The labormarket was to be stimulated by means which were to result from the future savings of public taxes if the measures were successful. The economic laws were based only on this exhausting of financial possibilities. stimulation of the labor market by armament orders. These long range economic measures, which could be successful only in the case of an uninterrupted government policy, made the problem of their acceptance by the Reichstag especially urgent. Bruening cabinet had pursued, and in so doing he laid particular emphasis on those points of honor, the recognition of which would have brought no damage to the other parties to the treaty but which would have taken from the National-Socialist Party a forceful means of propaganda in influencing the masses. situation. He pointed out that substantially ideological points were at stake the denial of which would give the National-Socialists the impetus they desired. He explicitly emphasized that his efforts were the last attempt of a middle-class cabinet and that in the event his policy failed only NationalSocialism would profit from it. responsibility without wishing to entrust it with the key position of the office of Reich Chancellor, a share in the responsibility which would have brought a party of negative politics to a recognition of actual conditions and which would thus have eliminated the attractive demagogic propaganda. National-Socialist movement in governmental work are already regarded by the Prosecution as paving the way for National-Socialism. kind of practical governmental work, an attempt Which had to take into account the experience of the Bruening cabinet and the development of the National Socialist Party.
election in March 1932 had brought Hitler 36.8% of all the votes. If one ta* into consideration the fact that Hindenburg was the candidate on the opposite side and that Hindenburg's personality certainly caused many followers of the NSDAP to cast their vote in this special case in a way which was not in accordance with party directives, the fact follows that a heretofore hardly known opposition party arose which numerically outweighed by far all the other parties, and which in its position as an opponent was able to paralyze a priori any governmental activity. Hence followed, what was a foregone conclusion for Papen, the endeavour to got this party out of its status as an opposition party. This decision would be all the easier if the firm conviction were there that a share in the responsibility of government would turn the opposition party from its radical course and especially curb it considerably in its further development.
The best evaluation of Papen's governmental activity, seen from the standpoint of the National-Socialists, comes from the fact that it was the National-Socialist Party which opposed Papen's decisive economic legislation and with its vote of no confidence -- pronounced jointly with the Communist Party -- brought about the end of the Papen cabinet. especially the events of the 1 and 2 December 1932 show again his unequivocal attitude toward the NSDAP.
Papen proposed a violation of the constitution to Hindenburg. He wished to exhause this last means in order to avoid a Hitler chancellorship. Schleicher prevented this solution on the grounds that in the event of a civil war which might then break out the government would not remain master of the situation with the existing police and military forces. In the fact of these clear historical events the attempt of the Prosecution must remain without success to read the opposite into the facts and into those clearly recognizable unequivocal motives. marshal in the face of this?
One: that Papen, in his first negotiation with Hitler and a short time after forming his government, consented to rescind the order prohibiting the wearing of uniforms, a measure which, even if it had merely been taken is a political compensation deal to achieve acceptance of the cabinet, would be something very natural according to parliamentary rules. Not only was the NSDAP the strongest party in the Reichstag, but also and especially on accoun of its general political work in public life it constituted a powerful factor of the first order. Therefore, it could not a priori be driven into a state of opposition if it was intended at all to pursue a realistic policy of long duration and to overcome the emergency in earnest by revolutionizing the economic program. deep lying reasons, because it was a one-sided prohibition against one party a the opposing organizations were not limited in this respect and the acknowledgment of the law of equal treatment here could only eliminate dangerous propaganda material. The repeal of the prohibition concerning uniforms was furthermore by no means the announcement of a license for political acts of violence. The warning of the Reich President, announced with the proclamation of the decree, that acts of violence resulting from the decree would bring about an immediate prohibition of the organizations as such according to all intelligent estimation should have had the effect of preventing damaging results. uniforms was the main cause of the increase in the number of NationalSocialist scats at the July election, is completely at variance with the facts. In this connection I will refer to the already mentioned result of the Reich presidential election of Larch 1932 at which the real situation did not even become completely manifest wing to the fact that Hindenburg was the candidate on the other side. The election of 21 July 1932 brought 13,700,000 National-Socialist votes whereas in the Reich presidential election of 10 April 1932 Hitler had already received 13,400,000 votes.
There are no grounds whatsoever for assumption that the appearance of uniforms which, incidentally, had been replaced earlier by camouflaged standardized clothing oven during the period of prohibition, might have had a determining influence on the outcome of the elections. of the elections was certainly the general prohibition of political parades proclaimed by the Papen cabinet at the beginning of the election campaign. Public meetings and political parades are the most important expedient for a party under demagogic leadership. To have this taken away before the electi was undoubtedly a much greater minus for the NSDAP than the previous plus it had received in the form of permission to wear uniforms. Hitler to participate in the government, the prosecution sees an effort which undignified in its form and blameworthy in its essence, to smooth the path of National-Socialism to power. It forgets that Papen conducted the November elections in sharp opposition to the NSDAP, because he tried to remove the party from the key position in which without Hitler it was impossible numerically to form a majority from the Social-Democrats inclusive of them and extending to the farthest right. It forgets that this result had not been achieved, that they key position even with 196 seats remained with Hitler and that, therefore, it was necessary to make another attempt to win Hitler over for a presidential cabinet under some conservative chancellor. It overlooks in this point that Papen's proposals here again had the definite aim of excluding the NSDAP from the Reich Chancellorship. For NationalSocialism a cabinet under a conservative politician, who according to the constitution would have had to determine the principles of the policy, would only have brought the party's influence on to this or that department, but in return for this influence it would have resulted also in its sharing the responsibility through its participation in the government. From the standpoint of the opposition to National-Socialism seen in retrospect one could indeed have welcomed nothing more than such a case in which the party's participation in the government was limited in influence and had a share in the responsibility. The end of opposition policy which was so tremendously favorable for propaganda would undoubtedly have brought about the end of the growth of the National-Socialist movement and the conversion of its radical elements.
Chancellor towards the leader of the strongest party in parliament. It is a foregone conclusion that in using this form and because of the purpose of the letter the writer does not refer to negative points but to those positive things which were suitable for use in any cooperation in the government.
In order to be able to construct from the period of Papen's Reichchancellorship something that is at least a foothold in proving his union of ideas with National-Socialism the prosecution has imputed to the temporary elimination of the Prussian government by the decree of 20 July 1932 intentions which in no way could pass the test of an objective examination.
The "coup d'etat" of 20 July, as the prosecution terms the execution of the decree of 20 July, had not the slightest thing to do with promoting the National-Socialists. In the opinion of the Reich cabinet and according to the decisive judgment of Reich President von Hindenburg domestic policy showed the necessity for eliminating that toleration of Communist acts of terror which was practised by the Prussian cabinet in office and which continuously and openly came to light. From this state of affairs Hindenburg drew his conclusions and issued the emergency decree of 20 July. By a decision of the then still entirely independent Reich supreme court it was determined that this decree with regard to constitutional law was permissible within the framework of state political necessities. conveyed by police authorities to the minister of the interior who had been suspended, that he leave his offices, the word "coup d'etat" lends a meaning to this measure which goes far beyond that actually happened. Also in considering the effects of this measure on assumption that here the way was paved for National -Socialism isnot justified by any facts. The appointed Reich Commissioner Bracht belonged to the Center Party. The key position of police president in Berlin was entrusted to a man on whom the hitherto existing cabinet Braun had previously conferred the office of police president in Essen.
Briefly, the result of the change was only that on the one hand an effective cooperation was now assured with the Reich authorities, and on the other hand now people filled some political positions which up to now had been the almost exclusive monopoly of the Socialist Democratic Party, to an extent which from the point of view of parity could no longer be justified. That in filling these positions the National Socialists were passed over, was a charge which was made against Papen time and again by the National Socialists.
Consequently, Papen's entire term of office in the government constitutes a clear line of realistic politics which show that on the one hand he did not let go the rudder in carrying out necessary and especially economic measures, but that on the other hand he tried to get a numerically almost oversholming opposition party to collaborate. Papen's attitude towards the NSDAP became oven more manifest after he had been asked by the Reich President late in November 1932 to collaborate in the efforts to form a now cabinet. consequences. Realizing that it was impossible to go on with a nonNational-Socialist government according to parliamentary principles, he submitted to the Reich President the proposal to rule with the aid of armed force even if he thus caused a violation of the constitution and risked causing a civil war. when one adheres to thinking along lines of constitution law as it is impossible to overlook in retrospect that the proposed violation of the constitution limited in time was probably the only possibility to avoid the solution which then become necessary on 30 January 1933. Sooner or later the opposition party would have forced the resignation of any non-National-Socialist cabinet. Thus, the political unrest with its consequences on the entire economic life would have become a latent state. A state of affairs, which, by its alternate effect, was only suited to strengthen the national socialist movement and thus to bring it by force to a numerical strength which in the end would have resulted in the fulfilmen of its entire totalitarian claim for assuming unlimited power.
1933 might in itself be disregarded. It is sufficient to be aware of the fact, that all endeavors to bring about a parliamentary government without Hitler, were already impossible from a purely numerical standpoint, and that such a parliamentary solution with Hitler was wrecked by his opposition A measure born out of political and constitutional necessity cannot, according to the indictment, be considered as evidence of intended planning of a crime in the sense of the Charter. The significance of this count of the indictment must be considered. By maintaining all parliamentary rule a government is appointed by Hindenburg in his capacity of chief of state, the head of which is the leader of the strongest party. This government when presented before the parliament, finds an overwhelming majority. That which Papen is accused of, the knowledge of the activities of the NationalSocialist party in the past, holds true to the same extent also for the other participants, Hindenburg and all consenting members of parliament. The reproach levelled against Papen thus includes also an accusation against Hindenburg and the entire consenting parliament. For this consideration alone, the unique attempt of including in an indictment a self-evident, constitutional procedure of a sovereign state, must probably fail. formation of the government, it is only in order to clearly show here, too, the unequivocal standpoint of Papen, who on one hand did not wish to close his eyes to the real facts, but on the other hand desired to undertake everything in order to prevent the danger of an uncontrollable development of this new formation. The prosecution considers the Hitler-Papen meeting at the home of Schroeder on 4 January as being the beginning of the efforts made for the formation of the Government of 30 January. As a matter of fact the meeting at Schroeder's was nothing else than an exchange of ideas about the situation of the moment during which Papen and Hitler maintained their previous opinions and Papen pointed out that Hindenburg, owing to the apprehensions which he expressed, would in no case agree to Hitler's taking the position of Reich Chancellor.
Hitler would have to accept the position of Vice-Chancellor, since Hindenburg took the standpoint that the possibility for a further development would only follow after he had proven himself over a long period of time.
This meeting in Koeln took place upon Hitler's request. I refer in this instance to Schroeder's communique published by the press, which I submitted as document No.9 of the defense, and which I erroneously indicated during the cross examination as being a joint communique* issued by Papen and Schroeder. Schroeder establishes in it that he himself took the first step toward this meeting. formation of the Government of 30 January is obvious from the fact that the discussion was immediately reported by Papen to Schleicher and Hindenburg and that during all the following time until 22 January Papen had nothing to do with the solution of the governmental problem. Schleicher as well as Hindenburg endeavored to obtain parliamentary support for the Schleicher cabinet through negotiations with the leaders of parties, efforts which failed, however, due to the weight of the political facts. The main effort was to split up the National-Socialist party by inviting the collaboration of the Strasser wing in the Government. These efforts failed when Hitler's position became so strong after the result of the elections in Lippe that he regained absolute control ever the Party against all attempts to split it up. The outcome of the elections in Lippe of 15 January 1933 was generally considered as a barometer of public opinion with respect to the political situation. All parties had mobilized their entire organization and propaganda apparatus, and therefore one could draw a conclusion from the result of this election concerning the general public opinion. The result showed that the losses suffered during the November elections were almost completely made up. Thus everybody could recognize that the decline of the NationalSocialist movement was stopped and that with the continuance of the momentary political and economic situation a further gain was to be expected 20 January 1935 the Council of Seniors of the Reichstag - through its convention of the Reichstag for the 31 of January - granted to Schleicher's cabinet practically only a period of grace up to that date.
For a vote of no confidence introduced by the left and the NSDAP meant its immediate fall. The meeting in the house of Ribbentrop on 22January, when Hindenburg wanted to learn through his son and the state secretary of the Presidential Chancellory Dr. Meissner Hitler's opinions about the political situation, has to be considered from this point of view. formation of the Hitler Government cannot be established with certainty by means of the data at hand. In any case, being a member of the immediate circle around Hindenburg who finally took the decisive decision, he was by no means uninterested in the matters. His personality has been judged at least very differently. Because of his own interest in the case he can in no event be considered as a classical witness for the judgment of the events of that time. His testimony bears certainly in one point the stamp of unlikeliness. He maintains that he opposed Hindenburg's decision, after the latter decided to appoint Hitler to the office of Reich Chancellor. This is said by the same man who during the session of the Cabinet concerning the "Enabling Law" did not consider it necessary to maintain the right of the Reich President to proclaim laws, the same man who after the events of 30 June 1934 obviously collaborated in isolating Hindenburg from all those who could give him a true representation of the events. I make those remarks because a part of a Meissner Affidavit was road during the hearing of evidence against Papen. Although according to the decision of the Tribunal, the contents (of the affidavit) which was read shall not constitute a basis for the verdict, during the cross examination-questions were nevertheless asked which referred to the affidavit; this could cause erroneous judgment. Besides, the decision of theTribunal relieves me of the obligation to discuss in detail the contents of the affidavit and to indicate a number of inaccuracies which could be easily refuted.
made no attempts whatsoever as regards the formation of a Government. On that day, in view of the imminent convocation of the Reichstag, Schleicher had to brine about a decision. On 1 December 1932 he advised Hindenburg against an open fight against the parliament and stated that the employment of the Armed Forces in a possible civil war would be hopeless. Now he thought that he himself could find no other solution than to beg to be permitted the use of those forces which he previously considered as being insufficient. But since no change in the situation had occurred since that time which could offer reasons for Schleicher's change of opinion, since moreover the position of the NSDAP was strengthened by the elections in Lippe and the general political situation had become still more tense through the attitude of the parties, Hindenburg upheld his decision of 2 December. Thus, the resignation of the whole Schleicher cabinet was inevitable. Now the events had to take their course, which necessarily and logically they had to follow, if the possible use of arms was to be avoided. There was only one solution now: Negotiations with Hitler. Hindenburg commissioned Papen to conduct the negotiations for the formation of the government. On Hitler's part it was clear that he would maintain his inflexible demands namely to take over himself the office of Reich Chancellor. The task, clearly recognized by Papen, was now to set limits to the political activities of the new party which had not proved itself yet on such a large scale. which any radicalism would have been particularly detrimental, namely the Foreign Office and the War Ministry. Hindenburg reserved for himself the right of filling these two key positions. In order not to entrust the new Chancellor with appointing the remaining ministers, as had been customary heretofore, Papen was charged with this task in his capacity of home regius. He succeeded in limiting the number of National-Socialist ministers to a minimum. Three National-Socialist members of the Government faced eight non-NationalSocialists who for the main part were taken over from the former cabinet and who guaranteed a steady policy in their ministries. That was not all; within the framework of the constitution the authority of the Reich Chancellor was to be limited in a manner never known before.
Papen was appointed to the position of Vice-Chancellor. His function was not connected with a special department but mainly intended to constitute a counterpoise to the position of the Reich Chancellor. It was decided that Hitler in his capacity of Reich Chancellor should report to the Reich President von Hindenburg only in the presence of the Vice-Chancellor. Thus, a certain control was established when the Reich President formed his opinion about the requests presented by the Reich Chancellor. In view of Hindenburg's personality, of which, according to huma foresight, one could expect a quite considerable influence upon Hitler, this control over the information Hindenburg received promised that a shift towards a radical court would be avoided. This was the part the defendant had in the formation of the Hitler Government. The prosecution sees herein a decisive, conscious step towards the transfer of full power to National-Socialism. arrive only at the conclusion that in view of the inevitable necessity of coding the leadership of the cabinet to the National-Socialist party, all possibilities for limiting the importance of this measure were exhausted. Th position of Reich Chancellor left to National-Socialism and the appointment of only two National-Socialist ministers represented the limit of Hitler's originally much more extensive demands and this limit was only reached after long efforts. solution adopted on 30 January was the only possible one or not. Even if one were of a different opinion, the only thing that matters in looking at the cas from a criminal angle is whether Papen could consider this solution as a necessity or only as a more political expediency. Even if, contrary to all facts one regarded his opinion as a Utopia, it should be taken into considerate from the point of view of penal law that one could only speak of a guilt if he had known the future consequences and the future plans of aggression and if in spite of this he had collaborated in the formation of the Government. The facts just mentioned have proved that there is not even the slightest supposi for this.
the two ministries which are the nest important or which are the only ones to play a part at all in connection with the accusation of breaking the peace; namely, the Foreign Office and the War Ministry, were placed in the hands of men who enjoyed Hindenburg's confidence and had no connection with Hitler and when an unbiased direction of the ministries could be expected. It is not unimportant to consider in this instance what expectations one night have from Hitler's personality and his future policy. responsibility. A party, the structure and development of which could certainly occasion many objections and apprehensions. A party which had developed on the basis of an absolutely negative attitude towards the hitherto existing Government leadership. A party which with its noisy appearance had certainly made many concessions with regard to the constitution of its membership. A party which had laid down a new program including points some of which seemed a long way from reality and impossible to carry out and which caused many objections, but which -- and this is the only essential fact within the scope of our consideration of the case -- apparently did not have any criminal character.
history that propaganda and responsible work are two very different things, that a party which developes from nothing needs, according to experience, more negative and noisy propaganda than old existing party. Even if the cabinet of 30 January had consisted of National Socialists exclusively, even if a moderating element had not existed in Hindenburg's personality, one could have assumed according to the rules of reason and experience that Hitler, who acceded to power by means of propaganda, would take into account the existing conditions in this practical, responsible work and would show himself in his activities essentially different from what he appeared during the propagandisti preparation of the ascension to power. sition and in responsible Government work: The same National Socialists with their same program and their same propaganda who now, on the 30th January took possesion of the position of Reich Chancellor had already held the leadership or participated in the governments of some German states, We see Frick, the leader of the Reichstag faction act as responsible minister in Thuringia. His field of action included even the police and we saw the National Socialists zealously tackling the economic problems in these states. But we did not see them commit excesses or not even pursue an unreasonable policy which would have been at least in approximate agreement with their propaganda. Could it not be expected then that in the Reich. together with the greater tasks, the natural sense of responsibility would also increase? And that especially in view of the safety measures taken, matters would not take a dangerous course?
It is not superfluous to discuss Hitler's personality in this connection, Hitler, especially after the failure of the attempt to split off the Strasser group was the absolute autocrat of his party. Undoubtedly he did not show the leadership of his party, in his speeches and in his appearance that reserve which would have been a matter of course for the leader of such a big party. such an extent that he would be able to put through also unpopular measures which had to be taken under the pressure of reality. In the questions concerning the participation in the Government he had pursued a policy wise in its tactics but unpopular with the impatient masses, because he took the facts into account Could it not be expected then that this man who now had reached his aim, namely to take over the leadership of the cabinet would abandon the unrealistic ideas he advocated when he was in the ranks of the opposition and would submit to the real exigencies of public and international life?
particularly great aims and with a particularly big responsibility grows as a ruler and as a man in proportion with these aims and this responsibility. In view of this general historic experience one could not assume that a man entrusted with responsibility, after certain attempts which could be interprets as being promising, would soon revert to the thesis of his former opposition ideas; that after a couple of years this man would throw overboard every positive idea he emphasized - I remember for instance Hitler professing his adheran to the Christian foundations of the State - and that he would even surpass the negative ideas he formerly advocated and increased to an immeasurable extent his aims and his methods. We see now Hitler's full development before us and we are perhaps tempted to interprete his actions during the last years, because they represent something which is so monstrous and therefore so particularly impressive, as being the manifestations of his whole personality, while assuming that during the proceeding time he had already been the same. upon his speeches and especially his actions, to interest and to understand Hitler psychologically, from the beginning of his political appearance until its end. and more towards nearly everybody in his sphere of life makesit particularly difficult to judge his personallity. that Papen too, despite the fact that he was close to Hitler, could not suspect him in 1933 of being the man he showed himself during later years.
If Papen, in agreement with Hindenburg's wishes, and while executing his orders in his capacity of homo regius did everything in order to prevent the possibility of a radical development, fully aware of his responsibility, he al strove with all his energy toward the same goal and beyond the obligations of this task.
easy way, which would have been favorable for him from and opportunist point of view. He undertook to form a counterweight to the National Socialists at the elections of 3 March 1933 through a union of the conservative parties of the right. For someone who would have adopted the National Socialist ideas or even agreed to offer blind, obedience to their leader, the next thing to do would have been to put an end to the opposition of this large, newly constituted conservative group and to let it make its way towards a union with the part which had recently come to power, a way which at that time appeared to many absolutely natural. Papen entered the election contest as leader and organizer of the oppositional group "Black-White-Red". His speeches of that time, excerpt of which I submitted in the document book, show a clear picture of his aims and intentions. They we the affirmation of a nationalistic idea, free from the propaganda licentiousness of National Socialism and its doctrines. In any case, his program was in irreconcilable contrast to what later turned out to be the unpredictable extension and unlimited transgression of the confirmed aims of the NSDAP. The formation of the political action block "Black-White-Red" was to guarantee what Papen had tried to achieve by the composition of the Cabinet of 30 January: a coalition cabinet which, as an inevitable result of parliamentary rules and the entire political situation, left the pest of Reich Chancellor to the loader of the strongest Party, who, however was forced to rule in the framework of a coalition cabinet with all the limitations which derived from it.
THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient place to recess?
(A recess was taken.)
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I believe that I have made it sufficiently clear by those statements that Papen's collaboration in the formation of the Cabinet of January 30 does not constitute an attempt to place National Socialism in a position of exclusive power. The opposite has been proven by facts. would be necessary in any way for the denial of a verdict of guilty. If, even at that state, somebody had cooperated in really giving the National Socialist Party an exclusive influence, there still would not be any proof to see in this of a preparatory action for the punishable crime in the sense of the accusation. the statements of the party loader of that time--which, in view of their propaganda value, must be construed much more narrowly from an objective angle-- can be misinterpreted as much as one likes, and one may read into then in retrospect any number of facts which become recognizable later; one can see in all this the way to the crimes set out in the Charter.
In Papen's activities as Vice-Chancellor during the period from 30 Janury 1933 to 30 June, 1934, the Prosecution thinks it can see a continuation of his efforts towards a conspiracy for the purpose of consolidating the position in power of the ruling National-Socialists. The Prosecution has charged him in this connectionwith collaboration in the various laws passed during this period by the Government, which, according to their opinion merely served the aforementioned aims. I will demonstrate, however, how the work of the defendant developed in detail, in particular that he did not deviate from his original policy. The Prosecution deals with a number of laws passed by the Cabinet in the beginning which must be considered as a compromise as far as their political format is concerned, a compromise between the demands of the National Socialists, and the conservative ideas of the other members of the Cabinet.
We see problems being touched which National-Socialism made the subject of discussion and propaganda for years. The conservative members of the Cabinet were then facing the following situation: entirely ignore these questions; they had to be solved in some form. promise for both parties, In compromising, the other party need not change its opinion. If, for example, in a coalition cabinet, which is led by a labor party, the program of the labor government which perhaps contemplates a general socialization is to be carried out in practice, the collaboration of the other members of the cabinet will consist in preventing a general extension of the we asure and in limiting its effect to those cases which, in their opinion, deviate least from the course followed before. Ono cannot expect from the strongest party and from its leader, who occupies the constitutional position of Reich Chancellor, to continue the policy of his predecessors. The other members of the coalition must make sacrifices if any governmental activity is ever to be possible. judge considerations of political expediency and not even rural conceptions, but only whether what happened was done with a criminal purpose, in the sense of the Charter, the task set for the defense is comparatively simple. raised by National-Socialism partly solved. We must conceded to the non-National-Socialist cabinet members involved that, in considering these laws, they thought about a final solution and not about an intermediary stage. Their basis was the experience of the past, the experience of the political life of all countries, namely, that a problem settled by law Is normally concluded. It was unthinable-for it was incompatible with a normal "governmental activity and the presevnation of the authority of a legislative body that after the issuance of a law, a problem which had already been dealt with should, continually be considered anew in the following years and each time be brought to a more radical solution.
Papen has proved that he carefully tried to maintain the concessions made to the opponent within a more or less endurable limit. The fact that in the laws of that time National Socialist doctrines appear only rarely and in moderate terms, whose sufficiently that the composition of the cabinet of that time with regard to personalities had a retarding influence on the penetration of National-Sociliast ideas. why Hitler undertook a relatively unpopular limitation of the previously advocated aims of the party. the sharing of the individual laws is clearly discernable. The classic example for this areendeavours in bringing about the Enabling Act. It was a techinical necessity to the legislation during the crisis of that time. The preceding years had down that owing to the time-consuming deliberations in the Reichstag, urgently needed legislation was not acted upon satisfactorily. Therefore, already in Bruening's time, a boost all the legislative power was practically put in the hands of the Reich President, so that the important laws were issued in the form of emergency decrees by unilateral legislative acts of the Reich president. If, due to these compellin reasons, the legislative power could not in practice be left in the hands of the Reichstag, the legislative power thus transferred to the cabinet constituted a compromise. As shown by the result of the Reichstaf vote concerning the Enabling Act, none of the parties, including the Zentrum party filed to recognize this. cabinet, whore according to the constitution of the Reich Chancellor had to establish the fundamental lines of policy, would be limited by the fact that the right of proclaiming laws was reserved for the Reich President.
The State Secretary of the Reich President himself decalred, in a cabinet session, that he did not think it necessary to charge Hindenburg with the responsibility of the entire legislation because of the letter's right to proclaim laws. Von Panen's direct intervention with Hindenburg immediately afterwards, remained without success, as stated by the witeness Tschirschky.
Mr. President, would thi be an appropriate time for me to present the questionnaire which was answered by Tochirschky?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can comment on it, but you aren't going to read the whole document, are you?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I will sum it up; with your approval I will give a summary of it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This is document 103, which I submitted. a while ago.
Question 3 concerns the controls just Discussed. The Witness says that they were surely intended to prevent Hitler and the NSDAP from carrying out their policy.
aim of the concervative block: Black-White-Red. which I still have to present, toward an authoratative government by Hitler. in many points, strongly resisted the suggested legislation. church. The last sentence is particularly important: "Von Papen believed, by the conclusion of the Concordat, that Hitler and the NSADP would be plaved under so stron contractual obligations that the anti-church attitude would he obstructed".The nest answer, 11:
"I do not consider it possible that von Papen himself participated in a later violation of the Concordat, or that he used his political conviction for political deceit." speech.
The answer to question 14 is significant: I do not know that von Papen expressed thoughts to the effect that the Hitler Government would have to solve Germany's foreign political aims through war and aggression. In the years 1933 and 1934 such ideas would have been observed."
The answer to question 18 confirms Papen's efforts, after the events of the 30th of June, to readh Hindenburg in order to achieve a change.
THE PRESIDENT: In the answer to question 14, does the answer begin "It is not known" or "IT is known"?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: "It is not known"; "It is not known to me".
THE PRESIDENT: In the translation it says "It is known".
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The answer to question 16 confirms Papen's statement that at a;; cpsts he wanted to prevent Germanys withdrawal from the League of Nations.
I have already spoken of question 18. From the answer to 18 it is also shown that the consequence of Papen's attitude after the 30th of June Was insistence on his resignation. ally important as well Is the second sentence of the answer: "It is correct that von Papen accepted the poast of Ambassador Extraordinary to Vienna for the sole reason that he hoped to prevent a policy of insanity being carried on in Austria by Hitler and the NSDAP. It is correct that von Papen predicated his acceptance of the mission on Hitler's pledge to forbid Party interference in matters pertaining to Austria, to call back Gaulieter Habicht at once, and to refrain from any aggressive action.