DR. PELCKMANN: I know his books, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Then if it is in his book, how will it help to have him say what is in his book again?
DR. PELCKMANN: Of course, his books represent but a very small extract of his entire knowledge, and he did not write his books with a view towards this trial and the chief points at issue in this trial as they are stressed the prosecution today. The witness can answer the questions relating to the trial now better than if you were to tear the pages out of his books.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand you to be saying that the only reason you got to thinking that he would be able to answer those questions is because of what you see in the books. Then you do not know that he can give any further evidence than is in the book.
DR. PELCKMANN: Mr. President, of course, I do not know that; but my assumption hased on experience is that he probably would be able to do so. I do not believe that I am asking for anything out of the ordinary. A man who applied himself so intensively from he years 1933 to 1936 and dealt so extensively with Hitler and Nazism and contemplated these matters in later years and, discussed this system with foreign people, I assume, knows a tremendous amount more than is set down in these books. And, on the other hand, I have teh following reason for my application: from the books of Rauschnigg. These quotations are Tactically identical wit affidavits. The prosecution would have been in a position just as well to obtain affidavits which would have given us a little more detail as to his assertions. have these witnesses who gave affidavits here for cross examination. And I believe -
THE PRESIDENT: I am not aware that such a rule applied to witnesses in the United States. The rule, in so far as any rule at all was made, was that people who were in this country, if they had made affidavits, might be brought here for cross examination; that rule has never been applied to persons who were in the United States or in any other country outside this country.
The case of Mr. Messersmith is an instance, and there has never been a case of anybody's being brought in, except, perhaps, the witness Dahlarus.
DR. PELCKMANN: Another point of significance is that, as against the prosecution, in view of the fact that in contrast to the individual nature of the defendants I can only deal with members of the organization -- and this only in a limited way -- I believe that I may ask the High Tribunal that this witness, the only one who knows those things and can tell the High Tribunal about conditions at the time and can give us his impression and opinion about these matters, be brought here; for technical difficulties should not play a tremendous part in a proceeding of this significance.
May I continue, My Lord?
DR. PELCKMANN: The witness is to testify further that it was Hitler's deliberate policy to deceive the German people as well as foreign countries about his plans and intentions, as, for instance, his war intentions. mentioned the fact -- and almost ridiculed the fact -- of how he was succeeding in fooling his own people, not only the foreign countries and in leading then a round by the nose. assertion on the part of the Prosecution that a consistent way led from the Party program to the destruction camps at Auschwitz. The Party program, according to the mass membership, foresaw only an ordering or a regulation of the Jewish question according to the minority problem, but intensified some what through the Nurnberg Laws of 1935. But -- and this we can still display would not be a crime against humanity. If it is proved that during this time Hitler actually did not have the intention to exceed this program and to beyond it, then the assertion of the Prosecution could not be upheld any long. If Hitler's intention and attitude at that time is proved, the SS at that time and the simple SS man who followed this program could not have any other program either.
The second point is the deception of the people. Today we know just what did take place, and all of this matter may be seen from the various documents, such as the Reichstag speeches of Hitler with regard to the will to peace, but it would be quite starting if a witness asserted that Hitler had confided to him that it was his principle that the followers, the Germans, should be deceived about his intentions, and in this matter the Prosecution world have to prove that the SS was not deceived -- that the SS, together with Hitler, actually knew what Hitler wanted to do.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pelckmann, the Tribunal did not desire to hear general argument from you upon the whole case. They are simply dealing with the question of whether this man Rauschning should be brought from the United States.
DR. PELCKMANN: If the relevance of the testimony is not disputed, Mr. President -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pelckmann, we have your written application before us, and you are dealing with a variety of matters which are not mentioned in that written application.
DR. PELCKMANN: Of course, Mr. President, I could not set down everything in my application which I rash to say now. Of course, this application contains my main points: first, the Jewish question and, second, the deception of the German people and of the SS membership.
THE PRESIDENT: We have indicated to you what the view of the Tribunal is -- that two think that have dealt with the application, and we do not desire to hear a general argument.
DR. PELCKMANN: Mr. President, I tried only to show the relevance my three points of evidence. If we assume the relevance in this matter, the may I be permitted to say the following: and I must say -
THE PRESIDENT: You have already said that, Dr. Pelckmann, more the once, and the Tribunal is quite aware of what you have said.
DR. PELCKMANN: Mr. President, do you care to hear argument on the question of what reasons I have for thinking that we should deviate from the general rule and brine this witness here from America?
THE PRESIDENT: You have already presented argument to that effect.
MR. DODD: Mr. President Counsel for the SD has asked for only two witnesses, and the Prosecution has no objection to these two witnesses being heard by the Tribunal. It seems like a reasonable number. for the Reich Cabinet and High Command as well?
THE PRESIDENT: The Reich Cabinet, we understood, was not going to be dealt with today.
MR. DODD: We received the application for one witness this morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes. Certainly. Go on and deal with those.
MR. DODD: With respect to the High Command, Counsel for the defendant organization has asked for six witnesses, and our position is that it is at least twice as many as are necessary and that three -- something like three -- would be a much more reasonable number to present before the Tribunal, We have no particular preferences or no objections, no particular objections, to any of the three. I understand, however, that Counsel prefers von Rundstedt; von Brauchitsch and von Mannstein, and we have no objections if that is his choice of the six, but we do object to six on the ground that they are too numerous and all of them have been heard before the Commission. are asked for -- the witness Best and the witness Hoffmann, and we have no objection to the appearances of these two witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: The two names Karl, Hans are Christian names, I suppose?
MR. DODD: Yes, so I have understood, Mr. President.
I am not clear, Mr. President, whether or not you wish to have me deal with the Reich Cabinet. Shall I make known our attitude toward the one witness?
THE PRESIDENT: I think so. Certainly, you may deal with them new if they are ready. Dr. Kubuschok -
MR. DODD: In any event, he has only asked for one witness, Mr. President, and we have no objection. The witness Schlegelberger.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Mr. Dodd. Unless Counsel for the SD, Gestapo and the Reich Cabinet want to say anything, the Tribunal does not think it is necessary to hear them.
Then, they would hear Counsel for the High Command, Dr. Laternser.
Yes, Dr. Laternser.
DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the High Command): Mr. President, in view of the accusations raised against the High Command, I am convinced that the application for six witnesses is quite justified. In order for the Tribunal to decide the question of whether the High Command in its policies was criminal, the Tribunal must in advance be able to get a personal picture and a personal impression of some of these military leaders so that a just sentence may be passed.
Can we assume that if we hear but a few people out of this large circle, which comprises 129 people, the High Tribunal has fathered a true picture because of those few people out of the circle that have been heard? My answer would be in the negative.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell me how many of the 129 we have already heard before the Tribunal?
DR. LATERNSER: Before this Tribunal, Mr. President, in the commissions, seven members of the group were heard, and two -
THE PRESIDENT: I did not say before the commission; I said before the Tribunal.
DR. LATERNSER: On occasion some of the persons who belonged to this group were questioned, and I would assume that five or six people were involved.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on.
DR. LATERNSER: In order to evaluate the number of people that are to be heard here, I ask that the following be taken into consideration: might be in a position to refute the statements made by witnesses produced by the Prosecution, according to the resolution of the High Tribunal, my possibilities along those lines are strongly limited, for these witness have to be heard before the commissions first, even though in every other penal procedure, many interrogations of the witnesses would take place in other proceedings. In this way the scope of the witnesses is delineated and limited from the beginning and is dependent upon the activity of the commission.
Mr. President, in order that I may be in a position to present to the High Tribunal the personal picture that is required for my proper defense, I should like to make the following suggestion, which I believe is quite practical: speaking only for myself and the organization I represent -- that a span of time be set down during which time I may carry through the examining of witnesses before the Tribunal, and that the distribution of the time allotted should be left to the Defense. Then I would have the possibility of questioning the six witnesses that I have asked for, and of the period of time set down by the Court, I would use only two thirds for my examination, and I would put one third of the time at the disposal of the Prosecution for cross examination.
In this way, Mr. President, I should like to accomplish only one thing -- so that in my opinion the most important point be proved and that would be that a personal impression be gained of the people who are accused.
I assume that the Court would have no misgivings in this connection. And a further suggestion that I should like to make for the procedure to be followed in the hearing of the organizations --
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, let me make certain that I understand the suggestion. You are suggesting that the Tribunal should allot a certain time for the witnesses for the High Command, and that you, as Counsel examining the witnesses, should take up two-thirds of the time, and that the Prosecution, in cross-examination, should tale up one-third of the time. Is that correct?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. I quite agree, Mr. President. In that period of time I may call as many witnesses as I choose to do.
THE PRESIDENT: How much time are you contemplating?
DR. LATERNSER: It is very hard for me to answer that question, Mr. President. I would like -
THE PRESIDENT: It is your suggestion. The Tribunal would like to know how much time you are suggesting.
DR. LATERNSER: One and one-half to two days, Mr. President. That is, altogether. And, I should like to put two more applications before the Tribunal, or rather, make two more suggestions, which may have some significance in this connection. All the witnesses which are to appear here have already been heard by the Commission. The transcripts of the interrogations are in the hands of the Tribunal, and the putting of the same questions would, in this case, with certainty be cumulative. How is the examination to be carried through, Mr. President, in order to avoid repitition? and the difficulties which we have just raised will be avoided by my suggestion. In my opinion, I believe the Tribunal should be in a position to complete with my application, and in conclusion, I should like to suggest that the High Tribunal voice an opinion as to the handling of these arguments on the part of the accused organizations as to just how they would be handled. That would be all, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to hear you with reference to Dr. Laternser's suggestions, Mr. Dodd.
MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President. We have, insofar as we recall, made a list of the names of the people who have appeared before the Commission as members of the organizations, or of the groups, and those who have appeared before the Tribunal.
I stated a few minutes ago that all of these who have not appeared, such as Von Brauchitsch -- who was to appear and who may have appeared yesterday, I am not informed -- will appear in a day or so.
With reference to the suggestion of Sr. Laternser that he be allotted a specific time and may use as many witnesses in that time as he sees fit, we find two difficulties. First of all, we do not feel that he is being generous enough in allotting us one-third of the time. In any event, we do not want to have a restriction placed on us in the effect that we have only one-third of the time that he has. If we are to examine witnesses on the time standpoint, we feel that much of the time would be taken up before the Tribunal on matters that have already been thoroughly dealt with before the Commission. All the witnesses have been heard before the Commission, and Dr. Laternser has had a full opportunity to examine and cross-examine before the Commission, and it seems unnecessary to burden the Tribunal with a great number of witnesses here.
THE PRESIDENT: I wanted to speak to Mr. Dodd. to the arguments just presented to us if the Prosecution were allotted the same amount of time as Dr. Laternser?
DR. DODD: Well, it would make a little difference. Frankly, I didn't consider that too important a point.
THE PRESIDENTS: Perhaps there's one other thing which bears upon it. The Tribunal would like to know how you think the difficulty is to be met that it seems unnecessary for the witnesses who are called before us here to give the whole of the evidence given before the Commission, or even to enter upon the evidence which has been entered upon before the Commission, and the Tribunal would like to know how that difficulty is to be met.
MR. DODD: We have been thinking about this very problem and we had assumed that the witnesses who have appeared before the Commission and who have been examined there would not go over the same grounds before the Tribunal, otherwise the proceedings of the Commission would be rather senseless, and we might just as well get up and read the record of what was said before the Commission.
We had understood that the witnesses would have something new to add to what they have already said before the Commission. That is our understanding.
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, I think Dr. Laternser has said on various occasions that he attached importance to the actual presence of the witnesses so that the Tribunal could see him and form their own opinion of the witnesses credibility.
MR. DODD: Yes, that is what I understood to be one of the reasons, but three members --
THE PRESIDENT: In addition to seeing the witnesses and forming an opinion of their credibility, he would be able to summarize the evidence given
MR. DODD: Yes, I assume that would be so. Of course, four of these members of the groups we are in the dark about, and two of the members of the Naval Command, Von Brauchitsch and Milch -- and there are a number of others.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
MR. DODD: With respect to the time suggestion which I made, I repeat I do not think that is too important. I know we can confine ourselves in cross examination to the important matters, but I think it is the experience of the Commission that we seldom stayed within the limits which were established.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it is necessary to hear further argument. We will consider your suggestion and further arguments, Dr. Laternser, are unnecessary unless there is anything particularly new that you wish to say. The Tribunal will consider your suggestion. We will now deal with the political leaders.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH JONES: The leadership gorup has asked for seven witnesses, two of them are Gauleiters, and are witnesses Kauffmann and Wahl; one Kreisleiter Mayon von der Borch; one Ortsgruppenleiter Wegscheider; Blockleiter Hauffe, and two experts on the staff of the Hoheitstraeger, namely a farming export, who was also a political leader, and Haupfbauer who was a political leader in the D.A.F. The Prosecution has no objection to any of these witnesses, but we feel that the grounds could be adequately and properly covered. And it may be of help to the Tribunal if I suggested the witnesses most important and those which might be dispensed with.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably the defense counsel would wish to make their own selection.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH JONES: My Lord, I fully appreciate that. I was only trying to assist the Tribunal if I could.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, in indicating which appeared to you to be the most important.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH JONES: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, perhaps you could do that.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH JONES: The Blockleiter Hoett, I respectfully submit, ought to be called, as he is the only Blocklieter represented. The witness Haupfbauer ought to be called because he represents the experts on these staffs. There is a certain amount of dispute about then. And also, he represents a number of political Leiters who were in the DAF itself. Of the Gaulieters, Kauffmann and Wahl are experienced. Kauffmann comes from an industrial district and Wahl from an agricultural district, and I understand, if there were to to be any preference, that Dr. Servatius prefers Kauffmann. to the Gaulieter Wahl, the Ortsgruppenleiter Wegscheider and the farmer Mohr. My Lord, I would respectfully suggest that certainly three of those witnesses are unnecessary. They really cover very much the same grounds as each other and the Prosecution, quite frankly, would have preferred the witness Wahl. I simply put that forward to explain that they are all from agricultural areas and perhaps one, or certainly two would be sufficient, Mayor von der Borch is an experienced Kreisleiter from an industrial district, and does, to a great extent, cover the same ground as the Gaulieter Kauffmann, so that the Tribunal might consider having one or the other if they felt that the present number was excessive.
Now, I don't think I can assist the Tribunal further than that.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I named two Gaulieters, one from the industrial region; that is the witness Kauffmann; and the witness Wahl from a rural area; he lives in the vicinity of Augsburg. I believe it would be important to gain an impression of these two different types of Gaulieters. One of these men was active in the Party for twenty years, and the other for seventeen years, and were political leaders. A judge ment ot their activities over a long period of time and over a wide scope of activities can be reached only if you hear two people on the various topics.
Therefore, I should like to ask that, if possible, both witnesses he heard and be granted me.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, two things I should like to ask you about these Gaulieters. Didn't these two, Kauffmann and Wahl, deal with exactly the same topics before the Commission?
DR. SERVATIUS: They could both testify about the same thing, but I should like to divide the topics and ask Kauffmann about the connections with the Reich government and I should like to ask Wahl about the connection and relationship to the Kreis and Orts group. Of course, if I use just one, then the topic won't be expanded.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean you haven't asked them about it before the Commission?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, but I kept these topics separate that way, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: There is one other thing: How many Gaulieters have we heard already before the Tribunal?
DR. SERVATIUS: I should assume three or four, but I can't give you the exact figure; but they were not questioned about this topic with special reference as it would have disturbed the presentation of evidence if we had asked such questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Go ahead and deal with the other matters.
DR. SERVATIUS: The next witnesses apply to Kriesi-OrtsgruppenBlock, and I believe that on each level one witness has to be questioned who can testify as to the conditions that applied and obtained. Their testimonies, of course, may overlap, but they can be abbreviated so that the actual testimony will be rather short so that we won't run too far afield; but it seems important to me to have one witness from each level, each bracket.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you give the Tribunal any estimate of the time you think it would take to deal with these seven witnesses?
DR. SERVATIUS: I am sure that I can conclude this matter in one day, Mr. President. However, it depends on how the presentation of evidence is to be carried on, I assume that we will have a brief summary, that we will have a principal clarification of but a few questions.
Then two witnesses, Haupfbauer and Mohr, are on our list. One comes from the DAF, the German Labor Front, from an industrial region; and the other comes from the Food Ministry, and he cal tell about rural conditions. In general, both of these witnesses can tell about the positions taken by the expert offices that were not political leadership offices, and in this way I should like to show the separation of the political and the non-political leaders.
These are the statements I wish to make, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken).
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal makes the following order:
24 July M LJG 8-1 Brill, von Eberstein, Hinderfeld, Reinicke and Hausser are allowed. ers. be administered immediately and they will only be considered before the case is closed. Further extracts from Rauschnigg book, which has been referred to, may be submitted to the Tribunal. applied for, Hoeppner and Roessner are allowed. are allowed. Cabinet, the witness named must be called before the Commission. von Rundstedt and two others will be allowed. If it is desired that General von Brauchitsch should be one of the two, he must be called before the Commission and it is necessary that these matters should be decided by counsel for the defendant organization at once.
With reference to the political leaders, the defendant's counsel must select five out of the witnesses applied for and those five will be allowed?
I call on Dr. von Luedinghausen.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: May it please the Tribunals: strength of which the leaders of the German state decided upon the reinstatement of Germany's armed supremacy. tions concerning a general agreement on disarmament, which had started again with the so-called London communique of February 3rd, 1935 of the British Government and in which the German foreign policy, faithful to its readiness for peace which it had constantly proven, had at once consented to participate, and it was ready to wait even longer, until one could see whether or not the so new 24 July M LJG 8-2 negotiations promised to succeed, when suddenly, before even the negotiations had actually begun, the French government submitted, on March 1st 1935, a new defense bill concerning prolongation of military service, and the British government published at about the same time its afore-mentioned White Book.
In view of both those documents, the German government could not do otherwise but take the measures mentioned before, if it did not want to become a trait or to its own people. a different one. England and Italy, it is true, at once protested against them as an alleged unilateral cancellation of international treaties, but they did by no means cut the threads for further negotiations. The British protest note contained the explicite inquiry whether the German government was ready to carry on further negotiations of the kind and extent provided for in the London communique, an inquiry which the defendant von Neurath at once answered in the affirmative, by the German communique of March 18th 1935, Document Book III, No. 98. And the then British foreign Secretary Eden went to Berlin at the end of March 1935 in order to hold conversations about the possibility of an agreement on the naval question. deposition of the witness, Ambassador Dr. Diekhoff, who has been examined here. France only consequently pursuing its attitude toward the League of Nations and the latter's exclusive legitimatic for collective solution of the problems of disarmament and, therefore, of peace took the initiative to submit to the League of Nations, on March 20th, 1935, the measures taken by Germany, and to induce the League to establish a violation of the duty incumbing to all nations of carrying out assumed obligations. It goes without saying that the German Government refused to accept, in a note of April 20th, 1935, the renewed discrimination contained in this resolution of the League of Nations. However, the German foreign policy did not let itself be kept back by this resolution to continue trying very actively to establish an agreement with the Western powers, nor did the signature, on May 2nd, 1935, of the aforementioned France-Russian Assistance Pact and of the RussianCzecheslovak Assistance Pact, supplementing the former.
a new peace program, in which he declared once more, and to the largest possible extent, his readiness, most strongly stressing his and the German people's will for peace, to participate in any system of collective cooperation, to secure European peace, and to re-enter the League of Nations, as well as to comply with any of such restrictions of the German Wehrmacht's armaments, which other countries would also adopt, provided the equality of rights for Germany was recognized.
This speech of Hitler and the diplomatic discussions with other powers initiated at the same time had the promising result that between England and Germany the well-known naval convention of June 18th 1935 was agreed on, which established a fixed ratio of the respective naval forces. sense. On the one hand, from a political point of view, it signifies no less and no more than the implicit acknowledgment of German military sovereignty by England, a negation of the League of Nation's resolution and, at the same time, the French point of view, and the acknowledgment and approval by England of the German act which had been stigmatized by the league of Nations as a violation of treaties. For the first time, therefore, the equality of rights for Germany had been recognized not only de jure, but also de facto by one of the Western powers, and by one of the most important, too. On the other hand, it proves, from the point of view of this trial, irrefutably that the prosecution's contention, that one had to see in Germany's rearmament an act of preparation of the future wars of aggression of Hitler, is erroneous. On the contrary, this naval agreement shows clearly and unambiguously that the German foreign policy at that time, when still under guidance of my client, did not have any warlike intentions, much less plans, that the reassumption of military sovereignty under no circumstances had any warlike purposes, but nothing but a decidedly defensive character, I may ask, which statesman who carries in his heart warlike intention or plans would voluntarily consent to a restriction of his armament, and, therefore, of a successful execution of his designs and plans, and, moreover, to an extent as provided by the naval agreement? Even the most malevolent mind cannot earnestly contend that the naval power allowed to Germany by this agreement would have been in the least sufficient for a war of aggression; that has been unobjectionably established by the evidence of this trial. Hitler himself had by this agreement robbed himself of the possibility of creating a navy which would have been able to wage a war of aggression. It is clear that any transgression worth mentioning of the agreed ratio of the two navies, which, as things were, could under no circumstances and by no means have been kept secret, would beyond doubt either have induced England to increase her own navy accordingly, or would have caused her to obstruct this German intention, and this could have been done at time. From whatever point of view one may look at this naval agreement, the fact that it was and is an irrefragable proof of the absolute honesty and sincerity of the repeated declarations of Germany's will for peace, an unreversible proof against the presence of any, even the most secret warlike designs or plans of German foreign policy and, therefore, of its leader, the defendant von Neurath, is not to be shaken.
In France this Naval Agreement not with general opposition. It was regarded as an arbitrary act of England, a departing from the common line that was still kept to in the resolution of the League of Nations, and that was bounce to interfere with the French plans. So France was vary reluctant and reserved with regard to the negotiations started by Britain for the conclusion of a general air-pact negotiations, which ran parallel with the negotiations about the Naval Agreement. Hitler's speech of 21st May 1935 had also been causative for these negotiations. Because in this speech, Hitler, referring to the London report, held out his hand for an agreement on limiting of air armaments. And the German government themselves, taking up the English suggestion, presented a project for such an air pact on 29th May 1935. Negotiations lasting for near 3 months between the English and French governments were necessary before England succeeded to induce France to agree to participate even in these negotiations. This consent, however, was in reality no consent at all because, among other things, it was tied to the condition that the realization of this air pact must keep pace with the negotiations about the East-pact. As this pact, however, had then to be rejected by Germany for reasons of own security, as already mentioned, it was clear that the French condition in reality blocked the way to successful negotiations from the start. When, at the beginning of the Soviet Union sponsored Komintern congress, on 25th July 1935 it became unequivocally clear that the Komintern's aim was the world-revolution, Germany's opposition -- as will be understood -- stiffened. September 1935 communicated to the English Ambassador, that the German foreign policy did not consider opportune an answer to the memorandum of the British Government of 5th August 1935, which demanded answers to a number of questions of France, that were hardly connected with the air-pact. Besides the ItalyAbyssinia conflict had already thrown its shadow ahead, whereby alone the further negotiations about the air-pact were suspended. How could a political agreement between the five powers of the Pact of Locarne be possible, and German foreign policy very reasonably pointed to the fact, if the collaboration of these powers was in dissolution and individual powers of this pact were facing each other in military readiness.
On 7 th September 1935 as it is known, the English home-fleet set out for the Mediterranean, and negotiations between England and France about the application of sanctions against Italy were in full swing. On 3rd October 1935 war broke out between Italy and Abyssinia. events in Africa and the efforts of the powers to apply sanctions against Italy. But nevertheless the events that followed became important for the German fore in policy; because it was these events and specially the question of sanctions which prepared a new constellation of powers, which on one hand led to a closer union of England and France and the point of view taken up by her and which, on the other hand, brought Germany, who was again defamed by the resolution of the League of Nations of 17th April 1935, naturally closer together with Italy who was defamed by the sanctions being taken against her. dissolution of the Pact of Lecarne, because it was not possible to consider a pact, as being still legally in existence if its participants were opposed to one another in so hostile a way, that the danger of war-like actions was present at any moment. September 1935, to draw also England into the not of its pacts and their obligations, clearly showed the tendency of French policy, and inevitably confirmed German statesmen in their conviction that France consistently followed only its policy of encirclement which was felt as a menace to Germany. However, Germany's leaders and the defendant von Neurath still hesitated to draw the last conclusions from this and from taking the absolutely necessary step for Germany's most primitive security. German foreign policy still kept hoping, in its unshakable desire for peace and readiness to negotiate, that an agreement could be reached, that France would abandon its course, and that a really honest and sincere understanding with France could be reached. This hope, however was soon found to be a delusion. On 16th January 1936, French Foreign Minister Laval announced that, after his return from Geneva in the beginning of February, he would present for ratification to the French parliament the pact of assistance concluded with Russia. And at about the same time the defendant von Neurath hear from reliable sources that the French General Staff had worked out military plans for an attack on Germany, providing for the advance of French troops from the Rhineland and following along the line of the river Main so as to join hands via Czechoslovakia with the Russian Armies.
Hereby the offensive character of the France-Russian pact was proved even to the most naive. There was all the less ground for doubt, if one took into consideration the negotiations that took place inside and outside the French chamber before the pact's ratification. For even in France, resistance to this pact, specifically on account of its offensive character, was not small. The French veterans of the 1st world war headed the opposition: The Union Nationale des Combattants declared, in a resolution of 8th February 1936, that this pact contained more certain ties of war than possibilities of peace. And the speech of deputy Montigny, in the French chamber, on 13 February 1936, was a single flaming protest. It is contained in my document book IV No. 107. The pact opened even further, so Montigny, said the breach between France and Germany, and Germany must more than ever gain the impression of encirclement, if a party depending on Moscow like the communists party followed the policy of Delcasse, the policy of revenge and of the former Russo-French pact. The greatest danger of war would arise, if France were to convey the impression that she enjoyed the secret protection of Moscow. Evan the German government made a last attempt to keep France from ratifying the pact. In the interview that Hitler gave to Bertrand de Jouvenel, the correspondent of the French Newspaper "Paris midi", on 21st February 1936 -- doc. Book IV No.108 -- Hitler once again held out his hand to the French people for an understanding, for a lasting peace and friendship: "I want to prove to my people", so Hitler literally declared, "That the idea of hereditary enmity between France and Germany is nonsense." And Hitler once and for all in that interview, finished off the reference to his book "My Straggle", that was brought up then as it has been continuously been repeated in this court, by stating: When I wrote this book I was in prison. At that time French troops occupied the Ruhr. It was a moment of greatest tension. Yes, we were enemies, and I stuck to my country as it should be, just as I steel to my country against yours in the trenches when I was for 4 1/2 years in the war. I would despise myself, if in case of a conflict I were not aGerman first of all But today there is no reason anymore for any conflict. You would like me to correct my book like a writer.