So far I have quoted Kellogg. Justice Jackson will permit me to mention that he, himself, in his opening speech of 21 November 1945, referred to the "right of legitimate self-preservation." February 1940, the Swedish Foreign Minister Guenther recognized this idea, although he protected the interests of one of the belligerents and although this speech was made before Germany proceeded to retaliatory measures in Norway. In that address Guenther took the attitude to the English declaration that Sweden's neutrality would be respected so long only as it would be respected by England's enemies. Guenther recognized the fact that Sweden, in its relationship with England, would lose its neutrality should Germany violate Sweden's neutrality and should Sweden not be willing or able to prevent such violation of neutrality through Germany. Consequently, so said Gunther, Great Britain would no longer be held to treat Sweden as a neutral country. It is clear that the conclusions drawn by Guenther in the event of a breach of neutrality through Germany must also apply to the tri-partite legal relationship between Great Britain-Germany-Norway. The real aim, however, and this I shall set forth in my presentation of evidence, was not Great Britain's mining actions in Norwegian coastal waters, but a much further-reaching Anglo-French scheme aiming it the occupation of Norwegian bases and of a portion of the Norwegian home territory. The mining action enters into the picture merely as a part of the total plan.
According to Mosler' sopinion,and in the light of the above remarks, it is absolutely certain that Germany was justified in occupying Norway had the Allies carried part of their plan into effect by landing at a Norwegian base before German troops made their appearance, This, however, did not occur. Rather, as I will show, the situation was that Germany anticipated an Anglo-French landing, in other words decided for counter-measures on account of the imminent danger which threatened, Legally, a second question should also be investigated:
Assuming the same conditions, are counter-measures not permitted until after the other belligerent has proceeded to violate neutrality, er is reaction permitted in the presence of the imminently threatening violation of neutrality in order to anticipate the enemy's attack?
According to the findings composed by Dr. Mosler the preventive counter-measure is permissible, andthe directly impending violation of neutrality which can be expected with certainty, is to be considered equal to a completed violation of neutrality.
states to the question of the preventime measure:
"Such a case in its character resembled that one, that a apparently too weak to resist;under these circumstances it attack on the neutral territory first."
lies in the right for self-preservation, which also applies against a threatening violation of neutrality. Another concept would also have been not true to life and would not correspond to the character of the society of nations asa majority of sovereign states with an as yet incompletely developed common law code. In the inner-state law system of every civilized country, the repulsing of an immediately threatening attack is a permissible defense act, although there even the help of the state against the law-breaker is furnished. In the society of international law, where this was not the case, anyway not at the beginning and during the 2nd world War, the viewpoint of self-preservation must apply to an unequally stronger extent. In conjunction with this concept, the British government during this war also considered the preventive measure as justified, when it occupied Iceland on 10 May 1940. The British government has justified this measure clearly and correctly in accordance with international law in an official announcement of the Foreign office, as follows:
"After the German occupation of Denmark it has become its country from falling into the hands of the Germans completely."
The preventive measure was carried out, although Iceland expressly defended herself in a note of protest against the occupation.
of law, as is proven by the well-known message of the president of the United States to Congress of 7 July 19141, and the subsequent occupation of Iceland by armed forces of the American Navy. must be explained. I have tried to clarify the charge in the presentation of evidence, and May I summarize the major viewpoints which actually showed a closely impending violation of neutrality on thepart of the Allies through the partial occupation of Norway, and thereby justified the German action against Norway. as the presentation of evidence has shown, received various information through the current reports of Admiral Canaris as director of intelligence and through General Admiral Carls, which let the danger be recognized, that the Allies, in accordance with their plans to encircle Germany, would occupy bases in Norway, in order to halt in particular the imports of ore from Scandinavia. Oslo, and survey works by Allied officers on Norwegian bridges, viaducts, and tunnels up to the Swedish border had been identified. Furthermore, the quiet mobilization of Swedish troops because of the endangerment of Swedish ore-territories had become known. Raeder was justified in considering himself obliged to report this state of facts to Hitler and to point out the danger to him which would arise for Germany, if English and French armed forces were actually to fortify themselves in Scandinavia. The dangers were clear. They consisted of the cutting-off of all imports from the industrial areas of Scandinavia, in particular of the ore-imports,as well as in the fact that the Allies obtained a favorable base for air attacks, and last but not least, inthe fact that the German Navy was threatened in its flank and its operational petenitalities were limited.
The blockade of the North Sea and Baltic wouldhave had strategically disastrous consequences.
did not suggest immediate occupation, but only pointed out the dangers in order to wait for further developments for the time being. Hitler therefore also did not make a final decision during this discussion of 10 Oct. 1939 but agreed to wait. Similar information was received during the months of October and November and now also by the Naval attache Lieutenant Commander Schreiber who had in the meantime been sent to Oslo, to whose Affidavit (Raeder Exhibit No. 107, Vol. VI, page 464 ff) I refer. The Norwegian shipping association had made tanker tonnage of about 1 million tons., available to England with the consent of the Norwegian Government (see also Reader Exhibit No. 86, War diary of 6 April 1940, )according to which 90% of the Norwegian tankers had been put at the disposal of England.
In Winter, 1939/40, the information concerning espionage missions of the English and French Secret Service to Norwegian agents and English harbor consulates for the purpose of reconneitering landing opportunities and examination of Norwegian Railroads with regard to their capacity, particularly the Narvik line and missions concerning information about land and sea airports in Norway took more definite form. By reason of the fact that the information from 2 different sources, namely the Naval Attache in Oslo and Admiral Cenaris, corresponded and became more gradually extensive during the months of October to December, 1939, the reported danger seemed to increase slowly all the time.
entirely independently of the sources of information which had existed up to that time -- the same or similar information concerning the landing intention. of the Allies, and not directly to Raeder, for the only reason that Raeder didn't know either Quisling or Hagelin at that time. As the question involve. was a purely military-strategic one, Rosenberg asked Raeder to discuss things with Quisling so that Raeder could examine the military technical possibiliti in consideration of the fact that an aggression by the Allies in Scandinavia must be expected according to the information received. This is evident fr the letter of Rosenberg to Raeder of 13 December 1939, which I submitted as Raeder Exhibit No. 67. Raeder now considered it his duty from the purely military point of view to inform Hitler, with whom he had not discussed this question in the meantime, that corresponding information had meanwhile been received from Canaris, the Naval Attache in Oslo, and Quisling. Hitler wished to speak personally with Quisling, which he did, and decided then to make the necessary preparations for a possible preventive measure to counter the danger threatening, namely the occupation of Norway. further news would be received and whether the danger increased was awaited. Raeder. As I have already remarked, Raeder would have preferred if the strict neutrality of Norway had been maintained, especially as he was against every conquest just for the sake of conquest. He knew, on the other hand, that an occupation required the commitment of the whole Navy, thus involving the fate of the entireNavy, and that the loss of at least a third of the fleet had to be reckoned with. It should be clear how hard, from such political and strategiv viewpoints, such a decision was for a conscientious man and soldier. 1940 and always more definite. In March 1940 surprisingly many Englishspeaking persons could be seen in Oslo, and Raeder received very serious information, worthy of credit, about shortly impending measures by the Allies against Norway and also Sweden.
As far as landing intentions were concerned, Narvik, Trontheim and Stavanger were mentioned. Thus it came about that the military planning only took place in February and March, and that the final instructions were issued to the Wehrmacht even as late as March 1940. have been collected in the war diary, and also the mine laying in Norwegian territorial waters at the beginning of April. prehensive informative material, according to which the German Ambassador in Oslo, Braeuer, did not regard the danger so great, but believed that the English attitude, mentioned also by him, pointed merely to provocation of Germany, in order that Germany might give cause for war operations in Norwegian waters.
Baron Weizsaecker's point of view in cross-examination was that at firs he did not consider the danger so great, but he admitted that later on the facts proved that he and Braeuer were wrong, but that Raeder, on the contrary, was right in his apprehension. of the information which was the basis of his conception, is shown from separate documents submitted by me and accepted by the Court. plan which had in view, amongst other things, the occupation of harbours and flying fields on the West Coast of Norway. The plan contemplated, in addition, that the operations should possibly be extended to Sweden and the mines of Gaellivare be occupied. Efforts have been made to justify this plan by stating that it was elaborated solely to help Finland against the Soviet Union. land does not justify any occupation of Norwegian territory. Moreover, the documents show that it was not a question of only altruistic measures in favour of Finland. During the interallied military conferences on 31 January and 1 February, which preceeded the meeting of the supreme Council on 5 February, the question of direct help for Finland was relegated by the English to second place; they showed themselves to be determined adherents of an enterprise against the mines of Northern Sweden.
This is confirmed by General Gamelin in a note of 10 March 1940, and he adds that this opinion obtained the majority vote in the supreme Council, and that the preparation of the Scandinavian Expedition should be started immediately. ready for transportation since the first days of March, whereby, according to Gamelin, the leadership of the proposed operations in Scandinavia was transferred to the British High Command. Gamelin adds finally that the Scandinavian plans must be resolutely pursued further, in order to save Finland-- I quote: -- "or at least to lay hands on the Swedish ores and the Northern harbours". land wished to obtain certain bases on the Norwegian coast in order to stop the German transport of ore from Narvik. landing places in agreement with the Norwegian authorities. 1940, the English intention in this respect was to land troops simultaneously in Bergen, Trontheim and Narvik. London, Corbin, that the occupation of the most important Norwegian ports and the landing of the 1st Division of the Allied Fighting Forces in Norway would give Sweden a feeling of security; and he goes on to say that this operation must be planned and executed at shortest notice, "independently of Finland's call for assistance." In the event of this demarche in Norway meeting with refusal, which was likely, the British Government waste confirm the Norwegian refusal and immediately seize control of the bases it needed for the safeguarding of its interests, and was to do so in the form of a "surprise operation". Whether Sweden refuses the passage through to Finland does not appear important; what is emphasized is rather the -- and I quote -"advantage of having secured a dominating position against Germany in the North, interrupted the sea transport of Swedish ore, and brought the Swedish ore districts within the radius of action of our aviation". that he was "tired of considering the rights of Neutrals."
of the Supreme Council on the 28 March 1940 -- and I quote:-
"Every attempt of the Soviet Government to obtain from Norway a position on the Atlantic coast runs counter to the vital interests of the Allies and would elicit due counter-measures." the vital interests of the Allies, coincides exactly with the legitimate notions of the "right of self-preservation" presented by me, and is in complete contradiction to the interpretation of international law propounded in this respect by the Prosecution. and the constitution of bases, was decided on 28 March 1940 between the authoritative British and French departments. This date was indicated at a session of the French war Committee by the French Prime Minister; and General Gamelin added that he had, on 29 March, impressed upon General Ironside the necessity of having everything ready for a swift occupation of the Norwegian ports. He said he had also informed Mr. Churchill to the same effect on the occasion of a visit to Paris.
One day later, on 30 March, Churchill declares on the Radio, and I quote:
"It would not be fair if, in the fight for life or death, the Western Powers adhered to legal agreements." the first transport was "to sail on J.l. day", and that J.l. day was in principle 5 April. neutrals could be certain that "England would allow her hands to be tied behind her back while following the letter of the law". that neither Germany nor the neutrals could be certain that the Western Powers would adhere to the letter of international law.
Norwegian territorial waters -- a secret English operational order was given "concerning preparations for the occupation of the northern Swedish ore fields outside Narvik." of all in "securing the port of Narvik and the railroad to the Swedish border." It was added that it was the intention of the commander-in-Chief to advance into Sweden and to occupy the Gaellivare ore fields and important points of that territory as soon as an opportunity occurred, a formulation which almost reminds one of the words in the prosecution document L-79: "to attack Poland at the first appropriate opportunity." altered; for on the evening of 5 April the British High Command informed the Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy that -- I quote -- "the first English convey could set out before 8 April which, within the framework of the established time schedule, means that the first French Division is to leave the embarkation port on 16 April". was designated by the allies by the camouflage name of "Stratford-Plan", meaning the action, while the German Norwegian operation was referred to by the camouflage name of "Weser Exercise" (Woseruebung).
The preceding facts show that: by the studying of landing possibilities. Since January-February 1940, the danger of an occupation of bases in Norway by the Allies was threatening. In March 1940, the execution of the scheme was ultimately decided upon and the departure of the first convoy scheduled for 5 April. Simultaneously, minelaying was carried out in the Norwegian territorial waters and troops were at the same time concentrated in British and French ports for the Norwegian operation.
Thus, factual illegality in the form of imminent neutrality violations existed from the point of view of international law, and neutralit violation had indeed been already committed to a certain extent (mine-laying) This was the point where Germany, in accordance with the international notion of the right of self-preservation, was entitled to resort to equivalent counter-measures, that is, to occupy Norway and prevent the threatened occupation by other belligerent States. It was, in fact, as was shown later, the last moment; for Germany did frustrate the allies, only beacuse the British High Command had postponed the departure of the first convey, original ly scheduled for 5 April. mate according to the principles of international law. I have the firm conviction that the High Tribunal, in view of the circumstances just exposed in relation to existing Internation law, will conclude that Grand Admiral Raeder has, with regard to the occupation of Norway, acted from purely strategic points of view, in due consideration of international legal standards, and accordingly acquit him of the charge made by the Prosecution. Raeder, and incidently against Doenitz, that a violation of International Law is entailed by the fact that according to an order dated 30 March 1940, the Naval Forces were, until the landing of troops, to fly the English flag. sea warfare. The Hague regulation on land warfare does expressly forbid the abusive flying of flags. But in sea warfare the answer to this question, according to the prevailing international law, is definitely that, until hostilities begin, ships may sail with their own, or with enemy or neutral flags, or even with no flags at all. I take the liberty, in this respect, of availing myself of Dr. Mosler's juridical treatment of the question in his judgment appearing under item 7, and in particular of his references to scientific literature on the subject, according to which the use of a foreign flag is universally considered as a legitimate war deception and is allowed and especially condoned by British practice, this in accordance with the historical precedent when Nelson, in the Napoleonic wars, flow the French fla off Barcelona to lure the Spanish ships.
actually the order just mentioned, instructing the flying of the English flag, was, according to documentary evidence, cancelled on 8 April, that is to say, prior to the execution of the Norway operation. of Norway, that after the occupation of Norway, Raeder and the German navy did everything they could to give a friendly character to the relations with Norway and to treat the country and the people honorably and well during the occupation, and to spare them every unnecessary burden, Raeder and the Admiral Commanding in Norwegian waters, General Admiral Hoehm, moreover, endeavored to conclude a peace with Norway guaranteeing Norwegian national interests. Their efforts were frustrated by the institution, by Hitler and Himmler of a so-called civil administration by the Reich Commissioner Terboven which unlike the Wehrmacht was connected with the Party, the SS, SD and Gestapo.
As confirmed by Boehm in his affidavit, Raeder repeatedly intervened with Hitler in favor of the ideas he shared with the Admiral in Command in Norwegian waters for good treatment of the Norwegian people and an early conclusion of peace and, together with Boehm, set himself with the utmost vigour against Terboven. A gain, the tragic event is repeated here that the Wehrmacht, despite its utmost efforts, has neither been able to oppose Hitler's dictature nor the dictature exercised to Hitler's knowledge by such a mediocre Reich Commissioner as Terboven. The Norwegian people who had to suffer under the occupation know - and this is the only gratification for Raeder that the Navy was not the cause of these sufferings. On the other hand, it is interesting to know that the differences which cropped up between Hitler and Raeder with reference to Norway are precisely one of the chief motives which caused Raeder to ultimately insist upon his resignation in September, 1942. Other motives were that Raeder also had differences with Hitler, with reference to France, because here again Raeder urged the conclusion of peace, while Hitler with his excessive character was opposed to conciliatory steps of this kind in occupied countries. Raeder also and differences with Hitler with reference to Russia, because he was in favour of observance of the German-Russian treaty and declared against the breach of the Treaty and against war with Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(A short recess was taken.) a war of aggression against Russia. The charge of the Prosecution on this subject cannot be very well understood. It dealt with land warfare, so that the Navy did not have to meet any preparations, with the exception of the few preparations in the Baltic Sea. The Prosecution itself has furthermore stated that Raeder had been opposed to the war against Russia. The only thing which could remain from the charge of the Prosecution is its claim that Raeder had fundamentally been in favor of the war against Russia also, and had only been opposed to Hitler with regard to the time factor.
With reference to C-170 the Prosecution states that Raeder had only recommended the postponement of the ear against Russia until the time after the victory over England. According to Document C-170 this actually could appear this way. In reality, however, the case is different, and the true state of affairs has been cleared up by the detailed presentation of evidence. The witness Admiral Schulte-Moenting has clearly stated, without being contradicted in the crossexamination, that Raeder not only raised objections with regard to time limits, but that he fundamentally argued with Hitler against a campaign against Russia, and that because of moral rea sons and reasons of international law just because he was of the opinion that the non-aggression pact with Russia, as well as the trade agreement would have to be observed under all circumstances. The Navy was especially interested in the delivery agreements with Russia, and has always tried to closely observe the treaties. Besides this basic principle of observing treaties, i.e. besides this general reason, Raeder represented the opinion that a war against Russia would also be false from the strategical standpoint. His own testimony a nd that of Schilte-Moenting show that in September, November and December of 1940 Raeder tried again and again with Hitler to dissuade him from the thought of a war against Russia. It is correct, that in Document C-170 only the strategical justification for his opposition has been recorded. However, this is not at all surprising, because in the papers with the Naval Operations Staff naturally only justifications were recorded, which were of naval technical and strategic importance, but not political reasons. mit, that Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy intervene in foreign-political questions, i.e. in things, which did not belong in his department. If Raeder did once try this, contrary to the will of Hitler, and that in cases of special importance, then he could do it only under four eyes and accordingly could not then record those conversations in the war diary.
However, he has always told everything to his chief of staff as his closest confidante. As the result of this, Schulte-Moenting could confirm clearly that Raeder in this case opposed Hitler because of moral misgivings, also with regard to international law and furthermore, also employed strategical reasons in the hope of being able to influence Hitler sooner in this manner. Schulte-Moenting even stated -- just like Raeder -- that in November the latter had gained the impression after a discussion, that he had dissuaded Hitler from his plans. I believe that this has clarified the matter, and only the tragical factor remains here also, that Hitler paid just as little attention to Raeder in regard to political objections to Russia also, as in regard to Norway and France. to the war of aggression against U.S.A. and the violation of the Neutrality of Brazil. As both these reproaches are sufficiently refuted within the framework of the evidence, I am only going to discuss then very briefly. collaborated in the plan to induce Japan to attack America. As a matter of fact no naval strategic conferences were held between Japan and Raeder. Raeder was always of the firm conviction that a war against the USA must be prevented just as much as a war against England. Since the war against England had now come about, it was Raeder's duty as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to use all his strength to fight successfully against England. Raeder know the limitations of the fighting ability of the Navy, and it was therefore quite out of the question that he should have collaborated in an extension of the war, considering as he did the conduct of a war against England as a too difficult task. The GB-122 document, C-152 submitted by the Prosecution mentions a proposition that Japan should attack Singapore and that the U. S. A. should be kept out of the war.
This suggestion made to Hitler that Japan must attack Singapore was in all points correct.
concentrate all his forces against England. He was thus justified in suggesting that Japan -- as Germany's ally -- should attack England. Moreover this one discussion of Raeder was held on 18 March 1941, whilst Hitler in his Instructions No. 24 of 5 March 1941 had established the directive that Japan must attack Singapore which he considered a key position of England.
May I interpose one sentence here? It can be seen from the report by General Marshal that General Marshal stated that no common plan had been in evidence between Germany and Japan. complete excerpt of Jodl's diary, which I submitted as Raeder Exhibit No. 115as well as by further submitted documents, Raeder Exhibit Nos. 116-118. These documents prove that Brazil had violated the rules of neutrality by permitting the USA to make use of Brazilian airdromes as a base for attacks on German and Italian U-boats. The Brazilian Air Ministry has furthermore officially announced that attacks had been made by the Brazilian airforce. Considering such conduct against all rules of neutrality, the demand of the Naval command for armed action against Brazilian vessels is justified. In this case also the Prosecution did not succeed in proving Raeder to have committed a crime or even an offense against International Law. of material, and the many details implied necessarily great exactitude in the taking of evidence. I have endeavored to demonstrate that all the remonstrances, partly on factual, partly on legal grounds, do not represent the facts of a criminal case within the meaning of this Charter. In as far as I have not, in spite of my striving for great exactitude, dealt with certain documents, it was because they seemed to me of small importance, and in any case of no importance in criminal law, for instance the many cases in which Raederwas only mentioned because -- without officially taking any part -he received a copy of the documents for routine reasons. It would have been tiring to go into such recurrent cases, even if the Prosecution unremittingly reiterated those formal indication, so that one was often inclined to remember the saying of Napoleon that repetition is that turn of speech which is the bestevidence.
I may leave aside an argumentation regarding the real war crimes or crimes against humanity, as I cannot establish any connection between these and Raeder from the material submitted by the Prosecution. Further no particular reproach is made against Raeder in this connection with the exception of the two cases connected with the commando order, namely the shooting of two soldiers in Bordeaux and the shooting of the British soldier Evans, who was made a prisoner by the SS on the Swedish border, after he had previously participated in the small weapons attack on the "Tirpitz". Thus far the reproach has been refuted by testimony in so far as it concerns the Navy. Both cases did not come, or came only later, to the knowledge of the Naval Command -- just before Raeder's departure. In both cases the act was committed on the basis of the commando order of Hitler himself or by the Security Service (SD) without the knowledge and will of the Naval Command; and -- what is the most Important -- in both cases the documents of the Prosecution showed that these soldiers were in civilian clothes, and therefore were not entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention. the East I need not deal with, as Raeder did not participate in them. I hope also to have the approval of the Court in mentioning the handling of the Katyn case, in which the Court pointed out that Raeder was not involved, and therefore refused my collaboration as Counsel in this connection; from this intend to draw the legal conclusion that, even in this round about way by the conspiracy, Raeder cannot be considered as burdened with these criminal facts, since he did not know of these events and had nothing to do with said events. basic assumption prevail and be acknowledged, namely the idea that so many crimes cannot have been the conception of a single person, but rather that they result from the conspiracy of many, that they must have originated in a plot. These conspirators could logically in the first place have been only Hitler's own collaborators, that is to say the real National Socialists.
As, however, Hitler wished to realize, and did realize, results of military and economic importance, something peculiar occurred: There were no specialists among the National Socialists for these particular tasks. Most of the National Socialist collaborators did not previously follow a trade requiring technical education. Hitler, therefore, despite his desire to have only National Socialists around him took on as key people in particular fields persons who were not National Socialists, such as for instance Schacht for economics, Neurath for politics and, for military tasks, Fritsch for the Army and Raeder for the Navy. The Prosecution followed him in the interests of its conspiracy theory, without paying attention to the fact that these were no National Socialists, and therefore in the last analysis could not really be counted among the conspirators, and without taking into account that Hitler used these non-National Socialists only as technicians in a well-defined field, and this moreover only as long as it seemed absolutely necessary to him and therefore he agreed to the elimination of these men, who at bottom were not in sympathy with him, as soon as the differences between them seemed unbridgable, which was bound to happen sooner or later with each of them in his own particular field. of the Prosecution's fight against non-National Socialists, the Prosecution has abandoned the basic concept which was formerly propagated abroad, namely that of the fight against National Socialism, but not against the whole of Germany, two ideas which at no time and in no place have been really identical, as the Prosecution now tries to make out. I do believe that thereby the Prosecution also abandons President Roosevelt's basic idea. consideration by the Prosecution. I mean the concept of division of competence in political law, that is to say the subdivision into individual competencies. This di vision of competence -- resting on the idea of division of labor -- has, in accordance with its essence, a separative character; it divides the field of work from the angle of local, functional and technical points of view. For one thing it positively defines the limits within which any single division is to become active; at the same time it defines negatively the boundaries of this activity by specifying which are the things which no longer concern the agencies in question, that is to say where they must not develop any official activity.
Cabinet meetings and/or through the Prime Minister, the Reich President, or the Reich Chancellor. But it is different in a dictatorship, particularly i the dictator -- as it was the case with Hitler in the National Socialist State uses the separation between the individual governmental departments with extreme skill and sees to it that the individual departments are as isolated as possible, with the result that all decision rests finally with him as the dictator, in which case he even plays out one department against the other. National Socialist State, contradicts the concept of conspiracy especially distinctly, making it difficult for the individual to go above his own department in any manner.
This significance may be described by the following example: The formulation of political relations with other States, the contracting or rescission of agreements or alliances with other States, declaring war and concluding peace are matters within the jurisdiction of the authority directing foreign affairs, but they are not within the jurisdiction of the authorities concerned with domestic tasks, such as for instance the Reich Finance Administration, Justice and the Military.
The result is: Since the decision concerning war and peace is not a matter of the military, the military has to accept the decisions made by the political leadership, decisions which have a binding obligation for the military authorities. resulting from the decision. As soon as war is declared, the military forces must fight. They do not bear any responsibility for the war because they we not able to take part in the decision concerning the declaration of war. strategic sense only. Moreover, every war the waging of which is charged to it, is simply warregardless whether it may legally be justified or not.
law corresponds to the field of jurisdiction. Therefore, if the Commanderin-Chief of a branch of the Wehrmacht assumes responsibility solely for the waging of war, not for the causes leading to war, his responsibility in respect to strategic planning must be confined to planning as such, but not to the possible causes which brought about that was on which the strategic planning is based. departments and the distribution of authority was carried out by Hitler in a particularly emphatic manner in the interest of strengthening his own power in many domains, such as for instance, the creation of "The Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan" whose field of work actually belongs to the Ministry for Economics; the creation of Reich Commissioner in the occupied territories, whose activity really comes under military administration;