Papen was appointed to the position of Vice-Chancellor. His function was not connected with a special department but mainly intended to constitute a counterpoise to the position of the Reich Chancellor. It was decided that Hitler in his capacity of Reich Chancellor should report to the Reich President von Hindenburg only in the presence of the Vice-Chancellor. Thus, a certain control was established when the Reich President formed his opinion about the requests presented by the Reich Chancellor. In view of Hindenburg's personality, of which, according to huma foresight, one could expect a quite considerable influence upon Hitler, this control over the information Hindenburg received promised that a shift towards a radical court would be avoided. This was the part the defendant had in the formation of the Hitler Government. The prosecution sees herein a decisive, conscious step towards the transfer of full power to National-Socialism. arrive only at the conclusion that in view of the inevitable necessity of coding the leadership of the cabinet to the National-Socialist party, all possibilities for limiting the importance of this measure were exhausted. Th position of Reich Chancellor left to National-Socialism and the appointment of only two National-Socialist ministers represented the limit of Hitler's originally much more extensive demands and this limit was only reached after long efforts. solution adopted on 30 January was the only possible one or not. Even if one were of a different opinion, the only thing that matters in looking at the cas from a criminal angle is whether Papen could consider this solution as a necessity or only as a more political expediency. Even if, contrary to all facts one regarded his opinion as a Utopia, it should be taken into considerate from the point of view of penal law that one could only speak of a guilt if he had known the future consequences and the future plans of aggression and if in spite of this he had collaborated in the formation of the Government. The facts just mentioned have proved that there is not even the slightest supposi for this.
the two ministries which are the nest important or which are the only ones to play a part at all in connection with the accusation of breaking the peace; namely, the Foreign Office and the War Ministry, were placed in the hands of men who enjoyed Hindenburg's confidence and had no connection with Hitler and when an unbiased direction of the ministries could be expected. It is not unimportant to consider in this instance what expectations one night have from Hitler's personality and his future policy. responsibility. A party, the structure and development of which could certainly occasion many objections and apprehensions. A party which had developed on the basis of an absolutely negative attitude towards the hitherto existing Government leadership. A party which with its noisy appearance had certainly made many concessions with regard to the constitution of its membership. A party which had laid down a new program including points some of which seemed a long way from reality and impossible to carry out and which caused many objections, but which -- and this is the only essential fact within the scope of our consideration of the case -- apparently did not have any criminal character.
history that propaganda and responsible work are two very different things, that a party which developes from nothing needs, according to experience, more negative and noisy propaganda than old existing party. Even if the cabinet of 30 January had consisted of National Socialists exclusively, even if a moderating element had not existed in Hindenburg's personality, one could have assumed according to the rules of reason and experience that Hitler, who acceded to power by means of propaganda, would take into account the existing conditions in this practical, responsible work and would show himself in his activities essentially different from what he appeared during the propagandisti preparation of the ascension to power. sition and in responsible Government work: The same National Socialists with their same program and their same propaganda who now, on the 30th January took possesion of the position of Reich Chancellor had already held the leadership or participated in the governments of some German states, We see Frick, the leader of the Reichstag faction act as responsible minister in Thuringia. His field of action included even the police and we saw the National Socialists zealously tackling the economic problems in these states. But we did not see them commit excesses or not even pursue an unreasonable policy which would have been at least in approximate agreement with their propaganda. Could it not be expected then that in the Reich. together with the greater tasks, the natural sense of responsibility would also increase? And that especially in view of the safety measures taken, matters would not take a dangerous course?
It is not superfluous to discuss Hitler's personality in this connection, Hitler, especially after the failure of the attempt to split off the Strasser group was the absolute autocrat of his party. Undoubtedly he did not show the leadership of his party, in his speeches and in his appearance that reserve which would have been a matter of course for the leader of such a big party. such an extent that he would be able to put through also unpopular measures which had to be taken under the pressure of reality. In the questions concerning the participation in the Government he had pursued a policy wise in its tactics but unpopular with the impatient masses, because he took the facts into account Could it not be expected then that this man who now had reached his aim, namely to take over the leadership of the cabinet would abandon the unrealistic ideas he advocated when he was in the ranks of the opposition and would submit to the real exigencies of public and international life?
particularly great aims and with a particularly big responsibility grows as a ruler and as a man in proportion with these aims and this responsibility. In view of this general historic experience one could not assume that a man entrusted with responsibility, after certain attempts which could be interprets as being promising, would soon revert to the thesis of his former opposition ideas; that after a couple of years this man would throw overboard every positive idea he emphasized - I remember for instance Hitler professing his adheran to the Christian foundations of the State - and that he would even surpass the negative ideas he formerly advocated and increased to an immeasurable extent his aims and his methods. We see now Hitler's full development before us and we are perhaps tempted to interprete his actions during the last years, because they represent something which is so monstrous and therefore so particularly impressive, as being the manifestations of his whole personality, while assuming that during the proceeding time he had already been the same. upon his speeches and especially his actions, to interest and to understand Hitler psychologically, from the beginning of his political appearance until its end. and more towards nearly everybody in his sphere of life makesit particularly difficult to judge his personallity. that Papen too, despite the fact that he was close to Hitler, could not suspect him in 1933 of being the man he showed himself during later years.
If Papen, in agreement with Hindenburg's wishes, and while executing his orders in his capacity of homo regius did everything in order to prevent the possibility of a radical development, fully aware of his responsibility, he al strove with all his energy toward the same goal and beyond the obligations of this task.
easy way, which would have been favorable for him from and opportunist point of view. He undertook to form a counterweight to the National Socialists at the elections of 3 March 1933 through a union of the conservative parties of the right. For someone who would have adopted the National Socialist ideas or even agreed to offer blind, obedience to their leader, the next thing to do would have been to put an end to the opposition of this large, newly constituted conservative group and to let it make its way towards a union with the part which had recently come to power, a way which at that time appeared to many absolutely natural. Papen entered the election contest as leader and organizer of the oppositional group "Black-White-Red". His speeches of that time, excerpt of which I submitted in the document book, show a clear picture of his aims and intentions. They we the affirmation of a nationalistic idea, free from the propaganda licentiousness of National Socialism and its doctrines. In any case, his program was in irreconcilable contrast to what later turned out to be the unpredictable extension and unlimited transgression of the confirmed aims of the NSDAP. The formation of the political action block "Black-White-Red" was to guarantee what Papen had tried to achieve by the composition of the Cabinet of 30 January: a coalition cabinet which, as an inevitable result of parliamentary rules and the entire political situation, left the pest of Reich Chancellor to the loader of the strongest Party, who, however was forced to rule in the framework of a coalition cabinet with all the limitations which derived from it.
THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient place to recess?
(A recess was taken.)
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I believe that I have made it sufficiently clear by those statements that Papen's collaboration in the formation of the Cabinet of January 30 does not constitute an attempt to place National Socialism in a position of exclusive power. The opposite has been proven by facts. would be necessary in any way for the denial of a verdict of guilty. If, even at that state, somebody had cooperated in really giving the National Socialist Party an exclusive influence, there still would not be any proof to see in this of a preparatory action for the punishable crime in the sense of the accusation. the statements of the party loader of that time--which, in view of their propaganda value, must be construed much more narrowly from an objective angle-- can be misinterpreted as much as one likes, and one may read into then in retrospect any number of facts which become recognizable later; one can see in all this the way to the crimes set out in the Charter.
In Papen's activities as Vice-Chancellor during the period from 30 Janury 1933 to 30 June, 1934, the Prosecution thinks it can see a continuation of his efforts towards a conspiracy for the purpose of consolidating the position in power of the ruling National-Socialists. The Prosecution has charged him in this connectionwith collaboration in the various laws passed during this period by the Government, which, according to their opinion merely served the aforementioned aims. I will demonstrate, however, how the work of the defendant developed in detail, in particular that he did not deviate from his original policy. The Prosecution deals with a number of laws passed by the Cabinet in the beginning which must be considered as a compromise as far as their political format is concerned, a compromise between the demands of the National Socialists, and the conservative ideas of the other members of the Cabinet.
We see problems being touched which National-Socialism made the subject of discussion and propaganda for years. The conservative members of the Cabinet were then facing the following situation: entirely ignore these questions; they had to be solved in some form. promise for both parties, In compromising, the other party need not change its opinion. If, for example, in a coalition cabinet, which is led by a labor party, the program of the labor government which perhaps contemplates a general socialization is to be carried out in practice, the collaboration of the other members of the cabinet will consist in preventing a general extension of the we asure and in limiting its effect to those cases which, in their opinion, deviate least from the course followed before. Ono cannot expect from the strongest party and from its leader, who occupies the constitutional position of Reich Chancellor, to continue the policy of his predecessors. The other members of the coalition must make sacrifices if any governmental activity is ever to be possible. judge considerations of political expediency and not even rural conceptions, but only whether what happened was done with a criminal purpose, in the sense of the Charter, the task set for the defense is comparatively simple. raised by National-Socialism partly solved. We must conceded to the non-National-Socialist cabinet members involved that, in considering these laws, they thought about a final solution and not about an intermediary stage. Their basis was the experience of the past, the experience of the political life of all countries, namely, that a problem settled by law Is normally concluded. It was unthinable-for it was incompatible with a normal "governmental activity and the presevnation of the authority of a legislative body that after the issuance of a law, a problem which had already been dealt with should, continually be considered anew in the following years and each time be brought to a more radical solution.
Papen has proved that he carefully tried to maintain the concessions made to the opponent within a more or less endurable limit. The fact that in the laws of that time National Socialist doctrines appear only rarely and in moderate terms, whose sufficiently that the composition of the cabinet of that time with regard to personalities had a retarding influence on the penetration of National-Sociliast ideas. why Hitler undertook a relatively unpopular limitation of the previously advocated aims of the party. the sharing of the individual laws is clearly discernable. The classic example for this areendeavours in bringing about the Enabling Act. It was a techinical necessity to the legislation during the crisis of that time. The preceding years had down that owing to the time-consuming deliberations in the Reichstag, urgently needed legislation was not acted upon satisfactorily. Therefore, already in Bruening's time, a boost all the legislative power was practically put in the hands of the Reich President, so that the important laws were issued in the form of emergency decrees by unilateral legislative acts of the Reich president. If, due to these compellin reasons, the legislative power could not in practice be left in the hands of the Reichstag, the legislative power thus transferred to the cabinet constituted a compromise. As shown by the result of the Reichstaf vote concerning the Enabling Act, none of the parties, including the Zentrum party filed to recognize this. cabinet, whore according to the constitution of the Reich Chancellor had to establish the fundamental lines of policy, would be limited by the fact that the right of proclaiming laws was reserved for the Reich President.
The State Secretary of the Reich President himself decalred, in a cabinet session, that he did not think it necessary to charge Hindenburg with the responsibility of the entire legislation because of the letter's right to proclaim laws. Von Panen's direct intervention with Hindenburg immediately afterwards, remained without success, as stated by the witeness Tschirschky.
Mr. President, would thi be an appropriate time for me to present the questionnaire which was answered by Tochirschky?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can comment on it, but you aren't going to read the whole document, are you?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I will sum it up; with your approval I will give a summary of it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This is document 103, which I submitted. a while ago.
Question 3 concerns the controls just Discussed. The Witness says that they were surely intended to prevent Hitler and the NSDAP from carrying out their policy.
aim of the concervative block: Black-White-Red. which I still have to present, toward an authoratative government by Hitler. in many points, strongly resisted the suggested legislation. church. The last sentence is particularly important: "Von Papen believed, by the conclusion of the Concordat, that Hitler and the NSADP would be plaved under so stron contractual obligations that the anti-church attitude would he obstructed".The nest answer, 11:
"I do not consider it possible that von Papen himself participated in a later violation of the Concordat, or that he used his political conviction for political deceit." speech.
The answer to question 14 is significant: I do not know that von Papen expressed thoughts to the effect that the Hitler Government would have to solve Germany's foreign political aims through war and aggression. In the years 1933 and 1934 such ideas would have been observed."
The answer to question 18 confirms Papen's efforts, after the events of the 30th of June, to readh Hindenburg in order to achieve a change.
THE PRESIDENT: In the answer to question 14, does the answer begin "It is not known" or "IT is known"?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: "It is not known"; "It is not known to me".
THE PRESIDENT: In the translation it says "It is known".
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The answer to question 16 confirms Papen's statement that at a;; cpsts he wanted to prevent Germanys withdrawal from the League of Nations.
I have already spoken of question 18. From the answer to 18 it is also shown that the consequence of Papen's attitude after the 30th of June Was insistence on his resignation. ally important as well Is the second sentence of the answer: "It is correct that von Papen accepted the poast of Ambassador Extraordinary to Vienna for the sole reason that he hoped to prevent a policy of insanity being carried on in Austria by Hitler and the NSDAP. It is correct that von Papen predicated his acceptance of the mission on Hitler's pledge to forbid Party interference in matters pertaining to Austria, to call back Gaulieter Habicht at once, and to refrain from any aggressive action.
It is true that these pledges were accepted by Hitler after lengthy protest, and that they were then put down in writing." the witness' period of observation, he hold on to this policy.
The answer to Question 26 denies the contents of Messersmith's affidavit. Papen was not concerned with an agressive policy in the Southeastern area. effect that Papen did not strive for an Anschluss to be obtained by force. Semitism had its first legal result. At that time, the situation was the following: direction, a predominantly National-Socialist group who had consistent antiSemitism as one point on their program. We saw the effects of propaganda on the masses which manifested themselves in the aforementioned individual actions, during the first weeks after the formation of the Hitler government.
The conclusions to be drawn from this situation were clear. A problem which has been stirred up, which had already a pernicious outcome in practice, had to be legally settled. It was clear that in this question National Socialism through its exaggerated propaganda, had contracted a certain obligation towards its followers. It was difficult to determine the extent of the legal limitation which for the incited masses always remained a disappointment. The way out could only be a compromise. The settlement was directed to a field where a change in the hitherto existing situation seemed to be the least severe.
Whereas in accordance with the contents of the "Professional Government Employee law" (Berufsbeamtengesetz) only those were dismissed from their position who occupied their position not on account of their professional qualification, but due to their membership in a political party, all Jewish government employees who were appointed after 1918 were also dismissed. As a rule, a right of pension was maintained. Papen's successful endeavor aimed to limit numerically the effect on the Jewish government employees concerned. He had an audience with Hindenburg, who was especailly approachable on the idea of protecting war veterans. Through Hindenburg's personal influence on Hitler, Jewish war veterans and dependants of fallen soldiers were then excepted from this law.
Since an overwhelming part of the young government employees who had been employed since 1914, were war veterans, the numerical effect of this exeration was quite considerable. This is made especially clear by the official figures published concerning the conditions in the legal profession, and which were presented in Defense Exhibit No. 33. Furthermore, the defendant is charged for the measures taken against the labor unions. First consideration must be given to the fact that the measures were not carried out by a regulation based on a Reich law. It is moreover important that with the the reshaping of affairs the continuation of labor unions with a SocialDemocratic character and a similar influence might have appeared as an anachronism. Papen's attitude with respect tothe labor problem is shown by his speech of 4 March 1933, Defense Document No. one could not have foreseen the extent of their further development. Considering its many rather sound ideas for the settlement of social questions, the German Labor Front at the time of its foundation did not merit the judgement it now deserves for the coercive measures taken at the end. Also in 1922, in order to set an end to a period of political unrest, amnesty decree was issued, which also pardoned crimes subject to death sentence. The establishment of special courts was a measure of expediency to speed up the sentencing of political offenders, because longer normal proceedings did not safeguard the desired momentum of warning. It is significant that the order concerning crimes of violence was applied for the first time during Papen's Reich chancellorship, National-Socialists in the case of the Potempa murderers (Document 1, pages 6 and 7). Thus it is erroneous to see in the nature of those laws a commendation actions committed or a promotion of the Nazi idea.
If the prosecution, in criticizing Papen's legislative activity during this time, still engages in considering the Political Coordination Act for the states of 31 March 1933, it touches first of all a question of homo policy.
which is really far outside of a field which could justify a discussion in the sense of the Indictment. showing that Papen has in this respect changed the point of view advocated previously. it must be said here that political opinions in general subject to alterations and often must be altered, and that from a change of concept with respect to political expedience measures one can by no means draw a conclusion as to a general change of opinion. As a matter of fact, first the Statthalter Act was designed to eliminate a dualism between the Reich and the states which Papen had always considered as disadvantageous, Papen has always advocated, especially with respect to Prussia, a solution in the sense of Bismarck's time, when the office of President of the Prussian Council of Ministers and that of Reich Chancellor were united in one person. not even a change of opinion, much less of change of sentiment. the cabinet of the defendant von Papen: His position of vice-chancellor was without an administrative province. The influence, even in political question which the head, of a regular ministry had in cabinet sessions did therefore not exist in the case of Papen He could only express misgivings or objections from a general point of view, Without being able to base them on departmental grounds. despite all my efforts I did not succeed in procuring the remaining ones, -the extent of Papen's opposition and that of the other ministers cannot be proved by documents. The fact that he voiced this opposition was revealed in the hearing of evidence. But, as admitted, the success was a small one. Thu* it is the duty of the defense, to investigate deeper the reasons why Hitler's powerful position gradually increased and why the influence of the nonnational-Socialist ministers become smaller, in short, why the guarantees fail ed which had been provided when the government was formed-on 30 January.
the normal procedure. The questions which arose were made the subject of discussions. Hitler did not try to carry through at any cost the bills which were rejected for good reasons. A clear description to that effect is given by the affidavit of the former minister Hugenberg - Defense Document No. 88. Socialist party brought along a substantial change. Beyond its purely parliamentary effects, Hitler was strengthened in his conviction of being the deputy of the German people. He thought that now the time had come for him to make use of his right, granted to him by article 56 of the constitution of the Reich, to determine in his capacity of Reich Chancellor the fundamental lines of policy even in case of an opposition on the part of the ministers.
With respect to the constitutional situation I refer to Document No. 22, which shows that in questions of fundamental policy even a majority decision of the ministers was without effect against the decision of the Reich Chancellor, Now, Hitler became very unapproachable to any suggestions. In case of a relevant opposition he thought to have against him an oppositional phalanx, and soon it became evident that objections made in the cabinet were of no use to change Hitler's attitude. At the best, one could hope, as the defendant von Neurath declared as a witness, to influence Hitler outside the cabinet in a direct discussion.
The essential factors in Hitler's development into an autocrat were his increasingly strengthened position with regard to Hinderburg and his ever increasing influence on the Reich Defense Minister von Blomberg.
Hitler's first measures which, in Hindenburg's eyes, showed his endeavor* toward the establishment of a strict order, had constantly improved Hitler's personal relations with Hindenburg. He skillfully undertook to adjust himself to Hindenburg's mentality. Therefore, he succeeded very soon, to abolis* the original stipulation concerning the obligation of making joint reports. Thus, Papen was deprived of the major possibility to influence Hindenburg. point in Hitler's development.
The Wehrmacht was a factor of power. Hitler knew that its men and officers were probably essentially unpolitical, but that by no means -especially as far as its leadership was concerned -- they were inclined to have National-Socialist ideas. An extensively radical course of the government might therefore always give rise to resistance on the part of the Wehrmacht. It must be added that *---*ing to his personality, Hindenburg listened especially willingly to reports coming from military circles. As long as the War Minister was not a disciple of Hitler, the latter was prevented from carrying out any radical ideas. would permit one to explain the reason for Hitler's influence on Blomberg. We must state the fact that Blomberg became very soon an ardent admirer of Hitler, and that on his part no sort of resistance could be expected against any extensive radical development whatsoever of Hitler's policy. The 30th June 1934 proved this very cleanly. Hitler could only be impressed by power. The Wehrmacht with its strength of that time was, especially in relation to the position of the Reich President von Hindenburg, a factor of power with which, at the beginning, even Hitler and his party would not have been able to cope in case of a commitment of forces. That is the reason for Hitler's endeavor to win Hindenburg's confidence.
during the time before Hindenburg's death, which by no means allowed to presume a further stronger development. From the time of Hindenburg's death, Hitler appeared as a dictator without consideration for anything; who, at least in the field of internal policy displayed his ruthless power policy. prosecution dealt with the question, to what extent Papen was responsible for the oppression of political opponents and for certain acts of violence which occurred during the period which the terminology of that time called "national revolution." knew about the arrest and mistreatment of individual Communist and Social-Democratic personnages named to him. Papen gave an essential ly negative answer. However, he knew that dur to the Decree for the Protection of People and State issued by the Reich P resident, measures had been taken which suppressed the personal liberty of a great number of leftists. The decree was issued by the Reich President, outside Papen's responsibility, and by suppression of the relevant constitutional stipulations. It was established under the impression created by the Reichstag fire, an event which up to the present day has not been clearly elucidated, but for which the official statement that Communist circle had instigated the arson, seemed to be absolutely believable. Especially since the search of the Liebknecht House, the Communist headquarters, produced, according to Goering's declamation, very serious evidence concerning the actions planned against the Reich cabinet. The inquiry was held by a judge of the Reichsgericht (Reich Supreme Court) a personality whose impartiality was beyond any doubt. Therefore, Papen could understand the legal security measures which the administration of the interior thought necessary. But knowledge of the arrest of these politicians is by no means connected eo ipso with the knowledge of the details and of the extent of the measures taken at that time. again and again that the knowledge of acts of violence remained restricted to the narrow circle of the direct participants.
The 22 July A LJG 20-2 measures taken before the release of an internee in order to reduce him to silence were evidently successful.
Thus, we see again and again that there was always only a small circle of knewing persons which was composed of the immediate environment of returned interne This explains the fact which sometimes amazes one afterwards, name that quite large circles were not informed of the kind and extent of the excesses committed. It is evident that close relatives and similarly thinking friends of the politicians arrested at that time, know of what had happened to that people. The extent of the secrecy is shown best by the fact that the witness Gisevius assumes that the conditions in concentration camps did not become generally known to Gestapo officials until 1935. very little about the measures which, during the first months, were almost exclusively taken against political opponents of National-Socialism coming from leftist circles. At any rate his knowledge did not go beyond the fact, that in the respect, arrests were made within the scope of the "Decree for the Protection of Nation and State." on the rights of church offices and organizations, which to a largo extent appealed to him end whom to at once tried to help energetically. The same holds true for the measures in connection with the 30th of June, 1934, which will be discussed later on. they were outside the law, were subject to the jurisdiction of the police and the ministry of the Interior. The law itself is an emergency decree of Hindenburg' . It came about legally. The now broadened conception of protective custody does not in itself constitute a crime. Papen of having sent a telegram to the New York Times on 25 March 1933, describing the situation in Germany as quiet so far, and of 22 July A LJG 20-3 having pointed out that individual actions had occurred but were now prohibited by an order from Hitler.
course heard of the excesses of which individual SA-men had become guilty in this period which was still unsettled politically. If on 12 March 1933, Hitler categorically forbade such actions by indivi als and ordered the strictest punishment for any culprits in the future, Papen could assume with a clear conscience that this order which emanated from the highest authority would henceforth be obeyed to a public announcement of the "League of Jewish Front Soldiers" of 25 March 1933. This proclamation also stated the fact that the situation with respect to the Jewish population was in general quiet, and that excesses were confined to actions by individuals, which had new been forbidden by Hitler. (I shall submit this publication of the League in my Document Book for the Reich Government. Chamber of Commerce in Cologne on 25 March 1933, which publication I shall also present during the hearing of evidence for the Reich Government. which was carried out on 1 April 1933, was, contrary to the opinion of the prosecution, no government measure, but exclusively a party measure which Papen, too, sharply opposed as well as others in the cabinet. The publication of the "Times", submitted with Neurath's defense Exhibit No. 9, proves that over and beyond this Papen made representations to Hindenburg and called for the latter's intervent with Hitler. the Jewish boycott had been announced as a defensive counter measur which was to be limited in time end to be extended only to business life. It had been expressly ordered that any use of force was forbidden and that excesses were to be prevented by corresponding measures. In its presentation of matters of domestic policy the 22 July A LJG 20-4 prosecution has merely shown that through the measures taken, the position of the National-Socialist party was to be strengthened, so that it should then be possible to turn to the aims of the foreign policy of force which had been decided upon beforehand.
Still more important than the discussion of domestic conditions is therefore an examination of the foreign policy of the Reich during the time Papen was Vice Chancellor.
Hindenburg's reservation that he would appoint the Foreign Minister and the appointment of von Neurath to this post when he had been Foreign Minister until then and was not a National-Socialist loads one necessarily to expect a development of foreign policy along the course hitherto taken.
Hitler's first measures seemed not only to justify this expectation but even to go beyond it. The ifrst speech on matters of foreign policy held on 17 May 1933, dealt with Germany's relations to Poland which in the past had never been entirely satisfactory. of large territories formerly belonging to the German Reich had brought with it a latent tension between these states. Hitler was the first to take up the problem and to resolve, according to his declaration in the Reichstag, to bring about a policy of friendship with Poland by recognizing the Polish state and its needs. If one considers the fact that the thought of renouncing all claims to a revision against Poland was not only generally unpopular but also stood in sharp opposition to previous propaganda, it was impossible to foresee the development of later years. One was necessarily convinced that here was an internally strong government supporting its domestic reconstruction with a policy of peace abroad.
Germany's adherence to the Four Power Pact, and its renewed profession of adherence to Locarno serve to underline this conviction. The struggle in foreign politics for ideological values lay in a different direction. The question of eliminating the clause in the Versailles Treaty which stipulates Germany's exclusive guilt and the question of equal rights for this large country which had pursued a persistent policy of peace since 1918, were demands which on one hand did not seem to burden the other side with unbearable 22 July A LJG 20-5 sacrifices and which were yet suited to remove from the German people an ideological burden which it considered a pressing one.