And he worked in the same way continuously for the release of about 8,000 prominent Czechs who were arrested at the beginning of the war. As proved by his own testimony to the truth by the Czech witnesses Bienert, Krejci, and Havelka, not even by Frank or by another higher SS or police chief in the Protectorate, but by Berlin directly. It is due, by the way, to the defendant that in 1941 the order Hitler issued at Frank's and Himmler's instigation for the removal and arrest of the then Czech Prime Minister General Elias was rescinded by Hitler because of his personal intervention. Only after he had left was Elias arrested by Heydrich and later condemned to death by the peoples court. that the defendant had arranged for the transportation of Czech workers into the Reich, that is, deported Czech workers by force into Germany. It is rather true that, during the whole term of office of the defendant not a single Czech worker was deported by force to Germany. laborers had yet taken place in any territory occupied by Germany. That happened later. But many Czech laborers voluntarily and gladly went to the Reich and accepted jobs there, as they earned, owing to the established currency exchange rate and to higher wages, much more than in Prague, and could send to their relatives in the Protectorate very important parts of their earnings. with the sending by the Gestapo of arrested persons to concentration camps, and with the ill-treatment committed there on those individuals, then it must be established with the utmost decision that until September 27th 1941 the end of the official activity of the defendant in the Protectorate, there was not even a single concentration camp in the Protectorate. They had all been established under his successor only, after his departure. They decree too, concerning security and preventive custody, which the Czech Prosecu-tion appears to charge him with too, has, as shown by the copy annexed to the Czech report (USSR 60), been issued but after his departure, but that was on March 9th 1942.
measures taken by the defendant against the Jews, in this point too the representation of the Indictment does not fit the facts and is shown to be erroneous on closer examination of the documents submitted by the Prosecution itself.
Of all the 21 decrees contained in the British document Book No. 12-B, only 4 have been signed by the defendant himself, 6 have been issued by the Reich Ministry directly, and 10 by Secretary of State Frank, or his direct subordinates Dr. von Burgsdorff, 1 by the Czech State President Hacha. which contained nothing by the introduction of the regulations concurring treatment of Jewish property valid for the entire German Reich into the Protectorate, which, since March 16th 1939, was a part of the German Reich too, had been presecribed to the defendant from Berlnnat the very beginning of his assuming of office. The fact, he ever, that it was publshed on June 21st 1939, 3 months Later, proves the correctness of his statement, that he wanted to give the Jews time to prepare themselves for the introduction of the Jewish legislation, as in force throughout the Reich. Its postponement to that day took place in the vary interests of the Jews. 1940, only prescribed an obligation to declare securities, i.e. mortgages which were Jewish property, and corresponded to the decrees of the some or similar kind issued in the German Reich too and which were applicable to all German nationals. well as the 4th, of September 14th 1940, aimed at rendering possible and facilitating Jewish emigration, as clearly shown by their contents, an emigration which the development of happenings in the Reich had made inevitable. Both decrees had accordingly been issued in the interests of the Jews themselves, and prove that the defendant had no anti-Semitic views.
All the documents submitted by me which refer to this matter, especially the newspaper report concerning the boycott of the Jews in the spring of 1933 doc.
book I Nr. 9 - and the submitted depositions of witnesses, show that He did not approve of the measures taken against the Jews, particularly of the violent ones, but opposed them. As shown especially by the deposition of the witness, Dr. Koepcke, such measures would have been in contradiction with his completely Christian and human attitude and ideology. It is a matter of fact that until his departure from Prague not a single synagogue had been closed, and that no religious restrictions against the Jews have been decreed. It doesnot need any particular proof that the defendant cannot be made responsible for the 6 ordinances issued by the Reich Ministry of the Interior. But neither does he bear any responsibility for the decrees signed by Frank and by Herr v. Burgsdorff, in view of the independent position of Secretary of State Frank and the competence of the police concerning all matters Jewish, which 1 have described. In opposition to the assertions of the indictment it must be particularly emphasized that, according to his own sworn deposition, no persecution of the Jews has occured during his entire tenure of office. the assertions of the Czech report of September 1945 - Nr. 993-PS - concerning an allegedhostillty of the defendant against the Church appear from the beginning as hardly likely. make this report an object of an accusation, but, nevertheless, I should like to speak about it in a short way. It is proven by evidence that the relations between Herr von Neurath and the Archbishop of Prague have been very good , even friendly, and that the latter hasexplicitly thanked the defendant for his support of the churches, and this would certainly hot have been the case if he had been opposed to the Church of if he had suppressed the churches, their organizations and clergymen or persecuted them in any way. It is certainly not an extraordinary occurrance that theremay have beendifferences in administrative matters, as has obviously been the case according to theletter of the Archbishop subm tted by the prosecution State and Church always have had differences with one another at all times and in all countries - but this canot be construed asimplying, on the defendant's side, a policy opposed to the Church.
It may be right that clergymen have been arrested, but firstly those arrests have been ordered net by the defendant, but by the police, which was not under his control, and secondly - insofar the defendant has known of them at all - not, because of any church activity, but because of political intrigues. Neither is it clear from the mentioned Czech report whether the alleged actions against the Church, its organizations, and ministers have actually taken place curing the defendant's tenure of office. The evidence has shown that he did not decree any anti-ecclesiastical or anti-religious measures, pilgrimages to theCzech religions relics e. g. were especially permitted by him. charged with any offense against Czech national-feeling. In contrast to the statement of the prosecution he did not destroy or close any Massarikhouses, nor did he destroy or remove any monuments of national personalities, as the prosecution would like to reproach him with. Insofar as the Massarik-houses were closed, the SS and the police which were not under his jurisdiction, are exclusively responsible for it. His attitude towards the Czech national-feeling is best illustrated by the factthat he especially permitted the deposition of wreaths at the foot of Massarik-monuments. spite of all efforts node in that direction by radical elements. The Czech theater-line was not touched and remained free, as well as Czech literature, which was not suppressed or encorached upon with the natural exception of forbidding such things that were of an anti-German or revolting character. Also the press, which by the way was not controlled and c ensured by him, but by the Reich Ministry for Propaganda, was not submitted to other limitations than the German press, as all in all the defendant's efforts were directed towards conserving and encouraging Czech national cultural life in its characteristic qualities and independence. I believe it is not necessary for me to go still further into details about that subject and that I can confine myself with referring to the defendant's own statements and the, statements of the German witnesses heard on this subject.
From these statements it will however, also be clearly seen what difficulties and resistance from certain radical circles andauthorities, and not least from his own Under Secretary Frank, he was up against in his above mentioned efforts and in all his policy towards the Czech people.
say that his entire life in Prague was one single fight against the forces inspired andled by Himmler, a fight that was the more difficult because he did not actually possess full powers in the Protectorate, and the offices and authorities which were themost important and influential ones in the field of home politics, the entire police and Gestapo, were not under his authority. Nevertheless he did not abandon this fight, and he did not get tired of protesting to Hitler repeatedly and demanding redress, in many cases successfully, inothers, not. He fought up to thevery end, and did not let himself be discouraged by failures and remained faithful to his policy of reconciliation and settlement, of pacification and conservation of theCzech people and of its national characteristics. And when he had to recognize, in Autumn 1941, here again, that any further fight was hopeloss, that Himmler's influence on Hitler was greater than his own and that Hitler had now decided to change over to a policy of force and terror and to send to Prague for the purpose, Heydrich who was known as a bloodhound, he immediately drew his conclusions as in the winter of 1937/38 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and resigned.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be a convenient time to recess.
(A recesswas taken)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit in open session on Saturday morning until one o'clock.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: He left Prague and finally retired to private life. What an impression this resignation made on the Czech people and even in circles hostile to Germany, and what people took it to mean, follows with a clarity which can hardly be surpassed from the fact that the Czech report USSR 60 -- which was truly not dictated by pro-German sentiments or love for my client, characterized this departure of my client as a "geheeriger Schlag" in the German text, "a heavy blow" in the English text; a fact which fundamentally disavows its own accusations against Herr von Neurath. And in fact I believe I have proved that, during and as a result of his administration, the defendant was not guilty personally of a single crime against humanity punishable under the Charter of this Court and only such a crime could, after all, come into question here. the defendant rendered himself guilty of supporting or aiding Hitler and his helpers -- in a manner punishable under the Charter -- in committing their crimes by accepting the office of Reich protector and by keeping it, in spite of the war launched by Hitler a few months after his assumption of office, and in spite of the events in November 1939, and several other occurrences. The prosecution answers this question in the affirmative. But can an objective, unprejudiced judgment of things really answer this question in the affirmative? from the defendant himself and from the witnesses question on the subject by me and from the affidavits presented. that time to enter Hitler's government and remain in it, just as little did such reasons enter into his acceptance of the Reich Protectorate. Evidence for this is found in the fact alone that he declined the endowment which Hitler had intended for his 70th birthday in 1943; and when this was nit possible, he had this endowment placed in his bank, as I have proved to you through the letter from his bank -- Document book V, No. 160 and 161 -- and never touched one penny of it.
attracted or much less suited him can unmistakably be seen from his letter of 14 October 1939 to the witness Dr. Koepke -- Document V, No. 1 -- in which he calls it an absolute prison.
In both cases, as has been proved not only by the defendant's own statements, but also by the statements of all the witnesses and documents which I have introduced, the motive and the reason for the acceptance of his position and his endurance in it was not perchance that he approved of the ideologies of the Nazi regime with all its methods and wanted to support them; to the contrary, his high ethical and moral convictions which sprang from his deep sense of responsibility towards his people as man and statesman -- these caused him to do it. Since he was not in the position and had not the power to remove Hitler and the Nazi Government, he considered it as his duty, at least in his small sphere within the compass and limits of his power in the field under his leadership, to fight the Nazi tendencies which he also despised and to prevent their materialization as far as his strength permitted.
Can one, so I ask, really reproach Herr von Neurath for this; can one condemn him because the task he had assumed with a sense of moral duty and a consciousness of responsibility was beyond his strength and he was frustrated by it? prejudices, from all the retrospective considerations of things with their in any case very uncertain deductions, and think yourselves into the soul of this man, into the world of thought, into the conception of life of this man. Brought up in the house of his parents which was filled not only with Christian, humane and decent ideas, but also with the sense of responsibility towards its German people. various governments, first under the imperial, then under the changing governments of the republic. Without caring for their political trends, without asking whether they were conservative, democratic or social-democratic, he had served them; he carried out the tasks assigned to him in his sphere of labor. As diplomat, as official of the Reich's Foreign Service, the field of internal politics was remote from him. He considered it his only duty to serve his people as such, regardless of its momentary governments and their innerpolitical attitude.
And thus, much against his personal wishes, upon Hindenburg's call in the hour of distress, he took over the Foreign Ministry and thereby entered the government of the Reich and remained in it also after Hitler was appointed, not as the representative of a certain political party, but as Hindenburg's special confidant in the field of Foreign Politics. He was the guarantor of the Reich's peace-policy, the rock of bronze in this field. not permit him to do anything else than to remain at his post when he was drawn into the whirl and dynamics of the National Socialist movement and had to see how this movement turned in directions and made use of means which he too could only condemn.
But exactly as was the case with other respectable and patriotic German? whose sense of responsibility and duty to their own people had driven then to the decision to remove Hitler and the Nazi-regime by force, so it was with the defendant whose sense of responsibility and sense of duty not only towards himself, but also towards his people, forced him to set aside his personal abhorrence of the immorality of this regime and, by remaining in office and continuing to conduct it according to his principles, to fight actively against this immorality and thus to keep it away, at least, from the section controller by him and to protect his German people from this immorality of the Nazi-regime and its consequences, namely war, as long as he had this possibility. came to him again to accept a position, this time as Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, and Hitler declared to him that he had expressly selected him form this position because he considered him the only suitable person to carry cut his intended policies of a conciliation and reconciliation of the Czech people with new conditions and the German people, the very same sense of duty and responsibility forced him to follow this call, for, would he not have to deduce from the fact that Hitler -- spite of knowing about his declining attitude toward the National Socialist regime, his policies and hits expedients desired to entrust him with this task, that he really and honestly meant to effect a reconciliation and appeasement of the Czech people?
of the highest benefit to his own, but also to the foreign people, at ask which was not only to serve the-conciliation of two nations, but also the ideal of humanity and Christian brotherly love, as well as to protect the Czech people from the pernicious methods of the Nazi-regime.
And now I ask: Is It not least just as moral and ethical to pledge one' self and one's person for such a goal, to actively, if only to a limited extend work against this regime, recognized as immoral and corrupt by a cooperation, outwardly appearing as such, to prevent the use of the expedients of this system, and thereby saving innocent people from misery and death, as to grumblingly retreat because of personal aversion and to watch inactively how this regime rages against humanity without restraint? force against the hated system and its executors. And do not forget, your Honors, that at that time, under Hitler's autocratic regime, only these two possibilities existed, to work really actively and positively against the nazi-regime and its terror. Under this regime no other possibilities existed to fight against a hated and accessed government, as this is the case in democratic free countries with free and independent selected parliaments. In Hitler-Germany any form of active or even public opposition only meant a completely useless sacrifice. and in answering my question, separate yourselves from the democratic conditions and circumstances which are so familiar to you, but which are completely incomparable with the German conditions under Hitler at that time, a fact, the non-consideration of which has already caused some disaster up to date. thousands of people whose freedom and lives would have been irretrievably lost without him, especially by accepting the office of the Reich Protector, and which he kept, despite the fact that he had to realize that he could not accomplish this task without being guilty himself, that he did not have at his service the necessary means for its accomplishment, but that, in spite of it, continued his fight against the terror of the Nazi regime? Is this not worth a thousand times, is it not more, much more and ethical, than if he had retired right away, full of abhorrence and moral indignation?
first question, and to express my conviction that one one can condemn me for this Or shall a Sophoclean tragedy be unfolded before us, here in the fate of the defendant, in which a man becomes guilty, owing to no fault of his own, because he obeyed his conscience and his sense of responsibility? that not one of the actions of which the prosecution accuse my client is criminal in the sense of the Charter, and that not one of these actions by the defendant aimed intentionally at committing a crime in the sense of the Charter of this high Tribunal; that, in other words, there is no criminal action either objectively or subjectively. But I believe I have shown also, over and above this, that all my client's actions in their totality aimed at just the opposite of what the prosecution imputes to the---namely, not the perpetration, but the prevention of just such actions as the Charter defines as punishable crimes, be they crimes of planning, preparation or the waging of aggressive wars, be they crimes or crimes against humanity. to allthat, how impossible, how paradoxical even the principles of the conspiracy are with regard to my client, for the conspiracy has for its indispensabl supposition that each participant not only wants the criminal objective, but also that he, upon entering into the conspiracy, by his participate on, sanction, or will sanction from the start the preparatory actions or those in any way connected with it of the other members. this as evidence of approving the criminal objective and all preparatory actions for its achievement by each one of the other members in their official capacity -- in international law proven alone by the fact of simply accepting or remaining in office in spite of knowing the criminal aims -- and for this fact alone institutes a criminal co-responsibility of each individual, the consequence inexorably follows with forceful logic, that the application of the principle of co-responsibility due to the acceptance, of an office or of simply staying therein, without consideration as to the extent of his decent and ethics reasons, not only calls for motives and purposes for the punishment of the one who disapproves these criminal intentions, plans and actions of the others, but even fights it actively, and for this reason only accepted his appointment or remained in his position, as it was the case with the defendant von Neurath.
not only natural, but also legal sense and thought, that it is contrary to that which this high Tribunal has to strive for and is striving for, that it is contrary to any moral and ethical postulate. This Tribunal not only represents Justice, the legal and ethical conscience of all civilized nations on earth, but ought to show the way to universal Peace to the coming generations. Only then can this task be fulfilled, when you show manking once more that any generalization, any levelling, any treatment including judgment and conviction, of people and of their activities, based on corporative, I should like to say, even gregarious concepts, and not on the personality, the will and the designs of tie individual, is of evil. Such treatment denies the holiness of the individual and is bound to lead to the adoration of mere might. And such adoration of might, such belief in might, has actually been the deep cause of the terrible events which once more have been unrolled here. chastisement should be applied according to divine and humane law, and at the same time to show manking the way to international peace -- if by your sentence you take away from manking the belief in might and give back, instead of this belief, to all nations on earth and, not in the least, to the German nation, the belief in and the respect of the holiness of the individual, which the Lord once created in his image. Convinced by the truth of such knowledge, I now place with confidence the fate of my client the defendant Baron von Neurath, in your hands.
THE PRESIDENT: I now call on Dr. Fritz on behalf of the defendant Fritzsche.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, the result of the evidence in the case of Fritzsche is a relatively clear one. Although I am one of the last to plead, it cannot be avoided to go into legal problems more closely. Above all these problems arise from the fact that Fritzsche was characterized by the prosecution in a particularly striking manner as an accomplice. Propaganda Ministry and what part he played in the German propaganda in general. It is those facts which ought to be conclusive in determining what part he supposedly played in the alleged conspiracy.
At the beginning of the trial, Mr. Albrecht submitted as evidence the organizational structure of the government of the Third Reich as of March, 1945, in the form of a diagram. Mr. Albrecht admitted himself that Fritzsche's name did not appear in it in the provision of one of the main leaders of the Propaganda Ministry. It is true, he added, that his importance had been greater than one would be led to think from his position as shown on this diagram. He closed his statement by saying that evidence to this effect would be submitted to the Tribunal. Fritzsche had greater importance? as evidence a "compilation of the elements of guilt" which in a particularly impressive manner demonstrates in how far the individual defendants are connected with the facts of which they are to be guilty in the opinion of the prosecution. The classification of the individual defendants follows from the table which is attached to this compilation as Appendix A. The Tribunal will have noticed that the defendant Fritzsche is the only one not to appear on this table at all. from this follows that he does not belong to any of the organizations which are to be declared criminal here. submitted in Brief E by the prosecution also shows especially clearly that even in his last position as ministerial director and chief of the broadcasting division he was only one of twelve officials of the same rank.
Such a position in itself excludes a priori the assumption thathe could have determined the policy of the principles of news presentation and the principles of what may or may not become known to Germany and the world. It is true Captain Sprecher pointed out -- evidently in order to raise Fritzsche's importance -- that the chief of the German press division held a "unique" position, buthe did not pass over the fact in silence that he had predecessors and successors in this allegedly unique office. of the broadcasting division, he did not obtain a higher position in the civil service heirarchy as a result of it. His activity was purely administrative. It concerned technical-organizational questions. In his affidavit of 7 January, 1946, my client describes the administrative work connected with it. He also mentions his numerous predecessors. Did it occur to anybody to indict also these persons as major war criminals or to call then supreme commanders of a propaganda instrument? Since this is not the case, the conclusion must probably be drawn that it was not Fritzsche'. official position which formed the basis for the indictment. organizations under indictment here, not all administrativecivil service employees and division chiefs or state officials have been included as a whole; only the Reich Cabinet was named. Therefore, it can also not be imputed to Fritzsche -- as is allegedly possible in the case of the members of the organizations -- that from his position alone and the close connection of the individual members of the organizations it follows that they must have known and been completely dear about the plans of the alleged conspiracy by virtue of their membership alone.
During Fritzsche's cross examination, an attempt was also made by the Russian prosecution to magnify Fritzsche's position. It introduced three protocols as evidence, namely the interrogations of the witnesses Schoerner, Foss, and Stahel. However, these documents did not produce any supporting evidence. It is true that those depositions were only used to hold isolated passages from them against the defendant.
Because of this limitation, I could forego the cross examination of the three persons who signed these protocols. But Fritzsche did not fail to express his opinion on these passages which were hold up to him while he was being questioned on the witness stand. In this connection I have to point to only one more thing: These three persons did not even claim to have had any insight into the internal organization of the Propaganda Ministry. None of the three depositions contains any definite statement of Fritzsche's. On the contrary, these depositions contain more judgments, judgments which we do not want to know from witnesses, especially not in a case where they cannot furnish any kind of substantial facts. For this reason alone, their value as evidence must be denied. But aside from that aspect, they represent completely wrong judgments. They can by no means be derived from Fritzsche's own statements which were submitted in this trial by the prosecution - namely from his radio addresses. judgments could have been submitted, then, in view of the fact that the prosecution could have obtained oil of his radio addresses, it would have been more to the point to submit here those statements made by him which would have enabled the Tribunal to form its own judgment. the transcripts of the interrogations only contain the shortly summarizing statement that Fritzsche was Goebbels' "deputy". I confronted the witness yon Schirmeister with this assertion and he termed it as pure nonsense. Fritzsche had to say the same on the witness stand. There can be no doubt that the concurring testimony of both witnesses is correct. Finally, there are still hundreds of others who formerly worked in this ministry who could verify the truthfulness of these statements with their own knowledge.
I can state therefore that the attempt at enlarging Fritzsche's position contrary to the facts given in the organizational chart of the Propaganda Ministry as submitted by Mr. Albrecht - is a complete failure. the creator of the great control apparatus for the German press, as was furthermore claimed by the prosecution. On the contrary, it was Dr. Goebbels and others of his associates.
Fritzsche could not have been the creator because of the time element alone. became a consultant (Referent) and it was only since the winter of 1938/39 that he was one of the twelve division chiefs of the ministry. When he become chief of the German press division, the policy of the press was set by Reich Press Chief Dr. Dietrich. As has been said already, he became chief of the broadcasting division only in November 1942 and could not create anything fundamentally new there. Neither Goebbels nor Dietrich over allowed the control of the German press and radio to be taken out of their hands. With regard to the details I want to refer to the testimony of the witness von Schirmeister. press division nor a leader of the German propaganda as for as it emanated officially from the ministry, is also shown by the other numerous statements both by Fritzsche, when questioned about it on the witness stand, and by the witness von Schirmeister. authority to give orders in these fields, and could not have had it owing to his rank in civil service, which would justify his being called the creator or leader of the press and radio in the Third Reich. On the contrary between Dr. Goebbels, Dr. Dietrich and him there were quite a number of other higher intermediary posts. In this connection I can also refer to what Lieutenant Meltzer stated in general about the importance of a state secretary in the Reich Propaganda Ministry and a Reich Press Chief Then he referred to an affidavit by Amann on 19 December 1945; He pointed out that the holders of these positions exercised complete control over the news service in Germany. Fritzsche never hold any of those positions. Incident lly, the Propaganda Ministry did not have only one, but three state secretaries. Besides, D.r Goebbels had surrounded himself with a ministry Staff (Ministeramt). I believe it is appropriate to point here to this low rank because the prosecution thought, as it did in other cases, for instance in the case of the defendant Goering, to be able t o conclude a special responsibility from a high rank, i.e. from a defendant's external position alone.
Therefore, one can by no means start from the assumption that Fritzsche exerted any decisive influence upon propaganda in general and upon the politics which were pursued by the press and radio. news system involved him only as a journalist and expert. They had nothing to do with the contents of the propaganda which was pursued by the state leadership. In this respect, too, he was only a person who carried out directives. It is true that he set up the technical organization of the journalist news offices. He thereby modernized and perfected them. It is also true that this news system played an important part later in the war. In that respect Fritzsche's work extended only over the period from 1953 to 1936. But it is a fact that in those years he did not have the least influence upon the contents and political trend of the news, particularly in view of the fact that he was a more employee at that time.
I make these references to Fritzsche's official position within the Propaganda Ministry also for another reason. In admitting what he did and said and wanting to assume full responsibility for it - Fritzsche had an opportunity to explain in detail the cause for and contents of all the excerpts from his radio addresses submitted to him - he cannot, on the other hand, answer for theses which were championed by other offices of the state propaganda apparatus - also for those in his own Ministry. All the less can he answer for the unorganized propaganda of the party. Fritzsche described the various controlled and uncontrolled kinds of propaganda of the Third Reich and pointed out their effects. May I remind the Tribunal that the witnessvon Schirmeister testified to the effect that oven Goebbels could not do anything with the "party doctrines" and the "myth" in the field of propaganda. According to the witness, Goebbels did not regard them as things with which to lure the masses. when the defendant Speer mentioned the secret agitation about the miracle weapons, he could point to other sources of unorganized party propaganda. For all that, Fritzsche does not bear any responsibility. His official position was not influential enough to be able to fight effectively against all faulty conditions and abuses.
Therefore, his repeated attempt to have the " Stuermer" prohibited 24 July A LJG 20-1 propaganda - remained without success.
The party propaganda with all its practical consequences, played a much more important part than that which Fritzsche with his comparatively limited functions could ever have played. I recall the fact, that according to Fritzsche's testimony, even Dr. Goebbels was afraid of Bormann. This was explained by the portentious sentence according to which, it was not the state which had to give orders to the party, but inversely the party to the state. the witness von Schirmeister - has thus shown, without any doubt, that the decisive directives for the propaganda of the third Reich come from other agencies. Goebbels, with regard to whom Fritzsche kept his distance personally, did not allow any of the subordinate officials in his Ministry to interfere with his plans. It has been seen that he carried out his plans with the authority of his position, with the adroitness of his arguments, which the world knows, and if necessary, by means of fraud. The leadership of the German press policy - let us consider only this narrow sphere - was and remained in the hands of Dr. Goebbels and Dr. Dietrich. The same thing happened with the radio as the witness von Schirmeister has stated, when Fritzsche took over its direction in November 1942. Dr. Goebbels, one of the oldest and closest of Hitler's collaborators, and Dr. Dietrich, Hitler's permanent escort - during the war he was present almost uninterruptedly in his headquarters taken out of their hands, especially by a man, who like Fritzsche, had no connections of any kind to Hitler, and had not even had a single conference with him. ultimately, Hitler's will was decisive here, too. importance here whether it was due to Hitler, Goebbels or Dietrich, - other governmental agencies too successfully exercised on the press and radio.
Here I will mention the Foreign Office, 24 July A LJG 20-2 the High Command of the Wehrmacht and other ministries, the heals of which were much more closely connected with the three aforementioned personages than, for instance, Fritzsche.
out that the assertion of the indictment that Fritzsche was closely connected with the party propaganda apparatur, e.g., with the so-called Reich Press Agency of the NSDAP, has been expressively withdrawn by the prosecution in the course of the trial. with this, I think that I have sufficiently established the limits of the defendant's responsibility. This definition shows the inaccuracy of the widely spread opinion that Fritzsche occupied a very important and influential position in the "gigantic propaganda apparatus" of the Third Reich. This limitation not only takes into account the legal but also the moral facts, which have been clearly exposed by the production of evidence. the reproach that Fritzsche was a member of the alloyed conspiracy The prosecution has repeatedly tried to incorporate Fritzsche's work, at its different stages, in the alloyed group of conspirators and has drawn from it conclusions which go so far as to say that Fritzsche was also responsible for war crimes, for crimes against humanity and even for crimes against peace. Already in the arguments of the indictment these attempts seemed to have little relevant justification. it is certainly no improper criticism, if I declare here, that it caused the prosecution a certain embarassment to display Fritzsche's subordinate position as an official, as so important and full of meaning. Today, now that the hearing of evidence is complete, it seems to me, that the attempts to include Fritzsche in the circle of conspirators has miscarried. Hitler discussed any plans or actions with the closer or wider circle of his collaborators. And apart from this, he never actually took part either in any discussions which might have 24 July A LJG 20-3 been capable of plunging the world into a blood bath of wars of aggression.
He was neither an " old party fighter" nor was he "decorated" later on with the golden party badge. He did not belong, as I had to emphasize especially, to any of the organizations which are to be declared here as criminal. Up to the end he fulfilled the functions of an official in a ministry and received directives like any other official. He could never he a political advisor. the alleged conspiracy could have been spanned only by the person of Dr. Goebbels. The witness von Schirmeister has repudiated such an assumption. According to his testimony, Fritzsche did not even belong to the closer circle around Dr. Goebbels. Indeed, von Schirmeister could even state that Fritzsche often had to apply to him because he could not get Dr. Goebbels' opinion on any question other than through him, as he was Dr. Goebbels' personal press assistant. The relations through the state secretaries - e.g. Dr. Dietrich, Dr. Naumann, to mention only a few - also involved certain difficulties. That is not the method by which conspirators usually communicate. was out of question that Fritzsche could ever have embarked on an exchange of ideas with Dr. Goebbels with a view to forming plans. Now, it would have been the task of the prosecution to prove to the defendant Fritzsche where his participation in the conspiracy can be seen. I say that one cannot consider any count of the indictment as proved.
I think that it was not Fritzsche's official position at all which led to the bringing of an indictment against him. I rather assume that the latter is solely to be traced back to his broadcast speeches which made him and his name known - but only during the war - both in Germany and perhaps also in a part of the rest of the world.
A ll the serious charges levelled against him lead back 24 July A LJG 20-4 therefore, only to those addresses.
The other assertions concerning his position within the state or party apparatus are only based on assumptions or combinations without any factual basis, as appears for example especially clearly from the purely personal and refuted judgments of Schoerner, Foss and Strahel. But his name has only become so well known, because of the technical means he utilized. Only the great significance of the radio for the modern transmission of news made him appear in a special light. But because of this, it shall not be argued that he thus had a great influence on the German people. Out of our own experiences of Nazi-ruled Germany, I can well say that every Gauleiter, many a district leader (Kreisleiter), used a much mere far-reaching language. But, as a rule, the speeches of the latter were only published by the local press. insofar as they could not be made available with their entire wording. Unfortunately, the excerpts quoted during the crossexamination by the Russian prosecution could not be complemented either by the entire text of the respective speech. Thus, all possibility disappeared of reproducing the sense the respective address had at the time it was delivered. Later on, I will come back to this and give an example of it. The method of sumbitting only individual passages or quotations to the Tribunal, is here especially inadequate because it is impossible to see from it that in his speeches Fritzsche always put the events of the day in the foreground. It was only rarely and incidental that he drew any general ideological conclusions. But already from what Fritzsche has stated with regard to these of his discourses, which the prosecution was able to produce in their entire text, there results a completely different picture as to the cause and motives of his broadcast speeches. From 1932 - thus already before the seizure of power by National-Socialism - up to 1939, the latter were nothing but a political press review. And that is what they were called! Accordingly, they were a collection of quotations from domestic and foreign newspapers.