When we consider these events of June 30th we must bear in mind that these events fell into two parts. The first were measures against the SA leaders, who radicalism had always been known and who were always to be connected with acts of violence and independent activities, which in the past had had to be condemned. An intervention against such people coul be explained as an act of state-defense against dangerous forces which were ever ready for revolt. SA-circle. A court investigation would have resulted in the clearing up of these events and in the condemning of the responsible persons. at that time, one can only arrive at the conviction that Papen's situation the aims could actually have been no other, than that which he had proposed to Hitler a rehabilitation by means of a court action of those persons who had bee unjustly persecuted and the elimination of a summary justification of the measures in question by a law. If we come now to the heart of the matter and to what was actually desired we cannot give to the form of these letters the meaning which is ascribed to then by the prosecution. of June 30th, but was merely used for the above-mentioned purpose, is best show by the examination of the letter of 17 July. Though at that time Papen had achieved the release of his co-workers from the concentration camp, his other demands were not fulfilled by Hitler. So we now see a piece of writing which is entirely lacking even in the most elementary forms of politeness. Merely objective statements and objective requests. A piece of writing signed only with the name of Papen, without even a closing courtesy formula. single moment: He holds fast to his resignation and demands immediate action *---* it, as the letter of 10 July 1934 shows (Doc. D 17/5). He refuses to play any part in future government activities. He leaves Hitler immediately after having had him called out of the Cabinet session on 3 July. He keeps aloof from the Reichstag session, at which the Justification Law has been confirmed.
He rudely declines the offer to accept the comfortable post of ambassador at the Vatican. Such was his negative attitude. Wehrmacht. He turns to his friend Colonel General von Fritsch. Blomberg, owing to his attitude, is out of question. Fritsch will not act without a formal order from the Reich President. So now Papen endeavors to get in touch with Hindenburg. But Hindenburg's entourage keeps him off.
THE PRESIDENT: You might stop there.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 23 July 1946, at 1000 hours.)
HERMANN WILHELM GOERING. ET AL., SITTING
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yesterday I had stopped at the point where I was describing what Papen did in the course of the neasures of 30 June. I mentioned his resignation. I shall continue on Page 46, the last paragraph. of the Wehrmacht. He turns to his friend Coloenl General von Fritsch Bolmberg, but owing to his attitude, it is out of the question. Fritsch will not act without a formal order from the Reich Prseidnet. So now Papen endeavours to get in touch with Hindenburg. But Hindenburg's entourage keep him off.
All access to his estate Neudeck are clossed by SS guards. Papen sends his secretary Ketteler to Hindeburg's neighbour, but also that attempt fails. He has to witness how oblviously Hindenburg has been influences, when he publicly approves of Hitler's conduct on the 30th of June in an official telegram. success? legal plane. The attempts to mobilize the only factor of power, the Wehrmacht, had faled. Hindenburg cannot be reached: he is evidently influenced by his advosors in the opposite direction. when Papen should have openly pointed ou the criminal events on June 30; he could possible have effected thereby the collapse of the entire Nazi system. That assertion is untenable. Apart from the fact that Papen, as shown, had no longer the opportunity for such an official statement, subsequent developments in German demonstrated that such an individual protest would not have had any effect against the powerful position of Hitler either within the country or abroad.
Hitler's pres-
tige in Germany was already then so great, and more so later on, that such a protest, even if it could have reached the public at all, would surely not have found any echo in the masses of the population. To be sure, the great masses saw only the economic improvement and the strengthening of Germany's position abroad, and only a numerically thin layer realized the true danger of the develpment. Most foreign countries knew about the events on June 30 more than the German people. A statement by Papen to the people would not have *---*own much light on it. No conclusions were drawn from the available information by foreign cuntries either at that time or later. led to the reoccupation of the Rhineland by the French. I am unable to discover where the Prosecution has found a basis for such an assertion. It is contradicted by the fact that no military reaction of any kind followed after the events which occurred later and which do not belong in the realm of internal politics, bit vitally touched the world abroad as, for instance, the introduction of compulsory military service and the occupation of the Rhineland. of the Cabinet and of the Reichstag, Papen showed the public that he was hostile to the development. His conduct was a public protest against the measures of June 30 and against their *---*bration. The Prosecution can not overlook these apparent signs which are historical facts. It attempts therefore, to construct an anti-thesis between his conduct and his mental attitude. The only assistance at their disposal to that end are the letters addressed by Papen in July to Hiter. Even if the spirit and purpose of these letters were not clearly discernable from their cotents, as in fact is the case, such an attempt would also fail in the face of the facts which were just stated, because of the inadequate means at hand.
Generally, I would like to state in this regard the following: Hitler during his Vice-Chancellorship cad during the events of June 30, while being in fact a loyal follower of his?
On what ground should Hitler have desired it himself who, according to the Prosecution, conspired with Papren - and this, after all, would only be a result of the conspiracy?
Could it not be in the interests of Hitler, that Papen disclosed in his Marburg speech all the weaknesses and misdeeds of the Nazi system? On what ground should Hitler have wished that Papen so obviously distanced himself from the lawless actions on June 30?
If we consider that, only one conclusion can be arried at: What the Prosecution believes to be able to interpret as the mental attitude of Papen, lacks all logic. tain contrary facts intended to serve as camouflage, is used again by the Prosecution with respect to Papen's acceptance of the position in Vienna. following: which occurred after Papen's recall and undoubtedly without his cooperation, namely the marching in on 12 March 1938, does also not represent a crime in the sense of the Charter. The Charter considers as punishable the preparation and the waging of a war of aggression or of a war in violation of international treaties. self to the arraignment of what appears as a most serious crime with its terrible further consequences. The aggressive and prohibited war the crimes against the rules of warfare, and the crimes against humanity in their most violent form, the immeasurable consequences of these grave actions, have all justified this unusual, trial. The Charter does not charge the Tribunal with the punishment of all the injustices which has occurred during the course of the development of National Socialism. Such a task ould not be fulfilled within the framework of this Tribunal, for technical reasons and for lack of time. It is not the task of the Tribunal to examine whether international treaties were observed or not. This question is only of importance if wars were casued or if the crimes of violence which are to be described in detail have to be accounted for.
The march into Austria is no war, however for one stretches the conception from the standpoint of international law.
In this case it is a decisive fact that no force was employed, and not even the slightest resistance was offered, that on the contrary, the troops were received with jubilation. Furthermore, the march into Austria cannot be considered in connection with the later acts of aggression. It was a special case based on the special situation which, since 1918, had already found expression in the efforts both on the Austrian and on the German side to bring about a union of the hardly prosperous Austrian state with Germany in some kind of constitutional form.
Therefore, the actual events must be detached from Hitler's war plans or purely military plans of preparation - with which I shall deal later - and must be regarded as the solution of a political problem of the country which had become acute and the result of which had always been ten *---* of both sides, independent of Hitler.
Papen's activity in Vienna is clearly characterized by three episodes: the circumstances of his appointment on 26 July 1934: his letter to Hitler dated 16 July 1936 (Defense doc. No. 71) after the conclusion of the July agreement: and his recall on 4 February 1938.
The following circumstances lay at the origin of his appointment:
A crucial event had occurred. Dollfuss is murdered; not only are the relations between Germany and Austria strained, but they have reached an extremely dangerous stage of development. The international situation is menacing. Italy is marching upon the Brenner. An ultimate divergence of Austria towards one of the groups of powers interested is directly to be feared. Thus, there is the threat of a final situation which would definitely render impossible the maintenance of even merely supportable relations between Germany and Austria. dismiss his objections against the personality of Papen and entrust him with the mission in Vienna. Papen was particularly fitted for the initiation of a policy designed to overcome the deadlock resulting from the assassination of Dollfuss. Papen had always spoken in the Cabinet in favor of a friendly development of relations in the question concerning Austria. Papen was internationally known as a man for a reasonable policy of mutual understanding. post. His experiences in the domestic sector of the last period, his personal attitude to the treatment of himself and of his collaborators on the 30th of June, his attitude to the assassination of Dollfuss, with whom he had been on most friendly terns since the time of his previous activity, were opposed to the taking over of the post. This resolution therefore was, for Papen, a very grave one. The perception, however, that he himself would alone be in the position to fulfil this task within the framework of true pacification must outweigh everything. Could he assume that anybody else had the strong will and also the possibility of assuring the maintenance of the road of appeasement? He could never expect a personality of the Foreign Office, and still less a member of the Party, to have such a personal independence as he himself enjoyed.
From his pest as Vice-Chancellor Papen brought his experience. He knew the difficulties to convince Hitler by pertinent arguments in a corresponding form. He alone could hope to carry through his efforts for a peaceful policy, notwithstanding the extremist tendencies of Hitler's advisers. His experiences, on the other hand, had made him very careful. He made his conditions and demanded the establishment of a clear policy based on facts. He demanded the withdrawal of influence over the Austrian Nazi-movement, which must be assured by the dismissal of the man who directly or indirectly had participated in the criminal act: The Landesinspector Habicht. He requested his own subordination to Hitler in order to make possible the maintaining of the conditions which he had proposed, and in order to avoid any alterations in the course of its handling. He compels something seemingly impossible in contact with a head of the State; he has the conditions laid down in writing under which he takes over his post as Ambassador. They are signed by Hitler. He wishes always to be in a position to force Hitler to keep to his written word. particularly by the statement of the witness von Tschirschky, a man who, according to the declarations of the Prosecution, is really not suspected of viewing these things in the defendant's favor. follower of Hitler's already known plans of aggression, had eagerly and willingly declared himself prepared to take over the new post. of the defendant, be really in agreement with such an attitude? These secret conferences, this unpublished document signed by Hitler and in Papen's possession, cannot really be considered apretence in order to deceive -- as would be the consequence of the Prosecution's charge. These things were not intended to be publicized and were never made public. to the conclusion that Papen honestly strove to maintain the established appeasement policy. It likewise is impossible to talk here of opportunism. Papen had declined the position of Ambassador to the Vatican. This position of an Ambassador in Vienna was hardly an enticing post of honor for a former Reich Chancellor and recent Vice-Chancellor.
Papen's own good economic situation excluded all along any material motives. Papen's latter of 16 July 1936 to Hitler is the report of the success of his two years' efforts to bring about settled peaceful relations between both the countries. The treaty of 11 July 1936 put the seal upon this. clearly explains the task allotted to Papen and its performance. Papen points out that the aim was reached, for the execution of which he was called to Vienna on 26 July 1934. He considered his task as accomplished with the conclusion of the Treaty.
No clearer evidence can be produced of the exactness of Papen's statement on his task and its performance than by this letter. Why did they believe they must impute a dubious interpretation to his mission? As an obliging instrument of Hitler's plans of aggression he has undertaken the task to prepare and carry out a forcible annexation of Austria. He has been charged with undermining the Schuschnigg Government and cooperating with Austria's illegal Nazi movement to the effect. All he did with a view to pacifying the mutual relations has been camouflage, in order to enable him to carry out his underground plans. And here the trustworthy statement of account is mandatory. absolute contradiction to the facts -- this letter, found by the Allied troops in the secret records of the Reich Chancellory, and now thankfully placed at the disposal of the Defense Counsel by the Prosecution?
The third point that clearly characterizes Papen's activity in Vienna is his recall on 4 February 1938. The numerous recalls and nominations of that day clearly showed a reorganization of the most important military and political posts. The personalities of the recalled military and diplomats clearly show that the sole reason was for the unusual and extensive sudden change at that time. If Hitler then also recalled Papen from his post, without an actual reason for this, entirely unexpectedly and without giving a reason, it is thereby clearly proved that Hitler, at the beginning of a radical foreign political course, no longer saw in Papen the right man for Vienna. the peaceful activity of Papen during the entire duration of his Austrian mission. As the Prosecution, however, also strives here to apply single events against Papen, I shall submit this period also to a short consideration.
We see Papen in a steady struggle with the illegal movement. The reproach that he had conspired with it is best led ad absurdum by the fact that Papen was selected as victim of an attack by these same illegal men, according to the plans of the illegal movement which have been confirmed by Foreign Minister Schmidt. The documentary evidence from the reports at hand which Papen sent to Hitler also has but one meaning. Here, too, there is a completely clear piece of evidence, since the reports to Hitler, which took place regularly in the course of business, actually excluded an intention to deceive the public. It is regrettable that all the reports could not be found in order to give, in their entirety, a clear, complete historical picture of Papen's activity. Only a fraction of the reports are in front of us. But when Papen had transferred abroad, at the end of his activity, the copies of all his reports, as the evidence has shown, then he could have done this only in order to have a historical justification for his policy of peace. It is proven by this in complete clearness that his policy reproduced in the complete report must have been a policy which was in contrast to the development which was brought about by the other side in March 1938. about the Austrian conditions, have stated under oath that Papen led a policy of pacification and fought against any meddling of the illegal movement In the political happenings. What can be concluded from the presentation of the Prosecution against that? That Papen had to maintain a certain outside connection to members of the Austrian Nazi movement corresponding to his position as German Ambassador and corresponding to the state treaty concluded with Austria --a connection which was in no way kept a secret, which was of an observing nature only, and which was necessary in order to fulfil the obligation to report to Berlin about the actual conditions in Austria? If he had actually worked together with the illegal movement in the way the Prosecution states, this would most certainly have been expressed in his reports to Berlin. He does not fabricate any secret plans with the law breakers.
government about the participation of the national opposition in the governmental work, which was agreed on in the July Treaty. And if we finally have before us the deposition of the history of the illegal movement in the report of Rainer (PS-812), we see their activity in these years takes place without the slightest cooperation or support from Papen. interested in the activity of the Austrian Liberty Organization (Freiheitsbund) ? If it is set forth that this Liberty Organization represents a non-Na*i, trade-union, Austrian organization which was considered to be read to go with Schuschnigg and to support this Cabinet. observed the governmental conditions in Austria and reported to Berlin about them ? And when this wish is expressed at this occasion that this or that constellation is favorable for the development of friendly relations with Austria ? foreign agencies which Papen forwarded to Berlin. They believe that Papen had made the content of those reports his own. This supposition must be incorrect. The informational purpose of sending reports of the foreign secret service is clearly at hand. Beyond that the following has to be established here also. Papen especially forwarded to Berlin also these documents which had come into his hands and which contained a criticism of the German condition. The witness Gisevius and Lahousen have pointed out that Hitler was informed incorrectly or insufficiently by his closest coworkers. The critical reports of foreign countries which Papen had forwarded to Hitler in a direct way, could and also should fulfill the aim of drawing Hitler's attention to abuses and to make him abolish them. This is especially often the case concerning statements about the anticlerical conditions in Germany. The presentation of the reports in the case Tschirschky concerning the activity of the Gestapo which were especially mentioned in the cross-examination, are on the same line. The regular reports of Papen to Hitler deal partly also with the conditions in the neighboring states.
The checking of the contents of the reports shows that they deal entirely wit problems which are in direct connection with the foreign political situation of Austria in the Balkans and which therefore fall into the sphere of tasks of the ambassador accredited in Vienna.
Finally we have to go into the affidavits of Messersmith. He describes events after a period of 10 years, in the case of Papen, seemingly in free memory. Time and later acquired information obviously seem to have clouded the picture of memory so completely that we see, for example, Papen's explanations about his tasks in the Southeastern area reproduced in the two affidavits with contents basically deviating from each other the contents of the affidavits are in contradiction to every rule of experience and logic. A diplomat cannot have revealed the secret aims of his politics to the representative of another state who meets him with emphasized reserve. It is impossible, as Messersmith says in another place, that Papen told not only him, but even publicly, his alleged plan to overthro Schuschnigg, with whose government Papen himself was accredited. It is an impossibility that such disclosures are supposed to have had no consequences whatsoever, and, that they have been put down in an affidavit for the first time in 1945. gment, besides the fact that their content is disproved by the other evidence which contained both the intentions and the actions of Papen. ment 106. A complete contradiction of the Messersmith affidavit is given in this questionnaires by the Polish Minister, Jan Gawronski. This testimony of the diplomat of a country with which Germany was at war from September 1939 on seems especially noteworthy.
Dr. Gawronski had an opportunity during the whole Vienna activity, from 1935 to 1933 to observe Papen. In the answer in the questionnaire, the year 1937 is given by mistake, not 1934 as is correct, as the beginning of the activity of Gawronski in Vienna.
All charges made by Messersmith -- Papen's collaboration with the illegal Nazi movement and, the assumption to overthrow Schuschnigg's regime, the policy of aggression in the Southeastern area, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and giving it to Poland or Hungary -- are disproved by the testimony of Gawronski. which was read yesterday. If Papen refused to enter into a secret agreement with an Austrian minister, and if he refused to take advantage of this comfortable and convenient opportunity, this shows clearly that he took part in no subversive activity. Papen exercised his activity as Ambassador extraordinary in Vienna.
Beyond it the Prosecution has taken into consideration Papen's cooperation in the discussion of Berchtesgaden on 12 February. state of a new course, but the result of the development up to that time. Months before, Papen and Schuschnigg in conversations had already regarded a meeting in the near future between the two statesmen as desirable. The July Treaty had naturally left many points of difference undecided. The testimony of the witness Guido Schmidt showed us the situation clearly : an opposition party vert powerful in numbers, though officially not allowed, but tolerated tacitly because of actual conditions, looked ideologically to a full extent toward its, at least ideological leader in Germany. There the leader of this Party was at the same time head of the state. Regarding foreign policy a separation of the parties in both countries was necessary. The inner ideological unity, however, necessarily had to lead to differences again and again. We see, accordingly, in the Asutrian government and understandable reserve and a constant concern to prevent a growth of the influence of this movementin administration and government. The treatment of the questions resulting from the July Treaty corresponded in practice also to this state of interests. It was obvious that the Austrian side should make an effort to treat the stipulations of the Treaty in a restrictive way. It was only natural that the wish existed on the German side to exhaust the possibilities of the Treaty to the fullest extent.
Therefore, a direct contact with the responsible heads of both countries, who on the German side was at the same time the head the Party, could only be regarded as a reasonable requirement. this development. Perhaps with the approach of the more rigorous course which was expected, a meeting of that sort for the purpose of the eradication of existing difficulties would be postponed forever. Certainly, a different result could have been expected later on, in a tenser atmosphere, from the collaboration of a radical successor, than that hoped for by Schuschnigg and Papen. Papen, during his farewell visit to Hitler on 5 February, when they came to speak of affairs, still accepted the mission to bring about the Conference and to accompany the Austrian delegation to Berchtesgaden for this purpose. The Prosecution accuses Papen, that already at that time, the program of the subsequent talks had been determined. Papen, contrary to this, has testified in his interrogation, that he had only received the mission to arrange the discussion for the purpose of clearing up all points of difference on the basis of the July Treaty. The prosecution still lacks the proof for its claim to the contrary. From what has happened on 12 February, it cannot in any way be concluded because of Hitler's personality of Hitler, what he personally thought at the first mentioning of such a discussion on 5 Feburary and much less, of which of his plans no informed Papen. The evidence has shown that the points voiced by Hitler on 12 February are identical with those demands which the *---* National Socialists had raised immediately prior to the discussion and, transmitted to "Hitler in their own channels. From this it can be seen that the subject of conversation chosen by Hitler in the discussion of 12 February was at the very least substantiated and could not as yet have been on hand on 5 February. If the Austrian Nazis preceded Papen with their demands to Berchtesgaden, then the viewof the Prosecution is thereby refuted, that Papen had conspired with Hitler and the Austrian party.
In this case he himself would probably have been the best liaison man between the wishes of the Party and Hitler. This is also emphasized through the testimony of the witnesses Seyss-Inquart and Rainer, who have stated clearly that they did not hove report any contact with Papen during this time. Rainer also points out in his report, that Papen had been of the opinion that the fact of the rearranged discussion had remained secret before the Au strian party. that at the reception of the Austrian delegation of the German-Austrian frontier he had called Schuschnigg's attention to the presence of generals. whether this really-corresponds to the facts was not proven by the presentation of evidence. The sole evidence which can be used in respect to this is the testimony at Schmidt. The latter could not longer exactly testify anymore, whether Papen had spoken of one General, namely Keitel, who, according to past experiences after taking over his new office constantly kept himself in the surroundings of Hitler, or of several Generals.
Papen himself does not know anymore today, if and in what form he made such an exclamation to Schuschnigg at the time. He also does not know, if at the time he was aware at all of the presence of generals. It is very possible that it came to his knowledge at the overnight stay in Salzburg, where he had stayed at a different hotel from the Austrian delegation. In any case, however, the fact cannot be overlooked, that even if Papen had made thestatement claimed by the Prosecution, this statement was made prior to the visit. That, therefore, he did not participate in any attempt at intimidation toward the Austrian gentlemen which might have been aimed at a motive of surprise. His participation in the discussion has been cleared by the evidence. Hitler alone was in command, who, in a brutal manner surprising to those who knew him, tried to impress Schuschnigg. Technical details werenegotiated with Ribbentrop. Papen more or less participated as a spectator, which also bore the fact into account, that he did not occupy his official position anymore. According to the uniform testimonies of those participating, he only saw his task raised by circumstances to intervene soothingly.
One has to consider his position; he sees his intentions doomed to failure through the behavior of Hitler, which cannot be expected of any reasoning human being. He sees how a man who is quick-tempered by nature in his excitementlets all that go which is necessary for a reasonable discussion in the sphere of a conference of statesmen. He hears Hitler's throats, and has to consider him determined to let things go on an irreparable way at the abrupt failure of the negotiations. In the framework of this situation, therefore, the achievement of certain concessions -Hitler acquiesced in the field of the Army Ministry and the economic demandsand the postponement achieved after a hard struggle of the final settlement for ratification by the Austrian government and the Federal President (Bundespraesident), was theoptional solution of the dangerous situation. Even though in this point Papen agreed with the Austrian statesmen who undoubtedly were willing while safeguarding only reasonably the interests of their State to affix their provisional signatures on account of the prevailing conditions, this does not justify the charge against Papen that he approved and intended the result from the outset.
Hitler's opinion on Papen's previous activity in Austria and his participation in the Conference at Berchtesgaden is best illustrated by the fact that no further office of any kind was assigned to him in Vienna. It is very unlikely that during the decisive developments to come, Hitler would have failed to assign tasks to a man who inwardly and effectively attended the Conference at Berchtesgaden. One would not have replaced him by new people from Berlin, and for the still more complicated situation one would not have dispensed with the services of the man who, by reason of his years of service, was most intimately familiar with conditions as a whole. One would certainly have availed oneself of his personal contacts with Austrian statesmen which qualified him, inpreference to others, to continue work on Hitler's plans. If the Prosecution's interpretation of Papen's efforts towards understanding during the discussion in Berchtesgaden as deceitful maneuvering were correct, there is little doubt but that Papen would have been permitted to continue working along that line, and after replacing his person one wouldnot have charged people to deal further with those things whose course was much mere radical.
Papen's memorandum on his farewell visit to the Prime Minister is revealing. A man who in his own commentary to Berlin, passes on Schuschnigg's interpretation that to some extent he had acted under pressure in Berchtesgaden - under "noteworthy", is little likely to have been an active participant in the coercive negotiations. any public office.
The new Charge d' Affaires, Freiherr von Stein, a pronounced National Socialist, took charge of the Embassy. He was assisted by Keppler, a close friend of Hitler. Papen, on theother hand, makes his farewell calls, and he takes up residence at Kitzbuehel, a winter-sport resort.
In themeantime things are getting more and more critical. The plebiscite which Schuschnigg announces results in a development which perhaps Hitler even had not intended on that scale. The visit of Seyss-Inquart and Rainer on 9 March to Papen was accidental; there were no deliberations of any kind, and no decisions were taken. For Papen even to express the view - which Rainer confirmed - that, considering the formulation of the questionnaire, no decent Austrian could be expected to say "No", but that he was bound to follow Schuschnigg's password, suffices to indicate the contract of Papen's position towards the views of the Austrian Nazis and the views which the people from Berlin subsequently brought out.
If, in conclusion, I may still refer to Papen's presence in Berlin on 11 March I must say that even in reviewing things in retrospect I can give no clear explanation for Hitler's desire to know Papen in Berlin. Reasons for it may have been manifold. Should Hitler already at that time have been determined to forsee a solution in that direction as it finally came about - after all, doubts in that respect may exist - the reason might have been that he did not dare leave in Vienna this man who espoused the policy of peace; he might perhaps have assumed that because of the extremity of the position in which they found themselves, Austrian Government officials might perhaps have turned to him and that with Papen's help propositions for a settlement might perhaps have come about. the campaign against Poland when Hitler was fearful lest "some swine might still come along with a proposal for an understanding in the last minute." On the other hand it is also quite conceivable that it was suitable to have Papen in Berlin in the event of yielding on the part of the Austrian Government, in which case he might not have wanted to be deprived of Papen's advice because of this familiarity with conditions. however, unnecessary to attempt to actually understand Hitler's inner motives. Decisive, to be sure, is finally merely what Papen did during his presence in the Reich Chancellory. postponement of the plebiscite, *---*essening of tension would have to be brought about. His attitude concerning the further events was documented. Papen through his standpoint concerning the military preparations, respecively to the lifting of the order to march on. The shorthand notes of the telephone conversations Which had been carried on by Goering have given us a plastic picture of the events in the Reich Chancellery. In connection with this testimony theresult is that essentially he was the driving force and occasionally went even beyond Hitler's intentions.
He emphasized that from the beginning he had been consistent in striving for a solution, he new did not need to reflect or be advised in order to come to a decision.
Seherr-Thoss's affidavit renders Papen's attitude on the eve of the day in question. In an intimate circle he remarked that he had advised against marching in, that against his advice, Hitler, however, just then "had committed the madness of issuing the order to march in."
Finally, we still have a clear picture of Papen's attitude concerning this in his conversation with the witness, Guido Schmidt, which took place years later. Austria's annexation was for a long time then already an historical fact and was considered by most Germans a great political achievement. Papen, on the other hand, criticizes most severely the methods used by Hitler and acknowledges anew the fundamentals of legality and faithfulness to treaties which, seen from a broad view, was forsaken here to the detriment of Germany. whether the case of Austria is at all capable of discussion within the limitations outlined by the Charter - in completion of the defense of the defendant, contrary evidence has been produced that Papen neither brought about the entry into Austria himself nor prepared for it by a policy directed to this end; that his activity in Austria exclusively served the purpose which he assumed with his commission on 26 July 1934; a policy which served for the restoration of friendly relations between both countries, a legal aim which had not the slightest thing to do with a special or general policy of aggression. It is not in contradiction that Papen, as well as the overwhelming majority of Germans and Austrians hoped for, since 1913, for the aim of a normal development. The union of both peoples in some close, legal contacts. That in view of the existing limits of peace treaties there would be more difficulties to overcome was clear. But, could not Papen assume, with a clear conscience, that parties to the treaty did not refuse to recognize a wish of both peoples, a wish which was emphasized by the political and economic impossibilities of maintaining the status quo.
Was it not a question here of realizing the determination of peoples, the great principles of the Twentieth Century?
The many voices from abroad at that time; his talk with Ambassador Henderson which is mentioned in Papen's report of 1 June 1937, defense document No. 74? the attitude of neighboring countries, which is also shown from the reports, and finally, the experiences in the treatment of the repatriation question could lead him to hope that the solution might some day be found in international understanding. independent Austrian Government. This could be based only on a really friendly relationship with Germany. Papen's task could therefore be the basis for the fulfillment of the national wishes publicly expressed in both states.