Consequently, the testimonies of witnesses Raeder, Schulte-Moenting, Weizsaecker and Fritsche, together with the documents, establish the following facts absolutely clearly:
1. In early September 1939 Raeder himself firmly believed that the sinking was not imputable to a German U-boat because it was revealed by the reports that the nearest German U-boat was at least 75 nautical miles away from the spot of the sinking.
2. Accordingly, Raeder, as stated in Document D 912, published a "bona fide" denial, and issued declarations to this effect to the American Naval Attache and to the German Secretary of State Baron Weizsaecker.
3. Raeder did not realize the mistake until after the return of the U 30 on the 27 September 1939.
4. Hitler insisted, as evidenced by witnesses Raeder and SchulteMoenting, that no rectification of the facts should be made to any other German or foreign department, that is to say, that the sinking should not be acknowledged as caused by a German U-boat. He apparently yielded to the impulse of political considerations and wished to avoid complications with the USA over an incident which could not be remedied, however regrettable it was. Hitler's order was so strict that the few officers who were in the picture were put under oath to keep it secret.
5. Fritsche disclosed that after the first investigation by the Navy in early September 1939, he made no further investigation and that the "Voelkische Boebachter" article appeared as a consequence of a complete agreement between Hitler and Goebbels, without previous notice to Raeder. On this point the testimonies of Raeder and Schulte-Moenting coincide. It is consequently clear that Raeder -- in contradiction to the claim of the Prosecution -- was not the author of the article and moreover had heard nothing about the article before its appearance. I regret that in spite of this clarification, the Prosecution apparently are intent upon persisting in their claim by the production, on the 3 July 1946, of a new document, D 912. This newly submitted document contains only radio broadcasts by the Propaganda Ministry which are of the same kind as the "Voelkischer Beobachter" article.
These radio broadcasts were a propaganda instrument of Goebbels and cannot, any more than the article, be brought up as a charge against Raeder, who, in fact, was at the time informed of the article only and not of the radio broadcasts. Ev the fact that Raeder did not attempt any rectification, after being informed of the article, cannot be made a moral charge against him since he was bound by Hitler's order and had no idea at the time that Hitler himself had a hand in the article, which Weizsaecker aptly described as perverse phantasy. notorious fact that precisely at the beginning of the war, inaccurate reports also appeared in the English press about alleged German atrocities, which, even after this clarification, were not rectified, as for instance, the false report about the murder of 10,000 Czechs in Prague by German elements in September 1939, although the matter had been cleared up by a commission of neutral journalists. the defendants. If this presumption were correct with reference to Raeder, the Prosecution would scarcely have felt the necessity of bringing forward precisely this "Athenia" case in such ponderous and injurious terms with the sole purpose of discrediting the former Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy.
violation of neutrality and breach of international law, namely :
1. On the basis of document C 12 according to which Hitler decided on the basis of a report by Raeder on 30 December 1939 that :
"Greek merchant ships in the zone around England which the USA declared prohibited, are to be treated like enemy ships."
2. According to document C 167 on the occasion of delivery of a report to Hitler on 18 March 1941, Raeder asked for confirmation that "all of Greece is to be occupied, even in case of peaceful settlement." support ; in both cases there is no action which violated international law.
With reference to accusation one : Raeder and the German naval command learned in October /November 1939 that quite a number of Greek merchant ships had been put at the disposal of England, either at the instance or with the approval of the Greek government. This fact cannot be reconciled with strict neutrality and, according to principles of international law, it gave Germany the right to take an equivalent counter measure. This justified counter measures consisted in treating Greek ships, which sailed for England, as enemy ships from the moment they were in the zone around England which had been declared prohibited by the United States.
With reference to accusation two : Germany, especially the High Comman of the Navy, had received reports that certain Greek military and political circles maintained the closest connections to the Allied General Staff over since 1939.
As time went by more and more reports came in. What the Allies were planning on the Balkans is known; the intentions were the erection of a Balkan front against Germany. For this purpose local Conditions in Greece, as well as in Rumania, were examined on the part of the Allied General Staff of the Allied officers, in order to build airplane bases there. Furthermore preparations were made to land in Greece. As proof, I have presented as Raeder Exhibit No. 59, the minutes for the session of the French War Committee of 26 April 1940. which shows that the War Committee at that time had already checked the question of possible operations in the Caucasus area and in the Balkans, from which results the activity of General Jauneaud in Greece for the continuation of investigations and preparations and the attempts to camouflage the trip by making it in civilian clothing.
represents a violation of neutrality on the part of Greece; for Greece did not appear as England's ally But formally continued to maintain her neutrality Therefore, Greece could no longer figure that Germany would fully respect Greek neutrality. Germany nevertheless, respected Greek neutrality for a long time to come. The occupation of Greece took place in April 1941 only after British troops had already landed in Southern Greece on 3 March 1941. generally recognized rules, without importance in international legal relation and for the international legal decision between Germany and England and between Germany and Greece; it has importance only for the legal relations between England and Greece. the fact that Greek neutrality was menaced by Germany, especially by the occupation of Bulgaria on 1 March 1941. In this connection the Prosecution is overlooking that not only the execution of the occupation of Greece by British forces, but also the planning of the Allies starter essentially earlier than the German planning. But however that may be, no accusation, at all, can be raised against Raeder, because the date of document C 167 submitted by the Prosecution is 18 March 1941, which means it is 14 days later than the landing if the English in Southern Greece . In any case, at that time Greece could no longer demand that her alleged neutrality be respected. But beyond that the accusation is also unjustified when the Prosecution points out that Raeder asks for confirmation for all of Greece to be occupied. This question of Raeder was not a causal factor for the fact that all of Greece was occupied for Hitler had provided already in his order No. 20 of 13 December 1940 that the entire Greek continent was to be occupied, in order to frustrate English intentions of creating a dangerous basis for air operations under the protection of a Balkan front, especially for the Rumanian oil district.
In addition to that, the inquiry of Raeder on 18 March 1941 was justified on strategic grounds, because Greece offered many landing possibilities for the British and the only possible defense was for Greece to be firmly in the hands of Germany, as witnesses Raeder and Schulte-Moenting have explained.
est or desire for glory, as the Prosecution thinks for the navy won no glory whatsoever in Greece because the occupation was a land operation, and the occupation of an originally neutral country is simply the regrettable consequence of such a big war; it cannot be charged to one belligerent, if both belligerents had plans concerning the same state and carried out these plans.
I should like now to go on to the subject of Norway. On 9 April 1940 troops of all 3 branches of the German Armed Forces occupied Norway and Denmark. From this and the preceding plans, the Prosecution have drawn up the most grave accusation against Grand Admiral Raeder, alongside, I understand, with the collective charge of participation in a conspiracy. gested the occupation of Norway, to Hitler and believes that Raeder accomplished the occupation out of a spirit of conquest and vainglory. I shall demons trate that this argumentation is incorrect. Only one thing is correct, that is, that in this single instance Raeder took the initiative of first approaching Hitler on the subject of Norway, namely, on the 10 October 1939. I shall, however, show that he has in fact acted in this connection not as a politician but enclusively as a soldier. Raeder sensed purely strategic dangers, and pointed out these strategic dangers to Hitler, because he assumed that the Allies contemplated the establishment of a new from in Scandinavia in Norway in particular, and knew that an occupation of Norway by Britain could have a militarily decisive consequence to the detriment of Germany. I shall show that Germany has committed no violation of international law by the occupation of Norway. Before I state the legal foundation and connect the facts established by the appraisal of evidence with the principles of international law, I should like first to state an important fact As Raeder's examination shows, he was very reluctant in acting as Supreme Commander for the Norwegian action and as disclosed by Schulte-Moending's interrogations.
Raeder had the natural feeling of justice that a neutral state could not be drawn into the existing war without an absolutely imperative emergency. In the period between October 1939 and Spring 1940, Raeder had always defended the opinion that by far the best folution would be that Norway and all Scandinavia remain absolutely neutral.
This, Raeder and Schulte-Moenting disclosed unanimously at their interrogation and it is, moreover, proved by documents. For this, I refer to Raeder Exhibit No. 69. In this, the conviction of Raeder that the most favourable solution is undoubtedly the preservation of the strictest neutrality by Norway which is entered in the War Diary on 13 January 1940. Raeder had clearly convinced himslef that an occupation of Norway by Germany for motives of international justice or strategic reasons could only be conceivable if Norway could not or would not maintain an absolute neutrality. in particular to Document TC 31, in which the German Reich Government, on 2 September 1939 expressly assures Norway of her inviolabity and integrity. In this memorandum, the following legitimate remark is added "If the Reich Cabinet makes this declaration it, of course, also expects that Norway in turn, will observe irreproachable neutrality towards the Reich and that it will not tolerate breaches of Norwegian neutrality should attempts along that line be made by third parties."
way, this was done because of the threat that the plans of the Allies created the danger of occupation of Norwegian bases by then. In his opening speech, Sir Hartely Shawcross declared that according to the indictment, Germany's breach of neutrality and its war of aggression against Norway remained criminal even if Allied plans for the occupation had been correct and he added that in reality such plans were not ture. I believe that the argument advanced here by Sir Hartley Shawcross is contrary to accepted International Law. If Allied plans for the occupation of Norwegian bases existed, and there were dangers that Norway neither would nor could maintain strict neutrality, in such a case accepted standards of International Law did justify Germany's Norway campaign. of International Law, in order to create a foundation for my own reasoning, while I shall at the same time try to set forth those legal viewpoints which contradict the Prosecution's interpretation. In order to save time in this legal exposition, and in order to make the conception comprehensible I have submitted as Raeder Exhibit No. 66 an opinion on International Law on the Norway Campaign by Dr. Hermann Mosler, A Professor of International Law at the University of Bonn.
The High Tribunal will bear in mind that I was given permission to make use of this opinion for purposes of argumentation, and I may therefore refer at this point to this detailed scientific compilation and argument. In my final pleading I shall confine myself to a summary of the most essential concepts of legal opinion. Neutrals in the event of Warfar at Sea stipulate that "the parties at war are bound to respect the rights of sovereignty of neutral powers in the territory and coastal waters of the neutral power", and that all unfriendly acts on the part of the belligerent parties within the delimitation of the coastal waters of a neutral power "are strictly banned as violations of neutrality." Contrary to these stipulations, Great Britain violated Norway's neutrality through the laying of mines in Norwegian coastal waters for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate passage of German warships and merchantmen, especially in order to cut off the exportation of iron ore from Narvik to Germany. In the letter of the Foreign Office which I received in reply to my petition for authorization to submit files of the British Admiralty, confirmation as per Raeder Exhibit No. 130 was received to the effect that His Majesty's Forces laid mine fields in Norwegian waters, and in addition it was stated that this was a well known fact. reestablishing the disturbed equilibrium between the belligerent parties, in other words in wresting from the enemy's forces the benefit they were deriving from violation of neutrality.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sr. Siemers, the Tribunal would like to know what your contention is on this subject. Do you contend that any breach of neutrality of a neutral state entitles one of the warring nations to enter that neutral state.
DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry, Mr. President; I did not understand it all, I am afraid.
THE PRESIDNET: Well, there seems to be a certain amoung of electrical disturbance. What the Tribunal would like to know is whether it is your contention that any breach of neutrality by one of the warring states entitles the other warring state to enter and invade the neutral state.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in this general respect, I certainly would not think of saying that.
It is a principle of international law that a violation of international law committed by one state only entitles the other warring nation to counter-measures, or a counter-measure, which the breach of neutrality is equal to. In other words, certainly an occupation of Norway on the part of Germany would not be justified because Britain mined the coastal waters. That fact, as such, does not justify an occupation.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it be your contention that it made any difference on the rights of Germany if Germany were to be held to be an aggressor in the original war?
I will repeat it. According to your contention, would it make any difference that Germany was held, if it were held, to be the aggressor in the original war, out of which the occupation of the neutral country occurred?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I beg to apologize, but I am afraid I can not quite understand the sense as it comes through in translation.
THE PRESIDENT: I will say it again more slowly. According to your contention, would it make any difference if the Tribunal were to think that Germany had been the aggressor in the war which led to the occupation of the neutral state?
DR. SIEMERS: I simply can not understand.
My apologies, Mr. President. Now, if I understood it correctly, you wish me to answer the question whether the fact that previously a war had been begun by Germany against Poland, whether this fact would influence my juridical attitude toward the question of Norway.
THE PRESIDENT: Assuming. I only say assuming that the war begun by Germany against Poland were to be held to be an aggressive war.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe that the answer is in the negative because the individual acts, under international law, must be dealt with separately. The fact that the Tribunal may possibly assume--namely, that an aggressive war was conducted against Poland -- can not have any effect upon the point of view of international law in the subsequent years. Sir Hartley Shawcross also dealt with the complex of Greece and the question of landings entirely from the point of view of the Greek events, and he has not said that Britain could occupy Greece because Germany had occupied Poland. He said, just as I did, that from the standpoint of international law Britain could occupy Greece because Greece was threatened by a German occupation, and that is all that I am trying to say from the point of view of international law.
Other parallels I am not trying to draw. It applies to Norway also, as the further part of my plea will show.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. There is one other question which I should like to ask you. Is it your contention that Germany was entitled under international law to use the territorial waters of Norway, either for her warships or for the transport of ore, or for the transport of prisoners of war?
DR. SIEMERS: In my opinion, from the standpoint of international law, the situation is that Germany was entitled to use the coastal water, observing at the same time the various international rules; as, for instance, only brief stays in ports and similar rulings such as, for instance, the duty of submitting to investigation by neutrals, such as, for instance, was carried on in the case of the battleship "Altmark", but principally, to carry out shipping operations off Narvik was justified as far as I know from the point of view of international law.
THE PRESIDENT: Continue.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, with reference to the last point, may I add one thing? If one were of the opinion that Germany was not allowed to use these coastal waters, then the mining of these coastal waters would have been a justified breach of neutrality on Britain's part, so that, as far as I am concerned, the mining operations would have to be left out of my plea but not the other facts which I am referring to. Mining is an equivalent circumstance. I myself consider that the mining operation was not permissible and that travelling through coastal waters was permissible, but the entire complex is not bringing me to any final conclusions with reference to the occupation of Norway. I do hope that I shall be understood correctly. I am not saying that Germany was allowed to occupy Norway because Britain had mined the coastal waters.
THE PRESIDENT: But you are saying, are you, that Germany was entitled to use the coastal waters, first of all, for the transport or ore; secondly, for her warships?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And thirdly, for the transport of prisoners of war?
DR. SIEMERS: It is my opinion, Mr. President, that for ore transports there was no clause in international law which prohibitsthat, so that that shipping was permissible.
out that there is only one inference, and that is the case of the ship "Altmark". If Germany was not allowed to use coastal waters for transport of prisoners of war, then that could only bring about the consequences that Britain would be allowed to adopt an equivalent counter-measure, in an individual case to adopt some measure, some action; that it would not allow her to mine the entire coastal waters. The mining of the entire coast, from the point of view of international law, is only justified if you adopt the point of view that Germany's merchant navy was prohibited from entering those coastal waters. But that, in my opinion,is not the situation.
THE PRESIDENT: You may continue.
DR. SIEMERS: Reaction against such violation of neutrality is primarily direct ed against the adversary and not against the neutral party. Legal relationship deriving from neutrality exists not only between the neutral party and the two belligerent parties, but the neutrality of the respective neutral State is at the same time a factor in direct relations existing between the belligerent parties. If the relationship of neutrality between one of the belligerent parties and the neutral power suffers disturbance, the neutral powercan in no way file complaint if the other belligerent power take appropriate action, in which case it is entirely immaterial whether the neutral State is unable or unwilling to protect its neutrality. proceed to counter measure is "the right of self-preservation"; "le droit de preservation personell." As brought out in detail by legal opinion, this right of self-preservation is generally accepted by International Law. It may suffice to point out here that this basic law is not affected by the Kellogg Fact as often mentioned in this Court. I may therefore also ask permission for a brief quotation from the circularised memorandum of the American Secretary of State Kellogg dated 23 June 1938, as follows:
"There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which That right is inherent in every Sovereign State and is implicit in every treaty."
So far I have quoted Kellogg. Justice Jackson will permit me to mention that he, himself, in his opening speech of 21 November 1945, referred to the "right of legitimate self-preservation." February 1940, the Swedish Foreign Minister Guenther recognized this idea, although he protected the interests of one of the belligerents and although this speech was made before Germany proceeded to retaliatory measures in Norway. In that address Guenther took the attitude to the English declaration that Sweden's neutrality would be respected so long only as it would be respected by England's enemies. Guenther recognized the fact that Sweden, in its relationship with England, would lose its neutrality should Germany violate Sweden's neutrality and should Sweden not be willing or able to prevent such violation of neutrality through Germany. Consequently, so said Gunther, Great Britain would no longer be held to treat Sweden as a neutral country. It is clear that the conclusions drawn by Guenther in the event of a breach of neutrality through Germany must also apply to the tri-partite legal relationship between Great Britain-Germany-Norway. The real aim, however, and this I shall set forth in my presentation of evidence, was not Great Britain's mining actions in Norwegian coastal waters, but a much further-reaching Anglo-French scheme aiming it the occupation of Norwegian bases and of a portion of the Norwegian home territory. The mining action enters into the picture merely as a part of the total plan.
According to Mosler' sopinion,and in the light of the above remarks, it is absolutely certain that Germany was justified in occupying Norway had the Allies carried part of their plan into effect by landing at a Norwegian base before German troops made their appearance, This, however, did not occur. Rather, as I will show, the situation was that Germany anticipated an Anglo-French landing, in other words decided for counter-measures on account of the imminent danger which threatened, Legally, a second question should also be investigated:
Assuming the same conditions, are counter-measures not permitted until after the other belligerent has proceeded to violate neutrality, er is reaction permitted in the presence of the imminently threatening violation of neutrality in order to anticipate the enemy's attack?
According to the findings composed by Dr. Mosler the preventive counter-measure is permissible, andthe directly impending violation of neutrality which can be expected with certainty, is to be considered equal to a completed violation of neutrality.
states to the question of the preventime measure:
"Such a case in its character resembled that one, that a apparently too weak to resist;under these circumstances it attack on the neutral territory first."
lies in the right for self-preservation, which also applies against a threatening violation of neutrality. Another concept would also have been not true to life and would not correspond to the character of the society of nations asa majority of sovereign states with an as yet incompletely developed common law code. In the inner-state law system of every civilized country, the repulsing of an immediately threatening attack is a permissible defense act, although there even the help of the state against the law-breaker is furnished. In the society of international law, where this was not the case, anyway not at the beginning and during the 2nd world War, the viewpoint of self-preservation must apply to an unequally stronger extent. In conjunction with this concept, the British government during this war also considered the preventive measure as justified, when it occupied Iceland on 10 May 1940. The British government has justified this measure clearly and correctly in accordance with international law in an official announcement of the Foreign office, as follows:
"After the German occupation of Denmark it has become its country from falling into the hands of the Germans completely."
The preventive measure was carried out, although Iceland expressly defended herself in a note of protest against the occupation.
of law, as is proven by the well-known message of the president of the United States to Congress of 7 July 19141, and the subsequent occupation of Iceland by armed forces of the American Navy. must be explained. I have tried to clarify the charge in the presentation of evidence, and May I summarize the major viewpoints which actually showed a closely impending violation of neutrality on thepart of the Allies through the partial occupation of Norway, and thereby justified the German action against Norway. as the presentation of evidence has shown, received various information through the current reports of Admiral Canaris as director of intelligence and through General Admiral Carls, which let the danger be recognized, that the Allies, in accordance with their plans to encircle Germany, would occupy bases in Norway, in order to halt in particular the imports of ore from Scandinavia. Oslo, and survey works by Allied officers on Norwegian bridges, viaducts, and tunnels up to the Swedish border had been identified. Furthermore, the quiet mobilization of Swedish troops because of the endangerment of Swedish ore-territories had become known. Raeder was justified in considering himself obliged to report this state of facts to Hitler and to point out the danger to him which would arise for Germany, if English and French armed forces were actually to fortify themselves in Scandinavia. The dangers were clear. They consisted of the cutting-off of all imports from the industrial areas of Scandinavia, in particular of the ore-imports,as well as in the fact that the Allies obtained a favorable base for air attacks, and last but not least, inthe fact that the German Navy was threatened in its flank and its operational petenitalities were limited.
The blockade of the North Sea and Baltic wouldhave had strategically disastrous consequences.
did not suggest immediate occupation, but only pointed out the dangers in order to wait for further developments for the time being. Hitler therefore also did not make a final decision during this discussion of 10 Oct. 1939 but agreed to wait. Similar information was received during the months of October and November and now also by the Naval attache Lieutenant Commander Schreiber who had in the meantime been sent to Oslo, to whose Affidavit (Raeder Exhibit No. 107, Vol. VI, page 464 ff) I refer. The Norwegian shipping association had made tanker tonnage of about 1 million tons., available to England with the consent of the Norwegian Government (see also Reader Exhibit No. 86, War diary of 6 April 1940, )according to which 90% of the Norwegian tankers had been put at the disposal of England.
In Winter, 1939/40, the information concerning espionage missions of the English and French Secret Service to Norwegian agents and English harbor consulates for the purpose of reconneitering landing opportunities and examination of Norwegian Railroads with regard to their capacity, particularly the Narvik line and missions concerning information about land and sea airports in Norway took more definite form. By reason of the fact that the information from 2 different sources, namely the Naval Attache in Oslo and Admiral Cenaris, corresponded and became more gradually extensive during the months of October to December, 1939, the reported danger seemed to increase slowly all the time.
entirely independently of the sources of information which had existed up to that time -- the same or similar information concerning the landing intention. of the Allies, and not directly to Raeder, for the only reason that Raeder didn't know either Quisling or Hagelin at that time. As the question involve. was a purely military-strategic one, Rosenberg asked Raeder to discuss things with Quisling so that Raeder could examine the military technical possibiliti in consideration of the fact that an aggression by the Allies in Scandinavia must be expected according to the information received. This is evident fr the letter of Rosenberg to Raeder of 13 December 1939, which I submitted as Raeder Exhibit No. 67. Raeder now considered it his duty from the purely military point of view to inform Hitler, with whom he had not discussed this question in the meantime, that corresponding information had meanwhile been received from Canaris, the Naval Attache in Oslo, and Quisling. Hitler wished to speak personally with Quisling, which he did, and decided then to make the necessary preparations for a possible preventive measure to counter the danger threatening, namely the occupation of Norway. further news would be received and whether the danger increased was awaited. Raeder. As I have already remarked, Raeder would have preferred if the strict neutrality of Norway had been maintained, especially as he was against every conquest just for the sake of conquest. He knew, on the other hand, that an occupation required the commitment of the whole Navy, thus involving the fate of the entireNavy, and that the loss of at least a third of the fleet had to be reckoned with. It should be clear how hard, from such political and strategiv viewpoints, such a decision was for a conscientious man and soldier. 1940 and always more definite. In March 1940 surprisingly many Englishspeaking persons could be seen in Oslo, and Raeder received very serious information, worthy of credit, about shortly impending measures by the Allies against Norway and also Sweden.
As far as landing intentions were concerned, Narvik, Trontheim and Stavanger were mentioned. Thus it came about that the military planning only took place in February and March, and that the final instructions were issued to the Wehrmacht even as late as March 1940. have been collected in the war diary, and also the mine laying in Norwegian territorial waters at the beginning of April. prehensive informative material, according to which the German Ambassador in Oslo, Braeuer, did not regard the danger so great, but believed that the English attitude, mentioned also by him, pointed merely to provocation of Germany, in order that Germany might give cause for war operations in Norwegian waters.
Baron Weizsaecker's point of view in cross-examination was that at firs he did not consider the danger so great, but he admitted that later on the facts proved that he and Braeuer were wrong, but that Raeder, on the contrary, was right in his apprehension. of the information which was the basis of his conception, is shown from separate documents submitted by me and accepted by the Court. plan which had in view, amongst other things, the occupation of harbours and flying fields on the West Coast of Norway. The plan contemplated, in addition, that the operations should possibly be extended to Sweden and the mines of Gaellivare be occupied. Efforts have been made to justify this plan by stating that it was elaborated solely to help Finland against the Soviet Union. land does not justify any occupation of Norwegian territory. Moreover, the documents show that it was not a question of only altruistic measures in favour of Finland. During the interallied military conferences on 31 January and 1 February, which preceeded the meeting of the supreme Council on 5 February, the question of direct help for Finland was relegated by the English to second place; they showed themselves to be determined adherents of an enterprise against the mines of Northern Sweden.
This is confirmed by General Gamelin in a note of 10 March 1940, and he adds that this opinion obtained the majority vote in the supreme Council, and that the preparation of the Scandinavian Expedition should be started immediately. ready for transportation since the first days of March, whereby, according to Gamelin, the leadership of the proposed operations in Scandinavia was transferred to the British High Command. Gamelin adds finally that the Scandinavian plans must be resolutely pursued further, in order to save Finland-- I quote: -- "or at least to lay hands on the Swedish ores and the Northern harbours". land wished to obtain certain bases on the Norwegian coast in order to stop the German transport of ore from Narvik. landing places in agreement with the Norwegian authorities. 1940, the English intention in this respect was to land troops simultaneously in Bergen, Trontheim and Narvik. London, Corbin, that the occupation of the most important Norwegian ports and the landing of the 1st Division of the Allied Fighting Forces in Norway would give Sweden a feeling of security; and he goes on to say that this operation must be planned and executed at shortest notice, "independently of Finland's call for assistance." In the event of this demarche in Norway meeting with refusal, which was likely, the British Government waste confirm the Norwegian refusal and immediately seize control of the bases it needed for the safeguarding of its interests, and was to do so in the form of a "surprise operation". Whether Sweden refuses the passage through to Finland does not appear important; what is emphasized is rather the -- and I quote -"advantage of having secured a dominating position against Germany in the North, interrupted the sea transport of Swedish ore, and brought the Swedish ore districts within the radius of action of our aviation". that he was "tired of considering the rights of Neutrals."
of the Supreme Council on the 28 March 1940 -- and I quote:-
"Every attempt of the Soviet Government to obtain from Norway a position on the Atlantic coast runs counter to the vital interests of the Allies and would elicit due counter-measures." the vital interests of the Allies, coincides exactly with the legitimate notions of the "right of self-preservation" presented by me, and is in complete contradiction to the interpretation of international law propounded in this respect by the Prosecution. and the constitution of bases, was decided on 28 March 1940 between the authoritative British and French departments. This date was indicated at a session of the French war Committee by the French Prime Minister; and General Gamelin added that he had, on 29 March, impressed upon General Ironside the necessity of having everything ready for a swift occupation of the Norwegian ports. He said he had also informed Mr. Churchill to the same effect on the occasion of a visit to Paris.
One day later, on 30 March, Churchill declares on the Radio, and I quote:
"It would not be fair if, in the fight for life or death, the Western Powers adhered to legal agreements." the first transport was "to sail on J.l. day", and that J.l. day was in principle 5 April. neutrals could be certain that "England would allow her hands to be tied behind her back while following the letter of the law". that neither Germany nor the neutrals could be certain that the Western Powers would adhere to the letter of international law.
Norwegian territorial waters -- a secret English operational order was given "concerning preparations for the occupation of the northern Swedish ore fields outside Narvik." of all in "securing the port of Narvik and the railroad to the Swedish border." It was added that it was the intention of the commander-in-Chief to advance into Sweden and to occupy the Gaellivare ore fields and important points of that territory as soon as an opportunity occurred, a formulation which almost reminds one of the words in the prosecution document L-79: "to attack Poland at the first appropriate opportunity." altered; for on the evening of 5 April the British High Command informed the Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy that -- I quote -- "the first English convey could set out before 8 April which, within the framework of the established time schedule, means that the first French Division is to leave the embarkation port on 16 April". was designated by the allies by the camouflage name of "Stratford-Plan", meaning the action, while the German Norwegian operation was referred to by the camouflage name of "Weser Exercise" (Woseruebung).
The preceding facts show that: by the studying of landing possibilities. Since January-February 1940, the danger of an occupation of bases in Norway by the Allies was threatening. In March 1940, the execution of the scheme was ultimately decided upon and the departure of the first convoy scheduled for 5 April. Simultaneously, minelaying was carried out in the Norwegian territorial waters and troops were at the same time concentrated in British and French ports for the Norwegian operation.
Thus, factual illegality in the form of imminent neutrality violations existed from the point of view of international law, and neutralit violation had indeed been already committed to a certain extent (mine-laying) This was the point where Germany, in accordance with the international notion of the right of self-preservation, was entitled to resort to equivalent counter-measures, that is, to occupy Norway and prevent the threatened occupation by other belligerent States. It was, in fact, as was shown later, the last moment; for Germany did frustrate the allies, only beacuse the British High Command had postponed the departure of the first convey, original ly scheduled for 5 April. mate according to the principles of international law. I have the firm conviction that the High Tribunal, in view of the circumstances just exposed in relation to existing Internation law, will conclude that Grand Admiral Raeder has, with regard to the occupation of Norway, acted from purely strategic points of view, in due consideration of international legal standards, and accordingly acquit him of the charge made by the Prosecution. Raeder, and incidently against Doenitz, that a violation of International Law is entailed by the fact that according to an order dated 30 March 1940, the Naval Forces were, until the landing of troops, to fly the English flag. sea warfare. The Hague regulation on land warfare does expressly forbid the abusive flying of flags. But in sea warfare the answer to this question, according to the prevailing international law, is definitely that, until hostilities begin, ships may sail with their own, or with enemy or neutral flags, or even with no flags at all. I take the liberty, in this respect, of availing myself of Dr. Mosler's juridical treatment of the question in his judgment appearing under item 7, and in particular of his references to scientific literature on the subject, according to which the use of a foreign flag is universally considered as a legitimate war deception and is allowed and especially condoned by British practice, this in accordance with the historical precedent when Nelson, in the Napoleonic wars, flow the French fla off Barcelona to lure the Spanish ships.