But I am no writer. I am a politician. I make my corrections through my foreign policy which is directed towards an understanding with France. If I achieve the German French understanding, it will be a dignified correction, At the same interview, however, Hitler drew attention most clearly to the inevitable consequences of the France-Russian pact: "My personal efforts to such an understanding will never cease. However, this more than regrettable pact would, in fact, create a new situation. Are you not conscious, in France, of what you are doing?
nothing but to bring the great European nations into a chaos from which this power alone derives advantage. One must not lose sight of the fact that Soviet Russia is a political factor which has at her disposal an explosive revolutionary conception and a gigantic armament industry." alleged German danger for good if it so desired, because the German population had complete confidence in him, their leader, and ho, this leader, desired friendship with France. The hearing of evidence has proven that Hitler meant these declarations to be honest and sincere."
But it was all in vain. The French Government could not be moved any more to r elinquish its rigid attitude, and on 27 February 1936 the French Chamber voted to ratify the pact in spite of all warning.
The die was cast. On 7 March 1936 German troops marched again into their previous garrisons in the Rhineland Zone, which had been demilitarized until then; the German Reich had won again its full sovereignty over the entire Reich territory; the last of the restrictive barriers of the Versailles treaty had fallen. land, however, was of importance for one reason, which by far surpassed its political and prestige significance -- as seen from the standpoint of existence of the German State and nation -- and, also was the sole and therefore the more pressing reason and cause for the important resolutions made by the German Government. This was the security of the Reich. As long as the Rhineland was demilitarized, not only one of the most valuable and most important provinces but the Reich itself, and especially its life source the Ruhr territory, was without protection against any military attack from the West. The only protection for Germany against the latent terrible danger lying in this fact existed in the Locarne pact, made in 1925, firmly guarantee by Great Britain and Italy, in which France and Belgium, on the one hand, and Germany on the other hand, underwent the obligation not to wage war against each other.
vulnerability of its western frontier by having the Rhineland demilitarized. -a matter of life and death that the protection given by this treaty would not be falsified. Such falsification of its meaning and its essence, the protection of Germany, however, occurred at the moment when the political conditions and constellations, which existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, had changed fundamentally. Europe, and therefore also in Germany, were governed and determined solely by the four powers, England, France, Italy and Germany, acting in unison. And, therefore, the men who made the Locarno treaty for Germany could legitimately rely on the faithfulness of France and Belgium as sufficient protection. This supposition, however, ceased to exist and the meaning and essence of this treaty, and with it the protection for Germany, was bound to be changed, i.e. to be falsified, when France definitely changed the political conditions of Europe through concluding her pact of assistance with Russia and created a situation which frustrated the aim and purpose of the Locarno treaty, namely, to give Germany protection against the permanent danger caused by the demilitarization of the Rhineland. pact, by the fact that the world's greatest military power, which was openly revolutionary-minded at that time had entered the political arena. In the face of the not clarified situation in the East, amply laden with conflicting material, the pact could, lead, easily to the possibility that France, because of her duties toward Russia, became drawn in a war and would attack Germany, should the latter get entangled in a conflict in the East. tical whether the guaranteeing powers, England and Italy, would consider the case for which the guarantee was given as arisen and would actively assist Germany against a French attack, or would rather prefer to stay neutral. That this possibility positively existed also from the legal point of view was shown already in the German note of 25 May 1935 about the French-Russian pact-Document Book III No. 105 -- and was emphasized again in the German memorandum to the signatory powers of the Locarno pact of 7 March 1936 -- Document Book IV No. 109.
even greater and. more imminent through the events up to the ratification of the French-Russian pact by the French Chamber and. by the ratifiaction itself. Therefore, it was a command, a self-evident act of self-defence and selfpreservation, when the German Government, realizing this threatening danger, took steps which were the minimum of what was necessary to meet this danger, namely, to establish the military sovereignty of the Reich in 1935 and to reoccupy, one year later, the demilitarized Zone of the French Armies, and thereby to move forward the defense line against any attack from the West to the border of the Reich. the highest of all overriding duty of every government, every responsible statesman, has been is now and always will be, to maintain and safeguard the existence an life of his own State and nation. A statesman who neglects this duty commits a sin against his nation. Re-establishment of military sovereignty, rearmament, and reoccupation of the Rhineland were the natural reactions, the answer of the German statesmen in duty bound, and therefore also that of the defendant von Neurath, to the policy of the French government, in which, after all that had ahppened before, they had to see and saw a threat to Germany. reproach the French government, morally or otherwise, for the policy followed by it as I have described it above. Moreover, I am of the conviction -- in agreement with the defendant von Neurath -- and recognize fully, that the French policy was dictated solely by France's interest, and the French statesmen surely have done only what they believed was just from the French point of view.
German conviction, namely, the premise that a Germany which has regained its strength presented a danger and a throat to France, that from times of old the German people had faced in a blind rage of hatred and enmity the French people and were animated only by the furor to attack and the craving for revenue, then my client and I can only sincerely deplore this, but we cannot condemn it. statesmen, fir the defendant von Neurath, that their deeds and actions be judged according to their motives, according to the then prevailing circumstances which of necessity, from the viewpoint of German interests, led to these motives, and that not an in itself mostimprobable interpretation, which was the farthest from them, be given to their motices.
Politics, diplomacy, are history which has come to life. Like the entire universe, like everything that lives and moves in it, so too is this living history subject to an unchangeable law, the law of causality. given irrefutable evidence to you, Your honours, of the following facts: that the two actions charged to the defendant by the prosecution, and which are said to incriminate him in particular because they represent breaches of contract in preparation of war, namely, the recovery of the military sogereignty of the Reich and the remilitarization of the Rhineland, were, according to the iron rules of logic and necessity, the outcome of the events and the political development during the years of my client's activity as Foreign Minister, due to the politics of the stern rowers, and that neither he nor Hitler have consciously, intentionally, and according to a preconceived plan, brought them about, but that they were the inevitable consequence of the French policy. They can therefore not only not, as is asserted by the prosecution in its retrospective consideration of things, have an aggressive or even war-preparing character or tendence, but to the contrary, by serving only the purpose of defense against and the warding off of a possible attack, they have an outspoken defensive and hence peaceful character. That alongside of this there is no room for their interpretation for a future war of aggression by Germany I guess I need not emphasize, the whole absurdity of a retrospective interpretation of and conclusions drawn from certain historical events torn out and abruptly lined up without any coherence.
with the investigation of historical truths, which should be the first pre-supposition and duty of this high Tribunal, not only for the firming of its judgment but also for its duty to direct the ways of a now international law controlled by ethical principles, this manner of thinking has nothing whatsoever in common. ants as reaches of international treaties does not prove sound upon closer scrutiny of the connections. For the Treaty of Versailles as well as the Treaty of Locarno had in the course of time and events, not only lost their signification and therewith their inner justification, but both of thorn had long since been breached by exactly the French policy and thereby de jure annulled: the Treaty of Versailles by France's obstinate refusal of the disarmament obligations imposed upon her as well as upon the other contracting nations in return for Germany's disarmament; the Treaty of Locarno by the agreement with Russia which wan incompatible with the Locarno pact. History, as often before, had passed over them too, and had thus shown the nonsense of applying rigidly the dogma of "Pacta servanda sunt", as France tried to maintain against Germany. This fact will not be altered, not even by the League of Nations resolution of 19 arch 1936 which had been proposed by France and which is not astonishing in view of France's dominating position in the League of Nations, in which the latter declares that Germany, through remilitarizing the Rhineland had violated article 45 of the Treaty of Versailles. History passed over these too. explanations and parleys between the participating nations which preceded and followed it, for gradually, in the course of events, they petered out. Europe finally put up with the accomplished facts.
according to the Charter of this high Tribunal the breach of an international contract is punishable only when it serves the purpose of preparation for a war of aggression. In the course of this trial one of the American gentlemen of the prosecution stated expressly that it was absolutely legal and justifiable by peaceable means to bring about a revision or the end of treaties. But the German policy has been nothing else. The military action of the reoccupation of the Rhineland was, in view of the small force of troops of only one division without participation of the ari-force, in reality only a symbolic act for the restoration of the sovereignty of the Reich, and has been proved already by the fact, that as early as 12 March 1936 the German government through its ambassador in London in a statement contained in my document-book IV, No. 113, made the proposal, in the case of reciprocity to abondon the re-enforcement of troops and their closer approach to the borders.
The proposal was rejected by France. The German policy has throughout and in every respect held to its line of peace- policy for which it had stood consistently, for many years, and in reality it only wanted to serve and has served the purpose of peace and its maintenance in Europe. Both steps, the restoration of military sovereignty as well as the re-occupation of the Rhineland were, as I want to especially emphasize here, nothing else than the visible expression and effluence of the full and unlimited sovereignty of the Reich. This sovereignty in its part had already been recognized by the western powers in the often mentioned Five-Power-Agreement of 11 December 1932 by the recognition of Germany right of equality. More conclusive evidence of the love of peace and the absolute peace-policy of the defendant von Neural could hardly be found than the fact that for years he waited with the realization of this recognition, in the interests of avoiding complications which due to the French policy by reasons of its former attitude might possibly arise up to the moment when, in consequence of the changed balance of power this realization became an undeniable necessity for security of the Reich, a necessity for self-defence. And the German foreign policy continued in practice to follow this tendency unchanged, even after and in spite of this resolution. In the German memorandum of 31 March 1936 -Doc. book IV No. 116German foreign policy once more submitted to the powers, on behalf of the Reich Government, a new great peace-plan for a quarter of a century of peace in Europe, by which, as is stated in conclusion, it wanted to make a contribution to the building up of a new Europe on the basis of mutual respect. It thereby again gave clear and unmistakable evidence of its immutable will for peace. That this German peace plan, the absolute honesty and sincerity of whi had been affirmed upon oath by the defendant, was also not successful, and did not lead to the building up of a new pacified Europe, was not Germany's fault.
defendant's policy during the years 1936-1937, in spite of all the disappoint ments he had experienced to date. This was expressed above all also by the treaty between the German Reich and Austria, which was concluded on the 11 July 1936 as the result of negotiations which had been carried on for some time by the defendant von Papen. Not only the defendant's own testimony but also the testimony of the witnesses Koepcke and Diekhoff prove beyond doubt that the standpoint on the Austrian question which the defendant consistently took up and supported from the very beginning was, that a closer co-operation between the two countries -both in the political and particularly in the economic field- had indeed to be striven fur, but that Austria's inpedence had, under all circumstances to be respected and remain intact. interference by Germany with the internal politics of Austria and the attempt of the party to support the Austrian National Socialists in their fight against the Austrian Governments of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg and he had protested again and again against them with Hitler and not without success. That he, this Christian minded, honorable man, abhorred and condemned from the bottom of his hear the murder of Dollfuss need not be emphasized. And just from that viewpoint he welcomed the agreement of 11 July 1935 as it corresponded throughout to his own opinion. This alone contradicts the assertion of the prosecution that the agreement was concluded with intent to defraud, that is with the intention to lull the Austrian government into security and hereby to prepare and facilitate for the future the intent already existing at that time, of incorporation Austria by force into the German Reich. of the agreement is confirmed by the sworn testimony of the then Austrian foreign minister Dr. Guido Schmidt. That the defendant von Neurath had no reason to doubt Hitler's honesty and sincerity is demonstrated unequivocally by Hitler's statements as deposed by the witness Koepcke to the British Foriegn Minister Simon on his visit in Berlin in March 1935 in connection with the fact that Hitler immediately after conclusion of the agreement urged on the leaders of the Austrian National Socialists Rainer and Globotschnik strict adherence to the agreement by the Austrian Nazis, as shown by the testimony of the defendant.
And thus, from his view point, he considered this agreement another step to the appeasement of Europe as the recognition of Austria's independence proclaimed in it, eliminated the European danger point comprised in the Austrian problem. between Germany and the Czecheslovakian Republic, since it was only with this aim in mind that he mentioned so often to the Czechoslovak Ambassador Dr. Mastny that the Czechoslovak government must at last meet the demands, still very moderate at that time, of the Sudeten Germans, which were based on a promise in that matter given already in Versailles by the Czechoslovak govern ment but not kept by her.
Nothing was further from the defendant's mind in both questions than the idea of their solution by force as later, after he had left his position as Foreign Minister, Hitler thought it the right thing to do. European South Eastern nations and to make them closer, were served just as little aggressive intentions or even plans to partition Czechoslovakia with the help of these nations. If in Messersmith's affidavit it is alleged that Germany in order to secure this aim had promised to the South Eastern states, and even to Poland parts of Czechoslovakia an even of Austria, one can call this definite fantastic ideas which do not contain an iota of truth. What can be thought of these assertions is shown by the fact that the prosecution could not submit a single report from one of the diplomats of the Western Powers accredited States, which would confirm their accuracy or even only indicate it. Should only Mr. Messersmith have been so clever to have learned of such plans ? In reality the defendant's efforts and his trip to Budapest Belgrade and Sofia served exclusively peaceful purposes, namely the exchange and the strengthening of the economic relations of Germany with these states, an endeavour which, as shown by the testimony of the witness Koepcke, was close to the defendant's heart and influenced his policies.
to him in accord with his policy of peace and international understanding is Proved best by the fact that he rejected the negotiations with Japan, entered into and carried on by the defendant von Ribbentrop in London without his assistance and completely independent of him, on direct instructions by Hitler and objected to the Anticomintern fact finally concluded with her and expressed this clearly by refusing to sign this pact. It was, as is well known, and something quite extraordinary, signed by Herr von Ribbentrop as Ambassador. The objection of the defendant to this kind of policy could hardly be expressed more strongly. moment to this, his consistent peace policy in spite of the influences of other circles, especially from the party, noticeable during his last years in office. He hoped until the last moment, to be able to check successfully these influences, to eliminate them and to further direct the policies of Germany alone peaceful lines, faithful to his own convictions and to this promise to Hinderburg.
When on 5 November 1937, through Hitler's speech and his subsequent conversation with Hitler about it, in January 1938 he came to the conclusion that his influence on Hitler had disappeared, that Hitler would not shrink back from forceful, warlike measures, he drew immediately the consequences, and submitted his resignation, which was accepted. His task entrusted to him by Hindenburg, had become impossible to fulfill, He could not and could not have anything to do with a policy which did not shrink from warlike measures. It was completely out of the question to cover such a policy with his name, it would have been the negation of his entire life work. He would have betrayed hiemself and his people. people above everything, even above personal interests and desires, made himself available again when need be or when he believed to be able to spare Germany warlike complications, the danger which was brought about by Hitler's policy, made alone different lines. And out of this, his attitude, it is only too understandable that when Hitler summoned him on 11 March 1938 to inform him of the march of the German troops into Austria and because of Reichsminist von Ribbentrop's absence in London to ask for his advise and for the answer of the protest letter of the British Embassy, he declared himself willing to do it.
But if the prosecution now accuses him that the content of this re was actually incorrect the following must be said against it. The defends had in this letter only stated what Hitler himself had told him about the events. The defendant himself knew just as little about the actual every as the rest of the world as, since his resignation as Foreign Minister, he no longer received any political information whatsoever. Hitler's announcement about the marching in of the German troops surprised him just as much as it did everybody else and as the order for it had surprised even the highest commanders of the German armed forces, as admitted by Henderson himself in his well known book, with the addition that Hitler's decision to march in could only have been the a few days before. There was all the less reason to doubt the accuracy of the description of the preceding even given to him by Hitler, as it was given in the presence of Goering and not contradicted by the latter. With his true and pure character and in view of his entire previous official activity under clean and honest govern ments, it did not even occur to him that the head of the state, Hitler , c lie to him and give him, at such an important moment, information for answering the British protest, the incorrectness of which was inevitably bought to be demonstrated within a very short space of time. And whom could he really have asked ? Only very few men besides Goering had real knowledge and those he could not ask, if only because they were not in Berlin. Goering did not contradict Hitler's description. He also die not -and this I would like to drawparticular attention so - sign in his own name, nor on behalf of the absent Foreign minister, the reply which he caused to be drafted on the strength of this description of Hitler's, for which he also did not the letterheads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but as the wording of the document discloses forwarded, the description of the events by order the Reich Government. The Reich Government, however, was Hitler, or rather on this day Goering. Thus he unmistakably expressed, that he did not write on behalf of himself, taking the responsibility himself, but that rather, ke an attorney, he only forwarded the reports of a third person in this of Hitler.
He cannot be reproached for not having doubted their actual accuracy and for not having re-examined, the official description given by the head of the State, -who was Head of the State after all, aside from the fact, that he would not have been in position mine them. time later to the Czechoslovakian Ambassador Dr. Mastny. Aside from the that according to the statement by the defendant given under oath the discussion in question came off in a different fashion as was portrayed by the report of Ambassador Dr. Mastny, aiming ostensibly at greater emphasis and effect, the penultimate paragraph of this report -doc. book V No. 141- singularily discloses, that even Mastny interpreted the statement of the defendant- that Hitler had no intention to attack Czechoslovakia and saw himself. bound by the provisions of the agreement of arbitration now as before - to imply no permanent guarantee for all future, but only for the innediate moment, that is until the action against Austria had been terminated. In view of the insufficiently prepared state of the Wehrmacht for war, as con firmed by the defendant Jodl, there was absolutely no reason to doubt the accuracy of this statement, that is to doubt that it actually corresponded with Hitler's wish at that time, in spite of the fact, that the prosecution pointed out Hitler's statements in his speech on 5 November 1937 with recall to the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia. For these statements applied only to the possibility of war with other states and to a much later period Thus, the accusations raised against the defendant by the prosecution in this point are also unfounded. That Hitler already a few months after has speech on 5 November 1937, decided to incorporate Austria into Germany, car as a surprise to all, even his closest collaborators, Aside from the development trends in Asutria this, however, was brought about not at leats by conferences held between Hitler, the defendant and Lord Halifax, the then Lord privy Council in November and December 1937, in which, according to the deposition upon oath of the defendant, Lord Halifax declared -that the British people would not understand why they should enter into a war, because two German countries united.
(A recess was taken until 1000 hours.)
(The Tribunal reconvened at 1400 hours.) opportunity to intervene on behalf of the German people, in order to stave of the immediate danger of war. I need not go into details after the coinciding testimony of Goering and other witnesses on how the Munich conference was made possible toward the end of September 1938. It is a fact that its bringing about and its success -- that is an agreement with Britain and France in the Sudeten question -- were due in no small measure to the initiative and co-operation of the defendant. circumstance, which, in a complete misunderstanding of the situation is also made a point of accusation by the Prosecution. That is the fact, that upon his resignation as Foreign Minister he was appointed President of the Cabinet Council, which had been newly created by Hitler at the same time. get to Hitler in September 1938 and to persuade him to agree to the Munich conference. For, contrary to the allegation of the Prosecution, even though maintaining the title of Reich Minister, he was no longer on active Minister that is, a member of the Reich Cabinet -- as from the day of his resignation, which is discernible from the fact, that his salary was decreased by one third Reich ceased as from that day. For, contrary to the statement of the Prosecution, as President of the Secret Cabinet Council, he was not a member of the Reich Cabinet and had no access, let alone a seat or a vote, in the Cabinet sessions. Hitler's, creating this secret Cabinet council, for it says there expressly that its mission lies in rendering advice to Hitler personally; that is, solely to Hitler and only in affairs of foreign policy. Even the book of Huber "Constitutional law of Greater-Germany", quoted by the Prosecution under PS 1744, in its attempt to prove the contrary, shows that the Secret Cabinet Council and its President had nothing whatsoever to do with the Reich Cabinet and were not a branch or an organ of it, but only one of the several of the Fuehrer's personal offices.
witnesses, the Secret Cabinet Council never started work and was not meant to do so from the beginning. In point of fact, its creation was to bestow a personal honor upon him and was meant to efface the impression that difference had arisen between Hitler and the defendant. That he himself did not look upon his appointment in any other way is proved by the fact that the defendant lived on his estate in Wuertemberg after 4 February 1938 as a private citizen according to hiw own personal inclinations and only very rarely came to Berlin where, however, he was not and could not be active in any official capacity, since he was deliberately kept from all information on political affairs by the Foreign Office. submitted by it under No. 3945 PS, that the defendant received sums of money from the Reich or the Reich Chancellery for the gathering of diplomatic information, this is refuted -- apart from the defendant's own testimony on oath -- by a letter among these documents dated 31 May 1943 from Amtsrat Koeppen, the Head of the office of the Secret Cabinet Council, which was conducted for appearances sakd -- a letter which proves conclusively that these parents of not very large amounts, made at great internals to this office, were to cover the cost of maintaining this office and were not intended for any secret purposes or information. Secret Cabinet Council, with one exception in September 1938, just as little was he active as a member of the Reich Defense Council, to which he was appointed by the Law for the Defense of the Reich. Here too the Prosecution is making a mistake in turning this membership into an accusation against him and in using it to foist upon him war-like intentions or the support of such intentions. the course of the hearing of evidence, I believe I can dispense with a more detailed examination of this attempt by the Prosecution and limit myself to pointing out that no aggressive tendencies of any kind were contained in these Reich Defense laws, but that, on the contrary, as their contents state, they merely contain -- as is the custom in any state that has to reckon with the possibility of a war -- the necessary provisions for the event of the Reich being attacked or being drawn into a war in some other manner.
How one can deduce therefrom warlike intentions of plans on the part of the defendant is, however, utterly incomprehensible. sessions of this council, and no reports about the decisions of this council were ever forwarded to him. The document 2194 PS submitted by the Prosecution as alleged counter-evidence, was not sent to the defendant at all but to a department of the Reich ministry of Transport attached to the Government of the Protectorate, namely, the Transport Department -- and was intended for the latter. And its sender was not the Reich Defense Council but the Ministry for Economy and Labor of Saxony. prove that the defendant, by his policies, was at any time directly or indirectly guilty of the crime of planning or preparing an aggressive war or even of approving or assisting such. The opposite is the case.
All his efforts were bent to one and only one end -- to attain by peaceful means and in a peaceful way only the aims which had been sought by all former democratic governments since 1921; namely, the removal of the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles which were discriminating for Germany and stamped the German Reich as a second class State, and to bring about a general pacification Europe.
Not one of his diplomatic actions served any other purpose or contained any other intention which would involve a crime in the sense of the Charter. Minister was received by the whole world with anxiety and dismay, inside as well as outside Germany , especially in conservative circles. I refer to the statement of the Witness Diekhoff, by which for itself the assertion of the prosecution is refuted, that he was active in these circles as a fifth columnist. What the prosecution to all this points out, with regard to Hitler's speech to his generals inNovember 1939, and still less with regard to the speeches by the defendant himself of 29 August and 31 October 1937, will alter none of these facts at all. Hitler's speech was held at the time of the first military successe and was calculated as laying claim to the success of his, Hitler's state leadership and should only be valued at this face-value. The speeches made by the defendant, however, say just the opposite of what the prosecution likes to interpret into them. For both speeches, contained in my doc. book IV No. 126 and 128, emphasize quite expressly the successful pacific intentions of the German Foreign policy conducted by the defendant, and emphasize especially that the gained successes were obtained exclusively by peaceful means and not by means of force. Especially the speech of 31 October 1937, the least public speech of the defendant as Foreign Minister, frankly represents a resume of his policy of peace. That this resume was and is correct, the prosecution itself had to admit in this room when, in the words of one of the prosecutors, it expressly denoted Hitler's speech of 5 November 1937 as the turning point in German foreign policy, a speech which had been taken by my client as an excuse for his resignation; and the prosecution thereby acknowledged unequivocally that, up to that day, German foreign policy had not been aggressive, had not been a policy of force, her pursued any plans or intentions of war, but had been thoroughly peaceful and could not have been otherwise, in accordance with the defendant's confession of political and human faith which has been confirmed by all witnesses questioned here and in all of the questionnaires and affidavits contained in my document-books.
This declaration of faith was founded upon three basic pillars: human love, love of the fatherland, and love of peace, all three born of and supported by a very deep sense of responsibility towards himself, towards his God, and towards his people. the defendant to Vienna from his well-deserved otium cum dignitate on his farm and revealed to him that he had been selected as Reich-protector for Bohemia and Moravia, he felt himself obliged to answer this call as a result of his sense of responsibility. He resisted it to begin with and struggled with himself a long time, as he had always been the strictest opponent of interference not to speak of a more or less forceful annexation of other nations to the German Reich. the so-called protective alliance signed by President Hacha, and this without the least knowledge at that time how it really came about. The true details of this incident became really known to him first here in Nurnberg. at his age, and to take again service under Hitler and his regime, of which he heartily disapproved, he became convinced, due to his sense of responsibility towards his people and his humane principles, that he should not dory himself to this call. When Hitler explained to him that he had selected him as the sole personality suited for bringing about successful reconciliation intended by him, of the Czechoslovakian people with the new conditions and with the German people, he could not close his eyes to the knowledge that he would be given a task which he could not evade in the interest of the German people as well as humanity and international understanding. And was it not atask indeed worthy of the "sweat of noble", through a human and just government and treatment to appease a people which would regard every restriction and encroachment on its liberty and autonomy as the worst injustice imposed, and which would be filled with the bloodiest hatred and resentment against a people perceived as the intolerable oppressor; to reconcile with just this people and the conditions directly created by it.
preserving peace? And he could and had to say to himself with justification that if he refused this task, another man from Hitler's entourage would in all probability be nominated Reich-Protector who was not able or willing to appease the Czech people by humane and just treatment and was, on the contrary, much more inclined to hold it down by force and terror, as actually happened 2 1/2 years later. It was only as a result of these thoughts and reflections that he decided to accept the appointment offered him, eliminating all personal interests and even setting aside the risk that this night be interpreted and held against him in some quarters as an act of approval and support of Hitler and of his regime, since Hitler had explicitly and firmly promised him that he was at all times willing to support his (the defendant's) intended policy of appeasing and reconciling the Czech people by humane and just treatment which did justice to the interests of the Czech people to the greatest extent.
He was conscious of the weight of this task he had accepted. I do not hesitate to admit that it was here a question of a decision, to justify which could -- from the point of view put forward here by the British prosecutor that it was immoral to remain in a government, which should be rejected because of its amorality -- cause embarrassment in the case of a personality formed differently from and with a different attitude in thought and action than that of the defendant von Neurath; but that, in view of the personality of von Neurath, which I hope has been described to you sufficiently and clearly, and in view of his profound sense of responsibility, this decision was the only possible and logical one. It is actually pertaining to an antique tragedy that the failure of this mission, which had been assumed out of the highest ethical motives only, has brought the defendant von Neurath into this dock. the prosecution's attempt to present as unworthy of belief the defendant's assertion that he had assumed his office as Reichsprotektor only with the purpose and the object to appease the Czech people by safeguarding, to a large extent, its interests and its nationality and, accordingly, to be of service to this people and to its national prosperity, as being disproved, by the photostatic documents submitted by the prosecution under No.3859, consisting of a letter of the defendant to the Chief of the Reich chancellory Lammers dated August 31st 1940.
readily granted to me by the Tribunal, has proved that those documents, particularly the two reports annexed to the letter to Lammers, which indeed are not consistent with the designs and tendencies of the defendant as mentioned above, do not form any evidence. Not only do these photostatic copies by no means correspond, according to the definite statement of the defendant, to the contents and the form, e.g. the length of the originals annexed to the Lammers letter, which had been submitted to the defendant for signature and respectively approved by him, but they provoke more than reasonable doubts whether the photostatic copies of said documents are indeed identical with the annexes to the Lammers letter, owing to the following facts: copies do not contain the references of the Lammers letter, not even a note that they are annexes to a third paper, let alone to the Lammers letter. And the photostatic copy of the first copy does not bear the defendant's signature, which, according to his definite statement, he had added when signing the latter to Lammers, beneath the report annexed to the Lammers letter, which report had been done by himself or by his office according to his instructions and which had been submitted to him in a fair copy. should have been, but actually was not, signed by a SS-Obersturmfuehrer working in the office of Secretary of State Frank. Those facts warrant the defendant's assertion that, if the reports whereof the photostatic copies have been made have indeed been annexed to the Lammers letter, they have been substituted to the original report of the defendant and to Frank's report as approved in the draft by defendant, in the office of secretary of state Frank, either by the latter or by his order. Furthermore, the defendant's statement is quite worthy of credit, made in order to explain the fact and the purpose of this Lammers letter and its annexes, viz. that he wanted to try, just as according to the plan contained in general Friderici's report dated October 15th 1939, submitted under US 65 L 150 - to induce Hitler by both reports sent to him, as well as by oral report, to abstain from a division of the Protectorate territory and from a Germanization of the Czech people in any form whatever and to prohibit any similar plans at all, a course which the defendant expressly refused to sustain for all possible reasons, not in the lost in the interest of the Czech nation entrusted to him and of its national character and unity.