not only natural, but also legal sense and thought, that it is contrary to that which this high Tribunal has to strive for and is striving for, that it is contrary to any moral and ethical postulate. This Tribunal not only represents Justice, the legal and ethical conscience of all civilized nations on earth, but ought to show the way to universal Peace to the coming generations. Only then can this task be fulfilled, when you show manking once more that any generalization, any levelling, any treatment including judgment and conviction, of people and of their activities, based on corporative, I should like to say, even gregarious concepts, and not on the personality, the will and the designs of tie individual, is of evil. Such treatment denies the holiness of the individual and is bound to lead to the adoration of mere might. And such adoration of might, such belief in might, has actually been the deep cause of the terrible events which once more have been unrolled here. chastisement should be applied according to divine and humane law, and at the same time to show manking the way to international peace -- if by your sentence you take away from manking the belief in might and give back, instead of this belief, to all nations on earth and, not in the least, to the German nation, the belief in and the respect of the holiness of the individual, which the Lord once created in his image. Convinced by the truth of such knowledge, I now place with confidence the fate of my client the defendant Baron von Neurath, in your hands.
THE PRESIDENT: I now call on Dr. Fritz on behalf of the defendant Fritzsche.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, the result of the evidence in the case of Fritzsche is a relatively clear one. Although I am one of the last to plead, it cannot be avoided to go into legal problems more closely. Above all these problems arise from the fact that Fritzsche was characterized by the prosecution in a particularly striking manner as an accomplice. Propaganda Ministry and what part he played in the German propaganda in general. It is those facts which ought to be conclusive in determining what part he supposedly played in the alleged conspiracy.
At the beginning of the trial, Mr. Albrecht submitted as evidence the organizational structure of the government of the Third Reich as of March, 1945, in the form of a diagram. Mr. Albrecht admitted himself that Fritzsche's name did not appear in it in the provision of one of the main leaders of the Propaganda Ministry. It is true, he added, that his importance had been greater than one would be led to think from his position as shown on this diagram. He closed his statement by saying that evidence to this effect would be submitted to the Tribunal. Fritzsche had greater importance? as evidence a "compilation of the elements of guilt" which in a particularly impressive manner demonstrates in how far the individual defendants are connected with the facts of which they are to be guilty in the opinion of the prosecution. The classification of the individual defendants follows from the table which is attached to this compilation as Appendix A. The Tribunal will have noticed that the defendant Fritzsche is the only one not to appear on this table at all. from this follows that he does not belong to any of the organizations which are to be declared criminal here. submitted in Brief E by the prosecution also shows especially clearly that even in his last position as ministerial director and chief of the broadcasting division he was only one of twelve officials of the same rank.
Such a position in itself excludes a priori the assumption thathe could have determined the policy of the principles of news presentation and the principles of what may or may not become known to Germany and the world. It is true Captain Sprecher pointed out -- evidently in order to raise Fritzsche's importance -- that the chief of the German press division held a "unique" position, buthe did not pass over the fact in silence that he had predecessors and successors in this allegedly unique office. of the broadcasting division, he did not obtain a higher position in the civil service heirarchy as a result of it. His activity was purely administrative. It concerned technical-organizational questions. In his affidavit of 7 January, 1946, my client describes the administrative work connected with it. He also mentions his numerous predecessors. Did it occur to anybody to indict also these persons as major war criminals or to call then supreme commanders of a propaganda instrument? Since this is not the case, the conclusion must probably be drawn that it was not Fritzsche'. official position which formed the basis for the indictment. organizations under indictment here, not all administrativecivil service employees and division chiefs or state officials have been included as a whole; only the Reich Cabinet was named. Therefore, it can also not be imputed to Fritzsche -- as is allegedly possible in the case of the members of the organizations -- that from his position alone and the close connection of the individual members of the organizations it follows that they must have known and been completely dear about the plans of the alleged conspiracy by virtue of their membership alone.
During Fritzsche's cross examination, an attempt was also made by the Russian prosecution to magnify Fritzsche's position. It introduced three protocols as evidence, namely the interrogations of the witnesses Schoerner, Foss, and Stahel. However, these documents did not produce any supporting evidence. It is true that those depositions were only used to hold isolated passages from them against the defendant.
Because of this limitation, I could forego the cross examination of the three persons who signed these protocols. But Fritzsche did not fail to express his opinion on these passages which were hold up to him while he was being questioned on the witness stand. In this connection I have to point to only one more thing: These three persons did not even claim to have had any insight into the internal organization of the Propaganda Ministry. None of the three depositions contains any definite statement of Fritzsche's. On the contrary, these depositions contain more judgments, judgments which we do not want to know from witnesses, especially not in a case where they cannot furnish any kind of substantial facts. For this reason alone, their value as evidence must be denied. But aside from that aspect, they represent completely wrong judgments. They can by no means be derived from Fritzsche's own statements which were submitted in this trial by the prosecution - namely from his radio addresses. judgments could have been submitted, then, in view of the fact that the prosecution could have obtained oil of his radio addresses, it would have been more to the point to submit here those statements made by him which would have enabled the Tribunal to form its own judgment. the transcripts of the interrogations only contain the shortly summarizing statement that Fritzsche was Goebbels' "deputy". I confronted the witness yon Schirmeister with this assertion and he termed it as pure nonsense. Fritzsche had to say the same on the witness stand. There can be no doubt that the concurring testimony of both witnesses is correct. Finally, there are still hundreds of others who formerly worked in this ministry who could verify the truthfulness of these statements with their own knowledge.
I can state therefore that the attempt at enlarging Fritzsche's position contrary to the facts given in the organizational chart of the Propaganda Ministry as submitted by Mr. Albrecht - is a complete failure. the creator of the great control apparatus for the German press, as was furthermore claimed by the prosecution. On the contrary, it was Dr. Goebbels and others of his associates.
Fritzsche could not have been the creator because of the time element alone. became a consultant (Referent) and it was only since the winter of 1938/39 that he was one of the twelve division chiefs of the ministry. When he become chief of the German press division, the policy of the press was set by Reich Press Chief Dr. Dietrich. As has been said already, he became chief of the broadcasting division only in November 1942 and could not create anything fundamentally new there. Neither Goebbels nor Dietrich over allowed the control of the German press and radio to be taken out of their hands. With regard to the details I want to refer to the testimony of the witness von Schirmeister. press division nor a leader of the German propaganda as for as it emanated officially from the ministry, is also shown by the other numerous statements both by Fritzsche, when questioned about it on the witness stand, and by the witness von Schirmeister. authority to give orders in these fields, and could not have had it owing to his rank in civil service, which would justify his being called the creator or leader of the press and radio in the Third Reich. On the contrary between Dr. Goebbels, Dr. Dietrich and him there were quite a number of other higher intermediary posts. In this connection I can also refer to what Lieutenant Meltzer stated in general about the importance of a state secretary in the Reich Propaganda Ministry and a Reich Press Chief Then he referred to an affidavit by Amann on 19 December 1945; He pointed out that the holders of these positions exercised complete control over the news service in Germany. Fritzsche never hold any of those positions. Incident lly, the Propaganda Ministry did not have only one, but three state secretaries. Besides, D.r Goebbels had surrounded himself with a ministry Staff (Ministeramt). I believe it is appropriate to point here to this low rank because the prosecution thought, as it did in other cases, for instance in the case of the defendant Goering, to be able t o conclude a special responsibility from a high rank, i.e. from a defendant's external position alone.
Therefore, one can by no means start from the assumption that Fritzsche exerted any decisive influence upon propaganda in general and upon the politics which were pursued by the press and radio. news system involved him only as a journalist and expert. They had nothing to do with the contents of the propaganda which was pursued by the state leadership. In this respect, too, he was only a person who carried out directives. It is true that he set up the technical organization of the journalist news offices. He thereby modernized and perfected them. It is also true that this news system played an important part later in the war. In that respect Fritzsche's work extended only over the period from 1953 to 1936. But it is a fact that in those years he did not have the least influence upon the contents and political trend of the news, particularly in view of the fact that he was a more employee at that time.
I make these references to Fritzsche's official position within the Propaganda Ministry also for another reason. In admitting what he did and said and wanting to assume full responsibility for it - Fritzsche had an opportunity to explain in detail the cause for and contents of all the excerpts from his radio addresses submitted to him - he cannot, on the other hand, answer for theses which were championed by other offices of the state propaganda apparatus - also for those in his own Ministry. All the less can he answer for the unorganized propaganda of the party. Fritzsche described the various controlled and uncontrolled kinds of propaganda of the Third Reich and pointed out their effects. May I remind the Tribunal that the witnessvon Schirmeister testified to the effect that oven Goebbels could not do anything with the "party doctrines" and the "myth" in the field of propaganda. According to the witness, Goebbels did not regard them as things with which to lure the masses. when the defendant Speer mentioned the secret agitation about the miracle weapons, he could point to other sources of unorganized party propaganda. For all that, Fritzsche does not bear any responsibility. His official position was not influential enough to be able to fight effectively against all faulty conditions and abuses.
Therefore, his repeated attempt to have the " Stuermer" prohibited 24 July A LJG 20-1 propaganda - remained without success.
The party propaganda with all its practical consequences, played a much more important part than that which Fritzsche with his comparatively limited functions could ever have played. I recall the fact, that according to Fritzsche's testimony, even Dr. Goebbels was afraid of Bormann. This was explained by the portentious sentence according to which, it was not the state which had to give orders to the party, but inversely the party to the state. the witness von Schirmeister - has thus shown, without any doubt, that the decisive directives for the propaganda of the third Reich come from other agencies. Goebbels, with regard to whom Fritzsche kept his distance personally, did not allow any of the subordinate officials in his Ministry to interfere with his plans. It has been seen that he carried out his plans with the authority of his position, with the adroitness of his arguments, which the world knows, and if necessary, by means of fraud. The leadership of the German press policy - let us consider only this narrow sphere - was and remained in the hands of Dr. Goebbels and Dr. Dietrich. The same thing happened with the radio as the witness von Schirmeister has stated, when Fritzsche took over its direction in November 1942. Dr. Goebbels, one of the oldest and closest of Hitler's collaborators, and Dr. Dietrich, Hitler's permanent escort - during the war he was present almost uninterruptedly in his headquarters taken out of their hands, especially by a man, who like Fritzsche, had no connections of any kind to Hitler, and had not even had a single conference with him. ultimately, Hitler's will was decisive here, too. importance here whether it was due to Hitler, Goebbels or Dietrich, - other governmental agencies too successfully exercised on the press and radio.
Here I will mention the Foreign Office, 24 July A LJG 20-2 the High Command of the Wehrmacht and other ministries, the heals of which were much more closely connected with the three aforementioned personages than, for instance, Fritzsche.
out that the assertion of the indictment that Fritzsche was closely connected with the party propaganda apparatur, e.g., with the so-called Reich Press Agency of the NSDAP, has been expressively withdrawn by the prosecution in the course of the trial. with this, I think that I have sufficiently established the limits of the defendant's responsibility. This definition shows the inaccuracy of the widely spread opinion that Fritzsche occupied a very important and influential position in the "gigantic propaganda apparatus" of the Third Reich. This limitation not only takes into account the legal but also the moral facts, which have been clearly exposed by the production of evidence. the reproach that Fritzsche was a member of the alloyed conspiracy The prosecution has repeatedly tried to incorporate Fritzsche's work, at its different stages, in the alloyed group of conspirators and has drawn from it conclusions which go so far as to say that Fritzsche was also responsible for war crimes, for crimes against humanity and even for crimes against peace. Already in the arguments of the indictment these attempts seemed to have little relevant justification. it is certainly no improper criticism, if I declare here, that it caused the prosecution a certain embarassment to display Fritzsche's subordinate position as an official, as so important and full of meaning. Today, now that the hearing of evidence is complete, it seems to me, that the attempts to include Fritzsche in the circle of conspirators has miscarried. Hitler discussed any plans or actions with the closer or wider circle of his collaborators. And apart from this, he never actually took part either in any discussions which might have 24 July A LJG 20-3 been capable of plunging the world into a blood bath of wars of aggression.
He was neither an " old party fighter" nor was he "decorated" later on with the golden party badge. He did not belong, as I had to emphasize especially, to any of the organizations which are to be declared here as criminal. Up to the end he fulfilled the functions of an official in a ministry and received directives like any other official. He could never he a political advisor. the alleged conspiracy could have been spanned only by the person of Dr. Goebbels. The witness von Schirmeister has repudiated such an assumption. According to his testimony, Fritzsche did not even belong to the closer circle around Dr. Goebbels. Indeed, von Schirmeister could even state that Fritzsche often had to apply to him because he could not get Dr. Goebbels' opinion on any question other than through him, as he was Dr. Goebbels' personal press assistant. The relations through the state secretaries - e.g. Dr. Dietrich, Dr. Naumann, to mention only a few - also involved certain difficulties. That is not the method by which conspirators usually communicate. was out of question that Fritzsche could ever have embarked on an exchange of ideas with Dr. Goebbels with a view to forming plans. Now, it would have been the task of the prosecution to prove to the defendant Fritzsche where his participation in the conspiracy can be seen. I say that one cannot consider any count of the indictment as proved.
I think that it was not Fritzsche's official position at all which led to the bringing of an indictment against him. I rather assume that the latter is solely to be traced back to his broadcast speeches which made him and his name known - but only during the war - both in Germany and perhaps also in a part of the rest of the world.
A ll the serious charges levelled against him lead back 24 July A LJG 20-4 therefore, only to those addresses.
The other assertions concerning his position within the state or party apparatus are only based on assumptions or combinations without any factual basis, as appears for example especially clearly from the purely personal and refuted judgments of Schoerner, Foss and Strahel. But his name has only become so well known, because of the technical means he utilized. Only the great significance of the radio for the modern transmission of news made him appear in a special light. But because of this, it shall not be argued that he thus had a great influence on the German people. Out of our own experiences of Nazi-ruled Germany, I can well say that every Gauleiter, many a district leader (Kreisleiter), used a much mere far-reaching language. But, as a rule, the speeches of the latter were only published by the local press. insofar as they could not be made available with their entire wording. Unfortunately, the excerpts quoted during the crossexamination by the Russian prosecution could not be complemented either by the entire text of the respective speech. Thus, all possibility disappeared of reproducing the sense the respective address had at the time it was delivered. Later on, I will come back to this and give an example of it. The method of sumbitting only individual passages or quotations to the Tribunal, is here especially inadequate because it is impossible to see from it that in his speeches Fritzsche always put the events of the day in the foreground. It was only rarely and incidental that he drew any general ideological conclusions. But already from what Fritzsche has stated with regard to these of his discourses, which the prosecution was able to produce in their entire text, there results a completely different picture as to the cause and motives of his broadcast speeches. From 1932 - thus already before the seizure of power by National-Socialism - up to 1939, the latter were nothing but a political press review. And that is what they were called! Accordingly, they were a collection of quotations from domestic and foreign newspapers.
Fritzsche does not dispute the fact that those collections 24 July A LJG 20-5 aimed at promoting the interests of the National-Socialist state.
Only during the war, - out right till the end still based on quotations even from the foreign press - those speeches became the platform for the polemical controversy which, during the war, was carried, on on both sides. Without any doubt they did greatly contribute toward the formation of political opinion in Germany, but there is also no doubt that many people in Germany listened to Fritzsche's speeches not for their polemics but in order to learn from his quotations something about the opinions expressed abroad. For years these speeches were chiefly private work carried out alongside his official position. only during the war they came to be considered as semi-official because of their increasing political news value.
Thus they assumed - in order to make it clearer - approximately the character of editorials of a newspaper, which - as one used to say - stands close to the government. It Would have been easy for the defense to submit to the Tribunal tomes of newspapers dating from the same time, the editorials of which showed the same trend, and even, as it can he asserted here with all force, used quite a bit more violent language. repudiate the fact that these addresses constituted an incitement to race hatred, to murder or violence, to hatred among nations or to wars of aggression If such an effect could really have been produced by these speeches, absolutely the same reproach should fall upon any editor of the Third Reich, who received the "slogan or the day" from the Reich press chief. The accusation seems to be levelled against Fritsche before this Tribunal only because through a technical means he could be heard at a wide range. But it is due to the war and only since 1939 did his speeches gain a political news value at all - and in the nature of the thing, that the polemist becomes himself the subject of polemics. Especially the one whose influence, considered from the standpoint of political news value, extended farther technically than the influence of an article in a local paper. Only in this manner his name became better known to outsiders than names of people who were much more powerful than the publicist. capacity of a publicist is shown by the fact that not only is he supposed to have belonged to the plotting group of conspirators, but that he is also accused of crimes against peace. If a propagandist is subjected to such an accusation, there arises immediately the question of whether public radio speeches would not be the least proper means for carrying through criminal aims of a secret conspiracy. Speeches, which can be heard all over the world, could at best be suited for camouflaging such aims and for misleading the world. But actually, just the opposite reproach is levelled against Fritsche. He is supposed to have incited other people. Thus one may consider that the nature a and the character of these speeches is sufficiently characterized. Their importance had to be brought in proper relationship to the far reaching con conclusion of the prosecution.
Fritsche by radio speeches or by other means contributed towards the various wars of aggression, it is necessary, in a case where accusations to that effect, pertaining to criminal and international law, are raised against a publicist, to deal with a legal problem. At no point -- as far as I can see-did the prosecution consider the question of whether and to what eztent propaganda, i.e. the attempt to influence minds, especially during war, is subjected to the rules of international law. Perhaps this problem did not come up for discussion because this question, once it is asked, would have had to be definitely denied. However, while the indictment speaks of the "gigantic propaganda apparatur" during Hitler's dictatorship which was created as a consequence of the supervision and control of any cultural activity, it does not draw from it any conclusions for a judgment according to international law. For, as a matter of fact no generally or specially valid rules concerning this field have ever been established; also no sort of common law could develop here. national law no attention is paid at all -- as far as I could find out -to this problem. Nevertheless, a certain number of textbooks, especially those with a tint of natural law, contain regularly in their catalogues of fundamental international law also a section concerning national honor or national dignity. From the equality of nations and their living together in a community governed by international law the requirement is deduced in these chapters that they have to treat each other with respect. persons from their own sphere of influence against other countries be prevented, and such excesses be published when committed. But this idea found its positive legal expression only in a series of national criminal codes which subject to punishment -- naturally in peace times only -- the insulting of foreign chiefs of state for instance: Another doctrine which is based loss upon natural law holds that it is not a question of legal obligation but one of international courtesy only.
Be that as it may, in some form precisely defined international law does not exist, not even for peace times. Especially not as far as private propaganda through press and literature is concerned. And now as to war. any directive covering international law there is no limit to propaganda against foreign countries in war. Accordingly there is only one limit to this propaganda, namely the great limit which governs all the rules of warfare, that everything is permitted and only that quod ad finem belli necessarium est. individuals and nations, it is beyond doubt that propaganda can be an important and in certain cases even decisive means of war, of no lesser importance than for instance economic warfare or even the fight with weapons. Propaganda has here a double task: First, to serve as a means for increasing the power of resistance of the own nation and secondly to undermine the fighting powers of the opponent. This influence -- rosy coloring on one side, slandering on the other, concealment of facts, etc. -- is in its character nothing else than a stratagem which, within the framework of the rules of land warfare, has been expressly declared as a permissible instrument of warfare, according to article 24 of the Hague rules of land warfare. In order to continue this line of thought, it may be pointed out that syping -- also a form of war strategem -- has equally been declared as a permissible instrument of warfare by the Hague rules of land warfare. by the countries; defamation of the opponent and its statesmen, making him contemptible, falsifying the motices and intentions of the enemy, defamatory presentation, assertion of unproved statements, all this belongs unfortunately to those means of propaganda which are used on all sides and at an increasing rate during a war. from the time before the first world war. At that time they pursued an even further reaching aim, namely to contribute in general to the understanding among nations by means of a general moral and spiritual disarmament. (Desarmement moral).
However this goal was not reached before the first world catastrophe of this century. After 1918 though, as a reaction after the great armed conflicts, it received a stronger impulse and became known to the world through the tasks imposed upon the League of Nations in this respect. This was inded the first real attempt to start an intellectual disarmament. At the 5th session of the League of Nations in 1925 in Paris it was decided to found an institute for intellectual cooperation (cooperation intellectuelle). positions, in the establishment of general committees and sub-committees, of sections and committees of experts, with an incalculable wealth of documents. But nevertheless non of these great efforts led the idealistic impulse and the longing of the nations for a "moral disarmament" and for intellectual cooperation to a sober and concrete legislation which would have imposed legal obligations on the individual states as well as on their nationals. No results were achieved in advising a way in which to prevent during war, hatred, incitement, distortion of facts, and provocation of other nations or of the nationals of other countries in all the possible modern forms of expression. intellectual disarmament as those presented by the Polish Government to the League of Nations in two memoranda of 17 September 1931 and 13 February 1932 had the same fate. These propostions aimed at using national legislation to prohibit any propaganda, insofar as it might become dangerous for peace, and even any propaganda which aimed at a mere disturbance of the good relations between nations. Influence was to be exerted not only upon the big public news media but also upon the vast ramifications in the administration of any modern state, including even the revision of schoolbooks. These propositions which advised member states not to recoil even from censorship and measures of prohibition finally failed because of the paradox existing at that time: These propositions were confronted with the deeply-rooted conception that liberty of expression of opinion in moral matters could not be touched by means of such exceptionally far-reaching police measures; this freedom of expression was to be preserved as an "unalienable right" granted by the Creator. And the matter stopped there with this opposition of fundamental principles:
We have had here in the courtroom a special demonstration of what censorship and control of the press, radio and films could lead to. the Polish propositions of 1931 and 1932 are not worth mentioning here. They restricted themselves solely to certain sectors of propaganda methods, and only for the duration of goo-neighbour relations. Therefore we can only express the hope that on the nasis of international solidarity it will be possible in the future to unite these still contrary theses on a higher level. High Command of the Wehrmacht on 1 October 1938. The latter, in its section for interaction law, had a chart drawn up for the case of an armed conflict. On this chart one was to look up the principles for meeting any possible violation of the rules of warfare by friend and foe. Knowing the legal vacuum in the field of propaganda in its broadest sense, it is stated there that from the point of view of international law it is absolutely permissible to render the opponent contemptible and to try to undermine his strength "regardless of how many lies and falsehoods are used for this purpose", and that even from the legal standpoint a rule could be established for the future to the effect that in case the enemy should employ such propaganda, defense by means of "counter attacks" is legally possible, whereby "naturally the propagation of atrocity lies" must be used. This may sound cynical and brutal. But unfortunately it fitted in with the customs of war, or rather, this undisguised statement originated in the actual legal lacunas existing in internation agreements and in common Dr. Kranzbuehler rightfully stated here: In war thereis no duty to tell the truth. propaganda methods on both sides, we are permitted today to consider the happenings of those days as belonging to history. At that time, too, all belligerents reached the point where they tried to undermine the opponent through the means of propaganda. The legend of children's hands cut off by German soldiers -- a war lie as Arthur Ponsonby proved in his book "Falsehood in War-Time" showed up in a French school-book even in the midst of peace, namely nearly 10 years after the first world war.
Publications of all belligerent countries, drawings and cartoons, dating from the time of the first world war, can be found in abundance in all libraries. Many still remember today the film which showed terrible atrocities and was named: "The Knights of the Apocalypse", a motion picture which circulated almost throughout the entire world at the time fo the forst world war; and unfortunately the matter remained legally unsettled until today.
in his capacity of publicist in the Nazi state, into a new International Law, the creation of which is also one of the goals striven for by Mr. Justice Jacks in this Trial? Can the desire of the Prosecution to see Fritzsche punished as a war criminal be based upon the assertion of a logical development of existing laws when up to now, nothing absolutely nothing has been regulated juridically and legally in the field of propaganda and no fertile beginnings of any kind appeared in this direction? The question here is certainly not that of an only apparent legal loophole. dual crimes were actually incited by means of propaganda. Therefore, I shall now go into the individual accusations of the Prosecution in order to show that Fritsche is not guilty of having committed such acts. starts from the point that any important political and military attack on the part of the German state leadership was preceded by a press campaign. Therefore the Nazi conspirators for that reason would have had used the press also as an instrument of foreign policy and as a feint to cover subsequent aggressive actio From that general, perhaps even correct description of such intentions, the farreaching conclusion is drawn that Fritzsche may also be co-responsible for those matters. Such responsibility would be based only on the time factor that he was in December 1938 to the spring of 1942, the leader of the "German Press division within the official Ministry of Propaganda. But such inference lacks foundation. It could have been justified only if a proof had been found that Fritsche really was the creator and inspirer of all those press campaigns. But Fritzsche, if only due to his subordinate position, subordinate not only in regard to the departmental organization but also in relation to the real leaders of propaganda Hitler, Goebels, Dietrich and others-, could have known only what his superiors presented to him, as to other employees, as historical truth. influence of the foreign policy on the press, always pointed out, that before any political, and especially before military actions, the Foreign Office justified the measures taken in the field of high politics before the public by the issue of white Books, Just as in the case of other intentions or goals of the highest leaders of the Third Reich, the press was informed also in these instances only what the public was permitted to learn, while matters not destined for publication were kept secret.
ganda furnished by Fritzsche and the various military invasions? That could he have known of their background? the chief of the Reich press were given to him only a short time before the decisive step of 15 March 1939. They consisted, as in all other cases, in socalled "Daily Directives" given out at press conferences. Such daily directives found their expression in the headlines of German papers. It may be mentioned here, that the best known organ of the party, namely the "Voelkischerbeobachter' due to its direct connection with the chief of the Reich press - and, during th war, with the headquarters of the Fuehrer, has been more independant of such slogans of the lay since it had a foreign news service of its own. That was printed in the "VoelkischeBeobachter" does hot therefore, represent what had been approved by Fritzsche as leader of the German press. Fritzsche had alreadyand that attitude is of great importance in regard to all of his activities established the principle for his press information namely, that untrue news should never be given to the press.
The apparent reason for that was the fact, that his predecessor in the "German Press" division, Berndt, had all kinds of news spread during the Sudeten crisis, losin thereby the confidence of the leading German writers. Fritzsche on the witness stand as well as the witness von Schirmeister gave details about these matters. by any other officials or officers when the German troops marched into Czechoslovakia. Whatever has been disclosed in this trial about Hitler's hidden intentions of those days, was as little known to Fritzsche as the plan "Fall Gruen" could have been known to him. As head of the inland press, he could not have had any influence on the propaganda possibilities which were to be made use of within Czechoslovakia proper.
The same is true of the Polish campaign: Here, too, Fritzsche did in no way express himself for any armed conflict or spread purposely some information which might have supported any bellicose intentions. In his very radio broadcase of 29 August 1939, which was held against him during his crossexamination, he points out explicitly that there could not in fact exist any serious doubt about the German will for peace. Those and many other lines are particularly significant in proving Fritzsche's good faith. He gave expression to his and the German nation's disappointment that Hitler's repeated emphasis on his will for peace had proved to be a lie; even a fraud. If one examines in their full meaning the other broadcasts by Fritzsche shortly before and during the Polish campaign none of his statements could be interpreted as favoring that war of aggression. The official reasons given at that time convinced Fritzsche as well as millions of other Germans that Right was on their side. That Fritzsche had been sharing such conviction in times is proved by his admission, declared on the witness stand, that he also feels to have been deceived by Hitler.
It was no different in the case of Yugoslavia. Here likewise Fritzsche was able to learn only whatever facts were given to him and to other leading journalists by the chief of the Reich Press, which Fritzsche had no opportunity to verify if only for the speed at which those events were developing, if ever the thought struck him at all that the press was utilized to provoke warlike measures.