center of Germany's economic power. At that time of economic collapse and complete disarmament of Germany, Hitler made the first attempt through the revolution of 9 November 1923 to seize the power of the State. The defendant Rudolph Hess also took part in the march on the Feldherrn Hall in Munich. Together with Adolph Hitler after conviction by the People's Court, he underwent imprisonment at Landsberg Fortress where Hitler wrote his book "Mein Kampf". was one of the first to resume with Adolph Hitler the struggle for national rebirth of the German people.
During the first years after its re-establishment the Party was to begin its very slow climb. Germany's domestic economy had recovered from the worst effects of the Rhur invasion. The currency had been established and due to very extensive foreign credits it had even been possible to bring about an economic boom. of idle years 1927/1928/1929 in reality was byt illusory prosperity for which in Germany, at any rate, there was no foundation of a sound and well-balanced national economy. It is true that the economic crisis which began in 1930 was a general crisis in world economy and that the decline which Germany experienced at that time was but a part of the general disintegration in world economy. It is just as certain, however, that this was not a question here simply of a seasonal declined within the capitalist economy -- such as had been experienced repeatedly before by individual national economics of countries and by world-commerce, but a case in this instance of structural changes at work which may differ in causes but one of the most important of which undoubtedly was the disturbance in the exchange of products and legal tender caused by the unreasonable reparations policy. economy were so devastating in Germany, finally finding expression in an unemployment figure of almost 7 million because the changes brough about in the national economy as a result of reparations payments were particularly far reaching, a fact not of negligible importance. If, consequently, the National Socialist Party won a major electoral victory in the Reich stag elections of 14 September 1930 and entered the new Reichstag with no less than 107 delegates, it is not to be attributed in the last place to the then prevailing economic crisis, to the great unemployment and, indirectly to the economic absurdity of the Reparation payments and the refusal of the victorious states to consent to a now deal despite the most urgent warnings. True, the reparation payments stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles and the mode of settlement were amended by the Dawes and Young plans. It is, however, just as true that these amendments came too late and continued the demand payments from Germany to an extent and under conditions which were bound to, and did in fact, lead to an economic catastrophe.
In this connection, I must point to the following fact: The Prosecution has produced an extensive amount of documentary evidence in reference to the rise of the NSDAP until its seizure of power. A comparison of the Reichstag mandates in the years ranging from 1930 to 1932 with the unemployment figures for the same period would disclose that the progression of these figures was approximately parallel. The more hopeless the social consequences of unemployment became -- and in 1932, no less than 25 million people, including family members, may be estimated to have been hit by the consequences of unemployment -- the more impressive became the electoral successes of the Rational Socialists. I hardly believe that the proof of the existence of a casual relation between the consequences of the Reparation policy of the victorious powers of 1919 and the rise of Rational Socialism can be more convincingly demonstrated. The causal relation may be summed up in a short formula: No Versailles Treaty, no Reparations -no Reparations, no economic collapse with its particularly catastrophic effects upon Germany, resulting in an unemployment figure of nearly 7 millions The political and historical responsibility of the authoritative statesmen of the opposite side as resulting from this causal origin is so crystal-clear that further demonstrations of it are superfluous in the framework of this trial. prove that it was not the economic emergency and the high unemployment figure alone which induced millions of Germans to vote National Socialist on the 14 September for the first time and Which led to the subsequent progress of the Party's rise to power. Nevertheless, these causes were assuredly among the foremost and even the other causes which played a part in the decision of many voters can be traced back in finality to the fatal effects of the Treaty of Versailles and refusal of the victorious powers -- especially France -- to consent to a revision of the treaty. This applies in the first place to the claim for equality of rights raised by all subsequent democratic governments.
it was entitled to expect the victorious powers to disarm also, in accordance with the obligation assumed by them in the Treaty. This was not carried out and there can be no doubt that their denial of the equality of rights as evidenced by their refusal to disarm themselves, figures amongst the most decisive causes of the rise of National Socialism in the years 1931 and 1932. And if any of Hitler's arguments ever found a respose in the German nation, it was that equality of rights could not be denied in the course of time, even after a lost war, to a nation like the German nation with a population of over 75 millions situated in the heart of Europe and with a cultural past of which few other nations can boast. It has already been remarked in this room that a nation which has produced a Luther, a Kant, a Goethe and a Beethoven cannot be indefinitely treated as a minor nation. men of the Weimar Republic left no method untried to arrive at a peaceful revision of the more unbearable clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. For eight years the statesmen of democratic Germany, a Stressmann, and a Bruening, went to Geneva to obtain at last the repeatedly promised equality of rights for Germany and they were repeatedly sent home with empty hands. The dangers produce by this situation could not remain concealed to anyone. In fact, the world was warned by German statesmen, as well as by shrewd politicians of Germany's former enemies. All these warnings were scattered to the winds. Reichstag had become by far the strongest party in Germany, it could only be a question of time until Hitler and his party would be entrusted with the taking over of government leadership. In the long run this could be avoided all the less since the previous governments of Herr von Papen and General Schleicher had no worthwhile following in the Reichstag at their disposal and exercised their governmental authority exclusively by the means of emergency decrees in accordance with Article 48 of the Weimar Reich Constitution. When on 30 January 1933 Adolf Hitler was actually appointed Reich Chancellor by Reich President von Hindenburg and was entrusted with the formation of a new cabinet, then this was done alsigether according to the clauses of the Reich Constitution.
in its favor so many votes as had not been accomplished by any party since the existence of the German Reich. If the leader of this strongest party was entrus ed with the formation of the cabinet, then this was, particularly in view of the parlimentary conditions prevailing in Germany at that time, by no means extraordinary and there cannot be the slightest doubt that Hitler and his party came to power legally, that is according to the Constitution. However, it is correct that in the course of the following years the constitutional structure of the German Reich and particularly Hitler's position, underwent a change. There is, however, no evidence on hand that this development as well was not legal. the witness Dr. Lammers. this development to Hitler's absolutely autocratic rule by the creation of a so-called common law or whether one avails oneself of another theory. For the scope of this trial it seems to me much more decisive that not a single nation with which Germany maintained diplomatic relations raised any objections whatsoever or even drew diplomatic or international legal conclusions neither at the seizure of power nor on the occasion of the transformation of the constitutional structure carried on openly before the entire world. Neither at the seizure of power nor at any later period was the question of diplomatic and international legal recognition of the National Socialist State in doubt. ing period was to be of the greatest importance for the relationship between citizen and state, was still issued by Reich President von Hindenburg pursuant to Article 48 of the Reich Constitution. I have in mind the decrees of the Reich President for the protection of the people and state, dated 28 February 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt, part 1, page 83). In article 1 of this decree the pertinent basic laws of the Weimar Constitution were voided and curtailments of personal liberty, the rights of free speech, including freedom of the press, the right to organize and assemble, interference in the privacy of the letters and mails, telegraph and telephone, orders for searching of homes and confiscations. aswell as limiting property were declared valid, also outside of the legal limitations otherwise designated for it.
validity of this decree as there can be about any other so-called constitutional or basic state law issued by the Reichstag, the Reich Cabinet, the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense, or by Hitler himself.
Gentlemen of the Tribunal: assumed the full responsibility for all laws and decrees which he has signed in his capacity as the deputy of the Fuehrer, as Reichsminister and member of the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense. accusations which, as a sovereign state, merely concern the domestic affairs of the German Reich and have no bearing on the crimes against peace and crimes against the laws of war asserted by the Prosecution. I shall, therefore, now also only touch on such laws and constitutional and political measures which have some recognizable connection with the actual counts of the Indictment and the common plan or conspiracy asserted by the Prosecution. military, economic and psychological preparations for war and to have participated in the political planning and preparation of wars of aggression. As evidence for this assertion, the Prosecution pointed to the fact that the defendant Rudolf Hess, in his capacity as Reich Minister with Portfolio, cosigned the law of 16 March, 1935, for the reconstruction of the armed forces. This law reintroduced general conscription in Germany and stipulated that the German peace army was to be divided into 12 corp commands and 36 divisions. German people in connection with the publication of this law and which was placed ahead of the law in the Reichsgesetzblatt, appears to me no less important than the contents of this law. I refer to the contents of this proclamation which has been presented as an exhibit. this question which had not already previously been brought out by the democratic German government at the time of the Weimar Republic.
brief in connection with this question. With reference to the fact, however, that defense counsel for defendant von Neurath has already referred to this question in detail, I shall merely refer to his argument in this connection and I shall therefore forfeit, on my part, coming to that question in detail once again. fourth last line. 1935, is apparently not considered in the Indictment as a punishable offense in itself, but only as part of the general plan asserted by the Prosecution, which is claimed to have been intended to commit crimes against peace, against the rules of war and against humanity. Whether such a plan ever existed at all whether and to what extent the defendant Rudolf Hess was involved in it and what part the re-introduction of general military service may have played in both an objective and a subjective way, I shall take up in detail later. a war of aggression, the defendant Rudolf Hess is also accused of having, in his capacity as deputy of the Fuehrer, set up the foreign organization of the NSDAP, the National League for Germans Abroad, the German Eastern League, the German-American Bund and the German Foreign Institute. The documents submitted by the Prosecution in this connection are not able to furnish proof to the effect that the defendant Hess himself issued directives or orders to these organizations, which could have caused them to pursue activities similar to those of a fifth column. the contrary, proved that the defendant Hess, in particular, forbade these organizations and leader's in the most definite way to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. The Prosecution has not been able to prove in any way that the above named organizations had actually developed activities which were aimed at undermining the structure of foreign states from within.
the above-named organizations and establishments in more detail, all the more so that there is nothing at all tending to prove that there was any causal connection between the tasks and functions of these organizations and the events which later led to the outbreak of war in the year 1939.
took a decisive part in the occupation of Austria on 12 March 1938. I do not intend to enter into details of the history of the annexation and to consider from the legal point of view the facts which actually led to the annexation of Austria to the German Reich in the year 1938. by the Defense Counsel for the co-defendant Dr. Seyss-Inquart, and I shall now continue in my brief on page 23, beginning with paragraph two. the Party in the execution of the annexation, the evidence has shown here only that the annexation of Austria was an incident which did not have anything to do with the National Socialist Party in the Reich as such. It is sufficient to refer in this connection to the testimony of the defendant Goering and to that of Dr. Seyss-Inquart on the witness stand, which shows that the question of the annexation was solved exclusively by the Reich; that is, therefore, by state authority and not by the Party. by Document USA-61, PS 812, presented by the Prosecution. It deals in this case with the letter of the Gauleiter of Salzburg, Dr. Friedrich Rainer, to Reich Commissioner District Leader Josef Buerckel, and in which he states, among other things:
"Soon after the seizure of power in the Eastern Province, Klaussner, Globocnik and I flew to Berlin in order to give a report to the deputy of the Fuehrer, Party Comrade Rudolf Hess, about the incidents which led to the seizure of power." and the Party itself had been directly and decisively participating in the solution of the annexation question. I do not mention this in order to give reasons of justification or excuses on behalf of the defendant Rudolf Hess. The findings are rather made exclusively in the interests of the historical truth.
with eight and one half million Czechs and Slovaks, without being granted a decisive influence on the state. All attempts of this national group to receive autonomy within the Czechoslovakian state structure remained without success. When the question of annexation with regard to Austria was solved, it could not but happen that the future position of the Sudeten Germans, which after all consisted of three and one half million persons and whose membership in the German nation is beyond any doubt, was also subject to a test. annexation of the Sudetenland to the Reich in the actual and legal respect. In view of the fact that the Prosecution in the Trial Brief which it presented before the Tribunal against the defendant Hess treated the Sudeten German question and has also presented several documents as evidence, it appears necessary, in spite of all, to take a brief stand concerning them. Fuehrer at the meeting of the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP on 28 August 1938. The latter takes a stand in the Sudeten German question in only general statements and that under emphasizing the principle of nationalities and the right of self-determination of the nations. Also the remaining documents presented by the Prosecution, USA-126, USA-26, do not show on which a decisive participation of the defendant Rudolf Hess in the solution of the Sudeten German question could be based. annexation of the Sudetenland to the Reich cannot in itself be a charge of a criminal act according to international law. After all, the annexation of the Sudeten province was not carried out on the basis of a one-handed act of Germany or on the basis of a perhaps disputable agreement between the German Reich and the Czechoslovak Republic. The annexation, rather, took place on the basis of an agreement which had been concluded in Munich on 29 September 1938 between Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, France and Italy. In this Treaty exact and very detailed agreements were reached about the evacuation of the territory to be ceded and the step-by-step occupation by German troops. The final determination of the frontier was carried out by an international committee.
certainty that this is a treaty which had been concluded on the basis of a free agreement of will and that all those participating maintained the expectation that it eight provide the basis or at least a considerable prerequisite for an improvement of international relations in Europe.
I am now coming to another point of the Indictment. As well within the limits of the Indictment as a whole, as also in the personal accusation raised by the Prosecution against the defendant Rudolf Hess, the latter is accused of having participated in the outbreak of war and of being responsible for it. The defendant Rudolf Hess actually did take a stand in several speeches on the question of the Polish Corridor and one problem of the Free State of Danzig. In this case, however, the following still has to be stated: self-determination of the nations was violated -- after all, more than one million Germans came under Polish domination in this manner -- but in excess of this through the partition of the state territory of the German Reich into two areas completely separated from each other, a condition was established which was not only contrary to all economic common sense but which, in excess of this, had to become the cause for constant discord and incidents from the very first day on. Indeed, from the day of the signing of the Versailles peace treaty, the demand for a revision of the treaty, especially in the question of the Polish Corridor, has never been silenced at any hour. There was no party and no government in Germany which did not acknowledge and demand the necessity of a revision of the treaty, primarily in this point. It cannot be the subject of any doubt that, if Poland ought to have an independent access at all to the Baltic Sea under all circumstances, this problem could have been solved much more sensibly than by the establishment of the so-called Corridor and the thereby conditional partition of the German Reich into two areas which were completely separated from each other. Danzig on the basis of international law and state sovereignty. It is not necessary to regard the facts more closely in this ease, which in the course of time have led to constantly increasing difficulties and which in the end caused a situation which made a change of the position in regard to international law and state sovereignty of this purely German city necessary.
minority problem which was raised by the Polish Corridor and the establishment of a Free State of Danzig. The fact is that in the course of two decades, no less than approximately one million Germans were forced to leave their settlement area and especially under circumstances which could not remain without effect on the general political relations between the German Reich and the Polish Republic. It is also not as if the problems which have been raised here have been publicly discussed only since the coming into power of Adolf Hitler. including page 29 are to be eliminated. seizure of power through Adolf Hitler and his party, the questions caused by the Polish Corridor and the separation of Danzig from the Reich were subject to an examination anew. This was all the less avoidable since after the conclusion of the German-Polish Treaty in the year 1934, Poland's attempts to exclude the German element to a continually rising extent did not stop in any way. which were conducted by the German Reich with the Polish Republic, the aim of which was to find a modus vivendi under consideration of the justified interests of Poland. In any case, it appears important to me to keep the following facts in mind, and this seems to be essential for the reason that the Prosecution stated again and again that the German Government was obliged to do everything to clarify those questions and that, especially, the German Government was obliged to conduct negotiations and that the one thing that they should not have done was to start a war. The following statements are to show that it was indeed attempted to solve the problems throuh negotiations, the problems that could not be forgotten and which had to be brought to a solution. course of a conversation with the Polish Ambassador on 24 October 1938 the questions caused by the Corridor and the separation of the City of Danzig and suggested a solution which was to be based on the following foundation:
1. The Free State of Danzig returns to the German Reich.
2. An extra-territorial Reichsautobahn belonging to Germany and likewise an extra-territorial railroad with several tracks would be constructed across the Corridor.
3. Poland likewise obtains an extra-territorial road or Autobahn and railroad and a free port in the Danzig area.
4. Poland receives a guarantee of disposal for her goods in the Danzig area.
5. The two nations recognize their common frontiers (Guarantee) or the territories of both sides.
25 July A LJG 16-1 6. The German-Polish Treaty is being extended by 10 to 25 years.
7. Both countries include in their treaty a consulation clause. of the Polish Government to this proposal. The document is TC-73 No. 45, which describes the attitude of the Polish Foreign Minister Book of 31 October 1938 and his instructions to the Polish Ambassador Lipski in Berlin. In this document the German proposal is flatly turned down on the ground that "any attempt to incorporate the Free City of Danzig into the Reich would invariably lead to a conflict, and the resulting difficulties would not merely be of a local nature, but would prevent any possibility of Polish-German understanding in all its aspects." sador during another conversation between him and the Reich Foreign Minister on 19 November 1938. Asked about the Polish Government's attitude regarding the German proposition of an extra-territorial arterial motor road and an extra-territorial railway through the Corridor, the Polish Ambassador declared that he was not able to make an official statement. was very restrained and contained nothing incompatible with Polish honor or the vital interests of that State. One should be the more willing to admit this, as the creation of the Corridor and the separation of East Prussia from the Reich was really felt by the German people as the hardest of the territorial burdens of the Versailles Treaty. If, nevertheless, the Polish Government turned this proposal down, for reasons leaving hardly any prospect of finding a solution in subsequent negotiations, the conclusion could be drawn that at that time already Poland altogether lacked a sincere wish for an agreement, which would take into consideration Germany's legitimate interests. This impression was confirmed by the negotiations during the visit 25 July A LJG 16-2 of the Polish Foreign Minister Beck to Berlin, on 5 January 1939, and the return by the Reich Foreign Minister to Warsaw, on 21 January 1939.
If, in spite of this hostile attitude of Poland the Reich Foreign Minister repeated the proposition made on 24 October 1938 in another meeting with the Polish Ambassador on 21 March 1939, this must lead to the conclusion that the German Government was sincerely desirous of solving, by means of negotiation, the questions relative to the Corridor and the separation of Danzig. Thus it cannot be seriously denied that the German Government tried to solve the Danzig question and that of the Polish Corridor by negotiation and that it made very moderate proposals in that respect. partial mobilization of the Polish armed forces. It need not be defined as to what was the connection between the partial mobilization ordered by the Polish Government and the British proposal for consultation, dated 21 March 1939, and whether, incidental to the transmission of this consultation proposal in Warsaw, the declaration of guarantee of 31 March had already been promised or contemplated. There can be no doubt, however, that the partial mobilization of the Polish armed forces, as also admitted by the British Prime Minister Chamberlain in a declaration before the House of Commons on 10 July 1939, was bound to do anything but create favorable prerequisites for further negotiations. As a matter of fact, the subject of the memorandum of the Polish Government handed by the Polish Ambassador Lipski on 26 March 1939 was a complete to rejection of the German proposal. It was declared that extra-territoriality for the highways could not come into question, and that a reunion of Danzig with the Reich could not be considered. In the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Polish Ambassador, which followed the handing over of the Memorandum, the latter declared openly that it was his unpleasant duty to point out that to pursue further the German plans, particularly insofar as they had a bearing on the return of Danzig to the German 25 July A LJG 16-3 Reich, would be tantamount to a war with Poland.