It is true that these pledges were accepted by Hitler after lengthy protest, and that they were then put down in writing." the witness' period of observation, he hold on to this policy.
The answer to Question 26 denies the contents of Messersmith's affidavit. Papen was not concerned with an agressive policy in the Southeastern area. effect that Papen did not strive for an Anschluss to be obtained by force. Semitism had its first legal result. At that time, the situation was the following: direction, a predominantly National-Socialist group who had consistent antiSemitism as one point on their program. We saw the effects of propaganda on the masses which manifested themselves in the aforementioned individual actions, during the first weeks after the formation of the Hitler government.
The conclusions to be drawn from this situation were clear. A problem which has been stirred up, which had already a pernicious outcome in practice, had to be legally settled. It was clear that in this question National Socialism through its exaggerated propaganda, had contracted a certain obligation towards its followers. It was difficult to determine the extent of the legal limitation which for the incited masses always remained a disappointment. The way out could only be a compromise. The settlement was directed to a field where a change in the hitherto existing situation seemed to be the least severe.
Whereas in accordance with the contents of the "Professional Government Employee law" (Berufsbeamtengesetz) only those were dismissed from their position who occupied their position not on account of their professional qualification, but due to their membership in a political party, all Jewish government employees who were appointed after 1918 were also dismissed. As a rule, a right of pension was maintained. Papen's successful endeavor aimed to limit numerically the effect on the Jewish government employees concerned. He had an audience with Hindenburg, who was especailly approachable on the idea of protecting war veterans. Through Hindenburg's personal influence on Hitler, Jewish war veterans and dependants of fallen soldiers were then excepted from this law.
Since an overwhelming part of the young government employees who had been employed since 1914, were war veterans, the numerical effect of this exeration was quite considerable. This is made especially clear by the official figures published concerning the conditions in the legal profession, and which were presented in Defense Exhibit No. 33. Furthermore, the defendant is charged for the measures taken against the labor unions. First consideration must be given to the fact that the measures were not carried out by a regulation based on a Reich law. It is moreover important that with the the reshaping of affairs the continuation of labor unions with a SocialDemocratic character and a similar influence might have appeared as an anachronism. Papen's attitude with respect tothe labor problem is shown by his speech of 4 March 1933, Defense Document No. one could not have foreseen the extent of their further development. Considering its many rather sound ideas for the settlement of social questions, the German Labor Front at the time of its foundation did not merit the judgement it now deserves for the coercive measures taken at the end. Also in 1922, in order to set an end to a period of political unrest, amnesty decree was issued, which also pardoned crimes subject to death sentence. The establishment of special courts was a measure of expediency to speed up the sentencing of political offenders, because longer normal proceedings did not safeguard the desired momentum of warning. It is significant that the order concerning crimes of violence was applied for the first time during Papen's Reich chancellorship, National-Socialists in the case of the Potempa murderers (Document 1, pages 6 and 7). Thus it is erroneous to see in the nature of those laws a commendation actions committed or a promotion of the Nazi idea.
If the prosecution, in criticizing Papen's legislative activity during this time, still engages in considering the Political Coordination Act for the states of 31 March 1933, it touches first of all a question of homo policy.
which is really far outside of a field which could justify a discussion in the sense of the Indictment. showing that Papen has in this respect changed the point of view advocated previously. it must be said here that political opinions in general subject to alterations and often must be altered, and that from a change of concept with respect to political expedience measures one can by no means draw a conclusion as to a general change of opinion. As a matter of fact, first the Statthalter Act was designed to eliminate a dualism between the Reich and the states which Papen had always considered as disadvantageous, Papen has always advocated, especially with respect to Prussia, a solution in the sense of Bismarck's time, when the office of President of the Prussian Council of Ministers and that of Reich Chancellor were united in one person. not even a change of opinion, much less of change of sentiment. the cabinet of the defendant von Papen: His position of vice-chancellor was without an administrative province. The influence, even in political question which the head, of a regular ministry had in cabinet sessions did therefore not exist in the case of Papen He could only express misgivings or objections from a general point of view, Without being able to base them on departmental grounds. despite all my efforts I did not succeed in procuring the remaining ones, -the extent of Papen's opposition and that of the other ministers cannot be proved by documents. The fact that he voiced this opposition was revealed in the hearing of evidence. But, as admitted, the success was a small one. Thu* it is the duty of the defense, to investigate deeper the reasons why Hitler's powerful position gradually increased and why the influence of the nonnational-Socialist ministers become smaller, in short, why the guarantees fail ed which had been provided when the government was formed-on 30 January.
the normal procedure. The questions which arose were made the subject of discussions. Hitler did not try to carry through at any cost the bills which were rejected for good reasons. A clear description to that effect is given by the affidavit of the former minister Hugenberg - Defense Document No. 88. Socialist party brought along a substantial change. Beyond its purely parliamentary effects, Hitler was strengthened in his conviction of being the deputy of the German people. He thought that now the time had come for him to make use of his right, granted to him by article 56 of the constitution of the Reich, to determine in his capacity of Reich Chancellor the fundamental lines of policy even in case of an opposition on the part of the ministers.
With respect to the constitutional situation I refer to Document No. 22, which shows that in questions of fundamental policy even a majority decision of the ministers was without effect against the decision of the Reich Chancellor, Now, Hitler became very unapproachable to any suggestions. In case of a relevant opposition he thought to have against him an oppositional phalanx, and soon it became evident that objections made in the cabinet were of no use to change Hitler's attitude. At the best, one could hope, as the defendant von Neurath declared as a witness, to influence Hitler outside the cabinet in a direct discussion.
The essential factors in Hitler's development into an autocrat were his increasingly strengthened position with regard to Hinderburg and his ever increasing influence on the Reich Defense Minister von Blomberg.
Hitler's first measures which, in Hindenburg's eyes, showed his endeavor* toward the establishment of a strict order, had constantly improved Hitler's personal relations with Hindenburg. He skillfully undertook to adjust himself to Hindenburg's mentality. Therefore, he succeeded very soon, to abolis* the original stipulation concerning the obligation of making joint reports. Thus, Papen was deprived of the major possibility to influence Hindenburg. point in Hitler's development.
The Wehrmacht was a factor of power. Hitler knew that its men and officers were probably essentially unpolitical, but that by no means -especially as far as its leadership was concerned -- they were inclined to have National-Socialist ideas. An extensively radical course of the government might therefore always give rise to resistance on the part of the Wehrmacht. It must be added that *---*ing to his personality, Hindenburg listened especially willingly to reports coming from military circles. As long as the War Minister was not a disciple of Hitler, the latter was prevented from carrying out any radical ideas. would permit one to explain the reason for Hitler's influence on Blomberg. We must state the fact that Blomberg became very soon an ardent admirer of Hitler, and that on his part no sort of resistance could be expected against any extensive radical development whatsoever of Hitler's policy. The 30th June 1934 proved this very cleanly. Hitler could only be impressed by power. The Wehrmacht with its strength of that time was, especially in relation to the position of the Reich President von Hindenburg, a factor of power with which, at the beginning, even Hitler and his party would not have been able to cope in case of a commitment of forces. That is the reason for Hitler's endeavor to win Hindenburg's confidence.
during the time before Hindenburg's death, which by no means allowed to presume a further stronger development. From the time of Hindenburg's death, Hitler appeared as a dictator without consideration for anything; who, at least in the field of internal policy displayed his ruthless power policy. prosecution dealt with the question, to what extent Papen was responsible for the oppression of political opponents and for certain acts of violence which occurred during the period which the terminology of that time called "national revolution." knew about the arrest and mistreatment of individual Communist and Social-Democratic personnages named to him. Papen gave an essential ly negative answer. However, he knew that dur to the Decree for the Protection of People and State issued by the Reich P resident, measures had been taken which suppressed the personal liberty of a great number of leftists. The decree was issued by the Reich President, outside Papen's responsibility, and by suppression of the relevant constitutional stipulations. It was established under the impression created by the Reichstag fire, an event which up to the present day has not been clearly elucidated, but for which the official statement that Communist circle had instigated the arson, seemed to be absolutely believable. Especially since the search of the Liebknecht House, the Communist headquarters, produced, according to Goering's declamation, very serious evidence concerning the actions planned against the Reich cabinet. The inquiry was held by a judge of the Reichsgericht (Reich Supreme Court) a personality whose impartiality was beyond any doubt. Therefore, Papen could understand the legal security measures which the administration of the interior thought necessary. But knowledge of the arrest of these politicians is by no means connected eo ipso with the knowledge of the details and of the extent of the measures taken at that time. again and again that the knowledge of acts of violence remained restricted to the narrow circle of the direct participants.
The 22 July A LJG 20-2 measures taken before the release of an internee in order to reduce him to silence were evidently successful.
Thus, we see again and again that there was always only a small circle of knewing persons which was composed of the immediate environment of returned interne This explains the fact which sometimes amazes one afterwards, name that quite large circles were not informed of the kind and extent of the excesses committed. It is evident that close relatives and similarly thinking friends of the politicians arrested at that time, know of what had happened to that people. The extent of the secrecy is shown best by the fact that the witness Gisevius assumes that the conditions in concentration camps did not become generally known to Gestapo officials until 1935. very little about the measures which, during the first months, were almost exclusively taken against political opponents of National-Socialism coming from leftist circles. At any rate his knowledge did not go beyond the fact, that in the respect, arrests were made within the scope of the "Decree for the Protection of Nation and State." on the rights of church offices and organizations, which to a largo extent appealed to him end whom to at once tried to help energetically. The same holds true for the measures in connection with the 30th of June, 1934, which will be discussed later on. they were outside the law, were subject to the jurisdiction of the police and the ministry of the Interior. The law itself is an emergency decree of Hindenburg' . It came about legally. The now broadened conception of protective custody does not in itself constitute a crime. Papen of having sent a telegram to the New York Times on 25 March 1933, describing the situation in Germany as quiet so far, and of 22 July A LJG 20-3 having pointed out that individual actions had occurred but were now prohibited by an order from Hitler.
course heard of the excesses of which individual SA-men had become guilty in this period which was still unsettled politically. If on 12 March 1933, Hitler categorically forbade such actions by indivi als and ordered the strictest punishment for any culprits in the future, Papen could assume with a clear conscience that this order which emanated from the highest authority would henceforth be obeyed to a public announcement of the "League of Jewish Front Soldiers" of 25 March 1933. This proclamation also stated the fact that the situation with respect to the Jewish population was in general quiet, and that excesses were confined to actions by individuals, which had new been forbidden by Hitler. (I shall submit this publication of the League in my Document Book for the Reich Government. Chamber of Commerce in Cologne on 25 March 1933, which publication I shall also present during the hearing of evidence for the Reich Government. which was carried out on 1 April 1933, was, contrary to the opinion of the prosecution, no government measure, but exclusively a party measure which Papen, too, sharply opposed as well as others in the cabinet. The publication of the "Times", submitted with Neurath's defense Exhibit No. 9, proves that over and beyond this Papen made representations to Hindenburg and called for the latter's intervent with Hitler. the Jewish boycott had been announced as a defensive counter measur which was to be limited in time end to be extended only to business life. It had been expressly ordered that any use of force was forbidden and that excesses were to be prevented by corresponding measures. In its presentation of matters of domestic policy the 22 July A LJG 20-4 prosecution has merely shown that through the measures taken, the position of the National-Socialist party was to be strengthened, so that it should then be possible to turn to the aims of the foreign policy of force which had been decided upon beforehand.
Still more important than the discussion of domestic conditions is therefore an examination of the foreign policy of the Reich during the time Papen was Vice Chancellor.
Hindenburg's reservation that he would appoint the Foreign Minister and the appointment of von Neurath to this post when he had been Foreign Minister until then and was not a National-Socialist loads one necessarily to expect a development of foreign policy along the course hitherto taken.
Hitler's first measures seemed not only to justify this expectation but even to go beyond it. The ifrst speech on matters of foreign policy held on 17 May 1933, dealt with Germany's relations to Poland which in the past had never been entirely satisfactory. of large territories formerly belonging to the German Reich had brought with it a latent tension between these states. Hitler was the first to take up the problem and to resolve, according to his declaration in the Reichstag, to bring about a policy of friendship with Poland by recognizing the Polish state and its needs. If one considers the fact that the thought of renouncing all claims to a revision against Poland was not only generally unpopular but also stood in sharp opposition to previous propaganda, it was impossible to foresee the development of later years. One was necessarily convinced that here was an internally strong government supporting its domestic reconstruction with a policy of peace abroad.
Germany's adherence to the Four Power Pact, and its renewed profession of adherence to Locarno serve to underline this conviction. The struggle in foreign politics for ideological values lay in a different direction. The question of eliminating the clause in the Versailles Treaty which stipulates Germany's exclusive guilt and the question of equal rights for this large country which had pursued a persistent policy of peace since 1918, were demands which on one hand did not seem to burden the other side with unbearable 22 July A LJG 20-5 sacrifices and which were yet suited to remove from the German people an ideological burden which it considered a pressing one.
Germany's withdrawal from the disarmament conference must be considered from these viewpoints. It took place after long drawn out negotiations had produced no positive results and because it was in no way evident that the powers were inclined to bring about in future a fulfillment of the German demands. The declaration of the Reich Government and of Hindenburg that this stop was to be looked upon as a tactical step, and that the same objectives were to be retained, namely the preservation of peace under recognition of equal rights, all this therefore had to appear credible and reasonable. With regard to the simultaneous withdrawal from the League of Nations opinions could have differed. Here, too, one might held the view that the withdrawal was necessary as a movement of protest and that one could prove through factual efforts in the matter itself that it was intended to adhere to a policy of peace. withdrawal from the League of Nations, even though he himself had experienced as Reich Chancellor that the negotiations in the large and manifold assembly of the League caused certain difficulties in some questions. On the other hand, however, he was so convinced of the institution of the League of Nations as an instrument of agreement and of facilitation of the technical possibilities for agreement that he wished to avoid withdrawal from the League of Nations. He advocated this opinion very strongly. Since he could not persuade Hitler in Berlin he followed him to Munich shortly before the decision in order to lay his well-founded opinion before him there. Ergo we see Papen here working activly in a field for which in his position as Vice-Chancellor he actually has no responsibility; aiming at a solution which if one takes as a basis the views of the prosecution concerning the withdrawal from the League of Nations can only be considered as a step towards peace.
Because of the fundamental importance of the withdrawal from 22 July A LJG 20-6 the League of Nations the measure was submitted to the German people in the form of a plebiscite enabling it to state its opinion.
On the occasion of this plebiscite, Hitler, the government, and Hindenburg, issued proclamations which emphasized expressly that this step was not intended to constitute a change of policy, but merely a change of method. Preparations for the plebiscite were carried out in line with this statement. speech the successes of Hitler's government and of having advocated an unconditionally affirmative attitude towards the questions to be decided by the plebiscite. so, the decision having been cast once and for all and having to be justified before the foreign countries. If the responsible loaders actually did not strive for anything but a change of methods, no objections could be made. The position of German foreign policy would have been shaken if the people had shown In the plebiscite that it opposed the measure already taken. It was therefore quite natural to approve of this policy in public within the framework of the solemnly given assurances. Moreover, it could not be overlooked that in a plebiscite on government measures the vote of confidence could not pass over internal politics altogether.
We have to take the date of the speech into consideration. In November 1933 Hitler had made good progress in the field which was in the foreground of necessity and interest:
Namely, in the easing of economic distress and the elimination of unemployment. His measures were on a large scale and at first showed apparent success. Here, too, one cannot measure things by the same standard as one applies to them today in full knowledge of their development. At that time the course taken hitherto seemed justified by its success. In his electoral speech which demanded a vote of confidence in the government for the purpose of agreement on a matter of foreign policy, Papen felt obliged to refer appreciately to this positive development in internal politics.
In his introductory speech Mr. Justice Jackson acknowledged himself, in the following words, the conditions in 1933 which have been described:
"After the reverses of the last war we saw the German people in 1933 regain their position in commerce, industry and art. We observed its progress without distrust and without malice." Those are the words of Justice Jackson. French relations which interested Papen most. In his own testimony he has stated his views on this subject and has related how, as early as in the twenties, he collaborated in various political and or Catholic bodies with the idea of promoting understanding and a rapprochement between France and Germany. I refer in this connection to Document No. 92 and to the meeting between Papen and the French Colonel Picot which is described therein and which is characteristic of Papen's attitude. as commissioner for the Saar territory. We see how he attempted to avoid also in the Saar question everything that could in any way impair the relations between the countries, even if only temporarily. From this came his suggestion that there should be no recourse to a plebiscite which might give renewed impetus to political chauvinism in both countries. Hitler himself, not only before he took over power but also as responsible chief of the cabinet, had stated time and again that Germany has no intention of bringing up the question of Alsace-Lorraine, but that the Saar question was the only problem still to be settled between the two countries. And in so doing he followed the suggestions of Papen entirely, which aimed at a peaceful settlement. namely the Vatican, when he concluded the concordat in July 1933.
By concluding the concordat Papen had intended merely to strenthen Hitler's position to enhance his reputation abroad. was a bilateral pact, and that the legal obligations of the concordat offered certain legal protection to the violated party, also, during the Treaty violations on the part of Germany which followed soon afterwards. the Concordat. I refer to Document 104 which I submitted today, and I summarize it as follows : Concordat was on the initiative of Papen. Furthermore, he confirms that Papen succeeded in persuading Hitler to the conditions of the Concordat. In the answer to Question 4, in particular, he confirms that Papen's activities while the Concordat was concluded were dictated by his positive position as regards religion. Finally he confirms, in the answer to Question 6, that the Concordat was a basis and a support in the later persecution of the Church. Answer 7 confirms that the community of German Catholic workers, which I will mention later, was not an organization protected by the Concordat. In any case, it is entirely wrong to suppose that Papen had any knowledge of intended future violations of the treaty and that he had brought about its conclusion while he was in possession of such information. If he had wished to enhance Hitler's reputation abroad, this means would have been the least suitable that could be imagined. A struggle against the church without the Concordat would have been a matter which, it is true, met with an unfavorable reception abroad but which nevertheless would have been an internal German affair. Through the existence of an interstate treaty these church persecutions became simultaneously a violation of an international treaty with resulting effects of a special nature upon prestige. One cannot conclude a treaty for the purpose of gaining prestige if immediately after its conclusions one proceeds to violate the same treaty. This deliberation alone already refutes the assumption of the prosecution. Beyond this the accusation of the prosecution is of symptomatic importance.
Every action of Papen's which has somehow come to light must be interpreted in the sense of the conspiracy theory to Papen's disadvantage, and the simplest recipe for this is to place the later development into the foregroun claiming Papen's cooperation and knowledge in this development, and to designate his previous contrary statements of opinion as ambiguous and doublefaced. This recipe is simple if one considers the knowledge of later developments in retrospective as self-evident and if one does not picture the ture, factual situation at the time; above all, if one makes no effort to reexamine the logic in the original intention which is claimed and the further developments it had. Only in this manner can one, as in this instance, achieve a result which on closer consideration presupposes the folly of the person acting at the time. towards religious matters prohibits the slightest doubt in the sincerity of his intentions. In the hearing of the evidence it was set forth that not only his closest personal advisors in church affairs but also the highest dignitaries of the church who were in closest personal as well as professional contact with the defendant in these matters, emphasized that his attitude as a Catholic was absolutely free of reproach at all times. questions is already made clear by the confutation of the assertion of the prosecution that Papen himself broke the Concordat by dissolving the "Work Association of Catholic Germans". I refer in this respect to the unequivocal testimony of the former secretary of the "Work Association of Catholic German Count Roderich Thun, Defense exhibit No. 47. It must be stated, however, tha Papen not only saw with regret the subsequent violations of the Concordat, by the Reich but that he actively tried to oppose them. The entire activities of the "Work Association of Catholic Germans" consisted practically of nothing else but the establishment of such violations of the Concordat in order to furnish Papen with a basis for his constant interventions with Hitler. After Papen's departure for Vienna the practical opportunity for such intervention ceased to exist.
From all of Papen's speeches it is evident that his attempt at safeguarding the churches did not emanate from considerations of political expediency of the day but from his fundamental religious attitude. I believe there is no speech in which he did not express himself on this problem, emphasizing time and again that only the Christian philosophy of life, and thus the Christian churches, could be the foundation for the orderly government of a state. In just this Christian foundation he saw the best protection against the tendency of the party to give preference to an ever increasing extent to the idea of sheer might over that of right.
With regard to Papen's report to Hitler of 10 July 1035 (PS 2248) which was submitted during the cross-examination, the prosecution fell fictim to a quite obvious misunderstanding. Papen refers in it to the favorable result there would be in the field of foreign politics if one could succeed in eliminating political Catholicism without touching the Christian foundation of the state.
Papen does not state here his opinion on the part and present situation but furnishes advice for the future. The contents of this advice are definitely positive in the ecclesiastical sense. They state that one ma eliminate political Catholicism but the purely ecclesiastical interests themselves, that is the Christian foundation of the state, must remain untouched. These directives destined for future times obviously contain criticism of the past as well. We see here how, in connection with activities in the field of foreign policy, matters are discussed and brought up to Hitler which in themselves belong to another field. the prosecution that as a good catholic he should have resigned after the Pope had issued his Encyclical Letter "With Grave apprehension" of 14 March 1937. Papen could refer, in this connection, without any criticism and with full approval, to the standpoint of the church itself, which has always been of the opinion that one should hold a position so long as it still offers the slightest opportunity for positive work. Owing to this wise attitude and to its feeling of responsibility for the German Catholics, the Church did not completely break with the Thrid Reich until the end. One cannot ask an individual Catholic to take any other standpoint. This all the less as Papen, in his purely foreign political activities, came into no conflict whatsoever with his Catholic conscience.
tler about the treatment of Cardinal Innitzer is also lacking in foundation. Papen himself can no longer remember today when and in what form he heard of these occurrences at all. The German press did not publish anything about it and in no case did such matters reach the public via internal Church channel as the prosecution assumes. In any case at that time Papen had no possibility whatsoever to intervene, being merely a private person and besides in bad standing with Hitler for the moment.
I have already dealt with Hitler's development into an autocrat. After the abolishment of joint reports to Hindenburg, Papen's influence was reduced to minimum. Protests in cabinet sessions coming from a single man, who was unable to base these protests on requirements of his own department, were of purely declaratory nature. Meanwhile the circle of applying nazistic doctrines in practice was closing more and more. It became clear that the willingness of the first days to compromise in agreeing to a rule by coalition was slowly abandoned and that the national socialist idea kept gaining ground in all fields. It was clear to Papen that he could not follow that course. It was likewise clear that in the frame work of his official position he could not alter the general trend, despite his efforts to help in individual cases. On the other hand his theoretically still existing position of Vice-Chancellor gave him certain weight in public life. Thus he had to face the problem, whether he should start forth with public criticism of prevailing abuses as a last attempt to gainsay influence upon the development by public discussions of the problems. In case of failure, he would have at least achieved the public branding of these abuses, by a responsible party, even if as a natural consequence Papen would have to give up his position and would thus no longer be able to aid many people in individual cases.
In his Marburg speech of 17 June 193* Papen distinctly branded all abuses which had become apparent until that time. Such extensive public criticism remained the only instance in the history of the "Third Reich". doctrines in practice dovetailed into an encircling enclosure suppressing the entire public life. Had that enclosure been breached at a single spot, the dangerous character of the entire system could not have been maintained. If only one of the points discussed would have met with success when carried out in practice, it would have shown a total change of conditions. The system objected to could not have existed another day if the freedom of public speech, demanded by Papen, would have been granted. It could not have been upheld, if the conception of justice and of equality before the law were recognized. It could not have existed if freedom of religion were granted. A nazistic racial theory cannot be upheld if the maxim of the individual's equality, common to all confessions, is advocated.
Each of Papen's attacks in his Marburg speech -- he had dealt with the racial issue already in his Gleiwitz speech -- was in itself an attack upon the development of the entire Nazi doctrine. The audience was clearly shown by a leading member of the opposition in the government, where the entirety of the abuses originated from. had become a matter of public discussion or Papen was going to offer his resignation, since for further cooperation he could no longer reconcile his viewpoing with the path chosen by Hitler. necessary to make a concession to public opinion by deviating from his line of action. He tried to kill the opposition by forbidding the publication of the speech and by penalizing its distributors. Papen resigned. Hitler did not accept his resignation immediately, since he obviously had to take Hindenburg into consideration, wishing to clear up the situation first of all with him.
Meanwhile the events of June 30th took place.
What fate had been destined *---* in the course of these events will probably never be known definitely. Particularly, it will never be elucidated whether different people were moved by different intentions. carried out against the office of the Vice-Chancellor. Bose was the first victim in the very building of the Vice-Chancellery. Jung, who was arrested outside of Berlin, was similarly shot. His fate, though, became known to Papen and the public only much later, as it had been hoped at the beginning that he not only had left Berlin but had gone to Switzerland, having been warned by the measures taken against the Marburg speech. The other members of the staff, who could be apprehended, were taken into custody by the police and later sent to concentration camps. As to Papen himself one evidently hesitated to make a final clear decision on his fate. His close relationship to Hindenburg would seem to indicate the advisability of not burdening the list of victims of June 30th with so pr*---* a name, after it had been burdened enough in relation to Hindenburg with the crime, against Schleicher, camouflaged though as self-defense. that whatever Papen's fate has been in the end, the measures taken against him and his people demonstrate his absolute opposition against Hitler and the Nazi policy. which outwardly seem to show at first a certain divergence from his usual attitude. hides his real and material desires under polite phrases which otherwise were in no way customary in his relations with Hitler. It may appear surprising, that a man who opposed the system, who had been persecuted for that reason and upon whose associates such incredible things had been inflicted, chose such a form of letter. But for a fair judgment a correct understanding of the state of affairs at that time is required. A state of lawlessness existed at that time. It offered a favorable opportunity to get rid of troublesome opponents in the course of these measures.
The examples of Schleicher, of Klausner and others have sufficiently shown that. There was no way of knowing beforehand when and in what manner the measures taken against the persons already involved in these matters would end. One believed almost hysterically to see an every man with opposing ideas a conspirator with these SA groups, who sooner or later were really going to revolt against Hitler. attitude had joined hands with the SA, a powerful factor at that time has not been established yet with certainty. Anyhow it could not be judged at that time whether or not Hitler's statements in regard to persons not belonging to the SA were correct.
For Papen the situation at that time was as follows: He knew of Bose's assassination, but was as yet unaware of June's fate. He hoped that the latter had escaped. Three of his co-workers Were in a concentration camp. These had first to be released from there. And also for the future the suspicion had to be dispersed, that any one of them as well as Papen himself had been in contact with the SA circles in revolt. requirement for any possible success would be to put a distance between him and such SA circles. Papen therefore felt obliged to assure Hitler of his loyalty and faith. behind the attack on him and the Vice-Chancellery and that Himmler in particular wanted to eliminate him, having been prevented from doing so only by Goering and that therefore in order to safeguard himself against these two, it was necessary to assure Hitler of his correct attitude. essential. The alpha and omega of the letters is the demand of rehabilitation for his own person and his associates. He demands court action. He advises Hitler to strike out from his indended Justification Law all actions directed against persons outside the SA-circle.
But what is the meaning of these demands of Papen? Their real significant is the upholding of what is legal against the illegal actions of the 30th. He demands an objective and legal clarification of all that is to be condemned in the events of June 30th.