For this decree unequivocally expresses that the German Security Police, and thereby also the Gestapo, was not subordinated to the Reich Protector. This is already evident purely outwardly from the fact that the decree completely separates both departmental spheres - Administration and police - by dealing in part 1 with the building up of a German administration in the Protectorate subordinated to the Reich Protector and dealing in part 11 completely separately with the German Security Police. This Security police is not under the juris diction of the Reich Protector but, as was already reserved in Article V, par 5 of the decree of 16 March 1939, is taken over by the administration of the Reich itself, that is to say, it receives its orders direct from the Chief of Police in Berlin, i,e. Himmler and in part also by the interpolation of the highest SS and Police Chief in Prague. For the relations of the police with the Reich Protector, the second sentence of paragraph 11 is authoritative. Its wording is as follows: "The organs of the German Security police are to collect and exploit the results of their investigations, in order to notify the Reich Protector and his subordinated offices accordingly about important events and to keep him informed and Reich him suggestions." influence the activities of the police in any form whatsoever. He could not oppose their orders, wmanating from Berlin, prior to their execution: quite a page from the fact that he never got to see them and had no authority to oppose them either. He had but one claim and that was to be subsequently informed by the police about measures already taken by them and even that happened - as was proved by the evidence - only in the rarest cases. He did not have the right or the possibility to Issue orders to the police himself. different attitude of Frank as compared to Herr v. Neurath's the sharpest diffences and contradictions were inevitably bound to result. For Frank, as a Sudet German and one of the leaders of the Sudeten Germans was filled with hatred and revenge against anything that was Czech. He did not want to hear of a reconcile tion or an undrstanding between the German and the Czech peoples, and gave free rein to this anti-Czech frame of mind of his from the first day of his activity.
activity of the police was actually slight, so that these opposing viewpoints were not so apparent. Herr v. Neurath could consequently assume that this opposition would gradually diminish and that Frank would conform to his wishes and aspirations and would show himself to be accomodating and he, the defendant, did not yet recognize the necessity of exerting a lawfully founded influence upon the police through Frank, when, however, he finally had to realize - from the gradually increasing activity of the police and their excesses - that his expectations were not being fulfilled, he protested to Hitler orally and by letter, time and time again - as confirmed by the testimony of the witnesses Dr. Voelckers and von Holleben - and implored him to alter this ominous state of affairs and to subordinate the police to him, and him only.
However, all Hitler's promises and assurance proved false, and the subordination of the police to Herr von Neurath did not take place.
Yet, he did not want to reliquish the fight so soon, nor despair of the task taken over by him. Now more than ever he wanted to try to impose his ideas and policy, and, should he have been successful, at least to diminish and alleviate subsequently the consquences and harshness of the measures taken by the police in general and individually. That, for this purpose, he had the most detailed account given to him personally in all cases of measures and action taken by the police, such as arrests and othe excesses in so far as he recieved information about them, mostly from Czech sources, and that, wherever he could, he exerted his influence for the release of arrested persons and other mitigations is evidence from the testimony of all witnesses produced by me, above all, from the testimony of Dr. Voelckers, who, as Head of the defendants Office, was continually engaged in receiving such complaints. themselves, such as the notes of the defendant about his conference with President Hacha of 26 March 1940 - App.5 to supplemtn No. 1 USSR 60 - and even from the testimony of Bienert, added to the special accusation, who himself was arrested by the police and again released in a very short time upon the intervention of the defendant. submitted during the hearing of evidence, the testimony of all witnesses corresponds on the question of responsibility of the defendant for the measures taken by the police.
At his interrogation on 30 May 1945 - Doc book V Mr. 153 Frank said, quote: "The police, however, was not under the control of the Reich Protectorate. Both, Gestapo and Security police, received their directions and orders directly from the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in Berlin. Frank's statement of 5 May 1945 concerning the students' riots - Doc. book V No. 152 - is also typical for the manner in which the police received its instruction directly from Berlin leaving out the Reichprotectorate. Frank speaks therein of the report about the first demonstrations, he had sent to Berlin and in which he had asked for instructions and had received them directly from the Fuhrer's headquarters through the Security Police in Prague, to Which they were sent by Berlin directly and he, Frank, received them from there.
There is no mentioning whatever of the person or even of the office of the Reich Protectorate during the entire proceedings, it is an internal affair of the police taking in Frank, the leader of the higher SS and police. Because of the importance of this point, I would like to refer explicitly to the statements, made by the witnesses von Burgsdorff and Voelckers, who both were, on the basis of their official position, thoroughly conversant with this question during the entire time the defendant was in office, Burgsdorff testified that the police was under Frank, who received his orders directly from Himmler. Voelckers said that the defendant had no influence on Frank 's activities, and thereby on the police. In practice, the police and, therefore, also Under Secretary Frank were from the beginning completely independent from the defendant, This was legally sanctioned later through the order of 1 September 1939.
All witnesses, also in their written testimonies, testify that the relations of the defendant Frank had been as bad as imaginable. Security Police should have been active as political adviser to the defendant. The defendant cannot at all remember a decree from May 1933 about the appointment of this man to which reference is taken in the document by the chief of Security Police (USSR 487). In any case, according to his definite statement, he never carried out any function. The document, USSR 487, therefore does not appear to have any proof of evidence. The copy submitted to me by the Tribunal is dated 21 July 1943. That alone proves that the appointment of the SD leader, if it occurred at all, was not given any effect during the defendant's entire time in office. Aside from the date, however, the result is that, in "Reference to the letter...", this appointment does not at all concern a political adviser to the Reich Protector in person but the Under Secretary for the Security Service namely Frank. The address "Dor Herr Reich-Protector" is to be understood, in a way that it does not mean the person but rather the office. In German Government circles it was customary to speak of the Herr Reichminister etc., even though he was not meant personally but any department of his office. It is entirely credible and probable that the SD leader was appointed political adviser to the Under Secretary, who at the same time was Under Secretary to the office of the defendant and independent Under Secretary to the Security Service. the Tribunal reproached my client it can be seen how he himself felt about the ways and means of easing the minds of the population and to hinder, that is, prevent violence and insubordination. According to his sworn testimony, the defendant thereby succeeded in discouraging the population from committing acts of violence and especially to prevent acts of sabotage, which were to be expected in this time of political high tension before the war and thus in preventing harsh police and legal measures which would embitter the population even more. It is doubtlessly more human to issue such a warning and thereby to prevent the committing of crimes instead of letting crimes be committed without previous warning and afterwards to give severe punishment. That acts of sabotage, if it was impossible to prevent them, were severely punished in those times, would certainly have been acknowledged also in any other country and is a matter of course.
As the defendant testified, the warning had fulfilled its purpose. No special punishments were threatened or determined; it contained no special threats of punishment whatever, but referred, as the wording proves, to crimina law already in force. only the culprit but the entire Czech population, is, of course, concerned only with the moral responsibility and not the legal one, as was also confirmed by the defendant. would be taken in the respective territories, as for example, earlier curfew, ban on going out or general stoppage of traffic or electric current, under which the entire population would have to suffer. A collective responsibility in the legal sense would have to be formulated much more concretely. It was expressly mentioned at the beginning of the proclamation that everyone who committed the cited crimes thereby proved himself to be an enemy of the Reich and would be punished accordingly. This sentence especially shows that the legal treatment of such sabotage acts would have been carried out individually. of the idea to decree a general punishment, or even, as the Prosecution asserte without any evidence whatever, to establish the hostage system. In this connect ion I also wish to refer to the statements made by the witness von Holleben Document book von Neurath 158, in which he states: "Neurath therefore always refused to make a person responsible for acts, committed by somebody else". ant von Neurath cannot be made responsible for the arrests made at the time of the occupation of the Czech territory nor for the arrests of, as the Prosecution asserts, 8000 promenent Czechs as hostages and their being taken to concentrate camps, ot their execution at the outbreak of the war.
These arrests, according to the defendant's testimony, with which Frank's testimony agrees were made on direct order from Berlin without knowledge and information of not only the defendant, but also of Frank himself.
Bienert's contradicting testimony presented by the Prosecution is objectively incorrect and is based on completely illogical and false deductions, his deduction that this entire action was under the defendant's direction because his order for Bienert's release had been issued already four hours after his arrest is without any logic and is objectively wrong. the defendant is not responsible for the order to shoot nine students and to arrest approximately 1200 students during the night from the 16th to the 17th November 1939; that tie so measures actually to be called terror actions had been ordered during his absence from Prague without his knowledge by Hitler personally and had been carried out on his direct order by Frank, and that also the proclamation of 17 November 1939, announcing it, was neither issued nor signed by him; that on the contrary his name under it had been misused. himself, and by that of the witness Dr. Voelckers, who accompanied the defendant on his trip to Berlin on 16 November 1959, the day of the students' riot, and had returned from Berlin to Prague with him together but on the afternoon of the 17th, furthermore by the written testimony of Mr. von Holleben and finally by the affidavit of the defendant's secretary, Miss Friedrich (document Book V, No. 159) and of the Baroness Ritter, the defendant was in the night of the 16 to 17 November, when the shootings and arrests took place, not even in Prague but in Berlin and the publication of these incidents was already posted on the house walls of Prague when the defendant returned to Prague. atrocities. The order for it as well as the simultaneous order for the closing of the universities had, on the contrary, been given direct to Frank by Hitler in Berlin and this, as the witness Voelckers expressly affirms, in the absence and without the knowledge of the defendant.
What value can, in contrast to that, be ascribed to Dr. Havelka's testimony, presented by the Prosecution, is self-evident. other Czech testimony submitted by the Prosecution, must in general be examined with the very greatest caution. They are sublet from the first to two very serious objections. Firstly, all these witnesses are members of the former autonomous Czech government, i.e. the so-called collaborationists who are in jail today for this reason and are awaiting sentence. It is humanly only too readily understandable if today they not only see the conditions obtaining then in a different light, judge then differently from what they really were and involuntarily mix in their memory the terrible things which happened after Herr von Neurath had left Prague with the events while he was there. This results in a haziness of their memory. We must, also, not overlook, the fact that, in a quite natural effort, they hope by incriminating Herr von Neurath to clear themselves. Added to this is the fact, which is almost more important still they no knowledge whatsoever and could have none of the internal factual and legal conditions within the office of the Reichsprotector and that they therefore are not able to judge to what extent the defendant himself was really the man who issued the individual decrees and orders or brought then about. One example shows this very clearly.
In the witness Kalfus' testimony it is allowed that the defendant was responsible for the customs union between the Protectorate and the German Reich. I hereby wish to refer only to the fact that already in Hitler's decree of 16 March 1939 it had been expressly announced that the Protectorate belonged to the customs district of the Reich The witness Bienert further assorts that it was Herr von Neurath who subordinated to the Germans the political administration of Bohemia and Moravia, which means state as well 24 July A LJG 16-3a as communal administration.
This is, however, also objectively wrong. As I have already proven, this subordination was ordered by the decree of 1 September 1939 which was not issued by the defendant but by the ministerial council of ministers for the defense of the Reich. all these testimonies are and how little the witnesses were informed about the actual organization and competences within the office of the Reichsprotector. many other measures of force by the Gestapo against the Czech population was done on the order or instruction of the defendant personally is, for example, either a deliberate falsehood or proof of their ignorance of even the published official decrees which were announced in the Czech official gazette. the command of the defendant, the conclusions from this for the credibility of the witnesses are self evident. It is obvious that in contrast with it the sworn testimony of the defendant and of the witnesses, presented by me, together with the pertaining decrees submitted deserve much mere credibility. on which, it is based that Herr von Neurath, in the middle of November 1939, ordered the closing of the universities has thus been disproved as objectively wrong. In fact, the closing of the universities took place on the express order of Hitler. As the evidence has shown beyond any doubt, the defendant his immediately protested to Hitler and succeeded in obtaining his promise to reopen the universities after one year instead of only after three years. The defendant cannot be blamed for the fact that Hitler then did net keep his promise. His efforts for the revocation of the closing of the universities prove, however, how much he was interested in maintaining the educational standard and the intellectual class of the Czech nation.
And just as in this case, the defendant worked whereever he could for the Czech nation in its entity and for the individual.
This applies expecially to the harmful activity of the police and the Gestapo as for as he received information about it. According to his own testimony, which is confirmed by that of the witness Dr. Voelckers, he had, immediately after the arrest of the students in the middle of November 1939, used all his influence with all energy and continually for their release, and, as we have heard here, not only out of his own mouth, but also from Dr. Voelckers, he succeeded in obtaining the release of almost all the students up to the time he left Prague on 27 September 1941.
And he worked in the same way continuously for the release of about 8,000 prominent Czechs who were arrested at the beginning of the war. As proved by his own testimony to the truth by the Czech witnesses Bienert, Krejci, and Havelka, not even by Frank or by another higher SS or police chief in the Protectorate, but by Berlin directly. It is due, by the way, to the defendant that in 1941 the order Hitler issued at Frank's and Himmler's instigation for the removal and arrest of the then Czech Prime Minister General Elias was rescinded by Hitler because of his personal intervention. Only after he had left was Elias arrested by Heydrich and later condemned to death by the peoples court. that the defendant had arranged for the transportation of Czech workers into the Reich, that is, deported Czech workers by force into Germany. It is rather true that, during the whole term of office of the defendant not a single Czech worker was deported by force to Germany. laborers had yet taken place in any territory occupied by Germany. That happened later. But many Czech laborers voluntarily and gladly went to the Reich and accepted jobs there, as they earned, owing to the established currency exchange rate and to higher wages, much more than in Prague, and could send to their relatives in the Protectorate very important parts of their earnings. with the sending by the Gestapo of arrested persons to concentration camps, and with the ill-treatment committed there on those individuals, then it must be established with the utmost decision that until September 27th 1941 the end of the official activity of the defendant in the Protectorate, there was not even a single concentration camp in the Protectorate. They had all been established under his successor only, after his departure. They decree too, concerning security and preventive custody, which the Czech Prosecu-tion appears to charge him with too, has, as shown by the copy annexed to the Czech report (USSR 60), been issued but after his departure, but that was on March 9th 1942.
measures taken by the defendant against the Jews, in this point too the representation of the Indictment does not fit the facts and is shown to be erroneous on closer examination of the documents submitted by the Prosecution itself.
Of all the 21 decrees contained in the British document Book No. 12-B, only 4 have been signed by the defendant himself, 6 have been issued by the Reich Ministry directly, and 10 by Secretary of State Frank, or his direct subordinates Dr. von Burgsdorff, 1 by the Czech State President Hacha. which contained nothing by the introduction of the regulations concurring treatment of Jewish property valid for the entire German Reich into the Protectorate, which, since March 16th 1939, was a part of the German Reich too, had been presecribed to the defendant from Berlnnat the very beginning of his assuming of office. The fact, he ever, that it was publshed on June 21st 1939, 3 months Later, proves the correctness of his statement, that he wanted to give the Jews time to prepare themselves for the introduction of the Jewish legislation, as in force throughout the Reich. Its postponement to that day took place in the vary interests of the Jews. 1940, only prescribed an obligation to declare securities, i.e. mortgages which were Jewish property, and corresponded to the decrees of the some or similar kind issued in the German Reich too and which were applicable to all German nationals. well as the 4th, of September 14th 1940, aimed at rendering possible and facilitating Jewish emigration, as clearly shown by their contents, an emigration which the development of happenings in the Reich had made inevitable. Both decrees had accordingly been issued in the interests of the Jews themselves, and prove that the defendant had no anti-Semitic views.
All the documents submitted by me which refer to this matter, especially the newspaper report concerning the boycott of the Jews in the spring of 1933 doc.
book I Nr. 9 - and the submitted depositions of witnesses, show that He did not approve of the measures taken against the Jews, particularly of the violent ones, but opposed them. As shown especially by the deposition of the witness, Dr. Koepcke, such measures would have been in contradiction with his completely Christian and human attitude and ideology. It is a matter of fact that until his departure from Prague not a single synagogue had been closed, and that no religious restrictions against the Jews have been decreed. It doesnot need any particular proof that the defendant cannot be made responsible for the 6 ordinances issued by the Reich Ministry of the Interior. But neither does he bear any responsibility for the decrees signed by Frank and by Herr v. Burgsdorff, in view of the independent position of Secretary of State Frank and the competence of the police concerning all matters Jewish, which 1 have described. In opposition to the assertions of the indictment it must be particularly emphasized that, according to his own sworn deposition, no persecution of the Jews has occured during his entire tenure of office. the assertions of the Czech report of September 1945 - Nr. 993-PS - concerning an allegedhostillty of the defendant against the Church appear from the beginning as hardly likely. make this report an object of an accusation, but, nevertheless, I should like to speak about it in a short way. It is proven by evidence that the relations between Herr von Neurath and the Archbishop of Prague have been very good , even friendly, and that the latter hasexplicitly thanked the defendant for his support of the churches, and this would certainly hot have been the case if he had been opposed to the Church of if he had suppressed the churches, their organizations and clergymen or persecuted them in any way. It is certainly not an extraordinary occurrance that theremay have beendifferences in administrative matters, as has obviously been the case according to theletter of the Archbishop subm tted by the prosecution State and Church always have had differences with one another at all times and in all countries - but this canot be construed asimplying, on the defendant's side, a policy opposed to the Church.
It may be right that clergymen have been arrested, but firstly those arrests have been ordered net by the defendant, but by the police, which was not under his control, and secondly - insofar the defendant has known of them at all - not, because of any church activity, but because of political intrigues. Neither is it clear from the mentioned Czech report whether the alleged actions against the Church, its organizations, and ministers have actually taken place curing the defendant's tenure of office. The evidence has shown that he did not decree any anti-ecclesiastical or anti-religious measures, pilgrimages to theCzech religions relics e. g. were especially permitted by him. charged with any offense against Czech national-feeling. In contrast to the statement of the prosecution he did not destroy or close any Massarikhouses, nor did he destroy or remove any monuments of national personalities, as the prosecution would like to reproach him with. Insofar as the Massarik-houses were closed, the SS and the police which were not under his jurisdiction, are exclusively responsible for it. His attitude towards the Czech national-feeling is best illustrated by the factthat he especially permitted the deposition of wreaths at the foot of Massarik-monuments. spite of all efforts node in that direction by radical elements. The Czech theater-line was not touched and remained free, as well as Czech literature, which was not suppressed or encorached upon with the natural exception of forbidding such things that were of an anti-German or revolting character. Also the press, which by the way was not controlled and c ensured by him, but by the Reich Ministry for Propaganda, was not submitted to other limitations than the German press, as all in all the defendant's efforts were directed towards conserving and encouraging Czech national cultural life in its characteristic qualities and independence. I believe it is not necessary for me to go still further into details about that subject and that I can confine myself with referring to the defendant's own statements and the, statements of the German witnesses heard on this subject.
From these statements it will however, also be clearly seen what difficulties and resistance from certain radical circles andauthorities, and not least from his own Under Secretary Frank, he was up against in his above mentioned efforts and in all his policy towards the Czech people.
say that his entire life in Prague was one single fight against the forces inspired andled by Himmler, a fight that was the more difficult because he did not actually possess full powers in the Protectorate, and the offices and authorities which were themost important and influential ones in the field of home politics, the entire police and Gestapo, were not under his authority. Nevertheless he did not abandon this fight, and he did not get tired of protesting to Hitler repeatedly and demanding redress, in many cases successfully, inothers, not. He fought up to thevery end, and did not let himself be discouraged by failures and remained faithful to his policy of reconciliation and settlement, of pacification and conservation of theCzech people and of its national characteristics. And when he had to recognize, in Autumn 1941, here again, that any further fight was hopeloss, that Himmler's influence on Hitler was greater than his own and that Hitler had now decided to change over to a policy of force and terror and to send to Prague for the purpose, Heydrich who was known as a bloodhound, he immediately drew his conclusions as in the winter of 1937/38 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and resigned.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be a convenient time to recess.
(A recesswas taken)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit in open session on Saturday morning until one o'clock.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: He left Prague and finally retired to private life. What an impression this resignation made on the Czech people and even in circles hostile to Germany, and what people took it to mean, follows with a clarity which can hardly be surpassed from the fact that the Czech report USSR 60 -- which was truly not dictated by pro-German sentiments or love for my client, characterized this departure of my client as a "geheeriger Schlag" in the German text, "a heavy blow" in the English text; a fact which fundamentally disavows its own accusations against Herr von Neurath. And in fact I believe I have proved that, during and as a result of his administration, the defendant was not guilty personally of a single crime against humanity punishable under the Charter of this Court and only such a crime could, after all, come into question here. the defendant rendered himself guilty of supporting or aiding Hitler and his helpers -- in a manner punishable under the Charter -- in committing their crimes by accepting the office of Reich protector and by keeping it, in spite of the war launched by Hitler a few months after his assumption of office, and in spite of the events in November 1939, and several other occurrences. The prosecution answers this question in the affirmative. But can an objective, unprejudiced judgment of things really answer this question in the affirmative? from the defendant himself and from the witnesses question on the subject by me and from the affidavits presented. that time to enter Hitler's government and remain in it, just as little did such reasons enter into his acceptance of the Reich Protectorate. Evidence for this is found in the fact alone that he declined the endowment which Hitler had intended for his 70th birthday in 1943; and when this was nit possible, he had this endowment placed in his bank, as I have proved to you through the letter from his bank -- Document book V, No. 160 and 161 -- and never touched one penny of it.
attracted or much less suited him can unmistakably be seen from his letter of 14 October 1939 to the witness Dr. Koepke -- Document V, No. 1 -- in which he calls it an absolute prison.
In both cases, as has been proved not only by the defendant's own statements, but also by the statements of all the witnesses and documents which I have introduced, the motive and the reason for the acceptance of his position and his endurance in it was not perchance that he approved of the ideologies of the Nazi regime with all its methods and wanted to support them; to the contrary, his high ethical and moral convictions which sprang from his deep sense of responsibility towards his people as man and statesman -- these caused him to do it. Since he was not in the position and had not the power to remove Hitler and the Nazi Government, he considered it as his duty, at least in his small sphere within the compass and limits of his power in the field under his leadership, to fight the Nazi tendencies which he also despised and to prevent their materialization as far as his strength permitted.
Can one, so I ask, really reproach Herr von Neurath for this; can one condemn him because the task he had assumed with a sense of moral duty and a consciousness of responsibility was beyond his strength and he was frustrated by it? prejudices, from all the retrospective considerations of things with their in any case very uncertain deductions, and think yourselves into the soul of this man, into the world of thought, into the conception of life of this man. Brought up in the house of his parents which was filled not only with Christian, humane and decent ideas, but also with the sense of responsibility towards its German people. various governments, first under the imperial, then under the changing governments of the republic. Without caring for their political trends, without asking whether they were conservative, democratic or social-democratic, he had served them; he carried out the tasks assigned to him in his sphere of labor. As diplomat, as official of the Reich's Foreign Service, the field of internal politics was remote from him. He considered it his only duty to serve his people as such, regardless of its momentary governments and their innerpolitical attitude.
And thus, much against his personal wishes, upon Hindenburg's call in the hour of distress, he took over the Foreign Ministry and thereby entered the government of the Reich and remained in it also after Hitler was appointed, not as the representative of a certain political party, but as Hindenburg's special confidant in the field of Foreign Politics. He was the guarantor of the Reich's peace-policy, the rock of bronze in this field. not permit him to do anything else than to remain at his post when he was drawn into the whirl and dynamics of the National Socialist movement and had to see how this movement turned in directions and made use of means which he too could only condemn.
But exactly as was the case with other respectable and patriotic German? whose sense of responsibility and duty to their own people had driven then to the decision to remove Hitler and the Nazi-regime by force, so it was with the defendant whose sense of responsibility and sense of duty not only towards himself, but also towards his people, forced him to set aside his personal abhorrence of the immorality of this regime and, by remaining in office and continuing to conduct it according to his principles, to fight actively against this immorality and thus to keep it away, at least, from the section controller by him and to protect his German people from this immorality of the Nazi-regime and its consequences, namely war, as long as he had this possibility. came to him again to accept a position, this time as Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, and Hitler declared to him that he had expressly selected him form this position because he considered him the only suitable person to carry cut his intended policies of a conciliation and reconciliation of the Czech people with new conditions and the German people, the very same sense of duty and responsibility forced him to follow this call, for, would he not have to deduce from the fact that Hitler -- spite of knowing about his declining attitude toward the National Socialist regime, his policies and hits expedients desired to entrust him with this task, that he really and honestly meant to effect a reconciliation and appeasement of the Czech people?
of the highest benefit to his own, but also to the foreign people, at ask which was not only to serve the-conciliation of two nations, but also the ideal of humanity and Christian brotherly love, as well as to protect the Czech people from the pernicious methods of the Nazi-regime.
And now I ask: Is It not least just as moral and ethical to pledge one' self and one's person for such a goal, to actively, if only to a limited extend work against this regime, recognized as immoral and corrupt by a cooperation, outwardly appearing as such, to prevent the use of the expedients of this system, and thereby saving innocent people from misery and death, as to grumblingly retreat because of personal aversion and to watch inactively how this regime rages against humanity without restraint? force against the hated system and its executors. And do not forget, your Honors, that at that time, under Hitler's autocratic regime, only these two possibilities existed, to work really actively and positively against the nazi-regime and its terror. Under this regime no other possibilities existed to fight against a hated and accessed government, as this is the case in democratic free countries with free and independent selected parliaments. In Hitler-Germany any form of active or even public opposition only meant a completely useless sacrifice. and in answering my question, separate yourselves from the democratic conditions and circumstances which are so familiar to you, but which are completely incomparable with the German conditions under Hitler at that time, a fact, the non-consideration of which has already caused some disaster up to date. thousands of people whose freedom and lives would have been irretrievably lost without him, especially by accepting the office of the Reich Protector, and which he kept, despite the fact that he had to realize that he could not accomplish this task without being guilty himself, that he did not have at his service the necessary means for its accomplishment, but that, in spite of it, continued his fight against the terror of the Nazi regime? Is this not worth a thousand times, is it not more, much more and ethical, than if he had retired right away, full of abhorrence and moral indignation?
first question, and to express my conviction that one one can condemn me for this Or shall a Sophoclean tragedy be unfolded before us, here in the fate of the defendant, in which a man becomes guilty, owing to no fault of his own, because he obeyed his conscience and his sense of responsibility? that not one of the actions of which the prosecution accuse my client is criminal in the sense of the Charter, and that not one of these actions by the defendant aimed intentionally at committing a crime in the sense of the Charter of this high Tribunal; that, in other words, there is no criminal action either objectively or subjectively. But I believe I have shown also, over and above this, that all my client's actions in their totality aimed at just the opposite of what the prosecution imputes to the---namely, not the perpetration, but the prevention of just such actions as the Charter defines as punishable crimes, be they crimes of planning, preparation or the waging of aggressive wars, be they crimes or crimes against humanity. to allthat, how impossible, how paradoxical even the principles of the conspiracy are with regard to my client, for the conspiracy has for its indispensabl supposition that each participant not only wants the criminal objective, but also that he, upon entering into the conspiracy, by his participate on, sanction, or will sanction from the start the preparatory actions or those in any way connected with it of the other members. this as evidence of approving the criminal objective and all preparatory actions for its achievement by each one of the other members in their official capacity -- in international law proven alone by the fact of simply accepting or remaining in office in spite of knowing the criminal aims -- and for this fact alone institutes a criminal co-responsibility of each individual, the consequence inexorably follows with forceful logic, that the application of the principle of co-responsibility due to the acceptance, of an office or of simply staying therein, without consideration as to the extent of his decent and ethics reasons, not only calls for motives and purposes for the punishment of the one who disapproves these criminal intentions, plans and actions of the others, but even fights it actively, and for this reason only accepted his appointment or remained in his position, as it was the case with the defendant von Neurath.