tation of the increasing gravity of the whole situation before world publicity my client felt it necessary to publish, in the well known Geneva periodical "Voelkerbund", on 11 May 1933 -- document book II No. 51 -- an article in which he discussed the result who the conference had so far achieve described the German attitude in detail, and finally established that the German demand for the practical realization, of the equality of rights of Germany by disarmament of the havily armed countries was wrecked by the lack of will of these countries to disarm, and that therefore Germany, in the interest of her own security, was forced to start completing her armament, should the general limitation and disarmament within the frame work of the English Mac Donald plan not satisfy her justified demands for security. tical situation at that time. These aggravated events which had intensified to crisis at the Disarmament Conference were only a small part, so to speak, of the expression of the international tension which prevailed since Hitler's assumption of power. Domestic events occuring in Germany were first observed abroad with astonishment; but also with a certain lack of comprehension. was forced abroad - the discussion of which would lead too far here about the so-called German Revolution, which made it appear a European danger not only to France and her allies but also to Great Britain as well. The fear of such a danger affected the attitude of the Western powers at the Disarmament Conference to an ever increasing degree, where Germany's completed logical and consistent point to of view was regarded as provocation. But these worries of theirs, their insecurity in the face of the new Germany, led to even much more extensive measures and threats.
With England's consent France began military preparations in the first days of May 1933, placing the border fortifications -- which had already bee provided with increased garrisons during the winter -- in a state of alarm alerting the large camps in Lorraine, the deployment area of her army of the Rhine, and carrying out a large trial mobilization between Belfort, Muehlhausen and St. Ludwig, at which the Chief of the French General Staff, General Weygand, appeared in person. And at the same time the French Foreign Minister Paul Boncour, ostentatiously declared in his speech on 12 May 1933 before the French Senate that, in view of the revolutionary explosions in Germany, Italy would have to be kept firmly among the group of Western Powers: and, in response to Germany's attitude at the Disarmament Conference, he added that Germany must adhere strictly to the Treaty of Versailles, if she wanted to keep the Reichswehr. And these words of the French Minister, which could only be understood as a threat, were still further emphasized and confirmed by similar statements of the British War Minister Hailshan and the otherwise so pacifist-minded Lord Cecil, in the English House of Commons; the latter even encouraged France to carry out further military operations.
The situation was so strained that Europe seemed to be standing directly on the brink of a new war. leading Europe close to disaster is one of the basic reasons for the entire subsequent policy of the defendant von Neurath during the following years. Therefore, the question must be examined as briefly as possible, to see what consequences it was bound to have and did have, for German foreign policy, from a German point of view. One thing is undeniably clear: In the spring of 1933 Germany was in no condition whatsoever to fight a war; it would have been complete madness, a sheer desire for self-destruction, to fight a war against the armies of France and her allies, which counted millions of men and were excellently equipped with the latest weapons of attack, with the small Reichswehr of one hundred thousand men which had at its disposal no motorized weapons of attack whatsoever, no tanks, no heavy artillery, no military airplanes. fore, from the point of view of the Western Powers, under no circumstances be the reason for their position and attitude. The one plausible reason could lie only in the attitude of the Western powers in regard to the question of disarmament as such, that is, in their unwillingness to carry it out, to continue to discriminate against Germany, to continue to refuse nor the realization of her equality of rights and to continue to keep her down. for the final proposals of France as well as England, in the Disarmament Conference, which were unacceptable to Germany for reasons of justice as well as for reasons of her own security and her national honor. Because even in spite of Germany's equality, which was recognized by the Western Powers, in the Five-Power Declaration, the French plan of 14 November 1932, as well as also the English plan of 16 March 1933, the Mac Donald plan, and the resolutions of the Disarmament Conference included therein, lacked any practical realization of equality, even from the most objective standpoint.
What justly and objectively thinking person can and wishes to reproach the German State leadership, if it drew the conclusions from all this, and recognized that this behavious of the Western powers contained not only a violation of existing treaties, and also of the Treaty of Versailles with regard to disarmament, but also the will of the Western powers to prevent Germany from maintaining her demands, justified by treaty, by force of arms if necessary, and furthermore to keep her as a second-rate State, and also to refuse her the security guaranteed to her also in the Treaty of Versailles.
responsibility towards its people, if this realization from now on had to be decisive for the continued direction of foreign policy? Because the highest duty of every State leadership, which is aware of its responsibility in foreign policy, is the securing and maintenance of the existence and the independence of its State, the regaining of a respected and free position in the Council of Nations. A statesman who neglects this duty sins against his own people. This realization should carry all the more weight because, on the part of Germany, nothing had happened which might have been interpreted as a threat against the Western Powers. On the contrary Hitler, in his first program speech, in a Reichstag still elected in accordance with Democratic principles, had emphatically declared on 23 March 1933, punctuated by unanimous applause, his will for peace; particularly emphasizing this with regard to France, and he confessed himself prepared for peaceful collaboration with the regaining nations of the earth, but emphasized also that as a prerequisite for this he considered the final removal of the discrimination against Germany, the division of the nations into victors and vanquished, to be necessary. paid by the Western Powers, although they corresponded throughout with the given conditions and contained nothing lessthan a threat. Unfortunately, the were unable toeffect a change in the attitude of the Western powers, and to prevent an acceleration of the crisis. of the defendant von Neurath, at the climax of the crisis, repeated once more to the world, with the greatest emphasis, his and the German people's will for peace in his great so-called peace-address before the Reichstag on 17 May 1933 -- it is in excerpt form in my Document Book II No. 52-- and expressed his conviction that, ashe declared literally, no newEuropean war would be in the position to replace the unsatisfactory conditions of today by something better; the breaking cut of such an insanity, as he described the war, would be bound to lead to the collapse of the present social and State order.
according to the evidence, and whose power of conviction also proved irresistible to the Western Powers, effected a general relaxation of the situation, the danger of a new international war was averted, and the world took a deep breath. This, however, else marked the end of the isolation and the loneliness of Germany, which caused her inner change and every kind of revolution, and German foreign policy took the opportunity gladly and with sincere will for active collaboration in the political state gamble, which was offered to her by the surest ion of Mussolini to unite the great Powers, England, France, Italy and Germany in a so-called Four rower Pact. This treaty, which was signed on 8 June 1933 in Rome and which was signed in the middle of June 1933 also by Germany, and which in its preamble also referred expressly to the Five-Power Agreement of 11 December 1932, was to place the participating Powers in such a position, that, if further negotiations in a larger circle, as for example in the Disarmament Conference should reach a stalemate, they could meet at a smaller conference table. For Germany the main motive lay in the fact that she again became an active member in the totality of European policy in which she was participating as a partner with equal rights in an international agreement, which contrasted the discrimination against Germany in its contents as well as in its character. international tension was already arising and increasing which again threatened to isolate Germany's position. This time it had its source not so much in the Disarmament Conference, the proceedings of which, after the customary fruitless endeavors for progress, were again suspended on 29 June 1933 until 16 October 1933, as in the contrasting position of Germany and Austria in the World Economic Conference which opened in London on 12 June 1933. The Austria. Prime Minister Dollfuss made use of this conference to call the attention of the Powers to a purported threat to Austria's independence by Germany, in that he accused Germany of lending support to the Austrian National Socialists in their fight against his (Dollfuss') Government.
Making the Austrian question the center of gravity for European policy and, calling on the Fevers for protection against alleged threat to Austria's independence by Germany -- which the former considered an important stone in the construction of European power relations -- he aggravated their mood anew, which had been quieted down only a short time before with some trouble. What the need was then in the summer of 1933 is shown in my document book I, under Nos. 11 and 12, reports of the defendant to Reich President von Hindenburg and Hitler, dated 19 June 1933; but reference is also made to the speech by the defendant on 15 September 1933 document book II No. 56 -- before representatives of the foreign press, which also comments on the consequences of such a mood for the prospects of the proposed negotiations to be resumed by the Disarmament Conference on 16 October 1933, and which is reflected in his words: "Judging by certain indications, the readiness of highly armed States to carry out disarmament obligations for which they pledged themselves seems to be smaller today than ever. Finally, there is only one alternative: Realization of the right to equality or else a collapse of the entire idea of disarmament, with incalculable consequences, for which responsibility would not rest on Germany". general, and prospects of the Disarmament Conference in particular, were only too well founded. For the new so-called Simon Plan -- submitted even before the Conference started by Sir John Simon, head of the English Delegation, as a basis for negotiations -- and to a no less decree the statement relative thereto, made by Sir John, made it clear beyond doubt that the attitude of the Western powers still continued to be the same as in the spring of 1933 and that they were even still less disposed to justify Germany's demand for an equality ox rights. For Sir John declared in plain language that in view of the present non-clarified conditions in Europe, and considering the s eriously shaken confidence in peace, a disarmament conference, even after the pattern of the MacDonald Plan which Germany in the spring had declared unacceptable, was an impossibility. This not only meant bringing on unjustified accusation against Germany -- which, had done no more but stand on the rights accorded it by treaty -- but it also was a clear denial of any kind of realization of Germany's equality of rights and of disarmament.
As a matter of fact, this Simon Plan falls even farther short than previous plans in doing justice to Germany's rightful demand for equality of right and disarmament, that is, a voting of all states among each other, including Germany. detail and must confine myself to pointing out that it meant an increased restriction and reduction of German armament in favor of the other nations. For it provided that during the first half of the 8 years duration of the proposed disarmament -- Germany alone -- through the conversion of its Reichswehr into an army with a brief period of service -- would as a practical matter be still further disarmed, subjecting hereself, in addition, to an armament control by the Powers, while the highly-armed powers were not schedule to begin disarming until the fifth year, and then only in terms of manpower reserve, not in terms of arms. These provisions demonstrated more clearly than ever that not only did the Western Powers not intend to disarm, but that they wanted to weaken Germany still more and make her tractable to their power interests. There was no more mention made of the fact that the Five-PowerAgreement of 11 December 1932 had agreed to recognize Germany's equality of rights. a plan depriving her of a chance to participate in further negotiations at the Conference was bound to be unacceptable to Germany from the outset. However, on the strength of the lessons which German foreign policy learned in the spring of 1933-- when Germany come very near having the Western powers threaten her with war because she was unwilling to renounce her just demands -nothing was left to her this time out to answer the now throat which this plan undoubtedly involved, not only by rejecting the plan but also be withdrawing from the Disarmament Conference as well as the League of Nations. Further negotiations during the conference under such conditions were doomed and could only result in astill greater heightening of contrasts. Germany's attitude and took her withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference as a surprise. In Hitler's speech, an appeal for peace delivered on 17 May 1933 and already cited here, he expressed in unequivocal terns that notwithstanding the sincere will for peace and honest willingness towards still further disarmament -- provided it were mutual -- entertained by the German Government and the German people they would never consent to further himiliation and to renunciation of her clam for equality of rights but that, if such was the demand, they rather assume the consequences without hesitation.
Still more incomprehensible is the fact that in all earnestness the Prosecution places the blame for this withdrawal by Germany on the defendant von Neurath, as head of Foreign Policy, and that it believes it can find evidence of deliberate action by the fact that the Prosecution preserves a complete silence on the reasons and happenings which led up to this withdrawal and thereby tries to create the impression that Germany's withdrawal occurred entirely without cause. The extent to which the Prosecution's attempt to interpret the withdrawal as an action in preparation for war is contrary to objective history be comes clearly apparent from the fact -- which the Prosecution also passed over in silence -- that concurrent with its declaration of withdrawal the German Government, through Hitler's speech of 14 October 1933 well as also through the speech of the defendant von Neurath of 18 October 1933 (document book II, Nos.
58a and 59) not only declared with all possible emphasis its unchanging desire for peace and readiness to negotiate in the case of any disarmament plan which would consider Germany's equality of rights, but also tried to carry into practice this willingness to negotiate by submitting on her part practical proposals for general disarmament, as set forth in the memorandum prepared by my client and submitted to the Powers on 18 December 1933 (document book II, No.61). York Times in Berlin (Interview document book II, No.62) is an expression of the same wish. A government or a foreign minister who intends to prepare, or even plan, an aggressive war is hardly likely to make proposals for limiting, or even still further reducing, the armament of countries, including his own. Powers which followed the memorandum of 18 December 1933 ended, as I may presume to be well known, with the Note of the French Government to the English Government of 17 April 1934 -- (document book III, No.70), which closes the door to further negotiations as proposed in an English memorandum of 29 January 1934 as well as another memorandum of the German Government of 13 March 1934, as this was fully stated in the speech of the defendant von Neurath on 27 April 1934 -Document Book III No.70. must be emphasized here, that in the course of the same an indisputable change was shown in relations between France and Russia, the further development of which became more or less authoritative, not only for the German foreign policy, but also for the entire European policy in the coming years. The Russian representative in his speech to the Office of the Disarmament Conference on 10 April 1934 took the stand, contrary to the point of view always previously represented by Russia, that the task of the Disarmament Conference is to decide on a most wide-reaching reduction of armaments, as through this security will be best provided for, and the non-successof their disarmament efforts, but did not, however, draw the conclusion therefrom that the Conference had failed, but on the contrary defined the creation of new security instruments of International Law as the sole task of the Disarmament Conference, a point of view which was underlined further by the Russian Foreign Minister Litvinov on 29 April 1934.
With this thesis Russia had made the point of view of France her cam: First security, then disarmament; but beyond that the door is opened to the increased disarmament exertions of all the nations. It becomes evident immediately of what far-reaching importance this fact was, if I refer to the French-Russian Assistance Pact which was signed one year later which induced the re-establishment of German armed sovereignty occasioned by this and by the increase in armament of all the remaining States. A direct route leads from this declaration of the Russian Foreign Minister via the expletive negotiations in the summer of 1934 regarding the project of the so-called Eastern Pact to the Franco-Russian Assistance Pact of 2 May 1935 and the Russia-Czech-Slovak Assistance Pact of 16 May 1935.
The French Note of 17 April 1934 with its categorical "No", signified the closure of an epoch and the beginning of a new one in international policy, France finally gave to understand that she was no longer willing to carry on with a general agreement between all States aiming at a solution of the questions of disarmament and security, but decided to go her own way from new on. The reason for this lay, obviously, in the fact that she recognized or thought she had recognized that the most important of the participating Powers, England and Italy, were not prepared to follow her unconditionally any more, and to continue to refuse Germany the equality of rights theoretically granted her on 11 December 1932. This was expressed through the far reaching approximation of the English and Italian points of view in the English Memorandum of 29 January 1934 and in the declaration of Mussolini to the English Minister Eden on 26 February 1934, which dealt with the clearly outlined German point of view in the Memorandum of 13 March and 16 April 1934. Powers, namely Denmark, Spain, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland of 14 April 1934, but also, above all, the speech of the Belgian Minister President Count Broqueville of 6 March 1934 (Document Book III No. 66) showed the same tendence.
referred in his speech of 27 April 1934 - Document Book III NO. 74 -- before the German Press explained his attitude thoroughly and convincingly. France, as was soon apparent, finally abandoned the basis and the principles of the Versailles Treaty, the preamble to part V of which has fixed in an unmistakable manner the general disarmament of all States of the League of Nations as the basis and the counter-obligation for the disarmament of Germany. The new French policy set up immediately after the note of 17 April 1934 let it soon be known that it had decided to do exactly the opposite of the basic idea of the Versaille Treaty regarding German, disarmament. journey eastwards, which took him to Warsaw and Prague and first of all, as it soon transpired, tried to prepare the ground for the resumption of diplomatic relations between the States of the so-called Little Entente with Russia, which so far did not exist, and thus prepare the way for the inclusion of the greatest military power of Europe in European politics on the side of France. This succeeded. Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania, the most important States of the Little Entente, recognized the Russian government on 9 June 1934 and renewed diplomatic relations with it. psychological aversion of the European States against the Soviet Russia of that time, and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs could now on his second journey to the East, not only win the consent of all States of the Little Entente to the so-called Eastern Pact which had long are been negotiated with Russia, but could subsequently place it openly on the agenda of international policy in London in the beginning of July. With this -- as the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs Benesch justly stated in his of 2 July 1934 -document Book III No. 81 -- a regrouping of the European Powers which appeared capable of everthrowing to a certain extent all former relations on the Continent was announced in advance.
Stanley Baldwin, who at that time was Lord President of the Council, before the House of Commons, that in view of the question a system of s-called collective peace, which if necessity would have to contain the need for sanctions, she stood before one of the most difficult decisions in her history. - he coined the phrase: Sanctions are war - gave his agreement in the beginning off July 1934 on the occasion of the visit of Barthou to London, not only to the Eastern Pact but in addition also to the entry of the Soviet-Union into the League of Nations, which had been suggested by France. On 18 December 1934 the League of Nations officially resolved to accept Russian into the League. Thus France had for the most part already reached her coal, the inclusion of Russia, the strongest military power, into European politics, and indeed on her side as would shortly be shown. foreign policy under the direction of the defendant not only continued unaltered and consequently its peaceful struggle for the practical recognition of German equality, even after the French note of 17 April 1934 which it considered disastrous, but also its policy of peace. In his speech of 27 April 1934 already previously quoted, my client once more and unreservedly expressed the will of Germany, that she was also in future prepared for any sort of an understanding even at the price of further armament limitations by agreement, if this would correspond with her demand for equality. She did not, however, limit herself to this alone. In order to resume the international discussions and negotiations regarding the disarmament question, which had been interrupted by France's "No" of 17 April 1934, Hitler had a meeting in Venice with Mussolini in the middle of June 1934. The purpose and contents of this meeting were at that time summarized by Mussolini with the words: "We have met in order to try to disperse the clouds which are darkening the political horizon of Europe". time was still entirely on the side of the Western Powers. Several days later Hitler used the opportunity to emphasize again his and German's unshakable wish for peace in his speech at the District Day ("Gautag") at Gera on 17 June 1934, - Document Book III No. 80 -- when he stated, literally amongst other things:
"If anyone tells us, if you National-Socialists wish equality for Germany, then we must increase our armaments. "Then we can only say, as far as we are concerned, you can do so, because after all we have no intention of attacking you. We just wish to be so strong that the others will have no wish to attack us. The more the world speaks of the formation of blocks, the clearer it becomes to us-that we must concern ourselves with the maintainance of our own power". taking more clearly defined shape, and the realization of political tendencies, which were the bases of the English air armament program which was announced before the house of Commons on July 1934 and which the French Minister President Doumergue expressed in his speech of 13 October 1934 at the coffin on the assassinated Minister Louis Barthou with the words: "The week nations are booty or a danger". No matter how irrefutably correct this idea really was, it received, as far as the attitude of the Western Powers toward Germany was concerned, as little consideration as all attempts of German foreign policy to carry on the negotiations regarding the disarmament question and as the repeated declarations of Germany about her preparedness for understanding. Germany was denied now, as Before, the recognition of her equality. This fact also made it impossible for German foreign policy, apart from the encirclement policy of France which became more discernible every day, to join the Eastern Pact. The reasons for this refutation of the Eastern Pact have been presented in detail in the communique of the German Government of 10 September 1934 -Document Book III No. 85. They culminated in the diagnosis that Germany, in view of her indisputable military weakness and defeat, could not take on any treaty oblications towards the highly armed States which might involve her in all possible conflicts in the East, and could make her a probably war theater. ies or even a lack of a will for peace, which caused Germany to maintain this attitude, but first and foremost her notorious military weakness. In addition to this came the true character of France's policy which showed itself more and more, and that of the Eastern Pact as an instrument of the French policy of encirclement directed against Germany.
This character become clear to all the world when, in the session of theArmy Committee of theFrench Cabinet on 23 November 1934, the reported Archimbaud described as an undeniable fact that a formal Entent existed between France and Russia, on the basis of which France would be prepared to furnish a considerable, well-equipped and welltrained army in the event of a conflict. (Document Book III No. 89). This fact, however, was clearly and openly moved through the declaration of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs Laval on 20 January 1935 before a representative of the Russian newspaper Istvestja, in connection with the France-Russian Record of 5 December 1934, (Document Book III No. 91) and the interpretations of Litvinov of 9 December 1934 given thereto. For those well-informed there could exist no further doubt of the existence of a close French-Russian alliance, even if the ratification of its final text only took place on 2 May 1935, and was then immediately followed by the ratification of the Russo-Czechoslovak Non-Aggression Pact of 16 May 1935. that such a perfect system of French alliances bore a desperate likeness to the one which had opposed Germany once already, in the year 1914. This involuntary parallel was bound to make every German statesman draw the conclusion that those alliances could only be directed against Germany and constituted accordingly, in every case a menace to her. And this, so much the more as these alliances, this obvious encirclement of Germany were by no means the only alarming events. Coupled with it, a vast increase in military armaments of nearly all non-German countries had been carried out in the course of the last few months. Not only had England begun to carry out her largescale armament program, as shown by the British White Book of March 1, 1935, the submitting of which does not seem necessary, since it is an official document, but in France too the efforts to reinforce her army had begun. Under the guidance of her, at that time most popular general Marshal Petain, while in Russia an increase in the peacetime figure of her army from 600,000 to 940,000 men had taken place, under joyful acquiescence on the side of France.
Czecho-Slovakia had introduced, in December 1934, a two years compulsory service (Document Book III No. 92) and Italy also was continually increasing her armaments. to be felt from the point of view of German politics -- as I have shown you, my Lords -- as nothing but a vast menace, and interpreted accordingly, a menace which left Germany all but defenceless. moment with the danger that such a concentrated and continually increasing power of France and her allies could fall upon Germany and crush her. For nothing is more dangerous than a concentration of power in one hand. It is bound, according to old experience, to lead some day to an explosion, if not counter-balanced by some other power, and this explosion is then directed towards the country nearest-at-hand considered as an enemy. This latter was and could be only Germany, as only this country was considered by France as a foe, and no other country in the world besides her. command of self-defence, an obvious demand of the most primitive instinct for self-preservation of any living being -- and the nations too are living entities, they too possess such an instinct for self-preservation -- that now the German government and the German people took back the military sovereignty which had constantly been denied it, and tried to take measures of security against the menace pending upon Germany by organizing a military aviation and by establishing a peacetime army of only 36 divisions on the basis of compulsory military service. I refer to the proclamation of the German Reich Government concerning the restoration of German compulsory service of March 16th, 1935. (Document Book II nr 97)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1000 hours, 24 July 1946.)
WILHELM GOERING ET AL. DEFENDANTS, SITTING AT
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the defendants Hess and Raeder are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now hear the applications for witness on behalf of the various organizations, taking the SS first.
MR. ELWYN JONES: If Your Lordship leases, with regard to the SS organization defending counsel has applied for seven witnesses. Five of these 29 SS witnesses whose evidence has been heard on commission. The prosecution has no objection to the calling of these witnesses, although, as there is a certain amount of overlapping in the evidence of Eberstein and Hinderfeld, it is suggested with respect that this might be avoided when those two sitnesses are examined by Dr. Pelckmann. nal will see from defending counsel's application that an affidavit from this witness was put in by the prosecution as Exhibit USA 562. Dr. Pelckmann has informed me that he does nut propose or desire to call Rode to testify before the Tribunal itself, but will be quite content to cross-examine Rode on commission. the resumption in this particular case of the taking of evidence on commission the prosecution has no objection to Dr. Pelckmann's suggestion. Perhaps in fairness to Dr. Pelckmann, I ought to add that I understand that Rode only arrived in Nurnberg a few days ago. President of the former free city of Danzig, and the author of the book "The Vocie of Destruction", extracts from which the prosecution has submitted in document Exhibit No. USSR 378 as part of the prosecution case. No affidavit from Rauschnigg has ever been used by the prosecution.
I understand, that Mr. Rauschnigg himself is now in the United States. witness upon the following grounds.
If the Tribunal will look at defending counsel's application, it will be seen that there are three matters which it is desired to elucidate from Rauschnigg. value, I submit that those facts can be extracted from Rauschnigg's book "The Voice of Destruction", and that in these circumstances it is quite unnecessary to have Rauschnigg here as a witness himself. The prosecution would, of course, have no objection to further extracts from that book being put in as part of the defense case of the SS organization.
THE PRESIDENT: Would the prosecution object to interrogatories being put to Rauschnigg ?
MR. ELWIN JONES: No, My Lord, we should have no obejction to that. sels application with regard to Rauschnigg. I submit that with regard to the first a Cassandra-like statement by Rauschnigg that up to 1939 his warnings were not heeded, it has, I submit, no evidential value whatsoever. With regard to the second paragraph in which it is stated, that Rauschnigg has knowledge of the fact that in 1936-1937 Hitler did not yet have the intention of exterminating the Jews, it is not in any way clear how Rauschnigg could, in fact, have had any knowledge of Hitler's intentions at all -- even the devil knoweth not the heart of man.
wholly irrelevant. Whatever I have said, theprosecution would hove no objection to further extracts' being taken from Rauschnier's book, or interrogatories being administered to him.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pelckmann.
DR. PELCKMANN: May it please the High Tribunal, I am in complete agreement with the exposition of Mr. Elwyn Jones as far as it applies to the rest of the witnesses. Regarding the statements referring to the witness Rauschnigg, I should like to state the fallowing: The decision of the 13th of March under Figure 6-A, under Paragraph 3, says that it is relevant to have the proof whether the possible criminal aims of the SS are quite obvious or might have been known to the mass of the membership. criminal, that they were only singular acts or the acts of certain groups, and that these acts were not know to the masses. To try to prove this, I have 29 witnesses, and I hove thousands of affidavits, and all this material will be submitted to the High Tribunal *---* course. But all of those matters concorn the legal membership . as against the other organizations, has brought its charges before the High Tribunal directly in this court room through documents and through the hearing of witnesses, a procedure which took many weeks, with the further assertion, as it applies to Figure 3 under the 13th of March, dealing with the fact that the mass of the SS membership knew of the possible criminal aims of theSS and of the criminal acts of-the various members of various groups. membership, but on the other hand assorted only that this could be seen clearly from the circumstances, and was not in evidence. I consider it only just, right and proper that in addition to these statements of the SS membership which in the large I have submitted in an indirect manner by affidavit, and whose probative value could, be disputed by the prosecution, we are concerned with the people in question, the members of the SS. And as I have said, I consider it only right and proper that besides the witness Rauschnigg, who is theonly one of my witnesses who is not under automatic arrest, and who seems to be the only one who can directly testify before the Court, with respect to the testimony of these five witnesses of the SS who had relatively high rank in the SS, and therefore have a general knowledge, it could be put to them that their testimony was not quite credible.
As far as the personal credibility of Rauschnigg is concerned, I should like to state the following. of the Danzig Senate. He had the complete confidence of Hitler up until 1938. Then there was a break with Hitler. Rauschnigg emigrated, and he was very, very active with respect to publishing matieral. He published many books, and constantly warned of Hitler and his plans. Even today he has the reputation in the world that he is not defending and never did defend Hitler and his regime. the main point of my application -- and he knows that at that time, at least, in the years 1936 and 1937, Hitler did not intend to exterminate the Jewish population, and he gave his reasons for that statement. The objection by the prosecution that it was quite impossible to know the intentions of Hitler does not apply completely, for it is the task of the Tribunal to realize and appreciate the intentions of Hitler in the prosecution and in the indictment. If the intentions of Hitler are known and recognized, then perhaps we can judge as to the knowledge of the mass of the membership of the organization. should like to present direct evidence and evaluate this evidence for Hitler's intentions; and these intentions should be know to Rauschnigg because of his conversations with Hitler. I do not believe that we can find a better witness far this point than Rauschnigg himself.
I come now to the second point of my application. Secondly, Rauschnigg learned that -
THE PRESIDENT: What is it, Dr. Pelckmann, that makes you think that Rauschnigg would, be able to give this evidence?