Germany's withdrawal from the disarmament conference must be considered from these viewpoints. It took place after long drawn out negotiations had produced no positive results and because it was in no way evident that the powers were inclined to bring about in future a fulfillment of the German demands. The declaration of the Reich Government and of Hindenburg that this stop was to be looked upon as a tactical step, and that the same objectives were to be retained, namely the preservation of peace under recognition of equal rights, all this therefore had to appear credible and reasonable. With regard to the simultaneous withdrawal from the League of Nations opinions could have differed. Here, too, one might held the view that the withdrawal was necessary as a movement of protest and that one could prove through factual efforts in the matter itself that it was intended to adhere to a policy of peace. withdrawal from the League of Nations, even though he himself had experienced as Reich Chancellor that the negotiations in the large and manifold assembly of the League caused certain difficulties in some questions. On the other hand, however, he was so convinced of the institution of the League of Nations as an instrument of agreement and of facilitation of the technical possibilities for agreement that he wished to avoid withdrawal from the League of Nations. He advocated this opinion very strongly. Since he could not persuade Hitler in Berlin he followed him to Munich shortly before the decision in order to lay his well-founded opinion before him there. Ergo we see Papen here working activly in a field for which in his position as Vice-Chancellor he actually has no responsibility; aiming at a solution which if one takes as a basis the views of the prosecution concerning the withdrawal from the League of Nations can only be considered as a step towards peace.
Because of the fundamental importance of the withdrawal from 22 July A LJG 20-6 the League of Nations the measure was submitted to the German people in the form of a plebiscite enabling it to state its opinion.
On the occasion of this plebiscite, Hitler, the government, and Hindenburg, issued proclamations which emphasized expressly that this step was not intended to constitute a change of policy, but merely a change of method. Preparations for the plebiscite were carried out in line with this statement. speech the successes of Hitler's government and of having advocated an unconditionally affirmative attitude towards the questions to be decided by the plebiscite. so, the decision having been cast once and for all and having to be justified before the foreign countries. If the responsible loaders actually did not strive for anything but a change of methods, no objections could be made. The position of German foreign policy would have been shaken if the people had shown In the plebiscite that it opposed the measure already taken. It was therefore quite natural to approve of this policy in public within the framework of the solemnly given assurances. Moreover, it could not be overlooked that in a plebiscite on government measures the vote of confidence could not pass over internal politics altogether.
We have to take the date of the speech into consideration. In November 1933 Hitler had made good progress in the field which was in the foreground of necessity and interest:
Namely, in the easing of economic distress and the elimination of unemployment. His measures were on a large scale and at first showed apparent success. Here, too, one cannot measure things by the same standard as one applies to them today in full knowledge of their development. At that time the course taken hitherto seemed justified by its success. In his electoral speech which demanded a vote of confidence in the government for the purpose of agreement on a matter of foreign policy, Papen felt obliged to refer appreciately to this positive development in internal politics.
In his introductory speech Mr. Justice Jackson acknowledged himself, in the following words, the conditions in 1933 which have been described:
"After the reverses of the last war we saw the German people in 1933 regain their position in commerce, industry and art. We observed its progress without distrust and without malice." Those are the words of Justice Jackson. French relations which interested Papen most. In his own testimony he has stated his views on this subject and has related how, as early as in the twenties, he collaborated in various political and or Catholic bodies with the idea of promoting understanding and a rapprochement between France and Germany. I refer in this connection to Document No. 92 and to the meeting between Papen and the French Colonel Picot which is described therein and which is characteristic of Papen's attitude. as commissioner for the Saar territory. We see how he attempted to avoid also in the Saar question everything that could in any way impair the relations between the countries, even if only temporarily. From this came his suggestion that there should be no recourse to a plebiscite which might give renewed impetus to political chauvinism in both countries. Hitler himself, not only before he took over power but also as responsible chief of the cabinet, had stated time and again that Germany has no intention of bringing up the question of Alsace-Lorraine, but that the Saar question was the only problem still to be settled between the two countries. And in so doing he followed the suggestions of Papen entirely, which aimed at a peaceful settlement. namely the Vatican, when he concluded the concordat in July 1933.
By concluding the concordat Papen had intended merely to strenthen Hitler's position to enhance his reputation abroad. was a bilateral pact, and that the legal obligations of the concordat offered certain legal protection to the violated party, also, during the Treaty violations on the part of Germany which followed soon afterwards. the Concordat. I refer to Document 104 which I submitted today, and I summarize it as follows : Concordat was on the initiative of Papen. Furthermore, he confirms that Papen succeeded in persuading Hitler to the conditions of the Concordat. In the answer to Question 4, in particular, he confirms that Papen's activities while the Concordat was concluded were dictated by his positive position as regards religion. Finally he confirms, in the answer to Question 6, that the Concordat was a basis and a support in the later persecution of the Church. Answer 7 confirms that the community of German Catholic workers, which I will mention later, was not an organization protected by the Concordat. In any case, it is entirely wrong to suppose that Papen had any knowledge of intended future violations of the treaty and that he had brought about its conclusion while he was in possession of such information. If he had wished to enhance Hitler's reputation abroad, this means would have been the least suitable that could be imagined. A struggle against the church without the Concordat would have been a matter which, it is true, met with an unfavorable reception abroad but which nevertheless would have been an internal German affair. Through the existence of an interstate treaty these church persecutions became simultaneously a violation of an international treaty with resulting effects of a special nature upon prestige. One cannot conclude a treaty for the purpose of gaining prestige if immediately after its conclusions one proceeds to violate the same treaty. This deliberation alone already refutes the assumption of the prosecution. Beyond this the accusation of the prosecution is of symptomatic importance.
Every action of Papen's which has somehow come to light must be interpreted in the sense of the conspiracy theory to Papen's disadvantage, and the simplest recipe for this is to place the later development into the foregroun claiming Papen's cooperation and knowledge in this development, and to designate his previous contrary statements of opinion as ambiguous and doublefaced. This recipe is simple if one considers the knowledge of later developments in retrospective as self-evident and if one does not picture the ture, factual situation at the time; above all, if one makes no effort to reexamine the logic in the original intention which is claimed and the further developments it had. Only in this manner can one, as in this instance, achieve a result which on closer consideration presupposes the folly of the person acting at the time. towards religious matters prohibits the slightest doubt in the sincerity of his intentions. In the hearing of the evidence it was set forth that not only his closest personal advisors in church affairs but also the highest dignitaries of the church who were in closest personal as well as professional contact with the defendant in these matters, emphasized that his attitude as a Catholic was absolutely free of reproach at all times. questions is already made clear by the confutation of the assertion of the prosecution that Papen himself broke the Concordat by dissolving the "Work Association of Catholic Germans". I refer in this respect to the unequivocal testimony of the former secretary of the "Work Association of Catholic German Count Roderich Thun, Defense exhibit No. 47. It must be stated, however, tha Papen not only saw with regret the subsequent violations of the Concordat, by the Reich but that he actively tried to oppose them. The entire activities of the "Work Association of Catholic Germans" consisted practically of nothing else but the establishment of such violations of the Concordat in order to furnish Papen with a basis for his constant interventions with Hitler. After Papen's departure for Vienna the practical opportunity for such intervention ceased to exist.
From all of Papen's speeches it is evident that his attempt at safeguarding the churches did not emanate from considerations of political expediency of the day but from his fundamental religious attitude. I believe there is no speech in which he did not express himself on this problem, emphasizing time and again that only the Christian philosophy of life, and thus the Christian churches, could be the foundation for the orderly government of a state. In just this Christian foundation he saw the best protection against the tendency of the party to give preference to an ever increasing extent to the idea of sheer might over that of right.
With regard to Papen's report to Hitler of 10 July 1035 (PS 2248) which was submitted during the cross-examination, the prosecution fell fictim to a quite obvious misunderstanding. Papen refers in it to the favorable result there would be in the field of foreign politics if one could succeed in eliminating political Catholicism without touching the Christian foundation of the state.
Papen does not state here his opinion on the part and present situation but furnishes advice for the future. The contents of this advice are definitely positive in the ecclesiastical sense. They state that one ma eliminate political Catholicism but the purely ecclesiastical interests themselves, that is the Christian foundation of the state, must remain untouched. These directives destined for future times obviously contain criticism of the past as well. We see here how, in connection with activities in the field of foreign policy, matters are discussed and brought up to Hitler which in themselves belong to another field. the prosecution that as a good catholic he should have resigned after the Pope had issued his Encyclical Letter "With Grave apprehension" of 14 March 1937. Papen could refer, in this connection, without any criticism and with full approval, to the standpoint of the church itself, which has always been of the opinion that one should hold a position so long as it still offers the slightest opportunity for positive work. Owing to this wise attitude and to its feeling of responsibility for the German Catholics, the Church did not completely break with the Thrid Reich until the end. One cannot ask an individual Catholic to take any other standpoint. This all the less as Papen, in his purely foreign political activities, came into no conflict whatsoever with his Catholic conscience.
tler about the treatment of Cardinal Innitzer is also lacking in foundation. Papen himself can no longer remember today when and in what form he heard of these occurrences at all. The German press did not publish anything about it and in no case did such matters reach the public via internal Church channel as the prosecution assumes. In any case at that time Papen had no possibility whatsoever to intervene, being merely a private person and besides in bad standing with Hitler for the moment.
I have already dealt with Hitler's development into an autocrat. After the abolishment of joint reports to Hindenburg, Papen's influence was reduced to minimum. Protests in cabinet sessions coming from a single man, who was unable to base these protests on requirements of his own department, were of purely declaratory nature. Meanwhile the circle of applying nazistic doctrines in practice was closing more and more. It became clear that the willingness of the first days to compromise in agreeing to a rule by coalition was slowly abandoned and that the national socialist idea kept gaining ground in all fields. It was clear to Papen that he could not follow that course. It was likewise clear that in the frame work of his official position he could not alter the general trend, despite his efforts to help in individual cases. On the other hand his theoretically still existing position of Vice-Chancellor gave him certain weight in public life. Thus he had to face the problem, whether he should start forth with public criticism of prevailing abuses as a last attempt to gainsay influence upon the development by public discussions of the problems. In case of failure, he would have at least achieved the public branding of these abuses, by a responsible party, even if as a natural consequence Papen would have to give up his position and would thus no longer be able to aid many people in individual cases.
In his Marburg speech of 17 June 193* Papen distinctly branded all abuses which had become apparent until that time. Such extensive public criticism remained the only instance in the history of the "Third Reich". doctrines in practice dovetailed into an encircling enclosure suppressing the entire public life. Had that enclosure been breached at a single spot, the dangerous character of the entire system could not have been maintained. If only one of the points discussed would have met with success when carried out in practice, it would have shown a total change of conditions. The system objected to could not have existed another day if the freedom of public speech, demanded by Papen, would have been granted. It could not have been upheld, if the conception of justice and of equality before the law were recognized. It could not have existed if freedom of religion were granted. A nazistic racial theory cannot be upheld if the maxim of the individual's equality, common to all confessions, is advocated.
Each of Papen's attacks in his Marburg speech -- he had dealt with the racial issue already in his Gleiwitz speech -- was in itself an attack upon the development of the entire Nazi doctrine. The audience was clearly shown by a leading member of the opposition in the government, where the entirety of the abuses originated from. had become a matter of public discussion or Papen was going to offer his resignation, since for further cooperation he could no longer reconcile his viewpoing with the path chosen by Hitler. necessary to make a concession to public opinion by deviating from his line of action. He tried to kill the opposition by forbidding the publication of the speech and by penalizing its distributors. Papen resigned. Hitler did not accept his resignation immediately, since he obviously had to take Hindenburg into consideration, wishing to clear up the situation first of all with him.
Meanwhile the events of June 30th took place.
What fate had been destined *---* in the course of these events will probably never be known definitely. Particularly, it will never be elucidated whether different people were moved by different intentions. carried out against the office of the Vice-Chancellor. Bose was the first victim in the very building of the Vice-Chancellery. Jung, who was arrested outside of Berlin, was similarly shot. His fate, though, became known to Papen and the public only much later, as it had been hoped at the beginning that he not only had left Berlin but had gone to Switzerland, having been warned by the measures taken against the Marburg speech. The other members of the staff, who could be apprehended, were taken into custody by the police and later sent to concentration camps. As to Papen himself one evidently hesitated to make a final clear decision on his fate. His close relationship to Hindenburg would seem to indicate the advisability of not burdening the list of victims of June 30th with so pr*---* a name, after it had been burdened enough in relation to Hindenburg with the crime, against Schleicher, camouflaged though as self-defense. that whatever Papen's fate has been in the end, the measures taken against him and his people demonstrate his absolute opposition against Hitler and the Nazi policy. which outwardly seem to show at first a certain divergence from his usual attitude. hides his real and material desires under polite phrases which otherwise were in no way customary in his relations with Hitler. It may appear surprising, that a man who opposed the system, who had been persecuted for that reason and upon whose associates such incredible things had been inflicted, chose such a form of letter. But for a fair judgment a correct understanding of the state of affairs at that time is required. A state of lawlessness existed at that time. It offered a favorable opportunity to get rid of troublesome opponents in the course of these measures.
The examples of Schleicher, of Klausner and others have sufficiently shown that. There was no way of knowing beforehand when and in what manner the measures taken against the persons already involved in these matters would end. One believed almost hysterically to see an every man with opposing ideas a conspirator with these SA groups, who sooner or later were really going to revolt against Hitler. attitude had joined hands with the SA, a powerful factor at that time has not been established yet with certainty. Anyhow it could not be judged at that time whether or not Hitler's statements in regard to persons not belonging to the SA were correct.
For Papen the situation at that time was as follows: He knew of Bose's assassination, but was as yet unaware of June's fate. He hoped that the latter had escaped. Three of his co-workers Were in a concentration camp. These had first to be released from there. And also for the future the suspicion had to be dispersed, that any one of them as well as Papen himself had been in contact with the SA circles in revolt. requirement for any possible success would be to put a distance between him and such SA circles. Papen therefore felt obliged to assure Hitler of his loyalty and faith. behind the attack on him and the Vice-Chancellery and that Himmler in particular wanted to eliminate him, having been prevented from doing so only by Goering and that therefore in order to safeguard himself against these two, it was necessary to assure Hitler of his correct attitude. essential. The alpha and omega of the letters is the demand of rehabilitation for his own person and his associates. He demands court action. He advises Hitler to strike out from his indended Justification Law all actions directed against persons outside the SA-circle.
But what is the meaning of these demands of Papen? Their real significant is the upholding of what is legal against the illegal actions of the 30th. He demands an objective and legal clarification of all that is to be condemned in the events of June 30th.
When we consider these events of June 30th we must bear in mind that these events fell into two parts. The first were measures against the SA leaders, who radicalism had always been known and who were always to be connected with acts of violence and independent activities, which in the past had had to be condemned. An intervention against such people coul be explained as an act of state-defense against dangerous forces which were ever ready for revolt. SA-circle. A court investigation would have resulted in the clearing up of these events and in the condemning of the responsible persons. at that time, one can only arrive at the conviction that Papen's situation the aims could actually have been no other, than that which he had proposed to Hitler a rehabilitation by means of a court action of those persons who had bee unjustly persecuted and the elimination of a summary justification of the measures in question by a law. If we come now to the heart of the matter and to what was actually desired we cannot give to the form of these letters the meaning which is ascribed to then by the prosecution. of June 30th, but was merely used for the above-mentioned purpose, is best show by the examination of the letter of 17 July. Though at that time Papen had achieved the release of his co-workers from the concentration camp, his other demands were not fulfilled by Hitler. So we now see a piece of writing which is entirely lacking even in the most elementary forms of politeness. Merely objective statements and objective requests. A piece of writing signed only with the name of Papen, without even a closing courtesy formula. single moment: He holds fast to his resignation and demands immediate action *---* it, as the letter of 10 July 1934 shows (Doc. D 17/5). He refuses to play any part in future government activities. He leaves Hitler immediately after having had him called out of the Cabinet session on 3 July. He keeps aloof from the Reichstag session, at which the Justification Law has been confirmed.
He rudely declines the offer to accept the comfortable post of ambassador at the Vatican. Such was his negative attitude. Wehrmacht. He turns to his friend Colonel General von Fritsch. Blomberg, owing to his attitude, is out of question. Fritsch will not act without a formal order from the Reich President. So now Papen endeavors to get in touch with Hindenburg. But Hindenburg's entourage keeps him off.
THE PRESIDENT: You might stop there.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 23 July 1946, at 1000 hours.)
HERMANN WILHELM GOERING. ET AL., SITTING
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yesterday I had stopped at the point where I was describing what Papen did in the course of the neasures of 30 June. I mentioned his resignation. I shall continue on Page 46, the last paragraph. of the Wehrmacht. He turns to his friend Coloenl General von Fritsch Bolmberg, but owing to his attitude, it is out of the question. Fritsch will not act without a formal order from the Reich Prseidnet. So now Papen endeavours to get in touch with Hindenburg. But Hindenburg's entourage keep him off.
All access to his estate Neudeck are clossed by SS guards. Papen sends his secretary Ketteler to Hindeburg's neighbour, but also that attempt fails. He has to witness how oblviously Hindenburg has been influences, when he publicly approves of Hitler's conduct on the 30th of June in an official telegram. success? legal plane. The attempts to mobilize the only factor of power, the Wehrmacht, had faled. Hindenburg cannot be reached: he is evidently influenced by his advosors in the opposite direction. when Papen should have openly pointed ou the criminal events on June 30; he could possible have effected thereby the collapse of the entire Nazi system. That assertion is untenable. Apart from the fact that Papen, as shown, had no longer the opportunity for such an official statement, subsequent developments in German demonstrated that such an individual protest would not have had any effect against the powerful position of Hitler either within the country or abroad.
Hitler's pres-
tige in Germany was already then so great, and more so later on, that such a protest, even if it could have reached the public at all, would surely not have found any echo in the masses of the population. To be sure, the great masses saw only the economic improvement and the strengthening of Germany's position abroad, and only a numerically thin layer realized the true danger of the develpment. Most foreign countries knew about the events on June 30 more than the German people. A statement by Papen to the people would not have *---*own much light on it. No conclusions were drawn from the available information by foreign cuntries either at that time or later. led to the reoccupation of the Rhineland by the French. I am unable to discover where the Prosecution has found a basis for such an assertion. It is contradicted by the fact that no military reaction of any kind followed after the events which occurred later and which do not belong in the realm of internal politics, bit vitally touched the world abroad as, for instance, the introduction of compulsory military service and the occupation of the Rhineland. of the Cabinet and of the Reichstag, Papen showed the public that he was hostile to the development. His conduct was a public protest against the measures of June 30 and against their *---*bration. The Prosecution can not overlook these apparent signs which are historical facts. It attempts therefore, to construct an anti-thesis between his conduct and his mental attitude. The only assistance at their disposal to that end are the letters addressed by Papen in July to Hiter. Even if the spirit and purpose of these letters were not clearly discernable from their cotents, as in fact is the case, such an attempt would also fail in the face of the facts which were just stated, because of the inadequate means at hand.
Generally, I would like to state in this regard the following: Hitler during his Vice-Chancellorship cad during the events of June 30, while being in fact a loyal follower of his?
On what ground should Hitler have desired it himself who, according to the Prosecution, conspired with Papren - and this, after all, would only be a result of the conspiracy?
Could it not be in the interests of Hitler, that Papen disclosed in his Marburg speech all the weaknesses and misdeeds of the Nazi system? On what ground should Hitler have wished that Papen so obviously distanced himself from the lawless actions on June 30?
If we consider that, only one conclusion can be arried at: What the Prosecution believes to be able to interpret as the mental attitude of Papen, lacks all logic. tain contrary facts intended to serve as camouflage, is used again by the Prosecution with respect to Papen's acceptance of the position in Vienna. following: which occurred after Papen's recall and undoubtedly without his cooperation, namely the marching in on 12 March 1938, does also not represent a crime in the sense of the Charter. The Charter considers as punishable the preparation and the waging of a war of aggression or of a war in violation of international treaties. self to the arraignment of what appears as a most serious crime with its terrible further consequences. The aggressive and prohibited war the crimes against the rules of warfare, and the crimes against humanity in their most violent form, the immeasurable consequences of these grave actions, have all justified this unusual, trial. The Charter does not charge the Tribunal with the punishment of all the injustices which has occurred during the course of the development of National Socialism. Such a task ould not be fulfilled within the framework of this Tribunal, for technical reasons and for lack of time. It is not the task of the Tribunal to examine whether international treaties were observed or not. This question is only of importance if wars were casued or if the crimes of violence which are to be described in detail have to be accounted for.
The march into Austria is no war, however for one stretches the conception from the standpoint of international law.
In this case it is a decisive fact that no force was employed, and not even the slightest resistance was offered, that on the contrary, the troops were received with jubilation. Furthermore, the march into Austria cannot be considered in connection with the later acts of aggression. It was a special case based on the special situation which, since 1918, had already found expression in the efforts both on the Austrian and on the German side to bring about a union of the hardly prosperous Austrian state with Germany in some kind of constitutional form.
Therefore, the actual events must be detached from Hitler's war plans or purely military plans of preparation - with which I shall deal later - and must be regarded as the solution of a political problem of the country which had become acute and the result of which had always been ten *---* of both sides, independent of Hitler.
Papen's activity in Vienna is clearly characterized by three episodes: the circumstances of his appointment on 26 July 1934: his letter to Hitler dated 16 July 1936 (Defense doc. No. 71) after the conclusion of the July agreement: and his recall on 4 February 1938.
The following circumstances lay at the origin of his appointment:
A crucial event had occurred. Dollfuss is murdered; not only are the relations between Germany and Austria strained, but they have reached an extremely dangerous stage of development. The international situation is menacing. Italy is marching upon the Brenner. An ultimate divergence of Austria towards one of the groups of powers interested is directly to be feared. Thus, there is the threat of a final situation which would definitely render impossible the maintenance of even merely supportable relations between Germany and Austria. dismiss his objections against the personality of Papen and entrust him with the mission in Vienna. Papen was particularly fitted for the initiation of a policy designed to overcome the deadlock resulting from the assassination of Dollfuss. Papen had always spoken in the Cabinet in favor of a friendly development of relations in the question concerning Austria. Papen was internationally known as a man for a reasonable policy of mutual understanding. post. His experiences in the domestic sector of the last period, his personal attitude to the treatment of himself and of his collaborators on the 30th of June, his attitude to the assassination of Dollfuss, with whom he had been on most friendly terns since the time of his previous activity, were opposed to the taking over of the post. This resolution therefore was, for Papen, a very grave one. The perception, however, that he himself would alone be in the position to fulfil this task within the framework of true pacification must outweigh everything. Could he assume that anybody else had the strong will and also the possibility of assuring the maintenance of the road of appeasement? He could never expect a personality of the Foreign Office, and still less a member of the Party, to have such a personal independence as he himself enjoyed.
From his pest as Vice-Chancellor Papen brought his experience. He knew the difficulties to convince Hitler by pertinent arguments in a corresponding form. He alone could hope to carry through his efforts for a peaceful policy, notwithstanding the extremist tendencies of Hitler's advisers. His experiences, on the other hand, had made him very careful. He made his conditions and demanded the establishment of a clear policy based on facts. He demanded the withdrawal of influence over the Austrian Nazi-movement, which must be assured by the dismissal of the man who directly or indirectly had participated in the criminal act: The Landesinspector Habicht. He requested his own subordination to Hitler in order to make possible the maintaining of the conditions which he had proposed, and in order to avoid any alterations in the course of its handling. He compels something seemingly impossible in contact with a head of the State; he has the conditions laid down in writing under which he takes over his post as Ambassador. They are signed by Hitler. He wishes always to be in a position to force Hitler to keep to his written word. particularly by the statement of the witness von Tschirschky, a man who, according to the declarations of the Prosecution, is really not suspected of viewing these things in the defendant's favor. follower of Hitler's already known plans of aggression, had eagerly and willingly declared himself prepared to take over the new post. of the defendant, be really in agreement with such an attitude? These secret conferences, this unpublished document signed by Hitler and in Papen's possession, cannot really be considered apretence in order to deceive -- as would be the consequence of the Prosecution's charge. These things were not intended to be publicized and were never made public. to the conclusion that Papen honestly strove to maintain the established appeasement policy. It likewise is impossible to talk here of opportunism. Papen had declined the position of Ambassador to the Vatican. This position of an Ambassador in Vienna was hardly an enticing post of honor for a former Reich Chancellor and recent Vice-Chancellor.
Papen's own good economic situation excluded all along any material motives. Papen's latter of 16 July 1936 to Hitler is the report of the success of his two years' efforts to bring about settled peaceful relations between both the countries. The treaty of 11 July 1936 put the seal upon this. clearly explains the task allotted to Papen and its performance. Papen points out that the aim was reached, for the execution of which he was called to Vienna on 26 July 1934. He considered his task as accomplished with the conclusion of the Treaty.
No clearer evidence can be produced of the exactness of Papen's statement on his task and its performance than by this letter. Why did they believe they must impute a dubious interpretation to his mission? As an obliging instrument of Hitler's plans of aggression he has undertaken the task to prepare and carry out a forcible annexation of Austria. He has been charged with undermining the Schuschnigg Government and cooperating with Austria's illegal Nazi movement to the effect. All he did with a view to pacifying the mutual relations has been camouflage, in order to enable him to carry out his underground plans. And here the trustworthy statement of account is mandatory. absolute contradiction to the facts -- this letter, found by the Allied troops in the secret records of the Reich Chancellory, and now thankfully placed at the disposal of the Defense Counsel by the Prosecution?
The third point that clearly characterizes Papen's activity in Vienna is his recall on 4 February 1938. The numerous recalls and nominations of that day clearly showed a reorganization of the most important military and political posts. The personalities of the recalled military and diplomats clearly show that the sole reason was for the unusual and extensive sudden change at that time. If Hitler then also recalled Papen from his post, without an actual reason for this, entirely unexpectedly and without giving a reason, it is thereby clearly proved that Hitler, at the beginning of a radical foreign political course, no longer saw in Papen the right man for Vienna. the peaceful activity of Papen during the entire duration of his Austrian mission. As the Prosecution, however, also strives here to apply single events against Papen, I shall submit this period also to a short consideration.
We see Papen in a steady struggle with the illegal movement. The reproach that he had conspired with it is best led ad absurdum by the fact that Papen was selected as victim of an attack by these same illegal men, according to the plans of the illegal movement which have been confirmed by Foreign Minister Schmidt. The documentary evidence from the reports at hand which Papen sent to Hitler also has but one meaning. Here, too, there is a completely clear piece of evidence, since the reports to Hitler, which took place regularly in the course of business, actually excluded an intention to deceive the public. It is regrettable that all the reports could not be found in order to give, in their entirety, a clear, complete historical picture of Papen's activity. Only a fraction of the reports are in front of us. But when Papen had transferred abroad, at the end of his activity, the copies of all his reports, as the evidence has shown, then he could have done this only in order to have a historical justification for his policy of peace. It is proven by this in complete clearness that his policy reproduced in the complete report must have been a policy which was in contrast to the development which was brought about by the other side in March 1938. about the Austrian conditions, have stated under oath that Papen led a policy of pacification and fought against any meddling of the illegal movement In the political happenings. What can be concluded from the presentation of the Prosecution against that? That Papen had to maintain a certain outside connection to members of the Austrian Nazi movement corresponding to his position as German Ambassador and corresponding to the state treaty concluded with Austria --a connection which was in no way kept a secret, which was of an observing nature only, and which was necessary in order to fulfil the obligation to report to Berlin about the actual conditions in Austria? If he had actually worked together with the illegal movement in the way the Prosecution states, this would most certainly have been expressed in his reports to Berlin. He does not fabricate any secret plans with the law breakers.