Prosecution, I come now to this conclusion. The defendant Fritzsche, against whom it has not been proved here that he took part in any common planning, can on this account also not have been a participator in the alleged conspiracy. At any rate he cannot be punished according to Paragraph 6, last section. According to the intellectual constriction of the Charter there should be somewhere a limit fixed concerning the arraignment of a single person in these trials. When is anybody still a participator -- accomplice -- and when is he no more so, but only a perpetrator or accessory? where is this boundary which sets of the responsibility for individual deeds from the responsibility for that which others have done? Because there must be a dividing line for this collective responsibility also. I mean the common plan is this dividing line. He who does not belong to those who did the planning should also be left out of the group of conspirators.
On the other hand the framers of the Charter provided:
a) establishment of a single individual as criminal culprit even though
b) declaration of an organization as such as a criminal organization. and, as is established, was never a member of even one of the organizations being prosecuted here, he could be convicted only if he as an individual had committed crimes as covered by article 6, paragraph 2, a to c of the Charter. In that case, however, just as in any ordinary criminal procedure, the prosecution must furnish him the proof of a criminal offense. If he does not belong to the conspiracy, if he does not belong to an organization, the Prosecution cannot derive its support from a so-called legal assumption, an assumption merely said to result from membership in an organization. It is not possible to reverse the burden of proof.
The second question then is: Did Fritzsche as an accessorial accomplice or abetter, belong to the class of those criminals of whom it has been proven that they as individuals committed crimes against the peace, a violation of law governing warfare, or a crime against humanity?
with his own hands. The charge is directed against him only by reason of his activity as an accessory. accomplice is not something foreign to the English and American criminal law. However, the common law is governed by the principle that the accessory falls into the same class as the accomplice, in other words that -- irrespective of the measure of his personal culpability -- he should be punished, in principle, just like the perpetrator. It is said that at all times the English law was inclined to apply the principle of equal punishment for perpetrator and accessorial accomplice. The reason for referring here to the English common law is merely to establish a link with the German concept of law. It is, therefore, sufficient that English law and American law make a differentiation between the concept of a perpetrator and accessory. fact that there is a difference in the concept of right and of wrong between the Prosecution and the Defendants. The concepts are bound to differ because the Statute Law is not the same.
That is the reason why I cannot as yet conclude my legal argumentation: differences in concept, which may be equally common in both spheres of law, result in different inferences of law as far as Statute Law is concerned. each single defendant according to the letter of para. 6, section 2 a to c of the Charter. In that connection he remarked that it is a commonplace in common law that persons who help a criminal and shield him, who give advice and help to a criminal, are criminals themselves. Perhaps he wished thereby to advocate the conception that according to the spirit of the development of English law such persons, by reason complicity in someone else's deed, should be punished in the same manner as the main perpetrator; that the accessoriness of the accomplice -- if I understand Sir Hartley Shawcross correctly, is in principle, without importance for consideration by common law.
In practical effect this might mean that the difference between the concept of accomplices and accessories plays no part here, or at best might determine the degree of the respective responsibility for the measure of the individual guilt. Is It intended, in principle, to judge him who merely supports the deed of someone else exactly in the same way as applies to him who carries out the deed as his own? I may refer to the effects which such a concept might have on the measure of punishment, for example.
At this point it might be in order to say this: The legal maxim propounded by Sir Hartley Shawcross may indeed by commonplace for every member of the English or American legal professions. This does not hold true for a German defendant, however. As I also infer from the argument of the French Prosecutor, Dubost, this does not seen to hold true for French Common Law, because he pointed out that according to the principle of penal law, strictly speaking, all the defendants could In that case not be considered as main perpetrators but merely as "accomplices." And because the confines of common law concepts are too narrow, it is the opinion of the French Prosecution that the deeds which are to be adjudicated here are not equal to the common law with its rationalistic statics; that it would be necessary to apply a law which goes beyond this. plot - and the practicability to declare an organization criminal, are to be the vehicle by means of which it will be possible to go beyond the common law. However, how about the case of a defendant who does not belong to the conspiracy nor to an organization? After all, law must be applied. This then leaves nothing but the common law for judging the individual deed. Which law other than general concepts such as, for instance, guilt, dolus, carelessness and also the accessoriness of the accomplice can be applied? It is possible that through the establishment of new facts of the case, the Charter created now substantive law.
But what is the juridical concept with which to approach these new facts of the ease? Classification of actual circumstances will probably have to be made by means of the analogy of penal law concepts. As regards the facts of the case listed in paragraphs 6(b) and (c) of the Charter, these correspond essentially with the facts of a case in common law. A defendant as an individual who did not take part in laying out the plan, and who did not belong to an organization, can then he judged only according to principles which also must apply for every other delight of common law. If concepts such as the accessorical accomplice are involved, argumentation against a defendant can take place according to common law only. complicated legal problems, particularly in connection with the doctrine of the form of participation; in other words with the question as to how an accessory should be classified according to the various possibilities of participation. From this in particular results the decisive question: is it possible that the Charter went so far as - I repeat, what is involved are common law concepts - it is a question here of banning, if possible concepts of common law; of respecting the old established legal concepts of the defendants in judging the accessorial assistants. Is it possible that it entirely ignored even the completely different structure of Statute law? especially with reference to the question of accessorial assistance, I ask permission for a few legal dogmatic remarks on the conception of German law. In all fairness and at least as far as the concept of an accessorial accomplice is concerned, a German defendant can be charged only with what is known to the concept of law adopted by his people and which, at the same time, is in keeping, morally, with his sphere of knowledge. That is the decisive point!
By reason of the provisions of Statute law in paragraph 49 of the Reich Penal Code, there is not only a strict separation between the accessory and the accomplice, as far as the concept is concerned, but necessarily and as a matter of principle he is also to be punished less severely than the perpetrator himself.
Jurisprudence and judges, therefore, have made a sharp distinction between the perpetration of an act itself and the more instigation or support of somebody else's act by accomplices. This distinction is made not only in accordance with external characteristics, and so according to objective factors, but also with regard to what occurs in the mind, and so according to subjective factors. During decades of the German law, particularly in the law of the Reich court, this is expressed in such a way that, in the case of assistance in somebody else's action, the accessory is said to have the animus socii, but the perpetrator himself the animus anctoris. According to German law the assistance is regarded outwardly, which means according to objective factors, only a furthering and support of the action of the principal perpetrator; the accessory must have helped to bring about success by his support. If he has not helped to bring about this success, then he is not an accessary. Then his action is not punishable. of the accessary (animus socii) must be directed to the end that somebody else's action is supported with his knowledge. And so when judging what is going on within the mind of a perpetrator, German law also makes a sharp difference between the will and the knowledge. whether somebody has given assistance at all. know about plans or the execution of them, from the range of his duties. Only if one had proved that he had a definite knowledge and will as an accessary to the fact could he be con demned.
It would have to be further proved In the case of defendant Fritzsche whether what he knew and wanted in connection with an alleged furtherance is identical with what any of the main criminals actually did.
Only when the knowledge and intent of both agree can one be on accessary at all. In this connection it is to be emphasized than an indefinite knowledge, a very general intent is not sufficient to establish the state of being an accessary. The accomplice must be concretely aware of the elements in a case which another is to carry out in accordance with his intention. points with instigating specific crimes as an accessary. And so the third question is: Has Fritzsche been the instigator of any single crime? referred to the details of Captain Sprecher's prosecuting speech. To me it is doubtful if here the concept of instigation is meant in the legal-dogmatic sense of the common law. The concept of "incitement" is used essentially to the extent that it corresponds to the German legal concept of more invitation. This charge of instigation can only be raised insofar as it can be said to concern the individual responsibility of Fritzsche for a specific crime mentioned in Article 6 Paragraph 2A - c. The assumption that Fritzsche was a possible "instigator" to a common plan within the group of conspirators cannot be substantiated in any case, in accordance with what I have already explained at an earlier time. general legal sense presupposes, however, quite otherwise than in the case of an accomplice, in which a criminal will is only to be supported or maintained, that such a will must first of all be produced in the perpetrator. The psychological influence, unlike that of the accomplice does not consist of affirming or strengthening the individual who has already decided to carry out the deed, but in first producing the will for the deed. The means for this can be of the utmost variety, but the perpetrator must first have his mind changed - brought around to it.
forms of participation, as in the case of instigation, a conscious and in the case of the instigator a designed causative connection must exist between his instigation and the decision of the perpetrator. The principle of equivalence is valid equally as in the case of assistance. The perpetration of a deed must correspond with the conception and the will of the instigator. The instigator is therefore responsible so far as his intention reaches. A possible excessus mandati cannot be attributed to him. From this follows the accessoryship not only of assistance but also of instigation! Fritzsche case htat he has committed an individual crime as instigator through his transmission of news. Nothing has been demonstrated that he has instigated a single person to murder, cruelties, deportations, killing of hostages, massacre of Jews or others, or crimes mentioned in the Charter, or had, as instigator caused a single crime by his transmission of news. Not a single passage from his nearly 1,000 wireless speeches could be produced from which such a conclusion of individual responsibility could be deduced. It could not happen from public speeches. The crimes which were committed were carried out by people completely indifferent to Fritzsche's propaganda. They received their urge or instructions from altogether different sources. These deeds were to be kept quite secret. The official news service should avoid handling this as much as possible. As this trial has shown particularly impressively the perpetrators made the greatest effort to inform a very small circle, for example, of the annihilation of the Jews. What is self-evident in every other State Constitution, namely, that occurences in the country should be handled through the press, was not permissible in a dictatorship. The people should not be asked whether they approve such incidents. The crimes established by this trial should not be permitted to be made public.
Can one assume that under such circumstances the press and the radio were suitable means to instigate the perpetration of crimes?
Is it not more probable that such incidents were kept specially secret from the press and the radio? ever so prejudiced - could it be reckoned that through public speeches he could evoke decisions for the perpetration of punishable deeds by a single individual. not go so far. The Prosecution will reproach Fritzsche that he has contributed to produce an "atmosphere of hate". gruesome crimes as these to be committed in Germany. This reproach however, is legally irrelevant. This charge would have legal importance only if the defendant Fritzsche had been among the group of so-called conspirators; if he had been the instigator of a common plan. I believe to have proved that such opinion is impossible. If he had actually brought about an "atmosphere of hate", his instigation of someone else - outside of the group of conspirators - to commit a certain crime would have been impossible legally speaking. Furthermore, according to the provision of the Statute Law of German Penal Code, a summons disseminated by radio would even exclude facts which the letter of the penal code requires in order to establish the charge of conspiracy. According to German jurisdiction as practiced for decades, there could be no conspiracy, because instigation could not have centered on a certain individual. Furthermore, German Law concerns itself merely with instigation to commit a concrete deed but not with an instigation to commit punishable actions in general. In principle, therefore, a summons of some kind, directed towards a group of persons individually undefined, does not constitute incitement to complicity; it is rather outside the framework of legal relevancy altogether.
It is quite selfevident, however, that Fritzsche's radio addresses were intended for an entirely unlimited group of persons. Furthermore, and since he was seriously striving to find for the German press and radio propaganda a "foundation based on truth", could he have such an aim to incite to culpable actions? My client admitted in an impressive and unequivocal manner that he followed a tendency which was inkeeping with the official German policy when he passed on the news which he was expected to disseminate. In other words, he did not take advantage of thefact that International Law did not place him under any restraint, and nothing in the evidence submitted has refuted his good faith. However, in the light of thelaw, when it is concerned with incitement to complicity, or with assistance given as an accomplice, good faith is equivalent with lack of will and lack of purposefullness.
This establishes:
1) that the defendant Fritzsche did not belong to the group of conspirators who planned;
2) that he was never at any time a member of a group or an organization which it is here proposed to term criminal;
3) that, factually and for legal reasons, he is not individually This will suffice, I believe, for my discussion of the question of evidence and legal conclusions. It is necessary though to mention one other thing: The Fritzsche case has also its human aspect. related question suggests itself which must not remain without answer: Taking Firtzsche strictly as a human being, can he be expected to have had knowledge, to have been co-originator of all the monstrosities which were established in this Court? According to the interpretation of the Prosecution a dolose instrument is (1) the conspirator - of whom Goebbels was perhaps one - : he only who had knowledge of its aims and purposes.
Fritzsche's measures and utterances, however, were not dictated by criminal will. During his examination before this High Tribunal, Fritzsche pointed out the fact thathe does not convoke his duty to obey. But he added that as far ashis own person is concerned a criminal proposition was never made to him. And he furthermore declared: There was no compulsion for anybody to carry out an order in which he could nothelp seeing the intended crime. Undoubtedly, Fritzsche sacrificed his own convictions and had to have recourse to many a compromise. This, however, he did not do where he thought he discovered injustice, violence and inhumanity. As is fitting to a journalist, he examined with care whatever reports reached him from abroad. In disregard to inherent dangers forhis own person, he traced the news which concerned Germany itself, daggers which ambushed every person who tried to penetrate that which absolute secrecy intended to hide. He did not permit himself to be put off with paltry, vague explanations. He reported many details. I merely refer to his visits to Gluecks, Heydrich, and his investigations in the Ukraine. "Kommissarbefehl" and the plan to revenge inhumanely the air bombardments on Dresden; he fought againstthem with determination, in the latter case even with the help of a foreign Ambassador. And he was successful, too, as these two particularly conspicious examples show. He did this because he followed the voice of his conscience. He did not first engage in lengthy deliberation as to the pros and cons. As regards the "Kommissarbefehl" he merely had heard of it as a soldier - he hadnever read it, nor did he know that it actually was carried into practice at any time - and he at once raised a protest. When Goebbels ordered him to announce the proposed killing of great numbers of allied fliers he did not mind incurring the anger and the fury of hisMinister. Dr. Scharping described this in detail. When he learns of cruelites in the concentration camp at Oranienburg he even sounded an alarm. The culprits were punished immediately, at that time. Dr. Scharping's affidavits which I submitted, and others, prove his implicit willingness to assist those who were persecuted, for political or racial reasons if they applied to him.
Most revealing is the tolerance with which he made the continued publication of the "Frankfurter Zeitung" possible.
Otherproofs along that line which are also submitted with my document Book II are not negligible, and in the case of Fritzsche certainly cannot simply be passed over with the comment that with his other hand he "cold-bloodedly" abandoned others to death. even to the seeming demands of what paraded as idealism, or for the sake of an oath he had taken. point to brighter spots, namely, those which have bearing on him as the representative of propaganda.
Was he a liar -- and even perhaps a notorious liar? That Goebbels was one is made clear by the revelations of this Trial. And as it was wrongly assumed that Fritzsche was his right-hand man, the implication was of course that Fritzsche had the same attributes. The assumption may be clearly refuted. It is my conviction that,.had not Goebbels sought evasion of responsibility in death, we should not now see Fritzsche in the prisoners dock here as representative of the Propaganda Ministry. The further assumption that all collaborators of Goebbels must have been wittingly at the service of his lies is unjustified. It would only be justified if it had been established here that Fritzsche was in a position to grasp everything including the real and most deep-lying connections. But that could only be determined in this Trial. Fritzsche remained entangled in error like millions of other Germans. Glaring abuses were to be seen everythwere. Fritzsche was not unaware of them. Indeed, he has declined to be characterized before this Tribunal as an opponent of Nazism. He has, however, claimed to have opposed abuses in so far as he could recognize them. This entitles him to be put on a better moral plane. adoration of power and success and inaccessible to criticism. Of course, it was a sin, indeed the grievous sin against the spirit, to have served the system. The decisive point is, however, whether he was in a position to detect more than mere abuses. Falsehood nevertheless was already built into the foundation and anything built upon that was bound to be untruthful. It was not only the "thousand door Ministry", as it was once called, that was poisoned. The real reason why everything in Germany was poisoned by falsehood could best be detected by these who lived in a purer atmosphere. perhaps with better taste than many others. He had occasion to claim here -and this is no mere empty phrase -- that he has always acted fairly and honorably in every respect in his professional work. Dr. Scharping too has emphasized this in his affidavit. Is this not an indication that he really did not detect that the whole foundation upon which his work was built up was hollow and deceptive? Had he been a professional liar, he would not have made a point of doing fine and honest work, that of checking foreign reports and of seeking, in everything that affected him, a truthful basis for the press and radio.
Did they mean to imply thereby that he was particularly qualified as a liar? Actually, his career -- however modest it was really compared to that of Hitler's other auxiliaries -- has quite another foundation which has also been clearly stated here. He only made headway because he was qualified as a journalist and technician; not because he was particularly good at lying but because he talked better than many others.
As proved by the affidavits of Dr. Scharping and Frau Krueger, Fritzsche lived on a modest scale. During his activity in the Propaganda Ministry he has gathered no riches, possessed no luxurious dwelling; and neither asked nor received any gift. It therefore does not appear astonishing that those who not only heard his voice on the Radio but also knew him personally should have particularly emphasized his human qualities. Dr. Scharping declares in his affidavit: It was a distinction to be allowed to work with him. Is it in keeping with human experience that an impostor should win such consideration? I believe human esteem can only be won by an honest character. Those who are in daily intercourse with a person can find out whether he is a liar or not. And if his speech does not betray him, then his eyes will. cooperated in the propaganda of the Third Reich is nevertheless honest and a lever of Truth. The most immediate explanation is probably that which can be taken from Fritzsche's own remark which I repeat here: He said he felt -- and this may well be significant for the verdict if not for history -- that he was deceived by Hitler too! German people as well. To what extent he is himself responsible to the German people for his persistent and ultimate exhortation to carry on the war to the very end is not a matter to be decided here. an evil cause, or it my be that he did not turn from the State leadership for the sole reason that he wished to share the cup of bitterness with the German nation to the last dregs.
But guilty in the sense of the accusation brought against him before the Tribunal he is not. I request his acquittal.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 2:00 o'clock.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the defendants Streicher and Raeder are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: The following is the order on the procedure to be followed in the cases against the organization:
First: The Tribunal draws the attention of counsel for the organization to the Order of July 1st, which directed that any of the evidence taken on commission, which counsel for the Defense, or the Prosecution, wish to use, should be offered in evidence and thus become part of the record, subject to any objections. It will be convenient to the Tribunal, if it is desired, to offer the whole of the evidence at the outset of the proceedings.
Paragraph 2: The Counsel for the Defense will then put in their Document Books, subject to any objections.
Paragraph 3: The witnesses for the Defense will then be called and examined by Defense Counsel, who will bring out the matters they regard as important, given in evidence before the Commission, and any new relevant matters, Each organization will be deatl with in turn, and the whole of the evidence for that organization, both examination and cross-examination, heard before dealing with the next organization.
Paragraph 4: Counsel for each organization will then make his closing speech, dealing with the evidence given before the Tribunal, and making the necessary references to the documents introduced in evidence. He will also draw the attention of theTribunal to the matters contained in the evidence given before the Commissioners, and in the summaries of the affidavits which he deems important and which he wishes the Tribunal specially to consider.
5. The Counsel for the prosecution will reply when all the speeches of the Defense Counsels have been made.
6. The Tribunal is of the opinion that the closing speeches of Counsel for the prosecution and the Defense, ought to be short, not exceeding one-half day in each case. If this time is thought to be exceeded, a special application must be made to the Tribunal, stating the grounds for such extension of time, not later than Monday next, July 29th.
That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: I call on Doctor Seidl for the defendant, Hess.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Honorable Judges. Before beginning with the final plea for the defendant, Hess. I beg the permission of the Tribunal to represent the Defense Counsel for Defendant Goering, and submit on his behalf, two exhibits, which have been allowed by the Tribunal, and they refer to the Catin case, that is to say, the question of the matter of 11,000 Polish Officers in the neighborhood of Smolensk. The first is Exhibit Goering Number 60, an extract from the German white Book. It is the post-mortem examination conducted by the Italian Professor Palmieri and the post-mortem examination conducted by the Bulgarian Professor Borotin, that is Exhibit Goering Number 60. The second is Goering Exhibit Number 61, which is also an extract from the German White Book, which refers to the case of Catin. It is the record of the International Commission of Medical Officers on 30 April 1940. Mr. President, Honorable Judges: When the German people, having lost the first world war, set out in 1919 to rebuild their existence according to Democratic principles, they found themselves facing difficulties which were caused not merely by the war itself and the material loss resulting therefrom. The defendant Rudolph Hess was among the first comrades in arms around Hitler who time and again reminded the German people of the great dangers which would of necessity arise for Germany's domestic and world economy because of the reparations policy of the victor states of 1919. The consequences of that policy were bound to be all the more devastating for Germany when in 1923 France proceeded to military occupation of the Ruhr territory, the center of Germany's economic power. At that time of economic collapse and complete disarmament of Germany, Hitler made the first attempt through the revolution of 9 November 1923 to seize the power of the State. The defendant Rudolph Hess also took part in the march on the Feldherrn Hall in Munich. Together with Adolph Hitler after conviction by the People's Court, he underwent imprisonment at Landsberg Fortress where Hitler wrote his book "Mein Kampf". was one of the first to resume with Adolph Hitler the struggle for national rebirth of the German people.
During the first years after its re-establishment the Party was to begin its very slow climb. Germany's domestic economy had recovered from the worst effects of the Rhur invasion. The currency had been established and due to very extensive foreign credits it had even been possible to bring about an economic boom. of idle years 1927/1928/1929 in reality was byt illusory prosperity for which in Germany, at any rate, there was no foundation of a sound and well-balanced national economy. It is true that the economic crisis which began in 1930 was a general crisis in world economy and that the decline which Germany experienced at that time was but a part of the general disintegration in world economy. It is just as certain, however, that this was not a question here simply of a seasonal declined within the capitalist economy -- such as had been experienced repeatedly before by individual national economics of countries and by world-commerce, but a case in this instance of structural changes at work which may differ in causes but one of the most important of which undoubtedly was the disturbance in the exchange of products and legal tender caused by the unreasonable reparations policy. economy were so devastating in Germany, finally finding expression in an unemployment figure of almost 7 million because the changes brough about in the national economy as a result of reparations payments were particularly far reaching, a fact not of negligible importance. If, consequently, the National Socialist Party won a major electoral victory in the Reich stag elections of 14 September 1930 and entered the new Reichstag with no less than 107 delegates, it is not to be attributed in the last place to the then prevailing economic crisis, to the great unemployment and, indirectly to the economic absurdity of the Reparation payments and the refusal of the victorious states to consent to a now deal despite the most urgent warnings. True, the reparation payments stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles and the mode of settlement were amended by the Dawes and Young plans. It is, however, just as true that these amendments came too late and continued the demand payments from Germany to an extent and under conditions which were bound to, and did in fact, lead to an economic catastrophe.
In this connection, I must point to the following fact: The Prosecution has produced an extensive amount of documentary evidence in reference to the rise of the NSDAP until its seizure of power. A comparison of the Reichstag mandates in the years ranging from 1930 to 1932 with the unemployment figures for the same period would disclose that the progression of these figures was approximately parallel. The more hopeless the social consequences of unemployment became -- and in 1932, no less than 25 million people, including family members, may be estimated to have been hit by the consequences of unemployment -- the more impressive became the electoral successes of the Rational Socialists. I hardly believe that the proof of the existence of a casual relation between the consequences of the Reparation policy of the victorious powers of 1919 and the rise of Rational Socialism can be more convincingly demonstrated. The causal relation may be summed up in a short formula: No Versailles Treaty, no Reparations -no Reparations, no economic collapse with its particularly catastrophic effects upon Germany, resulting in an unemployment figure of nearly 7 millions The political and historical responsibility of the authoritative statesmen of the opposite side as resulting from this causal origin is so crystal-clear that further demonstrations of it are superfluous in the framework of this trial. prove that it was not the economic emergency and the high unemployment figure alone which induced millions of Germans to vote National Socialist on the 14 September for the first time and Which led to the subsequent progress of the Party's rise to power. Nevertheless, these causes were assuredly among the foremost and even the other causes which played a part in the decision of many voters can be traced back in finality to the fatal effects of the Treaty of Versailles and refusal of the victorious powers -- especially France -- to consent to a revision of the treaty. This applies in the first place to the claim for equality of rights raised by all subsequent democratic governments.
it was entitled to expect the victorious powers to disarm also, in accordance with the obligation assumed by them in the Treaty. This was not carried out and there can be no doubt that their denial of the equality of rights as evidenced by their refusal to disarm themselves, figures amongst the most decisive causes of the rise of National Socialism in the years 1931 and 1932. And if any of Hitler's arguments ever found a respose in the German nation, it was that equality of rights could not be denied in the course of time, even after a lost war, to a nation like the German nation with a population of over 75 millions situated in the heart of Europe and with a cultural past of which few other nations can boast. It has already been remarked in this room that a nation which has produced a Luther, a Kant, a Goethe and a Beethoven cannot be indefinitely treated as a minor nation. men of the Weimar Republic left no method untried to arrive at a peaceful revision of the more unbearable clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. For eight years the statesmen of democratic Germany, a Stressmann, and a Bruening, went to Geneva to obtain at last the repeatedly promised equality of rights for Germany and they were repeatedly sent home with empty hands. The dangers produce by this situation could not remain concealed to anyone. In fact, the world was warned by German statesmen, as well as by shrewd politicians of Germany's former enemies. All these warnings were scattered to the winds. Reichstag had become by far the strongest party in Germany, it could only be a question of time until Hitler and his party would be entrusted with the taking over of government leadership. In the long run this could be avoided all the less since the previous governments of Herr von Papen and General Schleicher had no worthwhile following in the Reichstag at their disposal and exercised their governmental authority exclusively by the means of emergency decrees in accordance with Article 48 of the Weimar Reich Constitution. When on 30 January 1933 Adolf Hitler was actually appointed Reich Chancellor by Reich President von Hindenburg and was entrusted with the formation of a new cabinet, then this was done alsigether according to the clauses of the Reich Constitution.
in its favor so many votes as had not been accomplished by any party since the existence of the German Reich. If the leader of this strongest party was entrus ed with the formation of the cabinet, then this was, particularly in view of the parlimentary conditions prevailing in Germany at that time, by no means extraordinary and there cannot be the slightest doubt that Hitler and his party came to power legally, that is according to the Constitution. However, it is correct that in the course of the following years the constitutional structure of the German Reich and particularly Hitler's position, underwent a change. There is, however, no evidence on hand that this development as well was not legal. the witness Dr. Lammers. this development to Hitler's absolutely autocratic rule by the creation of a so-called common law or whether one avails oneself of another theory. For the scope of this trial it seems to me much more decisive that not a single nation with which Germany maintained diplomatic relations raised any objections whatsoever or even drew diplomatic or international legal conclusions neither at the seizure of power nor on the occasion of the transformation of the constitutional structure carried on openly before the entire world. Neither at the seizure of power nor at any later period was the question of diplomatic and international legal recognition of the National Socialist State in doubt. ing period was to be of the greatest importance for the relationship between citizen and state, was still issued by Reich President von Hindenburg pursuant to Article 48 of the Reich Constitution. I have in mind the decrees of the Reich President for the protection of the people and state, dated 28 February 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt, part 1, page 83). In article 1 of this decree the pertinent basic laws of the Weimar Constitution were voided and curtailments of personal liberty, the rights of free speech, including freedom of the press, the right to organize and assemble, interference in the privacy of the letters and mails, telegraph and telephone, orders for searching of homes and confiscations. aswell as limiting property were declared valid, also outside of the legal limitations otherwise designated for it.