With this thesis Russia had made the point of view of France her cam: First security, then disarmament; but beyond that the door is opened to the increased disarmament exertions of all the nations. It becomes evident immediately of what far-reaching importance this fact was, if I refer to the French-Russian Assistance Pact which was signed one year later which induced the re-establishment of German armed sovereignty occasioned by this and by the increase in armament of all the remaining States. A direct route leads from this declaration of the Russian Foreign Minister via the expletive negotiations in the summer of 1934 regarding the project of the so-called Eastern Pact to the Franco-Russian Assistance Pact of 2 May 1935 and the Russia-Czech-Slovak Assistance Pact of 16 May 1935.
The French Note of 17 April 1934 with its categorical "No", signified the closure of an epoch and the beginning of a new one in international policy, France finally gave to understand that she was no longer willing to carry on with a general agreement between all States aiming at a solution of the questions of disarmament and security, but decided to go her own way from new on. The reason for this lay, obviously, in the fact that she recognized or thought she had recognized that the most important of the participating Powers, England and Italy, were not prepared to follow her unconditionally any more, and to continue to refuse Germany the equality of rights theoretically granted her on 11 December 1932. This was expressed through the far reaching approximation of the English and Italian points of view in the English Memorandum of 29 January 1934 and in the declaration of Mussolini to the English Minister Eden on 26 February 1934, which dealt with the clearly outlined German point of view in the Memorandum of 13 March and 16 April 1934. Powers, namely Denmark, Spain, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland of 14 April 1934, but also, above all, the speech of the Belgian Minister President Count Broqueville of 6 March 1934 (Document Book III No. 66) showed the same tendence.
referred in his speech of 27 April 1934 - Document Book III NO. 74 -- before the German Press explained his attitude thoroughly and convincingly. France, as was soon apparent, finally abandoned the basis and the principles of the Versailles Treaty, the preamble to part V of which has fixed in an unmistakable manner the general disarmament of all States of the League of Nations as the basis and the counter-obligation for the disarmament of Germany. The new French policy set up immediately after the note of 17 April 1934 let it soon be known that it had decided to do exactly the opposite of the basic idea of the Versaille Treaty regarding German, disarmament. journey eastwards, which took him to Warsaw and Prague and first of all, as it soon transpired, tried to prepare the ground for the resumption of diplomatic relations between the States of the so-called Little Entente with Russia, which so far did not exist, and thus prepare the way for the inclusion of the greatest military power of Europe in European politics on the side of France. This succeeded. Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania, the most important States of the Little Entente, recognized the Russian government on 9 June 1934 and renewed diplomatic relations with it. psychological aversion of the European States against the Soviet Russia of that time, and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs could now on his second journey to the East, not only win the consent of all States of the Little Entente to the so-called Eastern Pact which had long are been negotiated with Russia, but could subsequently place it openly on the agenda of international policy in London in the beginning of July. With this -- as the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs Benesch justly stated in his of 2 July 1934 -document Book III No. 81 -- a regrouping of the European Powers which appeared capable of everthrowing to a certain extent all former relations on the Continent was announced in advance.
Stanley Baldwin, who at that time was Lord President of the Council, before the House of Commons, that in view of the question a system of s-called collective peace, which if necessity would have to contain the need for sanctions, she stood before one of the most difficult decisions in her history. - he coined the phrase: Sanctions are war - gave his agreement in the beginning off July 1934 on the occasion of the visit of Barthou to London, not only to the Eastern Pact but in addition also to the entry of the Soviet-Union into the League of Nations, which had been suggested by France. On 18 December 1934 the League of Nations officially resolved to accept Russian into the League. Thus France had for the most part already reached her coal, the inclusion of Russia, the strongest military power, into European politics, and indeed on her side as would shortly be shown. foreign policy under the direction of the defendant not only continued unaltered and consequently its peaceful struggle for the practical recognition of German equality, even after the French note of 17 April 1934 which it considered disastrous, but also its policy of peace. In his speech of 27 April 1934 already previously quoted, my client once more and unreservedly expressed the will of Germany, that she was also in future prepared for any sort of an understanding even at the price of further armament limitations by agreement, if this would correspond with her demand for equality. She did not, however, limit herself to this alone. In order to resume the international discussions and negotiations regarding the disarmament question, which had been interrupted by France's "No" of 17 April 1934, Hitler had a meeting in Venice with Mussolini in the middle of June 1934. The purpose and contents of this meeting were at that time summarized by Mussolini with the words: "We have met in order to try to disperse the clouds which are darkening the political horizon of Europe". time was still entirely on the side of the Western Powers. Several days later Hitler used the opportunity to emphasize again his and German's unshakable wish for peace in his speech at the District Day ("Gautag") at Gera on 17 June 1934, - Document Book III No. 80 -- when he stated, literally amongst other things:
"If anyone tells us, if you National-Socialists wish equality for Germany, then we must increase our armaments. "Then we can only say, as far as we are concerned, you can do so, because after all we have no intention of attacking you. We just wish to be so strong that the others will have no wish to attack us. The more the world speaks of the formation of blocks, the clearer it becomes to us-that we must concern ourselves with the maintainance of our own power". taking more clearly defined shape, and the realization of political tendencies, which were the bases of the English air armament program which was announced before the house of Commons on July 1934 and which the French Minister President Doumergue expressed in his speech of 13 October 1934 at the coffin on the assassinated Minister Louis Barthou with the words: "The week nations are booty or a danger". No matter how irrefutably correct this idea really was, it received, as far as the attitude of the Western Powers toward Germany was concerned, as little consideration as all attempts of German foreign policy to carry on the negotiations regarding the disarmament question and as the repeated declarations of Germany about her preparedness for understanding. Germany was denied now, as Before, the recognition of her equality. This fact also made it impossible for German foreign policy, apart from the encirclement policy of France which became more discernible every day, to join the Eastern Pact. The reasons for this refutation of the Eastern Pact have been presented in detail in the communique of the German Government of 10 September 1934 -Document Book III No. 85. They culminated in the diagnosis that Germany, in view of her indisputable military weakness and defeat, could not take on any treaty oblications towards the highly armed States which might involve her in all possible conflicts in the East, and could make her a probably war theater. ies or even a lack of a will for peace, which caused Germany to maintain this attitude, but first and foremost her notorious military weakness. In addition to this came the true character of France's policy which showed itself more and more, and that of the Eastern Pact as an instrument of the French policy of encirclement directed against Germany.
This character become clear to all the world when, in the session of theArmy Committee of theFrench Cabinet on 23 November 1934, the reported Archimbaud described as an undeniable fact that a formal Entent existed between France and Russia, on the basis of which France would be prepared to furnish a considerable, well-equipped and welltrained army in the event of a conflict. (Document Book III No. 89). This fact, however, was clearly and openly moved through the declaration of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs Laval on 20 January 1935 before a representative of the Russian newspaper Istvestja, in connection with the France-Russian Record of 5 December 1934, (Document Book III No. 91) and the interpretations of Litvinov of 9 December 1934 given thereto. For those well-informed there could exist no further doubt of the existence of a close French-Russian alliance, even if the ratification of its final text only took place on 2 May 1935, and was then immediately followed by the ratification of the Russo-Czechoslovak Non-Aggression Pact of 16 May 1935. that such a perfect system of French alliances bore a desperate likeness to the one which had opposed Germany once already, in the year 1914. This involuntary parallel was bound to make every German statesman draw the conclusion that those alliances could only be directed against Germany and constituted accordingly, in every case a menace to her. And this, so much the more as these alliances, this obvious encirclement of Germany were by no means the only alarming events. Coupled with it, a vast increase in military armaments of nearly all non-German countries had been carried out in the course of the last few months. Not only had England begun to carry out her largescale armament program, as shown by the British White Book of March 1, 1935, the submitting of which does not seem necessary, since it is an official document, but in France too the efforts to reinforce her army had begun. Under the guidance of her, at that time most popular general Marshal Petain, while in Russia an increase in the peacetime figure of her army from 600,000 to 940,000 men had taken place, under joyful acquiescence on the side of France.
Czecho-Slovakia had introduced, in December 1934, a two years compulsory service (Document Book III No. 92) and Italy also was continually increasing her armaments. to be felt from the point of view of German politics -- as I have shown you, my Lords -- as nothing but a vast menace, and interpreted accordingly, a menace which left Germany all but defenceless. moment with the danger that such a concentrated and continually increasing power of France and her allies could fall upon Germany and crush her. For nothing is more dangerous than a concentration of power in one hand. It is bound, according to old experience, to lead some day to an explosion, if not counter-balanced by some other power, and this explosion is then directed towards the country nearest-at-hand considered as an enemy. This latter was and could be only Germany, as only this country was considered by France as a foe, and no other country in the world besides her. command of self-defence, an obvious demand of the most primitive instinct for self-preservation of any living being -- and the nations too are living entities, they too possess such an instinct for self-preservation -- that now the German government and the German people took back the military sovereignty which had constantly been denied it, and tried to take measures of security against the menace pending upon Germany by organizing a military aviation and by establishing a peacetime army of only 36 divisions on the basis of compulsory military service. I refer to the proclamation of the German Reich Government concerning the restoration of German compulsory service of March 16th, 1935. (Document Book II nr 97)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1000 hours, 24 July 1946.)
WILHELM GOERING ET AL. DEFENDANTS, SITTING AT
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the defendants Hess and Raeder are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now hear the applications for witness on behalf of the various organizations, taking the SS first.
MR. ELWYN JONES: If Your Lordship leases, with regard to the SS organization defending counsel has applied for seven witnesses. Five of these 29 SS witnesses whose evidence has been heard on commission. The prosecution has no objection to the calling of these witnesses, although, as there is a certain amount of overlapping in the evidence of Eberstein and Hinderfeld, it is suggested with respect that this might be avoided when those two sitnesses are examined by Dr. Pelckmann. nal will see from defending counsel's application that an affidavit from this witness was put in by the prosecution as Exhibit USA 562. Dr. Pelckmann has informed me that he does nut propose or desire to call Rode to testify before the Tribunal itself, but will be quite content to cross-examine Rode on commission. the resumption in this particular case of the taking of evidence on commission the prosecution has no objection to Dr. Pelckmann's suggestion. Perhaps in fairness to Dr. Pelckmann, I ought to add that I understand that Rode only arrived in Nurnberg a few days ago. President of the former free city of Danzig, and the author of the book "The Vocie of Destruction", extracts from which the prosecution has submitted in document Exhibit No. USSR 378 as part of the prosecution case. No affidavit from Rauschnigg has ever been used by the prosecution.
I understand, that Mr. Rauschnigg himself is now in the United States. witness upon the following grounds.
If the Tribunal will look at defending counsel's application, it will be seen that there are three matters which it is desired to elucidate from Rauschnigg. value, I submit that those facts can be extracted from Rauschnigg's book "The Voice of Destruction", and that in these circumstances it is quite unnecessary to have Rauschnigg here as a witness himself. The prosecution would, of course, have no objection to further extracts from that book being put in as part of the defense case of the SS organization.
THE PRESIDENT: Would the prosecution object to interrogatories being put to Rauschnigg ?
MR. ELWIN JONES: No, My Lord, we should have no obejction to that. sels application with regard to Rauschnigg. I submit that with regard to the first a Cassandra-like statement by Rauschnigg that up to 1939 his warnings were not heeded, it has, I submit, no evidential value whatsoever. With regard to the second paragraph in which it is stated, that Rauschnigg has knowledge of the fact that in 1936-1937 Hitler did not yet have the intention of exterminating the Jews, it is not in any way clear how Rauschnigg could, in fact, have had any knowledge of Hitler's intentions at all -- even the devil knoweth not the heart of man.
wholly irrelevant. Whatever I have said, theprosecution would hove no objection to further extracts' being taken from Rauschnier's book, or interrogatories being administered to him.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pelckmann.
DR. PELCKMANN: May it please the High Tribunal, I am in complete agreement with the exposition of Mr. Elwyn Jones as far as it applies to the rest of the witnesses. Regarding the statements referring to the witness Rauschnigg, I should like to state the fallowing: The decision of the 13th of March under Figure 6-A, under Paragraph 3, says that it is relevant to have the proof whether the possible criminal aims of the SS are quite obvious or might have been known to the mass of the membership. criminal, that they were only singular acts or the acts of certain groups, and that these acts were not know to the masses. To try to prove this, I have 29 witnesses, and I hove thousands of affidavits, and all this material will be submitted to the High Tribunal *---* course. But all of those matters concorn the legal membership . as against the other organizations, has brought its charges before the High Tribunal directly in this court room through documents and through the hearing of witnesses, a procedure which took many weeks, with the further assertion, as it applies to Figure 3 under the 13th of March, dealing with the fact that the mass of the SS membership knew of the possible criminal aims of theSS and of the criminal acts of-the various members of various groups. membership, but on the other hand assorted only that this could be seen clearly from the circumstances, and was not in evidence. I consider it only just, right and proper that in addition to these statements of the SS membership which in the large I have submitted in an indirect manner by affidavit, and whose probative value could, be disputed by the prosecution, we are concerned with the people in question, the members of the SS. And as I have said, I consider it only right and proper that besides the witness Rauschnigg, who is theonly one of my witnesses who is not under automatic arrest, and who seems to be the only one who can directly testify before the Court, with respect to the testimony of these five witnesses of the SS who had relatively high rank in the SS, and therefore have a general knowledge, it could be put to them that their testimony was not quite credible.
As far as the personal credibility of Rauschnigg is concerned, I should like to state the following. of the Danzig Senate. He had the complete confidence of Hitler up until 1938. Then there was a break with Hitler. Rauschnigg emigrated, and he was very, very active with respect to publishing matieral. He published many books, and constantly warned of Hitler and his plans. Even today he has the reputation in the world that he is not defending and never did defend Hitler and his regime. the main point of my application -- and he knows that at that time, at least, in the years 1936 and 1937, Hitler did not intend to exterminate the Jewish population, and he gave his reasons for that statement. The objection by the prosecution that it was quite impossible to know the intentions of Hitler does not apply completely, for it is the task of the Tribunal to realize and appreciate the intentions of Hitler in the prosecution and in the indictment. If the intentions of Hitler are known and recognized, then perhaps we can judge as to the knowledge of the mass of the membership of the organization. should like to present direct evidence and evaluate this evidence for Hitler's intentions; and these intentions should be know to Rauschnigg because of his conversations with Hitler. I do not believe that we can find a better witness far this point than Rauschnigg himself.
I come now to the second point of my application. Secondly, Rauschnigg learned that -
THE PRESIDENT: What is it, Dr. Pelckmann, that makes you think that Rauschnigg would, be able to give this evidence?
DR. PELCKMANN: I know his books, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Then if it is in his book, how will it help to have him say what is in his book again?
DR. PELCKMANN: Of course, his books represent but a very small extract of his entire knowledge, and he did not write his books with a view towards this trial and the chief points at issue in this trial as they are stressed the prosecution today. The witness can answer the questions relating to the trial now better than if you were to tear the pages out of his books.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand you to be saying that the only reason you got to thinking that he would be able to answer those questions is because of what you see in the books. Then you do not know that he can give any further evidence than is in the book.
DR. PELCKMANN: Mr. President, of course, I do not know that; but my assumption hased on experience is that he probably would be able to do so. I do not believe that I am asking for anything out of the ordinary. A man who applied himself so intensively from he years 1933 to 1936 and dealt so extensively with Hitler and Nazism and contemplated these matters in later years and, discussed this system with foreign people, I assume, knows a tremendous amount more than is set down in these books. And, on the other hand, I have teh following reason for my application: from the books of Rauschnigg. These quotations are Tactically identical wit affidavits. The prosecution would have been in a position just as well to obtain affidavits which would have given us a little more detail as to his assertions. have these witnesses who gave affidavits here for cross examination. And I believe -
THE PRESIDENT: I am not aware that such a rule applied to witnesses in the United States. The rule, in so far as any rule at all was made, was that people who were in this country, if they had made affidavits, might be brought here for cross examination; that rule has never been applied to persons who were in the United States or in any other country outside this country.
The case of Mr. Messersmith is an instance, and there has never been a case of anybody's being brought in, except, perhaps, the witness Dahlarus.
DR. PELCKMANN: Another point of significance is that, as against the prosecution, in view of the fact that in contrast to the individual nature of the defendants I can only deal with members of the organization -- and this only in a limited way -- I believe that I may ask the High Tribunal that this witness, the only one who knows those things and can tell the High Tribunal about conditions at the time and can give us his impression and opinion about these matters, be brought here; for technical difficulties should not play a tremendous part in a proceeding of this significance.
May I continue, My Lord?
DR. PELCKMANN: The witness is to testify further that it was Hitler's deliberate policy to deceive the German people as well as foreign countries about his plans and intentions, as, for instance, his war intentions. mentioned the fact -- and almost ridiculed the fact -- of how he was succeeding in fooling his own people, not only the foreign countries and in leading then a round by the nose. assertion on the part of the Prosecution that a consistent way led from the Party program to the destruction camps at Auschwitz. The Party program, according to the mass membership, foresaw only an ordering or a regulation of the Jewish question according to the minority problem, but intensified some what through the Nurnberg Laws of 1935. But -- and this we can still display would not be a crime against humanity. If it is proved that during this time Hitler actually did not have the intention to exceed this program and to beyond it, then the assertion of the Prosecution could not be upheld any long. If Hitler's intention and attitude at that time is proved, the SS at that time and the simple SS man who followed this program could not have any other program either.
The second point is the deception of the people. Today we know just what did take place, and all of this matter may be seen from the various documents, such as the Reichstag speeches of Hitler with regard to the will to peace, but it would be quite starting if a witness asserted that Hitler had confided to him that it was his principle that the followers, the Germans, should be deceived about his intentions, and in this matter the Prosecution world have to prove that the SS was not deceived -- that the SS, together with Hitler, actually knew what Hitler wanted to do.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pelckmann, the Tribunal did not desire to hear general argument from you upon the whole case. They are simply dealing with the question of whether this man Rauschning should be brought from the United States.
DR. PELCKMANN: If the relevance of the testimony is not disputed, Mr. President -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pelckmann, we have your written application before us, and you are dealing with a variety of matters which are not mentioned in that written application.
DR. PELCKMANN: Of course, Mr. President, I could not set down everything in my application which I rash to say now. Of course, this application contains my main points: first, the Jewish question and, second, the deception of the German people and of the SS membership.
THE PRESIDENT: We have indicated to you what the view of the Tribunal is -- that two think that have dealt with the application, and we do not desire to hear a general argument.
DR. PELCKMANN: Mr. President, I tried only to show the relevance my three points of evidence. If we assume the relevance in this matter, the may I be permitted to say the following: and I must say -
THE PRESIDENT: You have already said that, Dr. Pelckmann, more the once, and the Tribunal is quite aware of what you have said.
DR. PELCKMANN: Mr. President, do you care to hear argument on the question of what reasons I have for thinking that we should deviate from the general rule and brine this witness here from America?
THE PRESIDENT: You have already presented argument to that effect.
MR. DODD: Mr. President Counsel for the SD has asked for only two witnesses, and the Prosecution has no objection to these two witnesses being heard by the Tribunal. It seems like a reasonable number. for the Reich Cabinet and High Command as well?
THE PRESIDENT: The Reich Cabinet, we understood, was not going to be dealt with today.
MR. DODD: We received the application for one witness this morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes. Certainly. Go on and deal with those.
MR. DODD: With respect to the High Command, Counsel for the defendant organization has asked for six witnesses, and our position is that it is at least twice as many as are necessary and that three -- something like three -- would be a much more reasonable number to present before the Tribunal, We have no particular preferences or no objections, no particular objections, to any of the three. I understand, however, that Counsel prefers von Rundstedt; von Brauchitsch and von Mannstein, and we have no objections if that is his choice of the six, but we do object to six on the ground that they are too numerous and all of them have been heard before the Commission. are asked for -- the witness Best and the witness Hoffmann, and we have no objection to the appearances of these two witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: The two names Karl, Hans are Christian names, I suppose?
MR. DODD: Yes, so I have understood, Mr. President.
I am not clear, Mr. President, whether or not you wish to have me deal with the Reich Cabinet. Shall I make known our attitude toward the one witness?
THE PRESIDENT: I think so. Certainly, you may deal with them new if they are ready. Dr. Kubuschok -
MR. DODD: In any event, he has only asked for one witness, Mr. President, and we have no objection. The witness Schlegelberger.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Mr. Dodd. Unless Counsel for the SD, Gestapo and the Reich Cabinet want to say anything, the Tribunal does not think it is necessary to hear them.
Then, they would hear Counsel for the High Command, Dr. Laternser.
Yes, Dr. Laternser.
DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the High Command): Mr. President, in view of the accusations raised against the High Command, I am convinced that the application for six witnesses is quite justified. In order for the Tribunal to decide the question of whether the High Command in its policies was criminal, the Tribunal must in advance be able to get a personal picture and a personal impression of some of these military leaders so that a just sentence may be passed.
Can we assume that if we hear but a few people out of this large circle, which comprises 129 people, the High Tribunal has fathered a true picture because of those few people out of the circle that have been heard? My answer would be in the negative.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell me how many of the 129 we have already heard before the Tribunal?
DR. LATERNSER: Before this Tribunal, Mr. President, in the commissions, seven members of the group were heard, and two -
THE PRESIDENT: I did not say before the commission; I said before the Tribunal.
DR. LATERNSER: On occasion some of the persons who belonged to this group were questioned, and I would assume that five or six people were involved.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on.
DR. LATERNSER: In order to evaluate the number of people that are to be heard here, I ask that the following be taken into consideration: might be in a position to refute the statements made by witnesses produced by the Prosecution, according to the resolution of the High Tribunal, my possibilities along those lines are strongly limited, for these witness have to be heard before the commissions first, even though in every other penal procedure, many interrogations of the witnesses would take place in other proceedings. In this way the scope of the witnesses is delineated and limited from the beginning and is dependent upon the activity of the commission.
Mr. President, in order that I may be in a position to present to the High Tribunal the personal picture that is required for my proper defense, I should like to make the following suggestion, which I believe is quite practical: speaking only for myself and the organization I represent -- that a span of time be set down during which time I may carry through the examining of witnesses before the Tribunal, and that the distribution of the time allotted should be left to the Defense. Then I would have the possibility of questioning the six witnesses that I have asked for, and of the period of time set down by the Court, I would use only two thirds for my examination, and I would put one third of the time at the disposal of the Prosecution for cross examination.
In this way, Mr. President, I should like to accomplish only one thing -- so that in my opinion the most important point be proved and that would be that a personal impression be gained of the people who are accused.
I assume that the Court would have no misgivings in this connection. And a further suggestion that I should like to make for the procedure to be followed in the hearing of the organizations --
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, let me make certain that I understand the suggestion. You are suggesting that the Tribunal should allot a certain time for the witnesses for the High Command, and that you, as Counsel examining the witnesses, should take up two-thirds of the time, and that the Prosecution, in cross-examination, should tale up one-third of the time. Is that correct?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. I quite agree, Mr. President. In that period of time I may call as many witnesses as I choose to do.
THE PRESIDENT: How much time are you contemplating?
DR. LATERNSER: It is very hard for me to answer that question, Mr. President. I would like -
THE PRESIDENT: It is your suggestion. The Tribunal would like to know how much time you are suggesting.
DR. LATERNSER: One and one-half to two days, Mr. President. That is, altogether. And, I should like to put two more applications before the Tribunal, or rather, make two more suggestions, which may have some significance in this connection. All the witnesses which are to appear here have already been heard by the Commission. The transcripts of the interrogations are in the hands of the Tribunal, and the putting of the same questions would, in this case, with certainty be cumulative. How is the examination to be carried through, Mr. President, in order to avoid repitition? and the difficulties which we have just raised will be avoided by my suggestion. In my opinion, I believe the Tribunal should be in a position to complete with my application, and in conclusion, I should like to suggest that the High Tribunal voice an opinion as to the handling of these arguments on the part of the accused organizations as to just how they would be handled. That would be all, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to hear you with reference to Dr. Laternser's suggestions, Mr. Dodd.
MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President. We have, insofar as we recall, made a list of the names of the people who have appeared before the Commission as members of the organizations, or of the groups, and those who have appeared before the Tribunal.
I stated a few minutes ago that all of these who have not appeared, such as Von Brauchitsch -- who was to appear and who may have appeared yesterday, I am not informed -- will appear in a day or so.
With reference to the suggestion of Sr. Laternser that he be allotted a specific time and may use as many witnesses in that time as he sees fit, we find two difficulties. First of all, we do not feel that he is being generous enough in allotting us one-third of the time. In any event, we do not want to have a restriction placed on us in the effect that we have only one-third of the time that he has. If we are to examine witnesses on the time standpoint, we feel that much of the time would be taken up before the Tribunal on matters that have already been thoroughly dealt with before the Commission. All the witnesses have been heard before the Commission, and Dr. Laternser has had a full opportunity to examine and cross-examine before the Commission, and it seems unnecessary to burden the Tribunal with a great number of witnesses here.
THE PRESIDENT: I wanted to speak to Mr. Dodd. to the arguments just presented to us if the Prosecution were allotted the same amount of time as Dr. Laternser?
DR. DODD: Well, it would make a little difference. Frankly, I didn't consider that too important a point.
THE PRESIDENTS: Perhaps there's one other thing which bears upon it. The Tribunal would like to know how you think the difficulty is to be met that it seems unnecessary for the witnesses who are called before us here to give the whole of the evidence given before the Commission, or even to enter upon the evidence which has been entered upon before the Commission, and the Tribunal would like to know how that difficulty is to be met.
MR. DODD: We have been thinking about this very problem and we had assumed that the witnesses who have appeared before the Commission and who have been examined there would not go over the same grounds before the Tribunal, otherwise the proceedings of the Commission would be rather senseless, and we might just as well get up and read the record of what was said before the Commission.
We had understood that the witnesses would have something new to add to what they have already said before the Commission. That is our understanding.
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, I think Dr. Laternser has said on various occasions that he attached importance to the actual presence of the witnesses so that the Tribunal could see him and form their own opinion of the witnesses credibility.
MR. DODD: Yes, that is what I understood to be one of the reasons, but three members --
THE PRESIDENT: In addition to seeing the witnesses and forming an opinion of their credibility, he would be able to summarize the evidence given
MR. DODD: Yes, I assume that would be so. Of course, four of these members of the groups we are in the dark about, and two of the members of the Naval Command, Von Brauchitsch and Milch -- and there are a number of others.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
MR. DODD: With respect to the time suggestion which I made, I repeat I do not think that is too important. I know we can confine ourselves in cross examination to the important matters, but I think it is the experience of the Commission that we seldom stayed within the limits which were established.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it is necessary to hear further argument. We will consider your suggestion and further arguments, Dr. Laternser, are unnecessary unless there is anything particularly new that you wish to say. The Tribunal will consider your suggestion. We will now deal with the political leaders.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH JONES: The leadership gorup has asked for seven witnesses, two of them are Gauleiters, and are witnesses Kauffmann and Wahl; one Kreisleiter Mayon von der Borch; one Ortsgruppenleiter Wegscheider; Blockleiter Hauffe, and two experts on the staff of the Hoheitstraeger, namely a farming export, who was also a political leader, and Haupfbauer who was a political leader in the D.A.F. The Prosecution has no objection to any of these witnesses, but we feel that the grounds could be adequately and properly covered. And it may be of help to the Tribunal if I suggested the witnesses most important and those which might be dispensed with.