THE PRESIDENT: Probably the defense counsel would wish to make their own selection.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH JONES: My Lord, I fully appreciate that. I was only trying to assist the Tribunal if I could.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, in indicating which appeared to you to be the most important.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH JONES: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, perhaps you could do that.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH JONES: The Blockleiter Hoett, I respectfully submit, ought to be called, as he is the only Blocklieter represented. The witness Haupfbauer ought to be called because he represents the experts on these staffs. There is a certain amount of dispute about then. And also, he represents a number of political Leiters who were in the DAF itself. Of the Gaulieters, Kauffmann and Wahl are experienced. Kauffmann comes from an industrial district and Wahl from an agricultural district, and I understand, if there were to to be any preference, that Dr. Servatius prefers Kauffmann. to the Gaulieter Wahl, the Ortsgruppenleiter Wegscheider and the farmer Mohr. My Lord, I would respectfully suggest that certainly three of those witnesses are unnecessary. They really cover very much the same grounds as each other and the Prosecution, quite frankly, would have preferred the witness Wahl. I simply put that forward to explain that they are all from agricultural areas and perhaps one, or certainly two would be sufficient, Mayor von der Borch is an experienced Kreisleiter from an industrial district, and does, to a great extent, cover the same ground as the Gaulieter Kauffmann, so that the Tribunal might consider having one or the other if they felt that the present number was excessive.
Now, I don't think I can assist the Tribunal further than that.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I named two Gaulieters, one from the industrial region; that is the witness Kauffmann; and the witness Wahl from a rural area; he lives in the vicinity of Augsburg. I believe it would be important to gain an impression of these two different types of Gaulieters. One of these men was active in the Party for twenty years, and the other for seventeen years, and were political leaders. A judge ment ot their activities over a long period of time and over a wide scope of activities can be reached only if you hear two people on the various topics.
Therefore, I should like to ask that, if possible, both witnesses he heard and be granted me.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, two things I should like to ask you about these Gaulieters. Didn't these two, Kauffmann and Wahl, deal with exactly the same topics before the Commission?
DR. SERVATIUS: They could both testify about the same thing, but I should like to divide the topics and ask Kauffmann about the connections with the Reich government and I should like to ask Wahl about the connection and relationship to the Kreis and Orts group. Of course, if I use just one, then the topic won't be expanded.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean you haven't asked them about it before the Commission?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, but I kept these topics separate that way, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: There is one other thing: How many Gaulieters have we heard already before the Tribunal?
DR. SERVATIUS: I should assume three or four, but I can't give you the exact figure; but they were not questioned about this topic with special reference as it would have disturbed the presentation of evidence if we had asked such questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Go ahead and deal with the other matters.
DR. SERVATIUS: The next witnesses apply to Kriesi-OrtsgruppenBlock, and I believe that on each level one witness has to be questioned who can testify as to the conditions that applied and obtained. Their testimonies, of course, may overlap, but they can be abbreviated so that the actual testimony will be rather short so that we won't run too far afield; but it seems important to me to have one witness from each level, each bracket.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you give the Tribunal any estimate of the time you think it would take to deal with these seven witnesses?
DR. SERVATIUS: I am sure that I can conclude this matter in one day, Mr. President. However, it depends on how the presentation of evidence is to be carried on, I assume that we will have a brief summary, that we will have a principal clarification of but a few questions.
Then two witnesses, Haupfbauer and Mohr, are on our list. One comes from the DAF, the German Labor Front, from an industrial region; and the other comes from the Food Ministry, and he cal tell about rural conditions. In general, both of these witnesses can tell about the positions taken by the expert offices that were not political leadership offices, and in this way I should like to show the separation of the political and the non-political leaders.
These are the statements I wish to make, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken).
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal makes the following order:
24 July M LJG 8-1 Brill, von Eberstein, Hinderfeld, Reinicke and Hausser are allowed. ers. be administered immediately and they will only be considered before the case is closed. Further extracts from Rauschnigg book, which has been referred to, may be submitted to the Tribunal. applied for, Hoeppner and Roessner are allowed. are allowed. Cabinet, the witness named must be called before the Commission. von Rundstedt and two others will be allowed. If it is desired that General von Brauchitsch should be one of the two, he must be called before the Commission and it is necessary that these matters should be decided by counsel for the defendant organization at once.
With reference to the political leaders, the defendant's counsel must select five out of the witnesses applied for and those five will be allowed?
I call on Dr. von Luedinghausen.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: May it please the Tribunals: strength of which the leaders of the German state decided upon the reinstatement of Germany's armed supremacy. tions concerning a general agreement on disarmament, which had started again with the so-called London communique of February 3rd, 1935 of the British Government and in which the German foreign policy, faithful to its readiness for peace which it had constantly proven, had at once consented to participate, and it was ready to wait even longer, until one could see whether or not the so new 24 July M LJG 8-2 negotiations promised to succeed, when suddenly, before even the negotiations had actually begun, the French government submitted, on March 1st 1935, a new defense bill concerning prolongation of military service, and the British government published at about the same time its afore-mentioned White Book.
In view of both those documents, the German government could not do otherwise but take the measures mentioned before, if it did not want to become a trait or to its own people. a different one. England and Italy, it is true, at once protested against them as an alleged unilateral cancellation of international treaties, but they did by no means cut the threads for further negotiations. The British protest note contained the explicite inquiry whether the German government was ready to carry on further negotiations of the kind and extent provided for in the London communique, an inquiry which the defendant von Neurath at once answered in the affirmative, by the German communique of March 18th 1935, Document Book III, No. 98. And the then British foreign Secretary Eden went to Berlin at the end of March 1935 in order to hold conversations about the possibility of an agreement on the naval question. deposition of the witness, Ambassador Dr. Diekhoff, who has been examined here. France only consequently pursuing its attitude toward the League of Nations and the latter's exclusive legitimatic for collective solution of the problems of disarmament and, therefore, of peace took the initiative to submit to the League of Nations, on March 20th, 1935, the measures taken by Germany, and to induce the League to establish a violation of the duty incumbing to all nations of carrying out assumed obligations. It goes without saying that the German Government refused to accept, in a note of April 20th, 1935, the renewed discrimination contained in this resolution of the League of Nations. However, the German foreign policy did not let itself be kept back by this resolution to continue trying very actively to establish an agreement with the Western powers, nor did the signature, on May 2nd, 1935, of the aforementioned France-Russian Assistance Pact and of the RussianCzecheslovak Assistance Pact, supplementing the former.
a new peace program, in which he declared once more, and to the largest possible extent, his readiness, most strongly stressing his and the German people's will for peace, to participate in any system of collective cooperation, to secure European peace, and to re-enter the League of Nations, as well as to comply with any of such restrictions of the German Wehrmacht's armaments, which other countries would also adopt, provided the equality of rights for Germany was recognized.
This speech of Hitler and the diplomatic discussions with other powers initiated at the same time had the promising result that between England and Germany the well-known naval convention of June 18th 1935 was agreed on, which established a fixed ratio of the respective naval forces. sense. On the one hand, from a political point of view, it signifies no less and no more than the implicit acknowledgment of German military sovereignty by England, a negation of the League of Nation's resolution and, at the same time, the French point of view, and the acknowledgment and approval by England of the German act which had been stigmatized by the league of Nations as a violation of treaties. For the first time, therefore, the equality of rights for Germany had been recognized not only de jure, but also de facto by one of the Western powers, and by one of the most important, too. On the other hand, it proves, from the point of view of this trial, irrefutably that the prosecution's contention, that one had to see in Germany's rearmament an act of preparation of the future wars of aggression of Hitler, is erroneous. On the contrary, this naval agreement shows clearly and unambiguously that the German foreign policy at that time, when still under guidance of my client, did not have any warlike intentions, much less plans, that the reassumption of military sovereignty under no circumstances had any warlike purposes, but nothing but a decidedly defensive character, I may ask, which statesman who carries in his heart warlike intention or plans would voluntarily consent to a restriction of his armament, and, therefore, of a successful execution of his designs and plans, and, moreover, to an extent as provided by the naval agreement? Even the most malevolent mind cannot earnestly contend that the naval power allowed to Germany by this agreement would have been in the least sufficient for a war of aggression; that has been unobjectionably established by the evidence of this trial. Hitler himself had by this agreement robbed himself of the possibility of creating a navy which would have been able to wage a war of aggression. It is clear that any transgression worth mentioning of the agreed ratio of the two navies, which, as things were, could under no circumstances and by no means have been kept secret, would beyond doubt either have induced England to increase her own navy accordingly, or would have caused her to obstruct this German intention, and this could have been done at time. From whatever point of view one may look at this naval agreement, the fact that it was and is an irrefragable proof of the absolute honesty and sincerity of the repeated declarations of Germany's will for peace, an unreversible proof against the presence of any, even the most secret warlike designs or plans of German foreign policy and, therefore, of its leader, the defendant von Neurath, is not to be shaken.
In France this Naval Agreement not with general opposition. It was regarded as an arbitrary act of England, a departing from the common line that was still kept to in the resolution of the League of Nations, and that was bounce to interfere with the French plans. So France was vary reluctant and reserved with regard to the negotiations started by Britain for the conclusion of a general air-pact negotiations, which ran parallel with the negotiations about the Naval Agreement. Hitler's speech of 21st May 1935 had also been causative for these negotiations. Because in this speech, Hitler, referring to the London report, held out his hand for an agreement on limiting of air armaments. And the German government themselves, taking up the English suggestion, presented a project for such an air pact on 29th May 1935. Negotiations lasting for near 3 months between the English and French governments were necessary before England succeeded to induce France to agree to participate even in these negotiations. This consent, however, was in reality no consent at all because, among other things, it was tied to the condition that the realization of this air pact must keep pace with the negotiations about the East-pact. As this pact, however, had then to be rejected by Germany for reasons of own security, as already mentioned, it was clear that the French condition in reality blocked the way to successful negotiations from the start. When, at the beginning of the Soviet Union sponsored Komintern congress, on 25th July 1935 it became unequivocally clear that the Komintern's aim was the world-revolution, Germany's opposition -- as will be understood -- stiffened. September 1935 communicated to the English Ambassador, that the German foreign policy did not consider opportune an answer to the memorandum of the British Government of 5th August 1935, which demanded answers to a number of questions of France, that were hardly connected with the air-pact. Besides the ItalyAbyssinia conflict had already thrown its shadow ahead, whereby alone the further negotiations about the air-pact were suspended. How could a political agreement between the five powers of the Pact of Locarne be possible, and German foreign policy very reasonably pointed to the fact, if the collaboration of these powers was in dissolution and individual powers of this pact were facing each other in military readiness.
On 7 th September 1935 as it is known, the English home-fleet set out for the Mediterranean, and negotiations between England and France about the application of sanctions against Italy were in full swing. On 3rd October 1935 war broke out between Italy and Abyssinia. events in Africa and the efforts of the powers to apply sanctions against Italy. But nevertheless the events that followed became important for the German fore in policy; because it was these events and specially the question of sanctions which prepared a new constellation of powers, which on one hand led to a closer union of England and France and the point of view taken up by her and which, on the other hand, brought Germany, who was again defamed by the resolution of the League of Nations of 17th April 1935, naturally closer together with Italy who was defamed by the sanctions being taken against her. dissolution of the Pact of Lecarne, because it was not possible to consider a pact, as being still legally in existence if its participants were opposed to one another in so hostile a way, that the danger of war-like actions was present at any moment. September 1935, to draw also England into the not of its pacts and their obligations, clearly showed the tendency of French policy, and inevitably confirmed German statesmen in their conviction that France consistently followed only its policy of encirclement which was felt as a menace to Germany. However, Germany's leaders and the defendant von Neurath still hesitated to draw the last conclusions from this and from taking the absolutely necessary step for Germany's most primitive security. German foreign policy still kept hoping, in its unshakable desire for peace and readiness to negotiate, that an agreement could be reached, that France would abandon its course, and that a really honest and sincere understanding with France could be reached. This hope, however was soon found to be a delusion. On 16th January 1936, French Foreign Minister Laval announced that, after his return from Geneva in the beginning of February, he would present for ratification to the French parliament the pact of assistance concluded with Russia. And at about the same time the defendant von Neurath hear from reliable sources that the French General Staff had worked out military plans for an attack on Germany, providing for the advance of French troops from the Rhineland and following along the line of the river Main so as to join hands via Czechoslovakia with the Russian Armies.
Hereby the offensive character of the France-Russian pact was proved even to the most naive. There was all the less ground for doubt, if one took into consideration the negotiations that took place inside and outside the French chamber before the pact's ratification. For even in France, resistance to this pact, specifically on account of its offensive character, was not small. The French veterans of the 1st world war headed the opposition: The Union Nationale des Combattants declared, in a resolution of 8th February 1936, that this pact contained more certain ties of war than possibilities of peace. And the speech of deputy Montigny, in the French chamber, on 13 February 1936, was a single flaming protest. It is contained in my document book IV No. 107. The pact opened even further, so Montigny, said the breach between France and Germany, and Germany must more than ever gain the impression of encirclement, if a party depending on Moscow like the communists party followed the policy of Delcasse, the policy of revenge and of the former Russo-French pact. The greatest danger of war would arise, if France were to convey the impression that she enjoyed the secret protection of Moscow. Evan the German government made a last attempt to keep France from ratifying the pact. In the interview that Hitler gave to Bertrand de Jouvenel, the correspondent of the French Newspaper "Paris midi", on 21st February 1936 -- doc. Book IV No.108 -- Hitler once again held out his hand to the French people for an understanding, for a lasting peace and friendship: "I want to prove to my people", so Hitler literally declared, "That the idea of hereditary enmity between France and Germany is nonsense." And Hitler once and for all in that interview, finished off the reference to his book "My Straggle", that was brought up then as it has been continuously been repeated in this court, by stating: When I wrote this book I was in prison. At that time French troops occupied the Ruhr. It was a moment of greatest tension. Yes, we were enemies, and I stuck to my country as it should be, just as I steel to my country against yours in the trenches when I was for 4 1/2 years in the war. I would despise myself, if in case of a conflict I were not aGerman first of all But today there is no reason anymore for any conflict. You would like me to correct my book like a writer.
But I am no writer. I am a politician. I make my corrections through my foreign policy which is directed towards an understanding with France. If I achieve the German French understanding, it will be a dignified correction, At the same interview, however, Hitler drew attention most clearly to the inevitable consequences of the France-Russian pact: "My personal efforts to such an understanding will never cease. However, this more than regrettable pact would, in fact, create a new situation. Are you not conscious, in France, of what you are doing?
nothing but to bring the great European nations into a chaos from which this power alone derives advantage. One must not lose sight of the fact that Soviet Russia is a political factor which has at her disposal an explosive revolutionary conception and a gigantic armament industry." alleged German danger for good if it so desired, because the German population had complete confidence in him, their leader, and ho, this leader, desired friendship with France. The hearing of evidence has proven that Hitler meant these declarations to be honest and sincere."
But it was all in vain. The French Government could not be moved any more to r elinquish its rigid attitude, and on 27 February 1936 the French Chamber voted to ratify the pact in spite of all warning.
The die was cast. On 7 March 1936 German troops marched again into their previous garrisons in the Rhineland Zone, which had been demilitarized until then; the German Reich had won again its full sovereignty over the entire Reich territory; the last of the restrictive barriers of the Versailles treaty had fallen. land, however, was of importance for one reason, which by far surpassed its political and prestige significance -- as seen from the standpoint of existence of the German State and nation -- and, also was the sole and therefore the more pressing reason and cause for the important resolutions made by the German Government. This was the security of the Reich. As long as the Rhineland was demilitarized, not only one of the most valuable and most important provinces but the Reich itself, and especially its life source the Ruhr territory, was without protection against any military attack from the West. The only protection for Germany against the latent terrible danger lying in this fact existed in the Locarne pact, made in 1925, firmly guarantee by Great Britain and Italy, in which France and Belgium, on the one hand, and Germany on the other hand, underwent the obligation not to wage war against each other.
vulnerability of its western frontier by having the Rhineland demilitarized. -a matter of life and death that the protection given by this treaty would not be falsified. Such falsification of its meaning and its essence, the protection of Germany, however, occurred at the moment when the political conditions and constellations, which existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, had changed fundamentally. Europe, and therefore also in Germany, were governed and determined solely by the four powers, England, France, Italy and Germany, acting in unison. And, therefore, the men who made the Locarno treaty for Germany could legitimately rely on the faithfulness of France and Belgium as sufficient protection. This supposition, however, ceased to exist and the meaning and essence of this treaty, and with it the protection for Germany, was bound to be changed, i.e. to be falsified, when France definitely changed the political conditions of Europe through concluding her pact of assistance with Russia and created a situation which frustrated the aim and purpose of the Locarno treaty, namely, to give Germany protection against the permanent danger caused by the demilitarization of the Rhineland. pact, by the fact that the world's greatest military power, which was openly revolutionary-minded at that time had entered the political arena. In the face of the not clarified situation in the East, amply laden with conflicting material, the pact could, lead, easily to the possibility that France, because of her duties toward Russia, became drawn in a war and would attack Germany, should the latter get entangled in a conflict in the East. tical whether the guaranteeing powers, England and Italy, would consider the case for which the guarantee was given as arisen and would actively assist Germany against a French attack, or would rather prefer to stay neutral. That this possibility positively existed also from the legal point of view was shown already in the German note of 25 May 1935 about the French-Russian pact-Document Book III No. 105 -- and was emphasized again in the German memorandum to the signatory powers of the Locarno pact of 7 March 1936 -- Document Book IV No. 109.
even greater and. more imminent through the events up to the ratification of the French-Russian pact by the French Chamber and. by the ratifiaction itself. Therefore, it was a command, a self-evident act of self-defence and selfpreservation, when the German Government, realizing this threatening danger, took steps which were the minimum of what was necessary to meet this danger, namely, to establish the military sovereignty of the Reich in 1935 and to reoccupy, one year later, the demilitarized Zone of the French Armies, and thereby to move forward the defense line against any attack from the West to the border of the Reich. the highest of all overriding duty of every government, every responsible statesman, has been is now and always will be, to maintain and safeguard the existence an life of his own State and nation. A statesman who neglects this duty commits a sin against his nation. Re-establishment of military sovereignty, rearmament, and reoccupation of the Rhineland were the natural reactions, the answer of the German statesmen in duty bound, and therefore also that of the defendant von Neurath, to the policy of the French government, in which, after all that had ahppened before, they had to see and saw a threat to Germany. reproach the French government, morally or otherwise, for the policy followed by it as I have described it above. Moreover, I am of the conviction -- in agreement with the defendant von Neurath -- and recognize fully, that the French policy was dictated solely by France's interest, and the French statesmen surely have done only what they believed was just from the French point of view.
German conviction, namely, the premise that a Germany which has regained its strength presented a danger and a throat to France, that from times of old the German people had faced in a blind rage of hatred and enmity the French people and were animated only by the furor to attack and the craving for revenue, then my client and I can only sincerely deplore this, but we cannot condemn it. statesmen, fir the defendant von Neurath, that their deeds and actions be judged according to their motives, according to the then prevailing circumstances which of necessity, from the viewpoint of German interests, led to these motives, and that not an in itself mostimprobable interpretation, which was the farthest from them, be given to their motices.
Politics, diplomacy, are history which has come to life. Like the entire universe, like everything that lives and moves in it, so too is this living history subject to an unchangeable law, the law of causality. given irrefutable evidence to you, Your honours, of the following facts: that the two actions charged to the defendant by the prosecution, and which are said to incriminate him in particular because they represent breaches of contract in preparation of war, namely, the recovery of the military sogereignty of the Reich and the remilitarization of the Rhineland, were, according to the iron rules of logic and necessity, the outcome of the events and the political development during the years of my client's activity as Foreign Minister, due to the politics of the stern rowers, and that neither he nor Hitler have consciously, intentionally, and according to a preconceived plan, brought them about, but that they were the inevitable consequence of the French policy. They can therefore not only not, as is asserted by the prosecution in its retrospective consideration of things, have an aggressive or even war-preparing character or tendence, but to the contrary, by serving only the purpose of defense against and the warding off of a possible attack, they have an outspoken defensive and hence peaceful character. That alongside of this there is no room for their interpretation for a future war of aggression by Germany I guess I need not emphasize, the whole absurdity of a retrospective interpretation of and conclusions drawn from certain historical events torn out and abruptly lined up without any coherence.
with the investigation of historical truths, which should be the first pre-supposition and duty of this high Tribunal, not only for the firming of its judgment but also for its duty to direct the ways of a now international law controlled by ethical principles, this manner of thinking has nothing whatsoever in common. ants as reaches of international treaties does not prove sound upon closer scrutiny of the connections. For the Treaty of Versailles as well as the Treaty of Locarno had in the course of time and events, not only lost their signification and therewith their inner justification, but both of thorn had long since been breached by exactly the French policy and thereby de jure annulled: the Treaty of Versailles by France's obstinate refusal of the disarmament obligations imposed upon her as well as upon the other contracting nations in return for Germany's disarmament; the Treaty of Locarno by the agreement with Russia which wan incompatible with the Locarno pact. History, as often before, had passed over them too, and had thus shown the nonsense of applying rigidly the dogma of "Pacta servanda sunt", as France tried to maintain against Germany. This fact will not be altered, not even by the League of Nations resolution of 19 arch 1936 which had been proposed by France and which is not astonishing in view of France's dominating position in the League of Nations, in which the latter declares that Germany, through remilitarizing the Rhineland had violated article 45 of the Treaty of Versailles. History passed over these too. explanations and parleys between the participating nations which preceded and followed it, for gradually, in the course of events, they petered out. Europe finally put up with the accomplished facts.
according to the Charter of this high Tribunal the breach of an international contract is punishable only when it serves the purpose of preparation for a war of aggression. In the course of this trial one of the American gentlemen of the prosecution stated expressly that it was absolutely legal and justifiable by peaceable means to bring about a revision or the end of treaties. But the German policy has been nothing else. The military action of the reoccupation of the Rhineland was, in view of the small force of troops of only one division without participation of the ari-force, in reality only a symbolic act for the restoration of the sovereignty of the Reich, and has been proved already by the fact, that as early as 12 March 1936 the German government through its ambassador in London in a statement contained in my document-book IV, No. 113, made the proposal, in the case of reciprocity to abondon the re-enforcement of troops and their closer approach to the borders.
The proposal was rejected by France. The German policy has throughout and in every respect held to its line of peace- policy for which it had stood consistently, for many years, and in reality it only wanted to serve and has served the purpose of peace and its maintenance in Europe. Both steps, the restoration of military sovereignty as well as the re-occupation of the Rhineland were, as I want to especially emphasize here, nothing else than the visible expression and effluence of the full and unlimited sovereignty of the Reich. This sovereignty in its part had already been recognized by the western powers in the often mentioned Five-Power-Agreement of 11 December 1932 by the recognition of Germany right of equality. More conclusive evidence of the love of peace and the absolute peace-policy of the defendant von Neural could hardly be found than the fact that for years he waited with the realization of this recognition, in the interests of avoiding complications which due to the French policy by reasons of its former attitude might possibly arise up to the moment when, in consequence of the changed balance of power this realization became an undeniable necessity for security of the Reich, a necessity for self-defence. And the German foreign policy continued in practice to follow this tendency unchanged, even after and in spite of this resolution. In the German memorandum of 31 March 1936 -Doc. book IV No. 116German foreign policy once more submitted to the powers, on behalf of the Reich Government, a new great peace-plan for a quarter of a century of peace in Europe, by which, as is stated in conclusion, it wanted to make a contribution to the building up of a new Europe on the basis of mutual respect. It thereby again gave clear and unmistakable evidence of its immutable will for peace. That this German peace plan, the absolute honesty and sincerity of whi had been affirmed upon oath by the defendant, was also not successful, and did not lead to the building up of a new pacified Europe, was not Germany's fault.
defendant's policy during the years 1936-1937, in spite of all the disappoint ments he had experienced to date. This was expressed above all also by the treaty between the German Reich and Austria, which was concluded on the 11 July 1936 as the result of negotiations which had been carried on for some time by the defendant von Papen. Not only the defendant's own testimony but also the testimony of the witnesses Koepcke and Diekhoff prove beyond doubt that the standpoint on the Austrian question which the defendant consistently took up and supported from the very beginning was, that a closer co-operation between the two countries -both in the political and particularly in the economic field- had indeed to be striven fur, but that Austria's inpedence had, under all circumstances to be respected and remain intact. interference by Germany with the internal politics of Austria and the attempt of the party to support the Austrian National Socialists in their fight against the Austrian Governments of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg and he had protested again and again against them with Hitler and not without success. That he, this Christian minded, honorable man, abhorred and condemned from the bottom of his hear the murder of Dollfuss need not be emphasized. And just from that viewpoint he welcomed the agreement of 11 July 1935 as it corresponded throughout to his own opinion. This alone contradicts the assertion of the prosecution that the agreement was concluded with intent to defraud, that is with the intention to lull the Austrian government into security and hereby to prepare and facilitate for the future the intent already existing at that time, of incorporation Austria by force into the German Reich. of the agreement is confirmed by the sworn testimony of the then Austrian foreign minister Dr. Guido Schmidt. That the defendant von Neurath had no reason to doubt Hitler's honesty and sincerity is demonstrated unequivocally by Hitler's statements as deposed by the witness Koepcke to the British Foriegn Minister Simon on his visit in Berlin in March 1935 in connection with the fact that Hitler immediately after conclusion of the agreement urged on the leaders of the Austrian National Socialists Rainer and Globotschnik strict adherence to the agreement by the Austrian Nazis, as shown by the testimony of the defendant.
And thus, from his view point, he considered this agreement another step to the appeasement of Europe as the recognition of Austria's independence proclaimed in it, eliminated the European danger point comprised in the Austrian problem. between Germany and the Czecheslovakian Republic, since it was only with this aim in mind that he mentioned so often to the Czechoslovak Ambassador Dr. Mastny that the Czechoslovak government must at last meet the demands, still very moderate at that time, of the Sudeten Germans, which were based on a promise in that matter given already in Versailles by the Czechoslovak govern ment but not kept by her.
Nothing was further from the defendant's mind in both questions than the idea of their solution by force as later, after he had left his position as Foreign Minister, Hitler thought it the right thing to do. European South Eastern nations and to make them closer, were served just as little aggressive intentions or even plans to partition Czechoslovakia with the help of these nations. If in Messersmith's affidavit it is alleged that Germany in order to secure this aim had promised to the South Eastern states, and even to Poland parts of Czechoslovakia an even of Austria, one can call this definite fantastic ideas which do not contain an iota of truth. What can be thought of these assertions is shown by the fact that the prosecution could not submit a single report from one of the diplomats of the Western Powers accredited States, which would confirm their accuracy or even only indicate it. Should only Mr. Messersmith have been so clever to have learned of such plans ? In reality the defendant's efforts and his trip to Budapest Belgrade and Sofia served exclusively peaceful purposes, namely the exchange and the strengthening of the economic relations of Germany with these states, an endeavour which, as shown by the testimony of the witness Koepcke, was close to the defendant's heart and influenced his policies.