to him in accord with his policy of peace and international understanding is Proved best by the fact that he rejected the negotiations with Japan, entered into and carried on by the defendant von Ribbentrop in London without his assistance and completely independent of him, on direct instructions by Hitler and objected to the Anticomintern fact finally concluded with her and expressed this clearly by refusing to sign this pact. It was, as is well known, and something quite extraordinary, signed by Herr von Ribbentrop as Ambassador. The objection of the defendant to this kind of policy could hardly be expressed more strongly. moment to this, his consistent peace policy in spite of the influences of other circles, especially from the party, noticeable during his last years in office. He hoped until the last moment, to be able to check successfully these influences, to eliminate them and to further direct the policies of Germany alone peaceful lines, faithful to his own convictions and to this promise to Hinderburg.
When on 5 November 1937, through Hitler's speech and his subsequent conversation with Hitler about it, in January 1938 he came to the conclusion that his influence on Hitler had disappeared, that Hitler would not shrink back from forceful, warlike measures, he drew immediately the consequences, and submitted his resignation, which was accepted. His task entrusted to him by Hindenburg, had become impossible to fulfill, He could not and could not have anything to do with a policy which did not shrink from warlike measures. It was completely out of the question to cover such a policy with his name, it would have been the negation of his entire life work. He would have betrayed hiemself and his people. people above everything, even above personal interests and desires, made himself available again when need be or when he believed to be able to spare Germany warlike complications, the danger which was brought about by Hitler's policy, made alone different lines. And out of this, his attitude, it is only too understandable that when Hitler summoned him on 11 March 1938 to inform him of the march of the German troops into Austria and because of Reichsminist von Ribbentrop's absence in London to ask for his advise and for the answer of the protest letter of the British Embassy, he declared himself willing to do it.
But if the prosecution now accuses him that the content of this re was actually incorrect the following must be said against it. The defends had in this letter only stated what Hitler himself had told him about the events. The defendant himself knew just as little about the actual every as the rest of the world as, since his resignation as Foreign Minister, he no longer received any political information whatsoever. Hitler's announcement about the marching in of the German troops surprised him just as much as it did everybody else and as the order for it had surprised even the highest commanders of the German armed forces, as admitted by Henderson himself in his well known book, with the addition that Hitler's decision to march in could only have been the a few days before. There was all the less reason to doubt the accuracy of the description of the preceding even given to him by Hitler, as it was given in the presence of Goering and not contradicted by the latter. With his true and pure character and in view of his entire previous official activity under clean and honest govern ments, it did not even occur to him that the head of the state, Hitler , c lie to him and give him, at such an important moment, information for answering the British protest, the incorrectness of which was inevitably bought to be demonstrated within a very short space of time. And whom could he really have asked ? Only very few men besides Goering had real knowledge and those he could not ask, if only because they were not in Berlin. Goering did not contradict Hitler's description. He also die not -and this I would like to drawparticular attention so - sign in his own name, nor on behalf of the absent Foreign minister, the reply which he caused to be drafted on the strength of this description of Hitler's, for which he also did not the letterheads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but as the wording of the document discloses forwarded, the description of the events by order the Reich Government. The Reich Government, however, was Hitler, or rather on this day Goering. Thus he unmistakably expressed, that he did not write on behalf of himself, taking the responsibility himself, but that rather, ke an attorney, he only forwarded the reports of a third person in this of Hitler.
He cannot be reproached for not having doubted their actual accuracy and for not having re-examined, the official description given by the head of the State, -who was Head of the State after all, aside from the fact, that he would not have been in position mine them. time later to the Czechoslovakian Ambassador Dr. Mastny. Aside from the that according to the statement by the defendant given under oath the discussion in question came off in a different fashion as was portrayed by the report of Ambassador Dr. Mastny, aiming ostensibly at greater emphasis and effect, the penultimate paragraph of this report -doc. book V No. 141- singularily discloses, that even Mastny interpreted the statement of the defendant- that Hitler had no intention to attack Czechoslovakia and saw himself. bound by the provisions of the agreement of arbitration now as before - to imply no permanent guarantee for all future, but only for the innediate moment, that is until the action against Austria had been terminated. In view of the insufficiently prepared state of the Wehrmacht for war, as con firmed by the defendant Jodl, there was absolutely no reason to doubt the accuracy of this statement, that is to doubt that it actually corresponded with Hitler's wish at that time, in spite of the fact, that the prosecution pointed out Hitler's statements in his speech on 5 November 1937 with recall to the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia. For these statements applied only to the possibility of war with other states and to a much later period Thus, the accusations raised against the defendant by the prosecution in this point are also unfounded. That Hitler already a few months after has speech on 5 November 1937, decided to incorporate Austria into Germany, car as a surprise to all, even his closest collaborators, Aside from the development trends in Asutria this, however, was brought about not at leats by conferences held between Hitler, the defendant and Lord Halifax, the then Lord privy Council in November and December 1937, in which, according to the deposition upon oath of the defendant, Lord Halifax declared -that the British people would not understand why they should enter into a war, because two German countries united.
(A recess was taken until 1000 hours.)
(The Tribunal reconvened at 1400 hours.) opportunity to intervene on behalf of the German people, in order to stave of the immediate danger of war. I need not go into details after the coinciding testimony of Goering and other witnesses on how the Munich conference was made possible toward the end of September 1938. It is a fact that its bringing about and its success -- that is an agreement with Britain and France in the Sudeten question -- were due in no small measure to the initiative and co-operation of the defendant. circumstance, which, in a complete misunderstanding of the situation is also made a point of accusation by the Prosecution. That is the fact, that upon his resignation as Foreign Minister he was appointed President of the Cabinet Council, which had been newly created by Hitler at the same time. get to Hitler in September 1938 and to persuade him to agree to the Munich conference. For, contrary to the allegation of the Prosecution, even though maintaining the title of Reich Minister, he was no longer on active Minister that is, a member of the Reich Cabinet -- as from the day of his resignation, which is discernible from the fact, that his salary was decreased by one third Reich ceased as from that day. For, contrary to the statement of the Prosecution, as President of the Secret Cabinet Council, he was not a member of the Reich Cabinet and had no access, let alone a seat or a vote, in the Cabinet sessions. Hitler's, creating this secret Cabinet council, for it says there expressly that its mission lies in rendering advice to Hitler personally; that is, solely to Hitler and only in affairs of foreign policy. Even the book of Huber "Constitutional law of Greater-Germany", quoted by the Prosecution under PS 1744, in its attempt to prove the contrary, shows that the Secret Cabinet Council and its President had nothing whatsoever to do with the Reich Cabinet and were not a branch or an organ of it, but only one of the several of the Fuehrer's personal offices.
witnesses, the Secret Cabinet Council never started work and was not meant to do so from the beginning. In point of fact, its creation was to bestow a personal honor upon him and was meant to efface the impression that difference had arisen between Hitler and the defendant. That he himself did not look upon his appointment in any other way is proved by the fact that the defendant lived on his estate in Wuertemberg after 4 February 1938 as a private citizen according to hiw own personal inclinations and only very rarely came to Berlin where, however, he was not and could not be active in any official capacity, since he was deliberately kept from all information on political affairs by the Foreign Office. submitted by it under No. 3945 PS, that the defendant received sums of money from the Reich or the Reich Chancellery for the gathering of diplomatic information, this is refuted -- apart from the defendant's own testimony on oath -- by a letter among these documents dated 31 May 1943 from Amtsrat Koeppen, the Head of the office of the Secret Cabinet Council, which was conducted for appearances sakd -- a letter which proves conclusively that these parents of not very large amounts, made at great internals to this office, were to cover the cost of maintaining this office and were not intended for any secret purposes or information. Secret Cabinet Council, with one exception in September 1938, just as little was he active as a member of the Reich Defense Council, to which he was appointed by the Law for the Defense of the Reich. Here too the Prosecution is making a mistake in turning this membership into an accusation against him and in using it to foist upon him war-like intentions or the support of such intentions. the course of the hearing of evidence, I believe I can dispense with a more detailed examination of this attempt by the Prosecution and limit myself to pointing out that no aggressive tendencies of any kind were contained in these Reich Defense laws, but that, on the contrary, as their contents state, they merely contain -- as is the custom in any state that has to reckon with the possibility of a war -- the necessary provisions for the event of the Reich being attacked or being drawn into a war in some other manner.
How one can deduce therefrom warlike intentions of plans on the part of the defendant is, however, utterly incomprehensible. sessions of this council, and no reports about the decisions of this council were ever forwarded to him. The document 2194 PS submitted by the Prosecution as alleged counter-evidence, was not sent to the defendant at all but to a department of the Reich ministry of Transport attached to the Government of the Protectorate, namely, the Transport Department -- and was intended for the latter. And its sender was not the Reich Defense Council but the Ministry for Economy and Labor of Saxony. prove that the defendant, by his policies, was at any time directly or indirectly guilty of the crime of planning or preparing an aggressive war or even of approving or assisting such. The opposite is the case.
All his efforts were bent to one and only one end -- to attain by peaceful means and in a peaceful way only the aims which had been sought by all former democratic governments since 1921; namely, the removal of the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles which were discriminating for Germany and stamped the German Reich as a second class State, and to bring about a general pacification Europe.
Not one of his diplomatic actions served any other purpose or contained any other intention which would involve a crime in the sense of the Charter. Minister was received by the whole world with anxiety and dismay, inside as well as outside Germany , especially in conservative circles. I refer to the statement of the Witness Diekhoff, by which for itself the assertion of the prosecution is refuted, that he was active in these circles as a fifth columnist. What the prosecution to all this points out, with regard to Hitler's speech to his generals inNovember 1939, and still less with regard to the speeches by the defendant himself of 29 August and 31 October 1937, will alter none of these facts at all. Hitler's speech was held at the time of the first military successe and was calculated as laying claim to the success of his, Hitler's state leadership and should only be valued at this face-value. The speeches made by the defendant, however, say just the opposite of what the prosecution likes to interpret into them. For both speeches, contained in my doc. book IV No. 126 and 128, emphasize quite expressly the successful pacific intentions of the German Foreign policy conducted by the defendant, and emphasize especially that the gained successes were obtained exclusively by peaceful means and not by means of force. Especially the speech of 31 October 1937, the least public speech of the defendant as Foreign Minister, frankly represents a resume of his policy of peace. That this resume was and is correct, the prosecution itself had to admit in this room when, in the words of one of the prosecutors, it expressly denoted Hitler's speech of 5 November 1937 as the turning point in German foreign policy, a speech which had been taken by my client as an excuse for his resignation; and the prosecution thereby acknowledged unequivocally that, up to that day, German foreign policy had not been aggressive, had not been a policy of force, her pursued any plans or intentions of war, but had been thoroughly peaceful and could not have been otherwise, in accordance with the defendant's confession of political and human faith which has been confirmed by all witnesses questioned here and in all of the questionnaires and affidavits contained in my document-books.
This declaration of faith was founded upon three basic pillars: human love, love of the fatherland, and love of peace, all three born of and supported by a very deep sense of responsibility towards himself, towards his God, and towards his people. the defendant to Vienna from his well-deserved otium cum dignitate on his farm and revealed to him that he had been selected as Reich-protector for Bohemia and Moravia, he felt himself obliged to answer this call as a result of his sense of responsibility. He resisted it to begin with and struggled with himself a long time, as he had always been the strictest opponent of interference not to speak of a more or less forceful annexation of other nations to the German Reich. the so-called protective alliance signed by President Hacha, and this without the least knowledge at that time how it really came about. The true details of this incident became really known to him first here in Nurnberg. at his age, and to take again service under Hitler and his regime, of which he heartily disapproved, he became convinced, due to his sense of responsibility towards his people and his humane principles, that he should not dory himself to this call. When Hitler explained to him that he had selected him as the sole personality suited for bringing about successful reconciliation intended by him, of the Czechoslovakian people with the new conditions and with the German people, he could not close his eyes to the knowledge that he would be given a task which he could not evade in the interest of the German people as well as humanity and international understanding. And was it not atask indeed worthy of the "sweat of noble", through a human and just government and treatment to appease a people which would regard every restriction and encroachment on its liberty and autonomy as the worst injustice imposed, and which would be filled with the bloodiest hatred and resentment against a people perceived as the intolerable oppressor; to reconcile with just this people and the conditions directly created by it.
preserving peace? And he could and had to say to himself with justification that if he refused this task, another man from Hitler's entourage would in all probability be nominated Reich-Protector who was not able or willing to appease the Czech people by humane and just treatment and was, on the contrary, much more inclined to hold it down by force and terror, as actually happened 2 1/2 years later. It was only as a result of these thoughts and reflections that he decided to accept the appointment offered him, eliminating all personal interests and even setting aside the risk that this night be interpreted and held against him in some quarters as an act of approval and support of Hitler and of his regime, since Hitler had explicitly and firmly promised him that he was at all times willing to support his (the defendant's) intended policy of appeasing and reconciling the Czech people by humane and just treatment which did justice to the interests of the Czech people to the greatest extent.
He was conscious of the weight of this task he had accepted. I do not hesitate to admit that it was here a question of a decision, to justify which could -- from the point of view put forward here by the British prosecutor that it was immoral to remain in a government, which should be rejected because of its amorality -- cause embarrassment in the case of a personality formed differently from and with a different attitude in thought and action than that of the defendant von Neurath; but that, in view of the personality of von Neurath, which I hope has been described to you sufficiently and clearly, and in view of his profound sense of responsibility, this decision was the only possible and logical one. It is actually pertaining to an antique tragedy that the failure of this mission, which had been assumed out of the highest ethical motives only, has brought the defendant von Neurath into this dock. the prosecution's attempt to present as unworthy of belief the defendant's assertion that he had assumed his office as Reichsprotektor only with the purpose and the object to appease the Czech people by safeguarding, to a large extent, its interests and its nationality and, accordingly, to be of service to this people and to its national prosperity, as being disproved, by the photostatic documents submitted by the prosecution under No.3859, consisting of a letter of the defendant to the Chief of the Reich chancellory Lammers dated August 31st 1940.
readily granted to me by the Tribunal, has proved that those documents, particularly the two reports annexed to the letter to Lammers, which indeed are not consistent with the designs and tendencies of the defendant as mentioned above, do not form any evidence. Not only do these photostatic copies by no means correspond, according to the definite statement of the defendant, to the contents and the form, e.g. the length of the originals annexed to the Lammers letter, which had been submitted to the defendant for signature and respectively approved by him, but they provoke more than reasonable doubts whether the photostatic copies of said documents are indeed identical with the annexes to the Lammers letter, owing to the following facts: copies do not contain the references of the Lammers letter, not even a note that they are annexes to a third paper, let alone to the Lammers letter. And the photostatic copy of the first copy does not bear the defendant's signature, which, according to his definite statement, he had added when signing the latter to Lammers, beneath the report annexed to the Lammers letter, which report had been done by himself or by his office according to his instructions and which had been submitted to him in a fair copy. should have been, but actually was not, signed by a SS-Obersturmfuehrer working in the office of Secretary of State Frank. Those facts warrant the defendant's assertion that, if the reports whereof the photostatic copies have been made have indeed been annexed to the Lammers letter, they have been substituted to the original report of the defendant and to Frank's report as approved in the draft by defendant, in the office of secretary of state Frank, either by the latter or by his order. Furthermore, the defendant's statement is quite worthy of credit, made in order to explain the fact and the purpose of this Lammers letter and its annexes, viz. that he wanted to try, just as according to the plan contained in general Friderici's report dated October 15th 1939, submitted under US 65 L 150 - to induce Hitler by both reports sent to him, as well as by oral report, to abstain from a division of the Protectorate territory and from a Germanization of the Czech people in any form whatever and to prohibit any similar plans at all, a course which the defendant expressly refused to sustain for all possible reasons, not in the lost in the interest of the Czech nation entrusted to him and of its national character and unity.
These assertions of the defendant are confirmed by the statements of the witness von Holleben in the questionnaire answered by him -- doc. book V Nr. 156 -- of the witness Dr. von Burgsdorf, as well as by the letter of the defendant to Baroness Ritter - as literally quoted by the latter in her affidavit - doc. bock Nr. 3. And the defendant has actually succeeded in carrying his point, as proven by the report of his conversation with Hider submitted by the prosecution. Germanization of the Czech nation, the defendant has even prohibited the discussion of this entire question, as proven by document 3862-PS submitted by the prosecution. By this prevention of any division of the Protectorate territory and of any more or less of Reich planned Germanization of the Czech nation, it is actually provedn, in the clearest possible manner, how sincere the aims and endeavours of the defendant were to save and to keep the Czech nation and its nationality in its national unity and character, true to his principles and designs, as stated publicly in his article reproduced by the Frankfurter Zeitung of March 30th 1939 -- doc. book V. Nr. 143 -- concerning the new order of central Europe, as forming the rule of conduct for the accomplishment of his duty.
He himself defines in this article his task as a fine one, but as a difficult one too.
How difficult it really was, how nearly inpossible, was to be proved unfortunately but a little while later. only the full power in the Protectorate had not been transferred to him, that never - quite aside from his subordination under Hitler had he received a solely decisive and overruling position, but also that his competences and power were not defined sharply enough. It is true that Hitler's decree of March 16th 1939 establishing the Protectorate, and the supplementing decree of March 22nd 1939 doc. book. V. No. 144 and 145 - had decreed that the Reichsprotektor was put under the control of the Fuehrer and Reich chancellor, that be was to be the Fuehrer's and the Reich government's sole representative and was to receive his directives from the Fuehrer and from Reich chancellor. But at the same time not only certain administrative branches, such as Wehrmacht, communications, postal, telegraphic and telephone services, were from the beginning, placed out of his competence, but also the he Reich government and the Reich itself had been given the right to take under their own administration, as Reich administrations - so-called "reichseigene" - independent of the Reichsprotektor, admininistrations which actually were Reichsprotektor offices, and to establish, if necessary, Reich offices, which did not fall under the Reichsprotektor's competence. The Reich had also received the right to take measures necessary to Maintain security and order in the Protectorate, every the head of the Reichsprotektor himself. Furthermore - and this is the most important point of all -, the right was granted to every one of the many supreme Reich authorities, i.e., not only to the Reich ministrios, but, e.g., to the Reichsbank, the hour Year Plan, the Council of ministers for Reich Defense and others, to decree laws and organizational measures on their own authority quite independently of the Reich protector, and therefore to interfere in branches of the administration which, by their nature, belonged to the competence of the Reich Protector, without the Reich Protector having either the right or the possibility to protest against, or prevent such decrees or measures should they be in opposition to his own decrees, measures and policy.
On the contrary it was his duty not only to publish them in the protectorate if asked to do so, but also to supervise their execution. Therefore the position of the Reich protector was using an example as explanation - by no means the same as, e.g., that of the British Viceroy in India, but corresponded far rather though to outward appearances a somewhat higher level - to the position of a Reich Governor or the President of a province. This position therefore did not correspond to what had hitherto been understood constitutionally by a protectorate, nor could it, because this so-called Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia belonged, according to Article 1 of the above mentioned decree of 16 March 1939 and to this I wish to draw particular attention here, - to the territory of the German Reich, that is to say it was a part of the German Reich. And it only possessed a certain amount of selfadministration and a limited autonomy within the Reich as a part of it, whereby the introduction of laws and regulations valid in the rest of the territory of the Reich was a priori understood. It is self-evident that the greatest difficulties were bound to result very soon from this so vague and indefinite delimitation of the powers and competence of the Reich-protector - difficulties not only for a homogeneous points of view and guiding lines, but also for the defendant himself as Reich Protector in governing in the way he wished and which he had embarked upon difficulties and resistances which become more and mere acute in the course of time. On the other hand it also follows from the above that the responsibility of the defendant can only be judged from this point of view i.e. only by taking into account these various competences of all kinds of other authorities. He Can never be made responsible for decrees, measures and actions which he did not decree or order himself which, on the contrary, were decreed without his co-operation, without his knowledge, even against his will, by authorities or other offices outside his sphere of power and influence - decrees, measures and actions which he had neither the right nor the power to prevent and for which he was at most a transit office.
attributed to him by the Czech prosecution (USSR 60-a) for all the actions of Hitler and of the Reich Government before and after the creation of the Protectorate. The assertion which forms the foundation and presupposition for this - the prosecution assertion that Herr v. Neurath, after having given up his post as Reich Foreign Minister, remained a member of the Reich Government - is factually wrong. I have already proved elsewhere beyond doubt that he was not a member of the Reich government, neither as a minister without employment now as president of the Secret Cabinet Council. And he was just as little a member of the Reich government as Reich Protector. That, too, is certain and has never been claimed by the prosecution before this court. Therewith any part-responsibility of the defendant for any actions or measures which preceded or prepared the setting up of the Protectorate, is out of the question. I have also already proved elsewhere that his statement to the Czechoslovak Ambassador on 12 March 1938, which he has been reproached with here again as being such a preparatory action, was not false, not deceitful, and was therefore not an action preparing the March in to Czechoslovakia. Article 5 of the above-mentioned decree of 16 March 1939, that, as Reich Protector, he was responsible without distinction for every thing that occurred in the Protectorate during the time he was in office, i.e. from 17 March 1939 to 27 September 1941, this conclusion is also factually wrong and false, in view of the actual position with regard to competence in the Protectorate, as explained above. There is no system of law in the world according to which one can charge a person with criminal responsibility for occurrences and acts by third persons, in which he did not participate, or cooperate or which even occurred against his will. of exchange between the Reichsmark and the Czech crown, because this rate had already been fixed when he took over office; he neither had any hand in fixing it nor had he the power or right to change tic rate of exchange; we can here very well leave aside the question whether, as the prosecution maintains without proofs, the rate of exchange was detrimental to the Czech people or not.
That, by the way, even if the letter were the case, this would not be a crime according to the charter - and only as such would it be punishable hardly needs to be stressed. of the customs union and its execution. This had already been laid down in Article 9 of the decree of 16 March 1939, which says literally: "The Protectorate belongs to the customs area of the German Reich and is subject to its sovereignty as regards customs." This regulation was a natural consequence of the already stressed fact that the Protectorate was a part of the territory of the German Reich. However I would like to draw special attention here to the feet that the defendant, because he regarded the absorption of the Protectorate into the customs area, the customs sovereignty of the Reich, as detrimental and harmful to Czech economy, managed to postpone the execution and realisation of this absorption for a year and a half, till 1st October 1940 in spite of all the urgings of the Reich Finance Minister, Which is clear proof that the defendant put the interests of the Czech people who had been confided to him, above the interests of the German Reich. He had absolutely nothing to do with the economic measures consisting in the alleged transfer of Czech banks and industrial enterprises and the alleged filling of the keypositions in them with Germans. These measures were taken by other offices, especially by the Reich bank and the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year's Plan, behind his back and without his collaboration. Resides, they were the natural result of the circumstance that already in earlier times very important German Capital had been invested in these banks and enterprises, and this capital increased after the occupation, because the credits given by other countries were withdrawn by them and taken over by German firms.
Lastly, he had nothing whatever to do with Jurisdiction. The latter was under exclusive control of the Reich Minister of Justice.
He alone established the German courts including summary courts and prosecuting authorities, he only appointed judges and prosecutors. Herr v. Neurath himself had nothing to do with this and still loss with the jurisdiction of the courts, as is clearly shown by the ordinances and decrees which established them, especially the decree concerning the execution of criminal jurisdiction of April 14th 1959 - Doc. Book, Vol. No. 147. the economic measures nor the establishment of German courts in the Protectorate, which was a part of the German Reich, even remotely fall under the category of crimes punished by this Charter. Just as little do fall under these crimes the alleged intrusions into Czech school organization, the appointment of German school inspectors, measures with which the defendant has been charged in the Czech indictment, and measures also were not taken by him, but by the German Reich Ministry of Education and instruction. And the closing of a large number of Czech secondary schools has not been ordered by the defendant at all, nor by the German Reich ministry, but actually by the Czech government itself, according, it is true, to a suggestion made by the defendant. This measure turned out to be useful and in agreement with the interests of the Czech youth and, therefore, of the Czech intelligentsia and people, by preventing the formation and growing of a large educated proletariat. This danger had become acute because, after the incorporation of the Sudeten German territory into the German Reich in the autumn 1938, a very large number of Czech officials and members of the free professions had streamed into the territory of the Protectorate, which, in conjunction with the already existing overcrowding of all higher professions, and in view of the diminution of the Protectorate territory owing to the separation of the Sudeten territory and Slovakia still mere diminished the possibilities for getting employment and remuneration for the up growing pupils in secondary schools.
Additionally to this came the closing of universities, in the middle of November 1339, according to a personal order of Hitler.
The Czech government could not deny the truth of such considerations of the defendant, and decreed itself the closing of quite a number of schools. The defendant did not exorcise any pressure on the Czech government. This had been proven by the evidence.
tions however, was done without knowledge or participation of the defendant, by the police, which was not controlled by him, neither did the confiscation and the use of their assets. It is not even certain, by the way, whether this dissolution has taken place while the defendant was holding office or after his departure. The dissolution of the Sokol, it must be said, was a real necessity for the government, to protect German interests, and moreover a measure which was taken in the interest of the pacification and reconciliation of the Czech nation tee, as the Sokol was, beyond doubt, the focus of anti-German efforts and of the incitement to the Czech people toward an active resistance against everything which was German. other administrations and offices on the administration of the Protectorate, and, accordingly, the difficulties and resistances against a Uniform policy of the defendant. These were, however, by no means removed, but on the contrary, aggravated by the decree of September 1st 1939 concerning the organization of administration and of the German Security Police -- document book V No. 149-. This decree has been issued, without any previous contact being made with the defendant, by the Council of Ministers for the Reich defence. Especially in its first part, it is absolutely obscure and misleading. True, it placed all German administration offices and their officials in the Protectorate under the control of the Reichprotector, but this subordination was an administrative one only, i.e. a purely external one, but not at the same time an actual one with a view to the administrative duties which they had to perform. power of the supreme Reich offices according to article 11 of the decree of March 16th 1939 and of the ordinance of March 22nd 1939. The difference was only that from now on all administrations and offices established or to be established by other offices were formally attached to the Reichsprotektor's office and were officially to be known as departments of the administrative designation "The Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia". However, this did by no means ensure that such attached departments were put, in fact, under control of the Reichsprotektor himself, i.e. the defendant, that they received from him their actual directives and orders and had to work according to his views and following his directives.
On the contrary, they received their instructions, just as before, from their original Reichoffices and had to observe and to obey only these. For instance, the so-called transportation department constituted accordingly at the Reichsprotektor's, which dealt with the communication - system already taken out of the Reichsprotektor's jurisdiction by ordinance of March 16th 1939 - was controlled, just as before, by the Reich Ministry of Communications, and not by the Reichsprotektor, and had to get instructions not from him but from the Ministry in Berlin. And the same applied to other sectors, also concerning purely interior administration. Ministers for the Reich defence, and not, as the Czech prosecution erroneously contends, by a decree of the defendant, a new division of the Protectorate territory was created, into Oberlandratsbezirke with an Oberlandrat at their head, which official is, according to para. 6 of the ordinance, the competent administrator for all administrations of interior administration, and subordinate to the Reichsprotektor in an administrative sense; as such he is invested with far-reaching authority, and also controls the Czech authorities in the Protectorate, and this, not by the order of the Reichsprotektor, but of the concerned Reich Ministry in Berlin. This tee was bound to cause very serious differences and oppositions between the measures taken by these Oberlandraete according to the directives issued to them by the Reich Ministry of the Interior in Berlin and the policy pursued by the defendant. Insofar this latter affected and influenced the Czech administrative offices, can remain out of consideration, as this decree tee and its result, the switchingin of Reich German officials into the activity of the Czech administration, is no crime punishable according to the Charter of this Tribunal. This decree tee is but a result of the belonging of the Protectorate to the Reich. the police within the Protectorate territory, as well of the political as of the security police.
This question was quite unsettled until the decree came into force and had led to differences and inconveniences between Herr von Neurath and his Secretary of State Frank, from the first day of the former's activity on. Protectorate, he had according to the defendants testimony, assured him of a great plentitude of power, especially for the protection and fullest assistance in such policies of the defendant as were intended to achieve conciliation and balancing of the radical aspirations of the party and other shauvinistic circle The defendant deduced from this, that as the representative of the Fuehrer in the protectorate he must and will have a decisive influence in the activity of the police also. According to his own testimony he could not visualize at that time that by the fact that the police had not expressly and from the beginning been subordinated to him, a large part of the sphere of activity expected by him became illusory from the beginning. By simultaneously appointing Frank -who had just been made higher SS and police Fuehrer in the Protectorate -- to the position of Under Secretary and as such subordinating him to the defendant, he could however derive Hitler's intention to centralise power of authority over the police, if not in his own person, at least under his jurisdiction e.g. his Under Secretary. In practive however this relation worked out entirely differently since Under Secretary Frank had not the slightest intention to include his superior, the defendant, into the sphere of activity of the Police an recognised only the jurisdiction and power of authority of Himmler, respectivel of the Main office for security of the Reich (Reichssicherheitshauptamt), his superior as SS and Police Fuehrer. 1939: