He was fully convinced that when he resigned his office it meant the collapse of the last bulwark against the infiltration of members of the Party and of the Nazi spirit into the Reich Ministry of Foreign Affairs; it also meant that the danger of the renunciation of the peace policy embodied in them became threatening, as happened immediately on his resignation on 4 February 1938. the most grievous disillusionment in his official life, when he was forced to recognize by Hitler's speech on the ominous day of 5 November 1937 that all his efforts, his entire struggle, all his personal sacrifices in the last 5 years appared to be in vain and that his influence with Hitler was broken; that the latter had decided to abandon him and the policy of peace and agreement advocated by him; and, if the occasion arose, to make use of military means in order to carry out his more than Utopian plans and intentions set forth in this speech. The acknowledgment struck him like lightning from a clear sky, since up to then nothing had intimated that Hitler might no longer agree on the peace policy advocated by the defendant. The heart-attack which he had the next day may testify to the fact how seriously he felt this blow, which seemed to shatter all his hopes, all his efforts to protect Germany from the dangers of this foreign policy, the military entanglements and a possible, if not probable, catastrophe. regarding the future of his people before drawing upon himself the last self-evident consequences and resigning, he considered it his duty to try once again by very detailed and serious conversations, to dissuade Hitler from persevering in his fatal plans and intentions. Yet, having to recognize from this conversation, that Hitler's decisions was unalterable, he did not hesitate for one instant to tell Hitler that he had decided under no circumstances to take part in this pernacious policy, and that for such a foreign policy Hitler must find another Foreign Minister. Hitler accepted his resignation by his letter of 4 February 1938.
than this resignation for the absolute inaccuracy, the entire instability of the charges made against my client at this trial of having assisted or wished to assist by his foreign policy in the planning and the preparation of wars of aggression which took place one and one half years later? Is there a more unequivocal and clearer proof of the absurdity of the application of the principles of Conspiracy to the acts and deeds of statesmen and in particular, of the defendant? Finally, is there a more unequivocal and clearer proof of the absurdity of a retrospective judgment of the policy of the States, such as they constitute here one of the main bases of the whole prosecution? own activity and experience at least as well as I do, how dangerous conclusions a posteriori are regarding the actions of a man regarding the thoughts, views and deeds of this man at a time going back several years.
Tempera mutantur et now in illis. Each of us has surely, more than once in his life, experienced the truth of this sentence. Convictions and views, intentions and resolutions, which we have hold and carried out at a certain time, have in the course of years become changed and altered, partly because of the transformation of one's own personality, partly because of exterior circumstances, or change of conditions. Docs one really wish to expound this thesis and draw conclusion, retrospectively, that the former views, assertions and actions were only camouflage, and that the person already intended to do and was determined to do, what he did years later under quite different circumstances? Why should you demand a different standard of a politician, a statesmen? He also is only a man and is subject to tie same changes of ideas, opinions and intentions, as any one else. He is even more subject to exterior influences, exterior conditions so certain imponderable circumstances than the ordinary man. Just one example for this: What would you say to a man who would earnestly dare to assert that Napoleon Bonaparte, when he went to Paris during the great Revolution, or later on when taking over the supreme command of the French armies in Northern Italy, already had the idea or even the plan or the intention, of making himself in 1804 Emperor of the French and of marching on Moscow in 1812? I believe whoever adopted this attitude would stand alone in the world. And an able dealectician with more or less apparent logic and right could still base this opinion on the historical development of events, like the Prosecution with regard to their opinion that Hitler, at the time of his assumption of power, yes, already with the presentation of the Party program in 1920, had not only the intention but even the plan ready for conducting his later wars of aggression, and everything which Hitler and the Nazis and/or his collaborators did, even the very moment of the assumption of power, both in domestic and foreign politics, was the conscious preparation for those wars of aggression.
its principle, which still stands on very weak basis, and its retrospective consideration of things, esteems too highly probably not only the spiritual, but also the statesmanlike abilities, not only of his satellites, out also of Hitler himself. Because, after all, it is in any case already evidence of a certain mental limitation, if a person, and particularly a statesman, founds his policy on the basis, as Hitler indisputably did, that the governments and statesmen of the remaining States would again and again lot themselves be fooled and bluffed, that they would again and again stand for actions which they considered to be violations of treaties, and that they would watch quietly until Hitler believed himself to be so for as to be able new to attack almost the whole world by force of arms. And is it not all the more proof of a mental limitation, if a statesman in this way underestimates the abilities and cleverness, but also the power instruments of his opponents as Hitler has done? In addition to all this, however, there is something which must not be underestimated either; that is the violence of the sudden transition of the thoughts and the decisions resulting therefrom which was a trait of Hitler. I do not consider it necessary to have to give you any further evidence thereof, as they are generally well-known. Hitler, however, was also a man who did not stand for only argument, or any resistance, and who, when he encountered such and met obstacles which he could not remove through an emphatic word, changed his plans and intentions like lightning and lot himself be led to decisions which were frequently just the opposite from what he bad waited, planned and done previously. preparation of wars at the time the seizure of power, and even already in previous years which the Prosecution has ascribed to Hitler. The impossibility of this charge is yet underlined, if the following is considered: To this Hitler has not only indisputably testified in public speeches, addresses and diplomatic notes on several occasions from the day of the seizure of power until 23 July A LJG 19-3 1937, as can be seen from documents presented by no, but he has also made positive suggestions for the practical execution of the limitation of armament of all States, therefore also that of Germany, from which it can be indisputably seen, that with regard to the German Armed Forces and its strength in relationship to the armament of the Western Powers, he declared himself satisfied with a relationship, which from the very beginning excluded any aggressive war against the other States.
And now just suppose that one of those offers of Hitler had been accepted by the remaining States, then the war of aggression which Hitler supposedly had been planning and preparing for years would never have been possible. All efforts, work, and expenses in connection with it would have been in vain. Or do you perhaps consider it probable that Hitler looked ahead, and figured that his offers would, be refused, raid that he only made then in this realization? Then he would really be an almost denomiacal genius, a prophetic seer of the first rank. Do you really wish to pressure this and to affirm from it the claim of the Prosecution of the planning of the aggressive war in the year 1939 already a long time before the seizure of power? And even if you should answer this question in the affirmative for the person of Hitler, do you also ascribe such a gift of second sight to his collaborators, his servants, yes even all Party numbers? To ask this question is to answer it in the negative, with this question alone also falls the whole painfully constructed and artificial construction of the motivation of the Prosecution. And along with it falls also the classification of the whole charge, and in particular the coresponsibility of all collaborators of Hitler generally under the conception of the conspiracy, at least until the period of time when it could be recognized by the most extensive circles of his followers that Hitler finally wanted war and had decided, on it. Simultaneously with this, however, the unvarying corrections of the postulate advanced by me at the beginning of my statements, after examining the subjective co-guilt of every single defendant, after the refusal of the co-responsibility of each individual only from the fact of 23 July A LJG 19-4 his participation in the actions which are considered as preparation for a war of aggression by the Prosecution at any period of time, simply without examination and investigation of his knowledge of Hitler's aims and intentions, becomes evident.
To waive and disregard this postulate, as the Prosecution does, would be to contradict every sense of justice, the most primitive as well the most highly developed, in every nation on earth. The "summum jus" sought in this trial would become a "summa injuria". defendant von Neurath himself. Is it not pure folly, is it not "sumna injuri to accuse this man of connivence in planning and preparing wars of aggression this man who deemed it his exclusive duty, a duty to which he has made many a personal sacrifice, to prevent every form of entanglement involving war; and who, the moment he realized that the task was beyond him, forthwith resigned his function and demanded his dismissal. The Prosecution obviously fool this themselves, otherwise they would not have brought, as evidence of the defendant's alleged joint culpability, his presence at Hitler's conference on the 5 November 1937, wittingly omitting however, that it was this conference and Hitler's deviation from a peace to a war policy which determined the defendant to refuse further Collaboration and thereby make it clear that he has never concurred in the past and is not prepared to concur in the future in, or approve of, the planning, preparation or waging of a war of aggression. Thus, every charge of guilt make in the Indictment against defendant von Neurath is originally void, once and for all. For should he be further accused of having broken international treaties while responsible for the conduct of German foreign policy, it must be pointed out, in answer, that according to the clear wording of the Charter, the breach of international treaties does not constitute a punishable crime in itself, and becomes a punishable crime only when it serves the purpose of preparation for wars of aggression. If such a breach of treaty serves this purpose, it must be intended to do so by its author, or at least its author must have conscience of the fact. That defendant v. Neurath had no such intention nor indeed the faintest conscience of the above implication is quite clearly proved by his resignation from the office of Foreign Minister. But I shall moreover demonstrate to you that even the charge of violation or breach of international treaties is without foundation. Office at Hindenburg's request, there were two questions that far surpassed in importance every other European problem and awaited an urgent solution; they were the problem of the German Reparations and the problem of the disarmament of the victor Powers and of German equality of rights, a factor which was inseparable from it.
The first question, the defendant and the then Reich Chancellor von Papen managed to conduct towards a satisfactory solution at the Conference held by the Powers in Lausanne on the 10 June 1932, a few days after the defendant's assumption of office. At the closing session of the Conference on the 9 July 1932, Germany was acquitted of the financial servitude established by the treaty of Versailles against a single final payment of 3 milliard marks. The Young Plan was obsolete, and only Germany's obligations deriving from the loans grouted her remained in force. Thus came for Germany the political achievement that Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles in which the Reparation obligations were contained in virtue of article 232, became obsolete. The first broach was made. Hatters differed as regards the disarmament problem. This arose from the obligation for disarmament imposed on Germany according to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles which, I presume, is well known. In case of its fulfilment, the preamble to this part likewise proscribed disarmament for the highly-armed victor nations in reciprocity. Germany had disarmed: it had already fully met its obligations in 1927, an uncontested fact which the League of Nations also had expressly recognized. This was the basis for Germany's request for reciprocal compliance by the other partners to the Treaty, as provided for in the Preamble to Part V. And Germany had announced its request for disarmament by the highly-armed States and in conjunction there with recognition of her equality of rights a considerable time before the defendant took office. However, during the so-called Disarmament Conference the negotiations not only had made no progress by the time the defendant took over the Foreign Office, but just at that time, the summer of 1932, they had become considerably more difficult. In view of the short time allotted for my disposal, I again refer for details to the German Memorandum of 29 August 1932 (my document book II, No.40) and to my client's interview of 6 September 1932 with a representative of the Wolff Telegraph Office, to be found in the same document book under No. 41. Lastly, I should like to refer to the defendants declaration of 30 September 1932 before the German Press submitted to the Tribunal under No. 45, my document book II.
of negotiations by the Disarmament Conference on 16 October 1932, and in order to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation to the world and, to the Western lowers -- prove clearly and unequivocally the great, fundamental tendency of the defendant's ideas, his trend of thought and intentions as a human being, as a diplomat and as Foreign Minister, which dominated his entire policy from the beginning until his resignation, and which can be summarized in the statement: to avoid and prevent the settling of differences through force of arms; realize all goals and tasks of German foreign policy by peaceful means only; to reject war as a means of policy: in a word, to strengthen and safeguard peace among the nations.
It is the same tendency which Mr. Francois Poncet, the former French Ambassador to Berlin so succinctly referred to as a characteristic of the defendant in his letter -- which I submitted to the Tribunal as No. 162 of my document book V -- and which was unanimously confirmed by all witnesses and affidavits. what really night be termed an affront to Germany, which caused the head of the German Delegation to declare that under such conditions it would not be possible for him to continue to attend the negotiations, the Western Powers in the end could not close their mines to the ethics of a policy inspired by such tendencies, and, followings a suggestion by the British Government, on 11 December 1932 the conclusion of the known Five-power Agreement was brought about (see my document book II, No. 47 a) in which England, France and Italy, with the admission in the united States of America recognized Germany's acknowledged equality of rights. On 14 December 1932 the Main Committee of the Disarmament Conference expressed its pleasure in taking cognizance of this agreement, and the German Delegate expressed his readiness to resume participation in the deliberation of the conference, stressing also that the equality recognized on 11 December 1932 in regard to Germany was the condition sine qua non for this continued participation by Germany.
It seemed that a great stop forward had thus been made in the path leading to an understanding on the question of disarmament.
However, things were to take a different turn: Immediately following the opening of the conference meeting, again in Geneva on 2 February 1933, serious clashes occurred between the German and the French Delegation, in the course of which M. Paul Boncour, the French Delegate, even went so far as to declare the Five power Agreement of 11 December 1932 legally invalid because involved five powers only. To the astonishment not only of Germany, the cause for these increasingly acute differences was the fundamental change in France attitude as regards the basic question of the entire armaments problem as law down in the French Plan of 14 November 1932 as a basis for these negotiation titude heretofore, France suddenly took the position in this plan that armies made of professional soldiers with a long period of service were aggressive in character and, consequently, meant a threat to peace and that only armies with a short period of service were defensive in character. at greater length to the details of the French plan, but also to the sequence of the differences which became constantly more critical between Germany and the other Powers. Rather I must presume that they are known and confine myself to stressing, that the new French thesis, which the Disarmament Confer adopted as its own, was clearly and unequivocally directed against Germany a the Reichswehr as it had come into being in accordance with the disarmament visions of the Treaty of Versailles, a thesis which, if it was to be carried into effect, would have required the transformation of the Reichswehr into a militia army with a short period of service, thus signifying a still further reduction in its armament, inadequate as it already was for an effective protection against attack. The establishment of this thesis, however, also proved clearly that France was unwilling to disarm, which was also shown by statements of the French representative himself. question of the ration in the reciprocal reduction of the individual armies, was merely a new expression of her old thesis, first security, then disar mament, which brought about the failure of not only the previous negotiations but also that of a new plan of mediation the so-called Mac Donald plan, proposed by England to prevent the threatening break-down of negotiations, Germany's reference to consideration for her own security and her demand for general disarmament as a result of the right to equality by reason of recognition accorded her on 11 December 1932, were received by the other parties as presumptive; indication being given that should negotiations fail responsibility would rest with her.
tation of the increasing gravity of the whole situation before world publicity my client felt it necessary to publish, in the well known Geneva periodical "Voelkerbund", on 11 May 1933 -- document book II No. 51 -- an article in which he discussed the result who the conference had so far achieve described the German attitude in detail, and finally established that the German demand for the practical realization, of the equality of rights of Germany by disarmament of the havily armed countries was wrecked by the lack of will of these countries to disarm, and that therefore Germany, in the interest of her own security, was forced to start completing her armament, should the general limitation and disarmament within the frame work of the English Mac Donald plan not satisfy her justified demands for security. tical situation at that time. These aggravated events which had intensified to crisis at the Disarmament Conference were only a small part, so to speak, of the expression of the international tension which prevailed since Hitler's assumption of power. Domestic events occuring in Germany were first observed abroad with astonishment; but also with a certain lack of comprehension. was forced abroad - the discussion of which would lead too far here about the so-called German Revolution, which made it appear a European danger not only to France and her allies but also to Great Britain as well. The fear of such a danger affected the attitude of the Western powers at the Disarmament Conference to an ever increasing degree, where Germany's completed logical and consistent point to of view was regarded as provocation. But these worries of theirs, their insecurity in the face of the new Germany, led to even much more extensive measures and threats.
With England's consent France began military preparations in the first days of May 1933, placing the border fortifications -- which had already bee provided with increased garrisons during the winter -- in a state of alarm alerting the large camps in Lorraine, the deployment area of her army of the Rhine, and carrying out a large trial mobilization between Belfort, Muehlhausen and St. Ludwig, at which the Chief of the French General Staff, General Weygand, appeared in person. And at the same time the French Foreign Minister Paul Boncour, ostentatiously declared in his speech on 12 May 1933 before the French Senate that, in view of the revolutionary explosions in Germany, Italy would have to be kept firmly among the group of Western Powers: and, in response to Germany's attitude at the Disarmament Conference, he added that Germany must adhere strictly to the Treaty of Versailles, if she wanted to keep the Reichswehr. And these words of the French Minister, which could only be understood as a threat, were still further emphasized and confirmed by similar statements of the British War Minister Hailshan and the otherwise so pacifist-minded Lord Cecil, in the English House of Commons; the latter even encouraged France to carry out further military operations.
The situation was so strained that Europe seemed to be standing directly on the brink of a new war. leading Europe close to disaster is one of the basic reasons for the entire subsequent policy of the defendant von Neurath during the following years. Therefore, the question must be examined as briefly as possible, to see what consequences it was bound to have and did have, for German foreign policy, from a German point of view. One thing is undeniably clear: In the spring of 1933 Germany was in no condition whatsoever to fight a war; it would have been complete madness, a sheer desire for self-destruction, to fight a war against the armies of France and her allies, which counted millions of men and were excellently equipped with the latest weapons of attack, with the small Reichswehr of one hundred thousand men which had at its disposal no motorized weapons of attack whatsoever, no tanks, no heavy artillery, no military airplanes. fore, from the point of view of the Western Powers, under no circumstances be the reason for their position and attitude. The one plausible reason could lie only in the attitude of the Western powers in regard to the question of disarmament as such, that is, in their unwillingness to carry it out, to continue to discriminate against Germany, to continue to refuse nor the realization of her equality of rights and to continue to keep her down. for the final proposals of France as well as England, in the Disarmament Conference, which were unacceptable to Germany for reasons of justice as well as for reasons of her own security and her national honor. Because even in spite of Germany's equality, which was recognized by the Western Powers, in the Five-Power Declaration, the French plan of 14 November 1932, as well as also the English plan of 16 March 1933, the Mac Donald plan, and the resolutions of the Disarmament Conference included therein, lacked any practical realization of equality, even from the most objective standpoint.
What justly and objectively thinking person can and wishes to reproach the German State leadership, if it drew the conclusions from all this, and recognized that this behavious of the Western powers contained not only a violation of existing treaties, and also of the Treaty of Versailles with regard to disarmament, but also the will of the Western powers to prevent Germany from maintaining her demands, justified by treaty, by force of arms if necessary, and furthermore to keep her as a second-rate State, and also to refuse her the security guaranteed to her also in the Treaty of Versailles.
responsibility towards its people, if this realization from now on had to be decisive for the continued direction of foreign policy? Because the highest duty of every State leadership, which is aware of its responsibility in foreign policy, is the securing and maintenance of the existence and the independence of its State, the regaining of a respected and free position in the Council of Nations. A statesman who neglects this duty sins against his own people. This realization should carry all the more weight because, on the part of Germany, nothing had happened which might have been interpreted as a threat against the Western Powers. On the contrary Hitler, in his first program speech, in a Reichstag still elected in accordance with Democratic principles, had emphatically declared on 23 March 1933, punctuated by unanimous applause, his will for peace; particularly emphasizing this with regard to France, and he confessed himself prepared for peaceful collaboration with the regaining nations of the earth, but emphasized also that as a prerequisite for this he considered the final removal of the discrimination against Germany, the division of the nations into victors and vanquished, to be necessary. paid by the Western Powers, although they corresponded throughout with the given conditions and contained nothing lessthan a threat. Unfortunately, the were unable toeffect a change in the attitude of the Western powers, and to prevent an acceleration of the crisis. of the defendant von Neurath, at the climax of the crisis, repeated once more to the world, with the greatest emphasis, his and the German people's will for peace in his great so-called peace-address before the Reichstag on 17 May 1933 -- it is in excerpt form in my Document Book II No. 52-- and expressed his conviction that, ashe declared literally, no newEuropean war would be in the position to replace the unsatisfactory conditions of today by something better; the breaking cut of such an insanity, as he described the war, would be bound to lead to the collapse of the present social and State order.
according to the evidence, and whose power of conviction also proved irresistible to the Western Powers, effected a general relaxation of the situation, the danger of a new international war was averted, and the world took a deep breath. This, however, else marked the end of the isolation and the loneliness of Germany, which caused her inner change and every kind of revolution, and German foreign policy took the opportunity gladly and with sincere will for active collaboration in the political state gamble, which was offered to her by the surest ion of Mussolini to unite the great Powers, England, France, Italy and Germany in a so-called Four rower Pact. This treaty, which was signed on 8 June 1933 in Rome and which was signed in the middle of June 1933 also by Germany, and which in its preamble also referred expressly to the Five-Power Agreement of 11 December 1932, was to place the participating Powers in such a position, that, if further negotiations in a larger circle, as for example in the Disarmament Conference should reach a stalemate, they could meet at a smaller conference table. For Germany the main motive lay in the fact that she again became an active member in the totality of European policy in which she was participating as a partner with equal rights in an international agreement, which contrasted the discrimination against Germany in its contents as well as in its character. international tension was already arising and increasing which again threatened to isolate Germany's position. This time it had its source not so much in the Disarmament Conference, the proceedings of which, after the customary fruitless endeavors for progress, were again suspended on 29 June 1933 until 16 October 1933, as in the contrasting position of Germany and Austria in the World Economic Conference which opened in London on 12 June 1933. The Austria. Prime Minister Dollfuss made use of this conference to call the attention of the Powers to a purported threat to Austria's independence by Germany, in that he accused Germany of lending support to the Austrian National Socialists in their fight against his (Dollfuss') Government.
Making the Austrian question the center of gravity for European policy and, calling on the Fevers for protection against alleged threat to Austria's independence by Germany -- which the former considered an important stone in the construction of European power relations -- he aggravated their mood anew, which had been quieted down only a short time before with some trouble. What the need was then in the summer of 1933 is shown in my document book I, under Nos. 11 and 12, reports of the defendant to Reich President von Hindenburg and Hitler, dated 19 June 1933; but reference is also made to the speech by the defendant on 15 September 1933 document book II No. 56 -- before representatives of the foreign press, which also comments on the consequences of such a mood for the prospects of the proposed negotiations to be resumed by the Disarmament Conference on 16 October 1933, and which is reflected in his words: "Judging by certain indications, the readiness of highly armed States to carry out disarmament obligations for which they pledged themselves seems to be smaller today than ever. Finally, there is only one alternative: Realization of the right to equality or else a collapse of the entire idea of disarmament, with incalculable consequences, for which responsibility would not rest on Germany". general, and prospects of the Disarmament Conference in particular, were only too well founded. For the new so-called Simon Plan -- submitted even before the Conference started by Sir John Simon, head of the English Delegation, as a basis for negotiations -- and to a no less decree the statement relative thereto, made by Sir John, made it clear beyond doubt that the attitude of the Western powers still continued to be the same as in the spring of 1933 and that they were even still less disposed to justify Germany's demand for an equality ox rights. For Sir John declared in plain language that in view of the present non-clarified conditions in Europe, and considering the s eriously shaken confidence in peace, a disarmament conference, even after the pattern of the MacDonald Plan which Germany in the spring had declared unacceptable, was an impossibility. This not only meant bringing on unjustified accusation against Germany -- which, had done no more but stand on the rights accorded it by treaty -- but it also was a clear denial of any kind of realization of Germany's equality of rights and of disarmament.
As a matter of fact, this Simon Plan falls even farther short than previous plans in doing justice to Germany's rightful demand for equality of right and disarmament, that is, a voting of all states among each other, including Germany. detail and must confine myself to pointing out that it meant an increased restriction and reduction of German armament in favor of the other nations. For it provided that during the first half of the 8 years duration of the proposed disarmament -- Germany alone -- through the conversion of its Reichswehr into an army with a brief period of service -- would as a practical matter be still further disarmed, subjecting hereself, in addition, to an armament control by the Powers, while the highly-armed powers were not schedule to begin disarming until the fifth year, and then only in terms of manpower reserve, not in terms of arms. These provisions demonstrated more clearly than ever that not only did the Western Powers not intend to disarm, but that they wanted to weaken Germany still more and make her tractable to their power interests. There was no more mention made of the fact that the Five-PowerAgreement of 11 December 1932 had agreed to recognize Germany's equality of rights. a plan depriving her of a chance to participate in further negotiations at the Conference was bound to be unacceptable to Germany from the outset. However, on the strength of the lessons which German foreign policy learned in the spring of 1933-- when Germany come very near having the Western powers threaten her with war because she was unwilling to renounce her just demands -nothing was left to her this time out to answer the now throat which this plan undoubtedly involved, not only by rejecting the plan but also be withdrawing from the Disarmament Conference as well as the League of Nations. Further negotiations during the conference under such conditions were doomed and could only result in astill greater heightening of contrasts. Germany's attitude and took her withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference as a surprise. In Hitler's speech, an appeal for peace delivered on 17 May 1933 and already cited here, he expressed in unequivocal terns that notwithstanding the sincere will for peace and honest willingness towards still further disarmament -- provided it were mutual -- entertained by the German Government and the German people they would never consent to further himiliation and to renunciation of her clam for equality of rights but that, if such was the demand, they rather assume the consequences without hesitation.
Still more incomprehensible is the fact that in all earnestness the Prosecution places the blame for this withdrawal by Germany on the defendant von Neurath, as head of Foreign Policy, and that it believes it can find evidence of deliberate action by the fact that the Prosecution preserves a complete silence on the reasons and happenings which led up to this withdrawal and thereby tries to create the impression that Germany's withdrawal occurred entirely without cause. The extent to which the Prosecution's attempt to interpret the withdrawal as an action in preparation for war is contrary to objective history be comes clearly apparent from the fact -- which the Prosecution also passed over in silence -- that concurrent with its declaration of withdrawal the German Government, through Hitler's speech of 14 October 1933 well as also through the speech of the defendant von Neurath of 18 October 1933 (document book II, Nos.
58a and 59) not only declared with all possible emphasis its unchanging desire for peace and readiness to negotiate in the case of any disarmament plan which would consider Germany's equality of rights, but also tried to carry into practice this willingness to negotiate by submitting on her part practical proposals for general disarmament, as set forth in the memorandum prepared by my client and submitted to the Powers on 18 December 1933 (document book II, No.61). York Times in Berlin (Interview document book II, No.62) is an expression of the same wish. A government or a foreign minister who intends to prepare, or even plan, an aggressive war is hardly likely to make proposals for limiting, or even still further reducing, the armament of countries, including his own. Powers which followed the memorandum of 18 December 1933 ended, as I may presume to be well known, with the Note of the French Government to the English Government of 17 April 1934 -- (document book III, No.70), which closes the door to further negotiations as proposed in an English memorandum of 29 January 1934 as well as another memorandum of the German Government of 13 March 1934, as this was fully stated in the speech of the defendant von Neurath on 27 April 1934 -Document Book III No.70. must be emphasized here, that in the course of the same an indisputable change was shown in relations between France and Russia, the further development of which became more or less authoritative, not only for the German foreign policy, but also for the entire European policy in the coming years. The Russian representative in his speech to the Office of the Disarmament Conference on 10 April 1934 took the stand, contrary to the point of view always previously represented by Russia, that the task of the Disarmament Conference is to decide on a most wide-reaching reduction of armaments, as through this security will be best provided for, and the non-successof their disarmament efforts, but did not, however, draw the conclusion therefrom that the Conference had failed, but on the contrary defined the creation of new security instruments of International Law as the sole task of the Disarmament Conference, a point of view which was underlined further by the Russian Foreign Minister Litvinov on 29 April 1934.