Nobody can say that there is no doubt about the circumstances of the case. the Document Book of the prosecution that Bormann was one of the most zealous in the fight against Christian churches. Most of the documents quoted in the Trial Brief referred to this point. It is certainly correct to say that Bormann was philosophically and according to his attitude a violent opponent of the Christian doctrine. But, such a spiritual attitude in inself is neither an offense nor oven a crime before the whole of mankind, which embraces so many different conceptions of the world and the higher connotations and will perhaps give birth to many more.
In modern times there are countless convinced atheists. In other countries of the globe, too, there are officially recognized organizations which oppose the Christian interpretation of the world, and at the turn of our century there were big associations in many countries which had pure materialism as their philosophical system and the negation of spiritual things openly inscribed on their ba**er. No one can be punished for wishing to teach others the precepts of his ideology or for wanting to convert them to his point of view. The modern world still recalls the horrers of the Inquisition. Therefore, Bormann could only be punished if it were proved that he participated in a real religious persecution and not merely in an idealogical or for struggle. which the prosecution has produced against Bormann, namely documents L-75 and 089-PS, do not show that the defendant Martin Bormann in his official position undertook anything against the churches as religious institutions. The quintessence of document L-75 is contained in the sentence which says that from the incompatibility between National-Socialist and Christian ideology it must be deduced that any strengthening, of existing Christian confessions and any furtherance of new ones arising is to be rejected by the party. It is of no importance for what urgent reasons Bormann came to write such a sentence at the end of his letter. One need not discuss the fact that failure to strengthen a religious conception which one opposed on philosophical grounds does not constitute religious persecution.
Nobody is obliged to support a religious conception. It is not permissible to direct one's attention only to excited arguments, stating that a religion should not be strengthened, and to disregard the conclusions from such considerations. copy of this document, a copy which a Protestant minister by the name of Eichholz made out for himself. Whether the reproduction of the contents of Bormann's statement in this document is fully correct has not at all been proved. In any case the document in this form does not represent true evidence takes indeed a very definite stand against the church. It finishes, howeverand this is the only fact which should be considered for the verdict -- by saying that no National-Socialist teacher be reproached for teaching Christian religion and in such a case the original text of the Bible should be used; any new interpretation, comment or taking apart of the text of the Bible is to be avoided. Therefore, Bormann, despite his previous philosophical attack against the church, takes here the legal standpoint that the Christian dogma may be freely propagated. Could a more loyal action ever be expected of sucha strong opponent of a doctrine? measures either. The fact that Bormann on Hitler's order prohibited the admission of priests or of members of certain religious association to the party and that on Hitler's order he forbade priests to be appointed to loading positions in the party in order to prevent dissensions is no religious persecution. The fact that during the war he demanded that the church make the same sacrifices as the other institutions of the State does not represent a criminal measure for religious reasons. That within the closing of many lay institutions which was to take place in order to make a better use of human reserves of the nation he strove for the closing of church institutions, too; that within the limitation of the number of copies and number of pages of lay publications he wished that church publications be limited also does not come under the provisions of Article 6 of the Charter.
It is true that he let himself be guided in this respect among other things also by his anti-clerical attitude. But when otherwise the same measures were takne in Germany against other institutions and other publications, too, measures which as war measures were supposed to be only temporary, one cannot speak of an actual religious persecution. Not even Bormann's participation in orginating the persecution of priests has been submitted or proved at all. It results from ail documents that Bormann always adhered to the effective legal stipulations so that he, who as so eagerly intent on complying with Hitler's orders, certainly observed strictly Hitler's decree which directed at the beginning of the war that al measures against the church he discontinued. be really cleared up despite the numerous documents presented. Documents alone do not suffice to dissipate all doubts on the case. Especially with respect to the importance and weight of Bormann's share in persecution measures against the church it seems necessary to determine Bormann's personal responsibility. Thus, this fact also remains somewhat obscure. A basis for a just determination of the amount of punishment cannot be established. details. I think that the indications I have given are sufficient to show that oven the documents presented by the prosecution prove, in any case, only one thing with certainty, namely, that Bormann, in his capacity as chief of the Party Chancellery, held "as ordered by the law" an intermediary position in the clerical, secretarial dealings between the head of the Reich and the subordinate agencies and in the dealings among those subordinate agencies. Anything else is only an assumption which has not been definitely proved, in any case not with that certainty which must seem essential for the sake of justice in order to pass a verdict in absentia and without hearing the defendant, especially with respect to the severity of the punishment. Unfortunately, a legend has been woven around Bormann's personality, his activity and his survival. But for the sober judgment of jurists, legends are not a valid basis for a sure verdict free from any doubt.
all times and all nations in passing a final, irreversible sentence upon an absent defendant, I beg the High Tribunal to make use of its right to carry through such a procedure only after having considered the hitherto existing legal conceptions and especially when examining the case to consider the prerequisites set down in a particularly precise manner by the Russian law. I, therefore, expressly propose that the Tribunal decide to suspend the proceedings against the defendant Bormann until he is personally heard and can personally state his case, and that the Tribunal make no use of its right according to article 12.
THE PRESIDENT: I call on Dr. Kubuschok on behalf of the defendant von Papen.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Before beginning my final plea, I should like to submit to the Tribunal a few interrogatories which have since been received and which have also been translated. Since I am referring to them in my final plea I would consider this a suitable moment for their submission.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kubuschok.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: First of all I am submitting the interrogatory which has been received from witness Tschirschky as document No. 103. I shall submit the copies for the judges immediately, four English and two French copies. Tschirschky is the secretary of the defendant von Papen, who, at the time when he was in Vienna, had been called by the Gestapo in Berlin, and then emigrated to Great Britain, where he has presumably obtained British citizenship. With reference to the very numerous questions dealing with Papen's vice-chancellorship and his activities in Vienna, the witness has expressed himself in great detail and in many cases answered in the affirmatice. detail now. The copies submitted to the Tribunal will be sufficient. But perhaps I could quote the last paragraph from Question 1: "Regarding his relation to the NSDAP, I can say that during the time when I was working with von Papen, von Papen's attitude was negative and, in fact, a hostile one in every respect."
Question 3, Which deals with the safety measures adopted during the formation of the government on the 30th of January.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal does not wish to comment twice on the interrogatory. If you want to comment upon it to the Court in your speech, well and good. You comment now, as you put it in, and then presumably you may make some observation later on in your speech.
DR. KUBISCHOK: Mr. President, during the plea I will refer very briefly to this document. The special questions which are answered are not referred to in my plea. I will merely refer to my resume. I an not dealing With the question and answers individually.
THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Kubuschok, the Tribunal thinks the appropriate course for you to take is to put in these interrogatories now, and when you deal on them in your speech, you can refer to any particular passage that you want
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. In its present written form, it is very brief. It is not even a sentence. It is an aside.
THE PRESIDENT: When you get to it -
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then you want me to deal on it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well. But on the other hand now, I have submitted to the interrogatory as Document 103. Then the completed interrogatory of Archbishop Groeber as Document 104. Groeber is connected with the Concordat. 0 0 I am also submitting interrogatory of Archbishop Roncalli under Document Number 105. And finally, the interrogatory from the Polish Ambassador Jan Gawrouski which is Document 106. These are documents the translations of which I have not yet received. I wouldlike to have the Tribunal permit me to enter any document, which, in spite of my pleadings, I have not been able to have translated. I have an affidavit from a foreign journalist, Rademacher von Unna. He had written a letter to my colleague. Doctor Dix, on the 29th of May, which arrived here about three weeks ago. What is of interest is mostly one paragraph. I should be most grateful to the Tribunal if I could read the paragraph over and so the Tribunal would be in a position to see if it is relevant, and if so, to permit me to submit the document. Then I would submit the original and the translation could be supplied as soon as completed.
THE PRESIDENT: You have not shown it to the Prosecution, yet, have you DR. KUBUSCHOK: I had submitted the German text at the time but now it has been in the translating department for two weeks and I have not been able to get it today.
I had already mentioned the document during the last session where we discussed evidence, and the Tribunal informed me that I should submit it on another occasion, when the matter came up for discussion.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it long?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It is not long, it is a page and a half, and I really want to read the paragraph which is shorter than half a page. Only that paragraph is of real importance to me.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution object to this?
MR. ELWYN JONES: I have not seen a copy of this document, but we have no objection in principal. I have not seen the document myself and it is a little difficult to give any opinion as to whether we would object, if we had the opportunity of examining it.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, perhaps the best would be for you to read the document and the prosecution can move to strike it out of the record if they object to it.
MR. ELWYN JONES: That would be quite a convenient course for the prosecution, my Lord.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Well then, I shall read from that affidavit from Rademacher dated the 29th of May 1946, which was executed in 'Milan, half of the penultimate and the last paragraph. The executor of the affidavit in this communication is referring to a statement made by Von Papen which is worded as follows: "He, Papen, would however, not be deterred from his views by anybody and carried out his mission in the way that lie himself understood it. Merely to be an intermediary and peacemaker, and therefore he would throw anyone out of the door who would misuse him in Austria for obscure purposes. In this connection it is worth mentioning that a member of the Austrian Government, a Secretary of State, the name of whom I have forgotten, was making efforts to establish personal, but secret, contact with the special German Ambassador, in order to offer him his services for the German cause. Herr von Papen turned down this offer giving as his reason that he was refusing to participate in the conspiracies which were directed against the official policies of the Ballhaus Platz. He had attempted to cooperate openly and loyally with the Federal Government, and, he, on his part, would not use any other means as far as he himself was concerned."
As an explanation, I should like to add that the member of the Austrian Government who is mentioned in this is Neustadter Stuermer.
Your Lordship, Gentlemen of the Court: peace. With respect to time the prosecution limits the discussions of the facts of the case to the termination of his activity in Vienna. It admits that for the subsequent period, especially during his activity as ambassador in Ankara, no indications were found to support the accusation. In other words, according to this viewpoint Papen is said to have taken part in the preparatory actions for unleashing a war of aggression - which actions as regards time, -the prosecution has placed very far ahead, but he is not said to have actively participated in the immeidate preparations and in the crimes against thepeace itself.
The prosecution deals with Papen's activity as Reich Chancellor in the last pro-Nazi cabinet, with thepart he played as vice-chancellor in Hitler's cabinet until 30 June 1934, and with his activity as Minister Extraordinary in Vienna. It was faced with the task of proving that during this period preparatory actions for a crime against peace actually took place and that Papen in full recognition of these aims collaborated in the preparations. Since the counts of the indictment deal with a field of activity which is in itself a legal one and since the criminal element cannot be introduced into the individual acts except in the direction of their aims, judgment of the Papen case lies essentially in the subjective field. The prosecution is faced with the fact that Papen's own sentiments which often came to light and the policy which he actually pursued cannot be made to agree with the interpretation, given by them. Therefore, they seize upon the promise that he is a double-faced opportunist who has sacrificed his real sentiments or those displayed, to the existing conditions of the day and Hitler's will. In consequence, it must be the task of the defense to bring about an elucidation of his personality in order to prove that Papen's actions and statements constitute a uniform, consistent line and that his entire attitude de facto was such as to forbid connecting him with the offenses of the Charter; and that those of his actions which a re under discussion must have been undertaken in. pursuit of other aims than those which the prosecution thinks it can recotnize. Furthermore, the defense will outline Papen's entire political activity in its legality and within the frame work of this activity it will deal with the actions considered punishable by the prosecution and will finally submit counter-evidence showing that he actively worked against a political development as represented by the facts of the case brought forward in this Indictment.
away from the question of political suitability and correctness and if we accept the politician as he reveals himself to us with the opinions which he developed from origin and tradition. Moreover, an essential element in judging fairly willbe the elimination of that knowledge we have now received at the trial from later years and concerning this later period. themselves, and only then shall we obtain a clear opinion of what Papen could see and expect at that time.
The prosecution places the beginning of Papen's participation in the conspiracy on the 1 June 1932, the date of his appointment as Reich Chancellor. However, it gives no answer to the question from what circumstances we are to see Papen's entry into the association of conspirators which is alleged to have been already in existence. It is impossible indeed to give an answer to this.
Papen's activity as Reich Chancellor cannot either be regarded in the least as an activity in the sense of a Hitler conspiracy. The idea behind the formation of the cabinet, the entire leadership of the government during his chancellorship, and finally his departure from office are too clearly manifest, to allow us to read into them a promotion of Nazi ideas, a paving theway for National Socialism or even a participation in a conspiracy allegedly already on foot. The Papen cabinet was formed at the time of an unusual economic, political and parliamentary depression. Unusual means had already become necessary under the preceding cabinet. They were to be continued now in part on entirely new lines. In times of unusual crises a parliamentary legislative body probably always offers a certain difficulty.
Therefore, even in the days of Bruening's cabinet the Reichstag was almost completely excluded from legislation and for all practical purposes was placed in the hands of the Reich President by means of the Emergency Powers Law It was now thought necessary to work on new lines. A cabinet of non who were exports in their own field but who were not bound to any party, was to do away with these difficulties. Therefore, it was with this intention that the new cabinet was composed without the collaboration of parties. The tasks with when the now government was faced and the program necessarily resulting from the conditions of the time brought with then of necessity an attitude which was hostile to National-Socialism. Any wish to strike at the roots of the depression must involve a fight on the part of government policy against the roots which would lead to the growth of National-Situation. These lay in discontent over economic conditions and the political situation abroad. reconstructive work of any benefit if some modus vivendi could be found with the National-Socialist Party. Not only according to constitutional law alone had the party the power practically to paralyze every government activity. With nothing more than the possibilities it had as regards propagandistic influence on the masses it offered the key to a possible pacification of inner-political conditions, the first prerequisite for the start of far reaching economic measures. without anything of his doing and to his surprise, he was commissioned by Hindenburg to form a presidential cabinet. defense against the Indictment to the following details: previous parliamentary custom without any preceding consultation with the National-Socialist Party. Now pioneer economic laws with hitherto unknown financial commitments were decreed in order to fight unemployment and at the same time to eliminate the previous inexhaustible reservoir for the growth of the National-Socialist Party. The purpose of the new economic measures and the limited financial possibilities were the conditions for a great enlargement of the frame of these laws in time.
The labormarket was to be stimulated by means which were to result from the future savings of public taxes if the measures were successful. The economic laws were based only on this exhausting of financial possibilities. stimulation of the labor market by armament orders. These long range economic measures, which could be successful only in the case of an uninterrupted government policy, made the problem of their acceptance by the Reichstag especially urgent. Bruening cabinet had pursued, and in so doing he laid particular emphasis on those points of honor, the recognition of which would have brought no damage to the other parties to the treaty but which would have taken from the National-Socialist Party a forceful means of propaganda in influencing the masses. situation. He pointed out that substantially ideological points were at stake the denial of which would give the National-Socialists the impetus they desired. He explicitly emphasized that his efforts were the last attempt of a middle-class cabinet and that in the event his policy failed only NationalSocialism would profit from it. responsibility without wishing to entrust it with the key position of the office of Reich Chancellor, a share in the responsibility which would have brought a party of negative politics to a recognition of actual conditions and which would thus have eliminated the attractive demagogic propaganda. National-Socialist movement in governmental work are already regarded by the Prosecution as paving the way for National-Socialism. kind of practical governmental work, an attempt Which had to take into account the experience of the Bruening cabinet and the development of the National Socialist Party.
election in March 1932 had brought Hitler 36.8% of all the votes. If one ta* into consideration the fact that Hindenburg was the candidate on the opposite side and that Hindenburg's personality certainly caused many followers of the NSDAP to cast their vote in this special case in a way which was not in accordance with party directives, the fact follows that a heretofore hardly known opposition party arose which numerically outweighed by far all the other parties, and which in its position as an opponent was able to paralyze a priori any governmental activity. Hence followed, what was a foregone conclusion for Papen, the endeavour to got this party out of its status as an opposition party. This decision would be all the easier if the firm conviction were there that a share in the responsibility of government would turn the opposition party from its radical course and especially curb it considerably in its further development.
The best evaluation of Papen's governmental activity, seen from the standpoint of the National-Socialists, comes from the fact that it was the National-Socialist Party which opposed Papen's decisive economic legislation and with its vote of no confidence -- pronounced jointly with the Communist Party -- brought about the end of the Papen cabinet. especially the events of the 1 and 2 December 1932 show again his unequivocal attitude toward the NSDAP.
Papen proposed a violation of the constitution to Hindenburg. He wished to exhause this last means in order to avoid a Hitler chancellorship. Schleicher prevented this solution on the grounds that in the event of a civil war which might then break out the government would not remain master of the situation with the existing police and military forces. In the fact of these clear historical events the attempt of the Prosecution must remain without success to read the opposite into the facts and into those clearly recognizable unequivocal motives. marshal in the face of this?
One: that Papen, in his first negotiation with Hitler and a short time after forming his government, consented to rescind the order prohibiting the wearing of uniforms, a measure which, even if it had merely been taken is a political compensation deal to achieve acceptance of the cabinet, would be something very natural according to parliamentary rules. Not only was the NSDAP the strongest party in the Reichstag, but also and especially on accoun of its general political work in public life it constituted a powerful factor of the first order. Therefore, it could not a priori be driven into a state of opposition if it was intended at all to pursue a realistic policy of long duration and to overcome the emergency in earnest by revolutionizing the economic program. deep lying reasons, because it was a one-sided prohibition against one party a the opposing organizations were not limited in this respect and the acknowledgment of the law of equal treatment here could only eliminate dangerous propaganda material. The repeal of the prohibition concerning uniforms was furthermore by no means the announcement of a license for political acts of violence. The warning of the Reich President, announced with the proclamation of the decree, that acts of violence resulting from the decree would bring about an immediate prohibition of the organizations as such according to all intelligent estimation should have had the effect of preventing damaging results. uniforms was the main cause of the increase in the number of NationalSocialist scats at the July election, is completely at variance with the facts. In this connection I will refer to the already mentioned result of the Reich presidential election of Larch 1932 at which the real situation did not even become completely manifest wing to the fact that Hindenburg was the candidate on the other side. The election of 21 July 1932 brought 13,700,000 National-Socialist votes whereas in the Reich presidential election of 10 April 1932 Hitler had already received 13,400,000 votes.
There are no grounds whatsoever for assumption that the appearance of uniforms which, incidentally, had been replaced earlier by camouflaged standardized clothing oven during the period of prohibition, might have had a determining influence on the outcome of the elections. of the elections was certainly the general prohibition of political parades proclaimed by the Papen cabinet at the beginning of the election campaign. Public meetings and political parades are the most important expedient for a party under demagogic leadership. To have this taken away before the electi was undoubtedly a much greater minus for the NSDAP than the previous plus it had received in the form of permission to wear uniforms. Hitler to participate in the government, the prosecution sees an effort which undignified in its form and blameworthy in its essence, to smooth the path of National-Socialism to power. It forgets that Papen conducted the November elections in sharp opposition to the NSDAP, because he tried to remove the party from the key position in which without Hitler it was impossible numerically to form a majority from the Social-Democrats inclusive of them and extending to the farthest right. It forgets that this result had not been achieved, that they key position even with 196 seats remained with Hitler and that, therefore, it was necessary to make another attempt to win Hitler over for a presidential cabinet under some conservative chancellor. It overlooks in this point that Papen's proposals here again had the definite aim of excluding the NSDAP from the Reich Chancellorship. For NationalSocialism a cabinet under a conservative politician, who according to the constitution would have had to determine the principles of the policy, would only have brought the party's influence on to this or that department, but in return for this influence it would have resulted also in its sharing the responsibility through its participation in the government. From the standpoint of the opposition to National-Socialism seen in retrospect one could indeed have welcomed nothing more than such a case in which the party's participation in the government was limited in influence and had a share in the responsibility. The end of opposition policy which was so tremendously favorable for propaganda would undoubtedly have brought about the end of the growth of the National-Socialist movement and the conversion of its radical elements.
Chancellor towards the leader of the strongest party in parliament. It is a foregone conclusion that in using this form and because of the purpose of the letter the writer does not refer to negative points but to those positive things which were suitable for use in any cooperation in the government.
In order to be able to construct from the period of Papen's Reichchancellorship something that is at least a foothold in proving his union of ideas with National-Socialism the prosecution has imputed to the temporary elimination of the Prussian government by the decree of 20 July 1932 intentions which in no way could pass the test of an objective examination.
The "coup d'etat" of 20 July, as the prosecution terms the execution of the decree of 20 July, had not the slightest thing to do with promoting the National-Socialists. In the opinion of the Reich cabinet and according to the decisive judgment of Reich President von Hindenburg domestic policy showed the necessity for eliminating that toleration of Communist acts of terror which was practised by the Prussian cabinet in office and which continuously and openly came to light. From this state of affairs Hindenburg drew his conclusions and issued the emergency decree of 20 July. By a decision of the then still entirely independent Reich supreme court it was determined that this decree with regard to constitutional law was permissible within the framework of state political necessities. conveyed by police authorities to the minister of the interior who had been suspended, that he leave his offices, the word "coup d'etat" lends a meaning to this measure which goes far beyond that actually happened. Also in considering the effects of this measure on assumption that here the way was paved for National -Socialism isnot justified by any facts. The appointed Reich Commissioner Bracht belonged to the Center Party. The key position of police president in Berlin was entrusted to a man on whom the hitherto existing cabinet Braun had previously conferred the office of police president in Essen.
Briefly, the result of the change was only that on the one hand an effective cooperation was now assured with the Reich authorities, and on the other hand now people filled some political positions which up to now had been the almost exclusive monopoly of the Socialist Democratic Party, to an extent which from the point of view of parity could no longer be justified. That in filling these positions the National Socialists were passed over, was a charge which was made against Papen time and again by the National Socialists.
Consequently, Papen's entire term of office in the government constitutes a clear line of realistic politics which show that on the one hand he did not let go the rudder in carrying out necessary and especially economic measures, but that on the other hand he tried to get a numerically almost oversholming opposition party to collaborate. Papen's attitude towards the NSDAP became oven more manifest after he had been asked by the Reich President late in November 1932 to collaborate in the efforts to form a now cabinet. consequences. Realizing that it was impossible to go on with a nonNational-Socialist government according to parliamentary principles, he submitted to the Reich President the proposal to rule with the aid of armed force even if he thus caused a violation of the constitution and risked causing a civil war. when one adheres to thinking along lines of constitution law as it is impossible to overlook in retrospect that the proposed violation of the constitution limited in time was probably the only possibility to avoid the solution which then become necessary on 30 January 1933. Sooner or later the opposition party would have forced the resignation of any non-National-Socialist cabinet. Thus, the political unrest with its consequences on the entire economic life would have become a latent state. A state of affairs, which, by its alternate effect, was only suited to strengthen the national socialist movement and thus to bring it by force to a numerical strength which in the end would have resulted in the fulfilmen of its entire totalitarian claim for assuming unlimited power.
1933 might in itself be disregarded. It is sufficient to be aware of the fact, that all endeavors to bring about a parliamentary government without Hitler, were already impossible from a purely numerical standpoint, and that such a parliamentary solution with Hitler was wrecked by his opposition A measure born out of political and constitutional necessity cannot, according to the indictment, be considered as evidence of intended planning of a crime in the sense of the Charter. The significance of this count of the indictment must be considered. By maintaining all parliamentary rule a government is appointed by Hindenburg in his capacity of chief of state, the head of which is the leader of the strongest party. This government when presented before the parliament, finds an overwhelming majority. That which Papen is accused of, the knowledge of the activities of the NationalSocialist party in the past, holds true to the same extent also for the other participants, Hindenburg and all consenting members of parliament. The reproach levelled against Papen thus includes also an accusation against Hindenburg and the entire consenting parliament. For this consideration alone, the unique attempt of including in an indictment a self-evident, constitutional procedure of a sovereign state, must probably fail. formation of the government, it is only in order to clearly show here, too, the unequivocal standpoint of Papen, who on one hand did not wish to close his eyes to the real facts, but on the other hand desired to undertake everything in order to prevent the danger of an uncontrollable development of this new formation. The prosecution considers the Hitler-Papen meeting at the home of Schroeder on 4 January as being the beginning of the efforts made for the formation of the Government of 30 January. As a matter of fact the meeting at Schroeder's was nothing else than an exchange of ideas about the situation of the moment during which Papen and Hitler maintained their previous opinions and Papen pointed out that Hindenburg, owing to the apprehensions which he expressed, would in no case agree to Hitler's taking the position of Reich Chancellor.
Hitler would have to accept the position of Vice-Chancellor, since Hindenburg took the standpoint that the possibility for a further development would only follow after he had proven himself over a long period of time.
This meeting in Koeln took place upon Hitler's request. I refer in this instance to Schroeder's communique published by the press, which I submitted as document No.9 of the defense, and which I erroneously indicated during the cross examination as being a joint communique* issued by Papen and Schroeder. Schroeder establishes in it that he himself took the first step toward this meeting. formation of the Government of 30 January is obvious from the fact that the discussion was immediately reported by Papen to Schleicher and Hindenburg and that during all the following time until 22 January Papen had nothing to do with the solution of the governmental problem. Schleicher as well as Hindenburg endeavored to obtain parliamentary support for the Schleicher cabinet through negotiations with the leaders of parties, efforts which failed, however, due to the weight of the political facts. The main effort was to split up the National-Socialist party by inviting the collaboration of the Strasser wing in the Government. These efforts failed when Hitler's position became so strong after the result of the elections in Lippe that he regained absolute control ever the Party against all attempts to split it up. The outcome of the elections in Lippe of 15 January 1933 was generally considered as a barometer of public opinion with respect to the political situation. All parties had mobilized their entire organization and propaganda apparatus, and therefore one could draw a conclusion from the result of this election concerning the general public opinion. The result showed that the losses suffered during the November elections were almost completely made up. Thus everybody could recognize that the decline of the NationalSocialist movement was stopped and that with the continuance of the momentary political and economic situation a further gain was to be expected 20 January 1935 the Council of Seniors of the Reichstag - through its convention of the Reichstag for the 31 of January - granted to Schleicher's cabinet practically only a period of grace up to that date.
For a vote of no confidence introduced by the left and the NSDAP meant its immediate fall. The meeting in the house of Ribbentrop on 22January, when Hindenburg wanted to learn through his son and the state secretary of the Presidential Chancellory Dr. Meissner Hitler's opinions about the political situation, has to be considered from this point of view. formation of the Hitler Government cannot be established with certainty by means of the data at hand. In any case, being a member of the immediate circle around Hindenburg who finally took the decisive decision, he was by no means uninterested in the matters. His personality has been judged at least very differently. Because of his own interest in the case he can in no event be considered as a classical witness for the judgment of the events of that time. His testimony bears certainly in one point the stamp of unlikeliness. He maintains that he opposed Hindenburg's decision, after the latter decided to appoint Hitler to the office of Reich Chancellor. This is said by the same man who during the session of the Cabinet concerning the "Enabling Law" did not consider it necessary to maintain the right of the Reich President to proclaim laws, the same man who after the events of 30 June 1934 obviously collaborated in isolating Hindenburg from all those who could give him a true representation of the events. I make those remarks because a part of a Meissner Affidavit was road during the hearing of evidence against Papen. Although according to the decision of the Tribunal, the contents (of the affidavit) which was read shall not constitute a basis for the verdict, during the cross examination-questions were nevertheless asked which referred to the affidavit; this could cause erroneous judgment. Besides, the decision of theTribunal relieves me of the obligation to discuss in detail the contents of the affidavit and to indicate a number of inaccuracies which could be easily refuted.
made no attempts whatsoever as regards the formation of a Government. On that day, in view of the imminent convocation of the Reichstag, Schleicher had to brine about a decision. On 1 December 1932 he advised Hindenburg against an open fight against the parliament and stated that the employment of the Armed Forces in a possible civil war would be hopeless. Now he thought that he himself could find no other solution than to beg to be permitted the use of those forces which he previously considered as being insufficient. But since no change in the situation had occurred since that time which could offer reasons for Schleicher's change of opinion, since moreover the position of the NSDAP was strengthened by the elections in Lippe and the general political situation had become still more tense through the attitude of the parties, Hindenburg upheld his decision of 2 December. Thus, the resignation of the whole Schleicher cabinet was inevitable. Now the events had to take their course, which necessarily and logically they had to follow, if the possible use of arms was to be avoided. There was only one solution now: Negotiations with Hitler. Hindenburg commissioned Papen to conduct the negotiations for the formation of the government. On Hitler's part it was clear that he would maintain his inflexible demands namely to take over himself the office of Reich Chancellor. The task, clearly recognized by Papen, was now to set limits to the political activities of the new party which had not proved itself yet on such a large scale. which any radicalism would have been particularly detrimental, namely the Foreign Office and the War Ministry. Hindenburg reserved for himself the right of filling these two key positions. In order not to entrust the new Chancellor with appointing the remaining ministers, as had been customary heretofore, Papen was charged with this task in his capacity of home regius. He succeeded in limiting the number of National-Socialist ministers to a minimum. Three National-Socialist members of the Government faced eight non-NationalSocialists who for the main part were taken over from the former cabinet and who guaranteed a steady policy in their ministries. That was not all; within the framework of the constitution the authority of the Reich Chancellor was to be limited in a manner never known before.