At the same time, however, this also includes the recognition that the verdict to be established by you in regard to these defendants is not a verdict in the ordinary meaning of the word; it is not merely a judge's sentence pronounced on behalf of individual defendants and their deeds, but it is the new fundamental law itself, the source from which all future Courts are to raw in accordance with which your verdict is to be established. the Charter according to their principle, and to establish in practice and for all time to come, the rules and principles of the Charter. The responsibility which you thereby assume before history gives you two questions to answer, which answer is all the more complicated, because the legal concept of conspiracy incorporate in the Charter and forming the legal foundation of the indictment is a concept foreign not only to the majority of peoples, especially the European peoples, but also because in one or the other country it owes its existence to its previous application to the combat against common crimes and offenses against the legal provisions governing domestic affairs and those alone. The postulate necessarily follows that the modus of interpretation and application of this legal concept in International Law com and must never be the same as employed in the fight against common bands of gangsters, guilty of a breach of the social order of a particular country and of the laws promulgated for its protection. The latter ordinarily involves individuals of a more or less amoral disposition, who act for reasons of selfishness, lust for money or other unethical instincts, placing themselves outside the existing social order. In the last analysis, however, and particularly when wars of aggression are involved, International Law does not deal with individual statesmen but much rather with whole peoples. The age of absolutism where the will of the ruler determined alone the destiny and acts of a peoplehas definitely passed. In this ago. It may be said that no avowed dictator no omnipotent despot who can rule without or against the will, or at least the tacit approval of the nation, at least its majority, is conceivable.
And so -- it is necessary to make this known once to the world -- unvisible behind the defendants, there sits also in the prisoners' dock our poor, beaten and tortured German people, because it placed upon a pedestal and selected as leader a man who led it to its doom. From this follows of necessity the inescapable demand that, contrary to the concept of a conspiracy applied in regard to ordinary criminals, application of the concept of conspiracy applied in International Law must firstly proceed by investigating and examining how it came about -- how it could come about -- that a people ranking high intellectually, a people who gave so much to the world in terms of gifts of culture and of mind as the German people did -- that it could ahil a man such as Hitler, following him into the bloodiest of all wars, giving him its last and best.
Not until you, your Honors, have incorporated this in the field of your considerations and examined this question, rail you be able to establish a just verdict in regard to the individual defendants themselves, with due consideration for their dissimilarity a judgment which will stand the test of history. Because of such reasoning and not merely by reason of my right as defense counsel of the defendant Freiherr von Neurath, but also because of my duty as a German, I deemed it necessary to explain in mere outline the fact of Nazi domination which the world outside of Germany cannot grasp; to make you visualize how it happened as a result of the effects of the Versailles Treaty and finally, because of the manner of its application, how it was bound to happen, true to historical necessity. of the Tribunal, I must refrain from reading that part of my final pleading, and express my definite hope that the Tribunal will go to the trouble of subsequently reading it itself and that it will consider its arguments when establishing its verdict. I now continue with page 44 of my final pleading, and should first of all like to give you a brief description of the personality and of the thoughts and feelings of that man who is today before you as prisoner
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen, probably that would be a convenient time to break off.
(A recess was taken.) Wuerttemberg so many faithful high government officials, the defendant von Neurath grew up with a simple and strict education in a parental home filled not only with a real Christian spirit and true love for mankind, but also with a flourishing, devoted love for his German people and Fatherland. From his tenderest age and during his entire life his thoughts and actions had implanted in him the desire and will, the holy duty, to place all his powers, all his ability, all his gifts and capacities at the service of the welfare of his people; to subordinate and even sacrifice all his personal interests to this. But, and this must certainly be emphasized in this place, aside from this aspiration there was alive in him and waven into his being to an equally strong extent a deep religious feeling, love of the truth and love of manking that made him from the beginning adverse to the use of any fem of violence, not only in his private life, in his relations with his fellow-men, but which ruled rather to the same extent his entire official activity, even after the Treaty of Versailles.
His acts bore the stamp of this feeling and it became the law governing his official dealings as representative of the Reich in other countries, as well as Foreign Minister and lastly as Reich Protector of Moravia and Bohemia. demeanor, so understandable in a man of his origin and education, but also primarily through the love of peace and sincerity which permeated all his actions as a diplomat and statesman he won the unlimited and sincere respect and sympathy of all people he came into contact with the world over, even of his political opponents. As unequivocal proof of this fact, the truth of which, your Honors, may be confirmed, by your own diplomats, it will suffice to refer to the fact that, as you know from the sworn affidavit of my client, no less persons than King George V and King Edward VIII of England received the defendant in private audiences upon the occasions of his presence in London in 1933 and 1935, that the British Government in the summer of 1937 and again in 1938, when he was no longer Foreign Minister, invited him to visit England for political discussions, and lastly that on his 65th birthday on 2 February 1938 the entire diplomatic corps called on him to congratulate him and to express through the then dean, Nensignore Orsenige, its thanks and its appreciation for the reasonable and understanding manner in which he always discharged all his duties. Do you, your Honors, credit your own diplomats and statesmen with so little knowledge of human nature, so little experience and knowledge of the world that in the course of the defendant's 6 years activity they would not have found out, if the assertion of the Prosecution were true, that Herr von Neurath had knowingly lot himself and his good reputation be used as a covering shield by the Nazis, and that all his statements and assurances as Foreign minister were mere camouflage, that is to say, a deliberate deceiving of the whole world?
old and experienced democracies as England, America, France, as well as the Vatican, had delegated to the then very important post of Ambassador in Berlin their cleverest and most experienced diplomats. And I am tempted to assume that the Prosecution possibly did not realize quite clearly what a dubious compliment it paid to its own diplomats by its assertion about the defendant, while it produces in proof of said assertion only the highly fantastic report of the American Consul Messersmith. I am moreover unshakably convinced that you, your Honors, based on the very reason of your long judicial experience, have far too much knowledge of human nature not to see at first glance that my client by his entire personality is absolutely incapable of such a perfidious and lying way of acting lot alone capable of play-acting to such an extent that for six long years he could have fooled the ablest and most experienced diplomats in the entire world.
A man who for 60 years has led an honorable and absolutely decent life, like the defendant, would never in the world at the end of such a life had lent himself for such a disavowal aid negation of all that he had so far held highest. That would be contrary to anybody's persons experience.
And on the same level stands the Prosecution's assertion that the defendant von Neurath, by joining and remaining in Hitler's cabinet serves as a fifth columnist in the conservative circles of Germany, for the express purpose of winning them over to National Socialism. This slandering of the defendant, which moreover was brought forward without any attempt at justification, is contradicted by the sworn statements of all witnesses and the affidavits submitted, which unanimously tend to prove that the resignation of the defendant from the office of foreign minister was viewed in just these circles with the greatest dismay and concern, because these circles considered that this withdrawal of the defendant from the government was in itself a sign that from then on his pronounced peace policy world be replaced by another, more belligerent, tendency in foreign policy, which was quite rightly considered as a national calamity. For, like everybody else, they shared the conviction of Reich President von Hindenberg, that von Neurath was the exponent of the peaceful foreign policy of the Reich and the guarantee for a consistent continuation of this peace policy, and was against any possible, undesired aggressive experiments by Hitler and the Nazi party and that the defendant should remain in the Cabinet as foreign Minister when Hitler was called to the Reich Chancellery. the witnesses heard, as well as by the carbon copy submitted by me of the letter of the witness Dr. Keepke of 2 June 1932 to Ambassador Ruemelin, Doc. book I, No. 8, and the affidavit of Baroness Ritter, document book I No. 3. But the latter proves also at the same time how unwillingly and after how long a struggle the defendant finally decided to accept this call and therefore supports the defendants own sworn statement that he only decided to so after the Reich President, whom he so highly venerated, appealed to his love of country and reminded him of the promise he had made two years before not to leave him, the Reich President, in the lurch whenever he needed him.
ness and inaccuracy of the further assertion of the Prosecution, also submit to without proof, that the defendant had used his single position, his reputation his connections and his influence to lift Hitler and the Nazi Party into the saddle, and to help them to secure supreme power in the Reich, therefore I hardly need to refer again to the statements of the defendant Goering and other witnesses, particularly Dr. Koepke, from which it appears beyond doubt that at the time there were absolutely no relations between Hitler and the Nazis and the defendant, and therefore even less could the defendant have taken any part in the negotiations which took place before Hitler's call to the chancellorship. and his promise not to leave Reich I resident von Hindenburg in the lurch in this time, of need -- these were the only reasons which moved this man to leave the post of Ambassador in London he had come to, like so much, to assume at that critical and fateful hour the heavy charge of Foreign Minister of the Reich, and the task assigned him as such by the President of the Reich to continue the guidance of the foreign policy of the Reich in peaceful ways, even eventually against the will of Hitler. this heavy task at all times, even after the death of Reich President von Hindenburg, with all his strength and with the pledging of the full force of his personality, up to the time he was of reed to admit that this task was beyond his strength, that Hitler no longer let himself be influenced by him, but had decided to pursue a line of foreign policy along which the defendant, owing to his inmost convictions and his personal point of view, could not follow.
Commanders of the various branches of the Wehrmacht, the defendant von Neurath remained at his post, in the most faithful performance of his promise to the Reich President von Hindenburg, even after the death of the latter. Out of this faithfulness to the dead Reich President, he has assumed the odium in many cases concerning Hitler's home politics of having been compelled as a member of the Reich Cabinet, to allow in silence things to take place which were contrary to his own convictions, did not agree with his views and where in direct contradiction to them. It was not in his power to prevent them. So he was forced to be satisfied with trying as far as was possible to mitigate their effects and consequences, as you could see from the Affidavit of Provincial Bishop Dr. Wurm, document book I, No. 1, and the statements of the other witnesses heard in this connection. cuse to lay down his office of Minister, but that through his remaining in office he had corsciously approved and abetted, is entirely irrelevant. The first law governing his action was the carrying out of the duty assigned him by President von Hindenburg, to secure the continuance of the Reich peaceful foreign policy. He would have considered himself false to his word if he had resigned his post of Foreign Minister before this was accomplished or before there was no possibility of its accomplishment. What person thinking objectively could bring himself to reproach him regarding this or even, as does the Prosecution, identify him with the Nazis. he did not refuse, as did the Minister Eltz von Ruebenach, his nomination to the rank of Honorany Gruppenfuehrer of the SS in September 1937 and the presentation by Hitler of the Party Badge in gold at the Cabinet Session of 30 January 1937, which facts are made a reproach by the Prosecution into a reproof and a proof of his alleged National-Socialist sentiments. For as the statement of the defendant Goering concerning the latter, such a refusal by the defendant von Neurath, as was the case with Eltz von Ruebenach,w ould have been resented by Hitler as an act of rudeness which would without any hesitation have been answered by to immediate dismissal of the defendant.
he was still in a position to carry out to the full extent the task assigned him by the President of the Reich -- to be the guarantor of peace in the foreign policy of the Reich, because he was fully justified in his conviction that his influence over Hitler was still strength enough to ensure his agree with the peace policy he was then fostering. not a question of actual membership of the SS and the Party, out in the fir. case it was only a matter of uniform, on external vanity of Hitler in regard to the men of his retinue during the impending visit from Mussolini; and secondly that it was a matter of a visible recognition for the services rendered by the defendant as Foreign Minister, which at the same time implied a proof of the unlimited agreement of Hitler with the peaceful foreign policy followed by the defendant; in other words, an entirely normal awarding of decorations as is practiced in every State. because at that time they did not yet exist in the Third Reich. That the defendant in both cases nevertheless expressed at once that under no circums tances did he wish to prove his entry or admission into the SS or the Part, by accepting, this investiture intended by Hitler as a mark of honor has been prove by the Affidavit of the defendant.
Moreover, he never took the oath required to become a member of the SS; he never exercised even the slighted activity in the SS and wore the SS uniform only twice in his life at Hitler's explicit request.
This has also been confirmed by his Affidavit. Both cases actually concerned a personal sacrifice of the defendant to the promise which he had given to Hindenburg. Socialist conviction, the defendant's agreement with Hitler's ideas and his entire governmental system from both these events, it is altogether off the track. tion's assertion even less. For this Order was not conferred on him as well as on the defendant Ribbentrop as a personal distinctions for services rendered, but it was merely valid for the position of the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs and for that of the Reich Protector as such; this was done in order to give to Order, which was intended to be conferred on foreign personalities only, a special significance in the eyes of people abroad, which is even shown by the fact that it had to be returned when he left. nesses examined in this connection, unequivocally resulted in the fact that the defendant's attitude towards the National Socialist system and its maxims were negative from the beginning to the end, and that therefore certain Party circles continually bore him ill-will and opposed him. For these circles knew quite well that the defendant von Neurath, as is proved by his own statement and by those of the witnesses Dr. Koepcke and Dr. Diekhoff, energetically and successfully opposed to the last day, all attempts to introduce members of the Party as officials into the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in so doing open it up to Nazi influences; and that in spite of various intrigues he could not be dissuaded from definite peace policy. The defendant also took upon his own shoulders this enmity and these intrigues from his inviolable sense of responsibility and his patriotism, endeavouring only to steer German Foreign policy into these channels, which were alone the right ones according to his convictions, formed by long years of most successful diplomatic activity.
He was fully convinced that when he resigned his office it meant the collapse of the last bulwark against the infiltration of members of the Party and of the Nazi spirit into the Reich Ministry of Foreign Affairs; it also meant that the danger of the renunciation of the peace policy embodied in them became threatening, as happened immediately on his resignation on 4 February 1938. the most grievous disillusionment in his official life, when he was forced to recognize by Hitler's speech on the ominous day of 5 November 1937 that all his efforts, his entire struggle, all his personal sacrifices in the last 5 years appared to be in vain and that his influence with Hitler was broken; that the latter had decided to abandon him and the policy of peace and agreement advocated by him; and, if the occasion arose, to make use of military means in order to carry out his more than Utopian plans and intentions set forth in this speech. The acknowledgment struck him like lightning from a clear sky, since up to then nothing had intimated that Hitler might no longer agree on the peace policy advocated by the defendant. The heart-attack which he had the next day may testify to the fact how seriously he felt this blow, which seemed to shatter all his hopes, all his efforts to protect Germany from the dangers of this foreign policy, the military entanglements and a possible, if not probable, catastrophe. regarding the future of his people before drawing upon himself the last self-evident consequences and resigning, he considered it his duty to try once again by very detailed and serious conversations, to dissuade Hitler from persevering in his fatal plans and intentions. Yet, having to recognize from this conversation, that Hitler's decisions was unalterable, he did not hesitate for one instant to tell Hitler that he had decided under no circumstances to take part in this pernacious policy, and that for such a foreign policy Hitler must find another Foreign Minister. Hitler accepted his resignation by his letter of 4 February 1938.
than this resignation for the absolute inaccuracy, the entire instability of the charges made against my client at this trial of having assisted or wished to assist by his foreign policy in the planning and the preparation of wars of aggression which took place one and one half years later? Is there a more unequivocal and clearer proof of the absurdity of the application of the principles of Conspiracy to the acts and deeds of statesmen and in particular, of the defendant? Finally, is there a more unequivocal and clearer proof of the absurdity of a retrospective judgment of the policy of the States, such as they constitute here one of the main bases of the whole prosecution? own activity and experience at least as well as I do, how dangerous conclusions a posteriori are regarding the actions of a man regarding the thoughts, views and deeds of this man at a time going back several years.
Tempera mutantur et now in illis. Each of us has surely, more than once in his life, experienced the truth of this sentence. Convictions and views, intentions and resolutions, which we have hold and carried out at a certain time, have in the course of years become changed and altered, partly because of the transformation of one's own personality, partly because of exterior circumstances, or change of conditions. Docs one really wish to expound this thesis and draw conclusion, retrospectively, that the former views, assertions and actions were only camouflage, and that the person already intended to do and was determined to do, what he did years later under quite different circumstances? Why should you demand a different standard of a politician, a statesmen? He also is only a man and is subject to tie same changes of ideas, opinions and intentions, as any one else. He is even more subject to exterior influences, exterior conditions so certain imponderable circumstances than the ordinary man. Just one example for this: What would you say to a man who would earnestly dare to assert that Napoleon Bonaparte, when he went to Paris during the great Revolution, or later on when taking over the supreme command of the French armies in Northern Italy, already had the idea or even the plan or the intention, of making himself in 1804 Emperor of the French and of marching on Moscow in 1812? I believe whoever adopted this attitude would stand alone in the world. And an able dealectician with more or less apparent logic and right could still base this opinion on the historical development of events, like the Prosecution with regard to their opinion that Hitler, at the time of his assumption of power, yes, already with the presentation of the Party program in 1920, had not only the intention but even the plan ready for conducting his later wars of aggression, and everything which Hitler and the Nazis and/or his collaborators did, even the very moment of the assumption of power, both in domestic and foreign politics, was the conscious preparation for those wars of aggression.
its principle, which still stands on very weak basis, and its retrospective consideration of things, esteems too highly probably not only the spiritual, but also the statesmanlike abilities, not only of his satellites, out also of Hitler himself. Because, after all, it is in any case already evidence of a certain mental limitation, if a person, and particularly a statesman, founds his policy on the basis, as Hitler indisputably did, that the governments and statesmen of the remaining States would again and again lot themselves be fooled and bluffed, that they would again and again stand for actions which they considered to be violations of treaties, and that they would watch quietly until Hitler believed himself to be so for as to be able new to attack almost the whole world by force of arms. And is it not all the more proof of a mental limitation, if a statesman in this way underestimates the abilities and cleverness, but also the power instruments of his opponents as Hitler has done? In addition to all this, however, there is something which must not be underestimated either; that is the violence of the sudden transition of the thoughts and the decisions resulting therefrom which was a trait of Hitler. I do not consider it necessary to have to give you any further evidence thereof, as they are generally well-known. Hitler, however, was also a man who did not stand for only argument, or any resistance, and who, when he encountered such and met obstacles which he could not remove through an emphatic word, changed his plans and intentions like lightning and lot himself be led to decisions which were frequently just the opposite from what he bad waited, planned and done previously. preparation of wars at the time the seizure of power, and even already in previous years which the Prosecution has ascribed to Hitler. The impossibility of this charge is yet underlined, if the following is considered: To this Hitler has not only indisputably testified in public speeches, addresses and diplomatic notes on several occasions from the day of the seizure of power until 23 July A LJG 19-3 1937, as can be seen from documents presented by no, but he has also made positive suggestions for the practical execution of the limitation of armament of all States, therefore also that of Germany, from which it can be indisputably seen, that with regard to the German Armed Forces and its strength in relationship to the armament of the Western Powers, he declared himself satisfied with a relationship, which from the very beginning excluded any aggressive war against the other States.
And now just suppose that one of those offers of Hitler had been accepted by the remaining States, then the war of aggression which Hitler supposedly had been planning and preparing for years would never have been possible. All efforts, work, and expenses in connection with it would have been in vain. Or do you perhaps consider it probable that Hitler looked ahead, and figured that his offers would, be refused, raid that he only made then in this realization? Then he would really be an almost denomiacal genius, a prophetic seer of the first rank. Do you really wish to pressure this and to affirm from it the claim of the Prosecution of the planning of the aggressive war in the year 1939 already a long time before the seizure of power? And even if you should answer this question in the affirmative for the person of Hitler, do you also ascribe such a gift of second sight to his collaborators, his servants, yes even all Party numbers? To ask this question is to answer it in the negative, with this question alone also falls the whole painfully constructed and artificial construction of the motivation of the Prosecution. And along with it falls also the classification of the whole charge, and in particular the coresponsibility of all collaborators of Hitler generally under the conception of the conspiracy, at least until the period of time when it could be recognized by the most extensive circles of his followers that Hitler finally wanted war and had decided, on it. Simultaneously with this, however, the unvarying corrections of the postulate advanced by me at the beginning of my statements, after examining the subjective co-guilt of every single defendant, after the refusal of the co-responsibility of each individual only from the fact of 23 July A LJG 19-4 his participation in the actions which are considered as preparation for a war of aggression by the Prosecution at any period of time, simply without examination and investigation of his knowledge of Hitler's aims and intentions, becomes evident.
To waive and disregard this postulate, as the Prosecution does, would be to contradict every sense of justice, the most primitive as well the most highly developed, in every nation on earth. The "summum jus" sought in this trial would become a "summa injuria". defendant von Neurath himself. Is it not pure folly, is it not "sumna injuri to accuse this man of connivence in planning and preparing wars of aggression this man who deemed it his exclusive duty, a duty to which he has made many a personal sacrifice, to prevent every form of entanglement involving war; and who, the moment he realized that the task was beyond him, forthwith resigned his function and demanded his dismissal. The Prosecution obviously fool this themselves, otherwise they would not have brought, as evidence of the defendant's alleged joint culpability, his presence at Hitler's conference on the 5 November 1937, wittingly omitting however, that it was this conference and Hitler's deviation from a peace to a war policy which determined the defendant to refuse further Collaboration and thereby make it clear that he has never concurred in the past and is not prepared to concur in the future in, or approve of, the planning, preparation or waging of a war of aggression. Thus, every charge of guilt make in the Indictment against defendant von Neurath is originally void, once and for all. For should he be further accused of having broken international treaties while responsible for the conduct of German foreign policy, it must be pointed out, in answer, that according to the clear wording of the Charter, the breach of international treaties does not constitute a punishable crime in itself, and becomes a punishable crime only when it serves the purpose of preparation for wars of aggression. If such a breach of treaty serves this purpose, it must be intended to do so by its author, or at least its author must have conscience of the fact. That defendant v. Neurath had no such intention nor indeed the faintest conscience of the above implication is quite clearly proved by his resignation from the office of Foreign Minister. But I shall moreover demonstrate to you that even the charge of violation or breach of international treaties is without foundation. Office at Hindenburg's request, there were two questions that far surpassed in importance every other European problem and awaited an urgent solution; they were the problem of the German Reparations and the problem of the disarmament of the victor Powers and of German equality of rights, a factor which was inseparable from it.
The first question, the defendant and the then Reich Chancellor von Papen managed to conduct towards a satisfactory solution at the Conference held by the Powers in Lausanne on the 10 June 1932, a few days after the defendant's assumption of office. At the closing session of the Conference on the 9 July 1932, Germany was acquitted of the financial servitude established by the treaty of Versailles against a single final payment of 3 milliard marks. The Young Plan was obsolete, and only Germany's obligations deriving from the loans grouted her remained in force. Thus came for Germany the political achievement that Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles in which the Reparation obligations were contained in virtue of article 232, became obsolete. The first broach was made. Hatters differed as regards the disarmament problem. This arose from the obligation for disarmament imposed on Germany according to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles which, I presume, is well known. In case of its fulfilment, the preamble to this part likewise proscribed disarmament for the highly-armed victor nations in reciprocity. Germany had disarmed: it had already fully met its obligations in 1927, an uncontested fact which the League of Nations also had expressly recognized. This was the basis for Germany's request for reciprocal compliance by the other partners to the Treaty, as provided for in the Preamble to Part V. And Germany had announced its request for disarmament by the highly-armed States and in conjunction there with recognition of her equality of rights a considerable time before the defendant took office. However, during the so-called Disarmament Conference the negotiations not only had made no progress by the time the defendant took over the Foreign Office, but just at that time, the summer of 1932, they had become considerably more difficult. In view of the short time allotted for my disposal, I again refer for details to the German Memorandum of 29 August 1932 (my document book II, No.40) and to my client's interview of 6 September 1932 with a representative of the Wolff Telegraph Office, to be found in the same document book under No. 41. Lastly, I should like to refer to the defendants declaration of 30 September 1932 before the German Press submitted to the Tribunal under No. 45, my document book II.
of negotiations by the Disarmament Conference on 16 October 1932, and in order to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation to the world and, to the Western lowers -- prove clearly and unequivocally the great, fundamental tendency of the defendant's ideas, his trend of thought and intentions as a human being, as a diplomat and as Foreign Minister, which dominated his entire policy from the beginning until his resignation, and which can be summarized in the statement: to avoid and prevent the settling of differences through force of arms; realize all goals and tasks of German foreign policy by peaceful means only; to reject war as a means of policy: in a word, to strengthen and safeguard peace among the nations.
It is the same tendency which Mr. Francois Poncet, the former French Ambassador to Berlin so succinctly referred to as a characteristic of the defendant in his letter -- which I submitted to the Tribunal as No. 162 of my document book V -- and which was unanimously confirmed by all witnesses and affidavits. what really night be termed an affront to Germany, which caused the head of the German Delegation to declare that under such conditions it would not be possible for him to continue to attend the negotiations, the Western Powers in the end could not close their mines to the ethics of a policy inspired by such tendencies, and, followings a suggestion by the British Government, on 11 December 1932 the conclusion of the known Five-power Agreement was brought about (see my document book II, No. 47 a) in which England, France and Italy, with the admission in the united States of America recognized Germany's acknowledged equality of rights. On 14 December 1932 the Main Committee of the Disarmament Conference expressed its pleasure in taking cognizance of this agreement, and the German Delegate expressed his readiness to resume participation in the deliberation of the conference, stressing also that the equality recognized on 11 December 1932 in regard to Germany was the condition sine qua non for this continued participation by Germany.
It seemed that a great stop forward had thus been made in the path leading to an understanding on the question of disarmament.
However, things were to take a different turn: Immediately following the opening of the conference meeting, again in Geneva on 2 February 1933, serious clashes occurred between the German and the French Delegation, in the course of which M. Paul Boncour, the French Delegate, even went so far as to declare the Five power Agreement of 11 December 1932 legally invalid because involved five powers only. To the astonishment not only of Germany, the cause for these increasingly acute differences was the fundamental change in France attitude as regards the basic question of the entire armaments problem as law down in the French Plan of 14 November 1932 as a basis for these negotiation titude heretofore, France suddenly took the position in this plan that armies made of professional soldiers with a long period of service were aggressive in character and, consequently, meant a threat to peace and that only armies with a short period of service were defensive in character. at greater length to the details of the French plan, but also to the sequence of the differences which became constantly more critical between Germany and the other Powers. Rather I must presume that they are known and confine myself to stressing, that the new French thesis, which the Disarmament Confer adopted as its own, was clearly and unequivocally directed against Germany a the Reichswehr as it had come into being in accordance with the disarmament visions of the Treaty of Versailles, a thesis which, if it was to be carried into effect, would have required the transformation of the Reichswehr into a militia army with a short period of service, thus signifying a still further reduction in its armament, inadequate as it already was for an effective protection against attack. The establishment of this thesis, however, also proved clearly that France was unwilling to disarm, which was also shown by statements of the French representative himself. question of the ration in the reciprocal reduction of the individual armies, was merely a new expression of her old thesis, first security, then disar mament, which brought about the failure of not only the previous negotiations but also that of a new plan of mediation the so-called Mac Donald plan, proposed by England to prevent the threatening break-down of negotiations, Germany's reference to consideration for her own security and her demand for general disarmament as a result of the right to equality by reason of recognition accorded her on 11 December 1932, were received by the other parties as presumptive; indication being given that should negotiations fail responsibility would rest with her.