Fritzsche does not dispute the fact that those collections 24 July A LJG 20-5 aimed at promoting the interests of the National-Socialist state.
Only during the war, - out right till the end still based on quotations even from the foreign press - those speeches became the platform for the polemical controversy which, during the war, was carried, on on both sides. Without any doubt they did greatly contribute toward the formation of political opinion in Germany, but there is also no doubt that many people in Germany listened to Fritzsche's speeches not for their polemics but in order to learn from his quotations something about the opinions expressed abroad. For years these speeches were chiefly private work carried out alongside his official position. only during the war they came to be considered as semi-official because of their increasing political news value.
Thus they assumed - in order to make it clearer - approximately the character of editorials of a newspaper, which - as one used to say - stands close to the government. It Would have been easy for the defense to submit to the Tribunal tomes of newspapers dating from the same time, the editorials of which showed the same trend, and even, as it can he asserted here with all force, used quite a bit more violent language. repudiate the fact that these addresses constituted an incitement to race hatred, to murder or violence, to hatred among nations or to wars of aggression If such an effect could really have been produced by these speeches, absolutely the same reproach should fall upon any editor of the Third Reich, who received the "slogan or the day" from the Reich press chief. The accusation seems to be levelled against Fritsche before this Tribunal only because through a technical means he could be heard at a wide range. But it is due to the war and only since 1939 did his speeches gain a political news value at all - and in the nature of the thing, that the polemist becomes himself the subject of polemics. Especially the one whose influence, considered from the standpoint of political news value, extended farther technically than the influence of an article in a local paper. Only in this manner his name became better known to outsiders than names of people who were much more powerful than the publicist. capacity of a publicist is shown by the fact that not only is he supposed to have belonged to the plotting group of conspirators, but that he is also accused of crimes against peace. If a propagandist is subjected to such an accusation, there arises immediately the question of whether public radio speeches would not be the least proper means for carrying through criminal aims of a secret conspiracy. Speeches, which can be heard all over the world, could at best be suited for camouflaging such aims and for misleading the world. But actually, just the opposite reproach is levelled against Fritsche. He is supposed to have incited other people. Thus one may consider that the nature a and the character of these speeches is sufficiently characterized. Their importance had to be brought in proper relationship to the far reaching con conclusion of the prosecution.
Fritsche by radio speeches or by other means contributed towards the various wars of aggression, it is necessary, in a case where accusations to that effect, pertaining to criminal and international law, are raised against a publicist, to deal with a legal problem. At no point -- as far as I can see-did the prosecution consider the question of whether and to what eztent propaganda, i.e. the attempt to influence minds, especially during war, is subjected to the rules of international law. Perhaps this problem did not come up for discussion because this question, once it is asked, would have had to be definitely denied. However, while the indictment speaks of the "gigantic propaganda apparatur" during Hitler's dictatorship which was created as a consequence of the supervision and control of any cultural activity, it does not draw from it any conclusions for a judgment according to international law. For, as a matter of fact no generally or specially valid rules concerning this field have ever been established; also no sort of common law could develop here. national law no attention is paid at all -- as far as I could find out -to this problem. Nevertheless, a certain number of textbooks, especially those with a tint of natural law, contain regularly in their catalogues of fundamental international law also a section concerning national honor or national dignity. From the equality of nations and their living together in a community governed by international law the requirement is deduced in these chapters that they have to treat each other with respect. persons from their own sphere of influence against other countries be prevented, and such excesses be published when committed. But this idea found its positive legal expression only in a series of national criminal codes which subject to punishment -- naturally in peace times only -- the insulting of foreign chiefs of state for instance: Another doctrine which is based loss upon natural law holds that it is not a question of legal obligation but one of international courtesy only.
Be that as it may, in some form precisely defined international law does not exist, not even for peace times. Especially not as far as private propaganda through press and literature is concerned. And now as to war. any directive covering international law there is no limit to propaganda against foreign countries in war. Accordingly there is only one limit to this propaganda, namely the great limit which governs all the rules of warfare, that everything is permitted and only that quod ad finem belli necessarium est. individuals and nations, it is beyond doubt that propaganda can be an important and in certain cases even decisive means of war, of no lesser importance than for instance economic warfare or even the fight with weapons. Propaganda has here a double task: First, to serve as a means for increasing the power of resistance of the own nation and secondly to undermine the fighting powers of the opponent. This influence -- rosy coloring on one side, slandering on the other, concealment of facts, etc. -- is in its character nothing else than a stratagem which, within the framework of the rules of land warfare, has been expressly declared as a permissible instrument of warfare, according to article 24 of the Hague rules of land warfare. In order to continue this line of thought, it may be pointed out that syping -- also a form of war strategem -- has equally been declared as a permissible instrument of warfare by the Hague rules of land warfare. by the countries; defamation of the opponent and its statesmen, making him contemptible, falsifying the motices and intentions of the enemy, defamatory presentation, assertion of unproved statements, all this belongs unfortunately to those means of propaganda which are used on all sides and at an increasing rate during a war. from the time before the first world war. At that time they pursued an even further reaching aim, namely to contribute in general to the understanding among nations by means of a general moral and spiritual disarmament. (Desarmement moral).
However this goal was not reached before the first world catastrophe of this century. After 1918 though, as a reaction after the great armed conflicts, it received a stronger impulse and became known to the world through the tasks imposed upon the League of Nations in this respect. This was inded the first real attempt to start an intellectual disarmament. At the 5th session of the League of Nations in 1925 in Paris it was decided to found an institute for intellectual cooperation (cooperation intellectuelle). positions, in the establishment of general committees and sub-committees, of sections and committees of experts, with an incalculable wealth of documents. But nevertheless non of these great efforts led the idealistic impulse and the longing of the nations for a "moral disarmament" and for intellectual cooperation to a sober and concrete legislation which would have imposed legal obligations on the individual states as well as on their nationals. No results were achieved in advising a way in which to prevent during war, hatred, incitement, distortion of facts, and provocation of other nations or of the nationals of other countries in all the possible modern forms of expression. intellectual disarmament as those presented by the Polish Government to the League of Nations in two memoranda of 17 September 1931 and 13 February 1932 had the same fate. These propostions aimed at using national legislation to prohibit any propaganda, insofar as it might become dangerous for peace, and even any propaganda which aimed at a mere disturbance of the good relations between nations. Influence was to be exerted not only upon the big public news media but also upon the vast ramifications in the administration of any modern state, including even the revision of schoolbooks. These propositions which advised member states not to recoil even from censorship and measures of prohibition finally failed because of the paradox existing at that time: These propositions were confronted with the deeply-rooted conception that liberty of expression of opinion in moral matters could not be touched by means of such exceptionally far-reaching police measures; this freedom of expression was to be preserved as an "unalienable right" granted by the Creator. And the matter stopped there with this opposition of fundamental principles:
We have had here in the courtroom a special demonstration of what censorship and control of the press, radio and films could lead to. the Polish propositions of 1931 and 1932 are not worth mentioning here. They restricted themselves solely to certain sectors of propaganda methods, and only for the duration of goo-neighbour relations. Therefore we can only express the hope that on the nasis of international solidarity it will be possible in the future to unite these still contrary theses on a higher level. High Command of the Wehrmacht on 1 October 1938. The latter, in its section for interaction law, had a chart drawn up for the case of an armed conflict. On this chart one was to look up the principles for meeting any possible violation of the rules of warfare by friend and foe. Knowing the legal vacuum in the field of propaganda in its broadest sense, it is stated there that from the point of view of international law it is absolutely permissible to render the opponent contemptible and to try to undermine his strength "regardless of how many lies and falsehoods are used for this purpose", and that even from the legal standpoint a rule could be established for the future to the effect that in case the enemy should employ such propaganda, defense by means of "counter attacks" is legally possible, whereby "naturally the propagation of atrocity lies" must be used. This may sound cynical and brutal. But unfortunately it fitted in with the customs of war, or rather, this undisguised statement originated in the actual legal lacunas existing in internation agreements and in common Dr. Kranzbuehler rightfully stated here: In war thereis no duty to tell the truth. propaganda methods on both sides, we are permitted today to consider the happenings of those days as belonging to history. At that time, too, all belligerents reached the point where they tried to undermine the opponent through the means of propaganda. The legend of children's hands cut off by German soldiers -- a war lie as Arthur Ponsonby proved in his book "Falsehood in War-Time" showed up in a French school-book even in the midst of peace, namely nearly 10 years after the first world war.
Publications of all belligerent countries, drawings and cartoons, dating from the time of the first world war, can be found in abundance in all libraries. Many still remember today the film which showed terrible atrocities and was named: "The Knights of the Apocalypse", a motion picture which circulated almost throughout the entire world at the time fo the forst world war; and unfortunately the matter remained legally unsettled until today.
in his capacity of publicist in the Nazi state, into a new International Law, the creation of which is also one of the goals striven for by Mr. Justice Jacks in this Trial? Can the desire of the Prosecution to see Fritzsche punished as a war criminal be based upon the assertion of a logical development of existing laws when up to now, nothing absolutely nothing has been regulated juridically and legally in the field of propaganda and no fertile beginnings of any kind appeared in this direction? The question here is certainly not that of an only apparent legal loophole. dual crimes were actually incited by means of propaganda. Therefore, I shall now go into the individual accusations of the Prosecution in order to show that Fritsche is not guilty of having committed such acts. starts from the point that any important political and military attack on the part of the German state leadership was preceded by a press campaign. Therefore the Nazi conspirators for that reason would have had used the press also as an instrument of foreign policy and as a feint to cover subsequent aggressive actio From that general, perhaps even correct description of such intentions, the farreaching conclusion is drawn that Fritzsche may also be co-responsible for those matters. Such responsibility would be based only on the time factor that he was in December 1938 to the spring of 1942, the leader of the "German Press division within the official Ministry of Propaganda. But such inference lacks foundation. It could have been justified only if a proof had been found that Fritsche really was the creator and inspirer of all those press campaigns. But Fritzsche, if only due to his subordinate position, subordinate not only in regard to the departmental organization but also in relation to the real leaders of propaganda Hitler, Goebels, Dietrich and others-, could have known only what his superiors presented to him, as to other employees, as historical truth. influence of the foreign policy on the press, always pointed out, that before any political, and especially before military actions, the Foreign Office justified the measures taken in the field of high politics before the public by the issue of white Books, Just as in the case of other intentions or goals of the highest leaders of the Third Reich, the press was informed also in these instances only what the public was permitted to learn, while matters not destined for publication were kept secret.
ganda furnished by Fritzsche and the various military invasions? That could he have known of their background? the chief of the Reich press were given to him only a short time before the decisive step of 15 March 1939. They consisted, as in all other cases, in socalled "Daily Directives" given out at press conferences. Such daily directives found their expression in the headlines of German papers. It may be mentioned here, that the best known organ of the party, namely the "Voelkischerbeobachter' due to its direct connection with the chief of the Reich press - and, during th war, with the headquarters of the Fuehrer, has been more independant of such slogans of the lay since it had a foreign news service of its own. That was printed in the "VoelkischeBeobachter" does hot therefore, represent what had been approved by Fritzsche as leader of the German press. Fritzsche had alreadyand that attitude is of great importance in regard to all of his activities established the principle for his press information namely, that untrue news should never be given to the press.
The apparent reason for that was the fact, that his predecessor in the "German Press" division, Berndt, had all kinds of news spread during the Sudeten crisis, losin thereby the confidence of the leading German writers. Fritzsche on the witness stand as well as the witness von Schirmeister gave details about these matters. by any other officials or officers when the German troops marched into Czechoslovakia. Whatever has been disclosed in this trial about Hitler's hidden intentions of those days, was as little known to Fritzsche as the plan "Fall Gruen" could have been known to him. As head of the inland press, he could not have had any influence on the propaganda possibilities which were to be made use of within Czechoslovakia proper.
The same is true of the Polish campaign: Here, too, Fritzsche did in no way express himself for any armed conflict or spread purposely some information which might have supported any bellicose intentions. In his very radio broadcase of 29 August 1939, which was held against him during his crossexamination, he points out explicitly that there could not in fact exist any serious doubt about the German will for peace. Those and many other lines are particularly significant in proving Fritzsche's good faith. He gave expression to his and the German nation's disappointment that Hitler's repeated emphasis on his will for peace had proved to be a lie; even a fraud. If one examines in their full meaning the other broadcasts by Fritzsche shortly before and during the Polish campaign none of his statements could be interpreted as favoring that war of aggression. The official reasons given at that time convinced Fritzsche as well as millions of other Germans that Right was on their side. That Fritzsche had been sharing such conviction in times is proved by his admission, declared on the witness stand, that he also feels to have been deceived by Hitler.
It was no different in the case of Yugoslavia. Here likewise Fritzsche was able to learn only whatever facts were given to him and to other leading journalists by the chief of the Reich Press, which Fritzsche had no opportunity to verify if only for the speed at which those events were developing, if ever the thought struck him at all that the press was utilized to provoke warlike measures.
made particularly clear during this trial: Already for strategical reasons the total propaganda apparatus thus including Fritzsche, as head of the Inland Press division had to be left in the dark. It was just that campaign, which Goebbels cleverly kept secret by simulating an intended German invasion of England. Goebbels consciously directed even his closest collaborators on that wrong track, as was stated here by the witness von Schirmeister.
Fritzsche's statement, that he did net knew anything about the secret preparations through the formation of a so-called Eastern Ministry was not refuted by the so-called Rosenberg report which was read to him during the cross-examination. This is a document which due to the many names it contains was used also in other connections. At the some time it is the only document, which includes the names of Fritzsche in connection with some secret plans. From that document, which was drafted by Rosenberg and some of his associates according to established facts sometime around the 28th or 29th of June 1941 -thus after the start of the campaign -- no conclusion can be drawn, that Rosenberg spoke with the defendant Fritzsche before the decisive date. The draft does not bear any date or signature. Besides, Fritzsche is mentioned in it by the title of "Ministerial Director" which he was given only in the fall of 1942. Fritzsche's statement on the witness stand has in no way been disproved, namely that he never had been informed by Rosenberg either about an approaching war with the Soviet Union or about an intended formation of a Ministry for the East. Only after the beginning of that campaign and after the official announcement that a new ministry had been established the requests of Rosenberg were transmitted to him by his associates, with regard to the presentation of Eastern problems in the German press.
Thus Fritzsche's deposition still holds that in the case of the war a gains the Soviet Union, as well as in other instances, he had been informed only at the moment when he was given the pertinent news for publication. That would n imply, as should be admitted, that he played, the role of a somehow scheming or at least informed conspirator. And it cannot be assumed that Fritzsche know anything about the plans of the High Command of the Wehrmacht in June 1941 or even of the Bormann Protocol of 16 July 1941 -- both of which were read to him during his cross examination.
Those negotiations show that they could only have taken place in the innermost circle. In this respect the hearing of evidence, which did not concern Fritzsche directly, has shown that even military means of deception had been used to camouflage the plans. This has been stated by the witness Paulus and becomes clear from the report of the German Military Intelligence Service. The nature of all these things was such that they could well be withheld from a newspaper man. Even the witness Gisevius, who after all, was always engaged in finding out secret ends, had to admit what efforts were required even within the High Command of the Wehrmacht to obtain information as to whether Hitler was planning a war or not. of the prosecution that Fritzsche was the accomplice of Goebbels in assisting him to hurl the world into a blood bath of wars of aggression is not justified. When I cross-examined Fritzsche he, on the other hand, pointed out: whatever the facts may have been in the various instances, he and the German public at every moment from the advance into Austria to the invasion of Russia were given only such information as made the necessity of the German actions seem justified. that Fritzsche constantly called on the German people to hold out during the carrying-out of a war of aggression. Naturally, he did not make any defeatist propaganda in the course of his radio speeches. participation in a war of aggression, after the latter broke out, could be considered as participation in the crime against peace and could be punished accordingly.
The French Chief Prosecutor M. de Menthon tried to draw the conclusion -proceeding from a literal interpretation of Article 6, Par. 2a of the Charter, without regard for the real meaning of this article -- that the soldiers and other representatives of the aggressor state could not undertake any military operations at all which could be justified by international law. He had to recognize openly, however, that in practise this idea must lead to impossible consequences.
Thus, for example, he recognized the Hague Convention for the Rules of Land Warfare as a law which not only obligates aggressor and attacked alike, but also justifies them. He thereby let it be clearly recognized by duplication that according to his idea this prescription of the Charter is to be interpreted restrictively.
In Art. 6, Par. 2a of the Charter the following are defined as crimes against peace: "The plan, the preparation, the introduction, and, according to the German translation, the "carrying-cut" of a war of aggression. "Execution" is the translation of the English word "waging". It could be translated more correctly by "undertaking". Undertaking now means in its natural sense about the same as "intend", whoever undertakes pursues, intends something, has not executed it yet. The word "execute" could create the opinion that the crime against peace was not concluded with the outbreak of war and therefore could continue for the whole duration. The result of this conception would be that all the persons, who participated in the war operations, as for instance, the Army leaders, all members of the Armed Forces and beyond that all the persons who supported the war in any way -- even by deliveries of war material and through broadcasted speeches -- were to be punished according to this decision. They had at least contributed support to the waging of war. These persons could even then be criminals against the peace, if before the war they had in no way participated in the planning or preparation of it. Alas, even if they had no idea that an aggression was involved.
To counter this the following must be stated: Only those can be considered as the executors of a war of aggression who had planned it themselves. They just execute their common plan by starting the war, with or without a declaration of war. Thus "execution" ranges on the same level as beginning. The accusation of crime against peace can reach only those who also planned it.
This is supported by the following reasons: i.e. against unlawful wars. At the moment that such unlawful wars start -are "unleashed" as the Indictment puts it -- the rightful domain of peace has been violated, the crime against peace is consummated and accomplished. There fore, no other meaning but "bring about" "proceed to execute the plan" can be attributed to the term "carry through", or "undertake", waging.
concept of "crime against the peace" International Law. For many years, international law has made a distinction between "war crime", in the narrower sense, and "war guilt", in the wider sense. War crimes are offenses against established rules of the law governing warfare, established by agreement or force or custom; against war practices and, going further, also offenses against humanity. War guilt mean being guilty of having brought about war, in particular an unlawful war of a session. treaty after the first World War. A deposition of this is found in Article of the Treaty of Versailles. There can be no doubt that the concept of crime against the peace in the meaning of the Charter is to be identical with this war guilt in the previous meaning of international law. Paragraph 6 part 2a has to deal with the war criminals, that is to say those who bring about an illegal war. likewise a crime against peace, must lead to entirely untenable consequences. Thus, hardly any citizen of a country, which had started a war of aggression would be guiltless. The war in its present form is, unlike any previous one no longer limited to fighting between the armies. It extended -- as has been shown in both these World Wars -- over all the belligerent nations and over a their vital interests. It grew in a total war. Total in this sense, that everybody takes part in it. The woman, who is manking screws in the factory is cooperating equally in this total war. And, as Professor Exner so vividl explained in his final pleading, in this war of aggression every arrestation would mean a deprivation of liberty, each requisition a robbery and each show a murder. It really would be absurd were all members of a nation to be made responsible as authors of crimes against the peace. war would moreover be practically impossible.
collaborating in breaking the peace, whilst the bulk of the people, who had not participated in it, could not be counted in this category. represented in the Indictment. The latter considers the crime of breaking the peace realized by the unleashing (Entfesselung). In no place has it even been hinted that the crime itself or its continuation is seen in participation in war or in its support by production or supply of any kind. Also, according to the drawing up of the indictment from the period of time from the beginning of war onwards, only crimes of the second and third group come into question, also war crimes in the more closely defined sense of International Law, and crimes against humanity. also took the point of view which has been advanced here, whereupon it was pointed out to him in the Session of 1 March 1946: Justice Biddle called his attention to the fact, that at that time he had indicated that the beginning of the war was the character of the crime and not the engagement on war itself, i.e. in other words, that with the beginning of the war of aggression the crime against peace within the meaning of Article 6 Paragraph 2a of the Charter was completed (breach of peace). war which furthers the wax cannot represent a criminal act, neither can the radio broadcasts of Fritzsche, which he made during the war.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 25 July, at 1000 hours.)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit on how until one o'clock without any interruption. directed that he should rewrite it and submit it for the Tribunal's directive that the alleged unfairness of the Versailles Treaty should not be argued.
The argument as now rewritten by Dr. Seidl has been carefully considered by the Tribunal. It still contains many allusions to the unfairness of the Versailles Treaty, irrelevant material, quotations not authorized by the Tribunal and other matters which have nothing to do with the issues before the Tribunal. The Tribunal has therefore deleted the objectionable passages and has directed the general secretary to hand a marked copy containing the deletions to Dr. Seidl The Tribunal directs Dr. Seidl to get in touch with the general secretary's representative.
He will then see the passages which the Tribunal considers objectionable.
Now, Dr. Fritz.
DR. FRITZ ( Counsel for defendant Fritzsche): Mr President, Your Honor: Fritzsche was guilty of a crime against peace. I had concluded that statement. Now I continue on page 32 of my manuscript. characterized by such terms as: incitement against Jews, incitement against foreign nationals, incitement to exploit occupied territories, propaganda for the "master race". mary of the knowledge he gained after the collapse and above all here in the court. It ran as follows: An ideology in whose name five million people were murdered must not be permitted to survive this event.
Now How far did Fritzsche make propaganda for this anti-Semitism? Was he able thereby to forsee this murder, did he approve of it or at least tolerate it? The Prosecution went very far in its assertions. It maintained that Streicher, as "the chief Jew-baiter of all times", could hardly have surpassed Fritzsche in his defamation of Jews Fritzsche defended himself against this accusation, And rightfully in my opinion we see this quite clearly when we compare the slogans from the arsenal of anti-Semitism, which Sir Griffith Jones read for hours in excerpts from the "Stuermer" at the session of 10 January 1946, with Fritzsche's statements submitted here by the Prosecution. Fritzsche supported by the affidavit of Scharping dated 17 May 1946, was able to point out what he undertook against this paper.
It must also be noted here that the language and arguments of the "Sturmer" found no echo in any German newspaper or at a single broadcasting station of the national-socialist regime. All the statements submitted by the Prosecution originated during the war. The are, however, not directed against the Jews as a people or as a race, but are related only to the question of the origin of the war. They mention only occasional polemical introduction of the Jewish question in the propaganda battle which was fought in this war alongside the battle of arms. This explain the fact that the radio addresses submitted by the Prosecution never contain more than casual remarks and never speak of the Jews by themselves. Each of his radio speeches may be examined to this effect. Nor does there exist a speech by him which would have dealt exclusively with the so-called "Jewish problem". He never talked on such a subject. Fritzsche always spoke simultaneously of "Plutocrats", "Bolshevists", "Democrats" and used other such phrases by means of which the propaganda of the Third Reich felt obliged to conduct its battle. During his cross examination as witness he dealt in detail with each of the radio addresses submitted in the trial and discussed the reason he had each time for making merely incidental remarks on this subject. An examination of all of his statements over the radio would show that of all the fundamental propaganda subjects of Nazi-ideology, Fritzsche mentioned and advocated anti-Semitism least of all.
This takes all foundation from the conclusions of the Prosecution. For there cannot be any connection between such rare statements on the part of Fritzsche and the murder order given by Hitler. I therefore expressly protest against the accusation that Fritzsche be considered more guilty than those credulous men who carried out the shootings. and ultra-secret means and methods were used by the really guilty ones to carry out this horrible murder. So many testimonies cannot be put aside as irrevelent and unreliable. Contrary to former assumptions this trial could have made it clear that there existed only a small group of instigators and initiates. It has not been proved in the least that a man like Fritzsche belonged to this closest circle of Hitler's despotism.
The trial has even shown that he made the acquaintance of the majority of his co-defendants here in the dock only. lead, to the assumption that everybody who took a public stand for anti-Semitism as such, if only with reservations, bore the same criminal guilt. The extent of moral guilt is identical with the criminal guilt. And therefore there is no need to discuss here how far a mere error - even a political one - may at the same time become immoral. The accusation, however, of being co-responsible for these murders, was an especially deep blow to Fritzsche. stand very closely to his chief Goebels and to the other heads of the information control, he was yet one of those persons who had access to the foreign press and radio news. This is perhaps the reason why Fritzsche is accused of having had knowledge of almost everything that happened during Hitler's rule. of details, on the point that even with this opportunity his faith was not shaken in the questions which were decisive - perhaps also morally. This no me enabled him to realize actual happenings than his profession of journalist, which gave him the opportunity to follow up for himselfrumours which were appearing. He could not break down by such means the wall which had been erected in front of the misdeeds. as well as von Schirmeister and especially Dr. Scharping, have stated that the examination by the office "Schnelldienst" (express news service) which was carried out in all cases, resulted time and again in official replies which eliminated doubts as to the inaccuracy of such statements from abroad, This office, he "Deutscher Schnelldienst" (German express news service) - which had an entirely different significance from that claimed by the Prosecution-- was a control agency created especially by Fritzsche in order to have foreign news tested as to the truth of its contents through inquiry at the competent German official agencies. If the Defense had succeeded in submitting the records of this "Schnelldienst" to the Tribunal, documentary evidence could have been offered, in every detail for the way in which German authorities answered inquiries of this kind.
credible. The foreign propaganda which had to serve a definite purpose could on the contrary lay no claim to any great power of persuaison. This all the more since enemy propaganda in war time also brought of course positively incorrect reports, of which fact Fritzsche was often able to convince himself. "Master Race". regard to this point, shows clearly that Fritzsche neither championed nor promoted such an idea, that on the contrary, he expressly rejected it. An examination of the quotation presented by the Prosecution does not leave any doubt about it. Beyond that the hearing of evidence -- the witness von Schirmeister and the affidavit of Dr. Scharping -- has shown that Fritzsche prohibited the use of the word "master race" for press and radio altogether. Fritzsche himself under oath termed this assertion nonsensical, Therefore, after thorough examination of all obtainable speeches by Fritzsche I can only state that his charge is untrue. Nothing is changed in regard to this statement by the fact that Foss and Stable judged differently without giving any concrete facts. I have already dealt with the value of those documents as evidence. from two of Fritzsche's radio addresses which were held on 5th and 10th July 1941. In order to be able to understand correctly the circumstances surrounding the speeches, one must take into consideration the dates on which they were held, They were made shortly after the attack on the Soviet Union, He is not charged with any further statements - made for instance at a later time or similar ones which might have shown some kind of system. When the passages cited by the Prosecution were supplemented by the full text of the speeches and by the examination of Fritzsche on the witness stand, it was shown that Fritzsche did not slander the Soviet Union in them. Neither could what had led up to these speeches have given him any reason to stir up hatred against that country. They were held shortly after German sources and in particular war correspondents had reported atrocities in towns in Galicia which had been conquered by German troops These were things which were reported everywhere in Germany--and also by foreign correspondents--in print, pictures and motion pictures.