actually the order just mentioned, instructing the flying of the English flag, was, according to documentary evidence, cancelled on 8 April, that is to say, prior to the execution of the Norway operation. of Norway, that after the occupation of Norway, Raeder and the German navy did everything they could to give a friendly character to the relations with Norway and to treat the country and the people honorably and well during the occupation, and to spare them every unnecessary burden, Raeder and the Admiral Commanding in Norwegian waters, General Admiral Hoehm, moreover, endeavored to conclude a peace with Norway guaranteeing Norwegian national interests. Their efforts were frustrated by the institution, by Hitler and Himmler of a so-called civil administration by the Reich Commissioner Terboven which unlike the Wehrmacht was connected with the Party, the SS, SD and Gestapo.
As confirmed by Boehm in his affidavit, Raeder repeatedly intervened with Hitler in favor of the ideas he shared with the Admiral in Command in Norwegian waters for good treatment of the Norwegian people and an early conclusion of peace and, together with Boehm, set himself with the utmost vigour against Terboven. A gain, the tragic event is repeated here that the Wehrmacht, despite its utmost efforts, has neither been able to oppose Hitler's dictature nor the dictature exercised to Hitler's knowledge by such a mediocre Reich Commissioner as Terboven. The Norwegian people who had to suffer under the occupation know - and this is the only gratification for Raeder that the Navy was not the cause of these sufferings. On the other hand, it is interesting to know that the differences which cropped up between Hitler and Raeder with reference to Norway are precisely one of the chief motives which caused Raeder to ultimately insist upon his resignation in September, 1942. Other motives were that Raeder also had differences with Hitler, with reference to France, because here again Raeder urged the conclusion of peace, while Hitler with his excessive character was opposed to conciliatory steps of this kind in occupied countries. Raeder also and differences with Hitler with reference to Russia, because he was in favour of observance of the German-Russian treaty and declared against the breach of the Treaty and against war with Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(A short recess was taken.) a war of aggression against Russia. The charge of the Prosecution on this subject cannot be very well understood. It dealt with land warfare, so that the Navy did not have to meet any preparations, with the exception of the few preparations in the Baltic Sea. The Prosecution itself has furthermore stated that Raeder had been opposed to the war against Russia. The only thing which could remain from the charge of the Prosecution is its claim that Raeder had fundamentally been in favor of the war against Russia also, and had only been opposed to Hitler with regard to the time factor.
With reference to C-170 the Prosecution states that Raeder had only recommended the postponement of the ear against Russia until the time after the victory over England. According to Document C-170 this actually could appear this way. In reality, however, the case is different, and the true state of affairs has been cleared up by the detailed presentation of evidence. The witness Admiral Schulte-Moenting has clearly stated, without being contradicted in the crossexamination, that Raeder not only raised objections with regard to time limits, but that he fundamentally argued with Hitler against a campaign against Russia, and that because of moral rea sons and reasons of international law just because he was of the opinion that the non-aggression pact with Russia, as well as the trade agreement would have to be observed under all circumstances. The Navy was especially interested in the delivery agreements with Russia, and has always tried to closely observe the treaties. Besides this basic principle of observing treaties, i.e. besides this general reason, Raeder represented the opinion that a war against Russia would also be false from the strategical standpoint. His own testimony a nd that of Schilte-Moenting show that in September, November and December of 1940 Raeder tried again and again with Hitler to dissuade him from the thought of a war against Russia. It is correct, that in Document C-170 only the strategical justification for his opposition has been recorded. However, this is not at all surprising, because in the papers with the Naval Operations Staff naturally only justifications were recorded, which were of naval technical and strategic importance, but not political reasons. mit, that Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy intervene in foreign-political questions, i.e. in things, which did not belong in his department. If Raeder did once try this, contrary to the will of Hitler, and that in cases of special importance, then he could do it only under four eyes and accordingly could not then record those conversations in the war diary.
However, he has always told everything to his chief of staff as his closest confidante. As the result of this, Schulte-Moenting could confirm clearly that Raeder in this case opposed Hitler because of moral misgivings, also with regard to international law and furthermore, also employed strategical reasons in the hope of being able to influence Hitler sooner in this manner. Schulte-Moenting even stated -- just like Raeder -- that in November the latter had gained the impression after a discussion, that he had dissuaded Hitler from his plans. I believe that this has clarified the matter, and only the tragical factor remains here also, that Hitler paid just as little attention to Raeder in regard to political objections to Russia also, as in regard to Norway and France. to the war of aggression against U.S.A. and the violation of the Neutrality of Brazil. As both these reproaches are sufficiently refuted within the framework of the evidence, I am only going to discuss then very briefly. collaborated in the plan to induce Japan to attack America. As a matter of fact no naval strategic conferences were held between Japan and Raeder. Raeder was always of the firm conviction that a war against the USA must be prevented just as much as a war against England. Since the war against England had now come about, it was Raeder's duty as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to use all his strength to fight successfully against England. Raeder know the limitations of the fighting ability of the Navy, and it was therefore quite out of the question that he should have collaborated in an extension of the war, considering as he did the conduct of a war against England as a too difficult task. The GB-122 document, C-152 submitted by the Prosecution mentions a proposition that Japan should attack Singapore and that the U. S. A. should be kept out of the war.
This suggestion made to Hitler that Japan must attack Singapore was in all points correct.
concentrate all his forces against England. He was thus justified in suggesting that Japan -- as Germany's ally -- should attack England. Moreover this one discussion of Raeder was held on 18 March 1941, whilst Hitler in his Instructions No. 24 of 5 March 1941 had established the directive that Japan must attack Singapore which he considered a key position of England.
May I interpose one sentence here? It can be seen from the report by General Marshal that General Marshal stated that no common plan had been in evidence between Germany and Japan. complete excerpt of Jodl's diary, which I submitted as Raeder Exhibit No. 115as well as by further submitted documents, Raeder Exhibit Nos. 116-118. These documents prove that Brazil had violated the rules of neutrality by permitting the USA to make use of Brazilian airdromes as a base for attacks on German and Italian U-boats. The Brazilian Air Ministry has furthermore officially announced that attacks had been made by the Brazilian airforce. Considering such conduct against all rules of neutrality, the demand of the Naval command for armed action against Brazilian vessels is justified. In this case also the Prosecution did not succeed in proving Raeder to have committed a crime or even an offense against International Law. of material, and the many details implied necessarily great exactitude in the taking of evidence. I have endeavored to demonstrate that all the remonstrances, partly on factual, partly on legal grounds, do not represent the facts of a criminal case within the meaning of this Charter. In as far as I have not, in spite of my striving for great exactitude, dealt with certain documents, it was because they seemed to me of small importance, and in any case of no importance in criminal law, for instance the many cases in which Raederwas only mentioned because -- without officially taking any part -he received a copy of the documents for routine reasons. It would have been tiring to go into such recurrent cases, even if the Prosecution unremittingly reiterated those formal indication, so that one was often inclined to remember the saying of Napoleon that repetition is that turn of speech which is the bestevidence.
I may leave aside an argumentation regarding the real war crimes or crimes against humanity, as I cannot establish any connection between these and Raeder from the material submitted by the Prosecution. Further no particular reproach is made against Raeder in this connection with the exception of the two cases connected with the commando order, namely the shooting of two soldiers in Bordeaux and the shooting of the British soldier Evans, who was made a prisoner by the SS on the Swedish border, after he had previously participated in the small weapons attack on the "Tirpitz". Thus far the reproach has been refuted by testimony in so far as it concerns the Navy. Both cases did not come, or came only later, to the knowledge of the Naval Command -- just before Raeder's departure. In both cases the act was committed on the basis of the commando order of Hitler himself or by the Security Service (SD) without the knowledge and will of the Naval Command; and -- what is the most Important -- in both cases the documents of the Prosecution showed that these soldiers were in civilian clothes, and therefore were not entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention. the East I need not deal with, as Raeder did not participate in them. I hope also to have the approval of the Court in mentioning the handling of the Katyn case, in which the Court pointed out that Raeder was not involved, and therefore refused my collaboration as Counsel in this connection; from this intend to draw the legal conclusion that, even in this round about way by the conspiracy, Raeder cannot be considered as burdened with these criminal facts, since he did not know of these events and had nothing to do with said events. basic assumption prevail and be acknowledged, namely the idea that so many crimes cannot have been the conception of a single person, but rather that they result from the conspiracy of many, that they must have originated in a plot. These conspirators could logically in the first place have been only Hitler's own collaborators, that is to say the real National Socialists.
As, however, Hitler wished to realize, and did realize, results of military and economic importance, something peculiar occurred: There were no specialists among the National Socialists for these particular tasks. Most of the National Socialist collaborators did not previously follow a trade requiring technical education. Hitler, therefore, despite his desire to have only National Socialists around him took on as key people in particular fields persons who were not National Socialists, such as for instance Schacht for economics, Neurath for politics and, for military tasks, Fritsch for the Army and Raeder for the Navy. The Prosecution followed him in the interests of its conspiracy theory, without paying attention to the fact that these were no National Socialists, and therefore in the last analysis could not really be counted among the conspirators, and without taking into account that Hitler used these non-National Socialists only as technicians in a well-defined field, and this moreover only as long as it seemed absolutely necessary to him and therefore he agreed to the elimination of these men, who at bottom were not in sympathy with him, as soon as the differences between them seemed unbridgable, which was bound to happen sooner or later with each of them in his own particular field. of the Prosecution's fight against non-National Socialists, the Prosecution has abandoned the basic concept which was formerly propagated abroad, namely that of the fight against National Socialism, but not against the whole of Germany, two ideas which at no time and in no place have been really identical, as the Prosecution now tries to make out. I do believe that thereby the Prosecution also abandons President Roosevelt's basic idea. consideration by the Prosecution. I mean the concept of division of competence in political law, that is to say the subdivision into individual competencies. This di vision of competence -- resting on the idea of division of labor -- has, in accordance with its essence, a separative character; it divides the field of work from the angle of local, functional and technical points of view. For one thing it positively defines the limits within which any single division is to become active; at the same time it defines negatively the boundaries of this activity by specifying which are the things which no longer concern the agencies in question, that is to say where they must not develop any official activity.
Cabinet meetings and/or through the Prime Minister, the Reich President, or the Reich Chancellor. But it is different in a dictatorship, particularly i the dictator -- as it was the case with Hitler in the National Socialist State uses the separation between the individual governmental departments with extreme skill and sees to it that the individual departments are as isolated as possible, with the result that all decision rests finally with him as the dictator, in which case he even plays out one department against the other. National Socialist State, contradicts the concept of conspiracy especially distinctly, making it difficult for the individual to go above his own department in any manner.
This significance may be described by the following example: The formulation of political relations with other States, the contracting or rescission of agreements or alliances with other States, declaring war and concluding peace are matters within the jurisdiction of the authority directing foreign affairs, but they are not within the jurisdiction of the authorities concerned with domestic tasks, such as for instance the Reich Finance Administration, Justice and the Military.
The result is: Since the decision concerning war and peace is not a matter of the military, the military has to accept the decisions made by the political leadership, decisions which have a binding obligation for the military authorities. resulting from the decision. As soon as war is declared, the military forces must fight. They do not bear any responsibility for the war because they we not able to take part in the decision concerning the declaration of war. strategic sense only. Moreover, every war the waging of which is charged to it, is simply warregardless whether it may legally be justified or not.
law corresponds to the field of jurisdiction. Therefore, if the Commanderin-Chief of a branch of the Wehrmacht assumes responsibility solely for the waging of war, not for the causes leading to war, his responsibility in respect to strategic planning must be confined to planning as such, but not to the possible causes which brought about that was on which the strategic planning is based. departments and the distribution of authority was carried out by Hitler in a particularly emphatic manner in the interest of strengthening his own power in many domains, such as for instance, the creation of "The Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan" whose field of work actually belongs to the Ministry for Economics; the creation of Reich Commissioner in the occupied territories, whose activity really comes under military administration;
and, finally, a fact of interest in the case Raeder, the strict limitation between the three branches of the Wehrmacht and the elimination of the Reichswehr Minister of the and/or Minister of War who held the three branches of armed services together and unified them. The greater the number of the governmental departments became, and the more the departments were cut off from one another, the stronger Hitler became as a dictator, as the only one with authority over all the innumerable agencies. But with this the constitutional as well as the criminal responsibility of the chief of the individual department decreased and with it also the responsibility for strategic planning in one individual department, in this instance the Navy. for instance the Navy, can in case of strategic planning only be responsible for the planning of naval strategy; he did not have an overall view of the total planning. Total planning was discussed nowhere; politically and militarily it was in Hitler's hands exclusively because he alone was the center where all threads and all activities of the individual departments joined. case of the Norway action, even Goering, as late as March 1940, was not included in the activities, which is one proof of the strong separation of the individual departments even within the Wehrmacht, the armed forces. it is customary in every country and because in every country the military commander of a branch of the armed forces does not and cannot know for what purpose the political leadership will use the plan prepared by him, whether it is a war of aggression or a defensive war. military agencies, both of the Allies as well as in Germany, worked out strategical plans in the same way and in the same areas and at the same times, namely in regard to Norway, Belgium, Holland, Greece, Rumania, and/moreover the Allied plans for the destruction of the Rumanian oil fields and especially of the oil sources in the Caucasus. Particularly , the plans concerning the Caucasus on the part of the Supreme Council, i.e. of the combined British and French General Staff, show the correctness of the statements. The Supreme Council would certainly decline to be made politically responsible for these thereof, and the execution of the plans was to strike not only the enemy country Germany, but also the neutral Soviet Union, as the documents also shown.
convincing and shows a strong parallel trend. May I point in this connection to my earlier statements made here on the occasion of the comprehensive discussion regarding the importance and admissibility of the documents submitted by me; may I also point in addition to document/Exhibit No. 130, namely the letter of the Foreign Office in which submission of the British Admiralty files is refused, but in which the plans in regard to Norway and the whole of Scandinavia are admitted, but with the addition that the plannin was not transferred into action, a fact which depended only on Germany's having started the execution of the planning first. but then one must be consistent and must take a stand not only against German military force, but against any military force. One may condemn the fact that the military, as the operational authorities, prepare military plans, and may in future insist that such plannings are punishable. But then not only German military planning, but also foreign military planning must be punishable. and legal conditions, if it wishes to make/responsible for political decisions although he had nothing to do with them, but has always worked as soldier only. Just as little as it could be suggested 130 years ago to bring before a Court an Admiral of the dictator/so just as little can one now condemn an Admiral of the dictator. Particularly with dictators -- and the Prosecution overlooks this -- not only the power and the influence of a military commander diminishes but his responsibility must also diminish to the same extent; for the dictator has seized all power and with it all responsibility, all the more so, if a dictator appears with such an extraordinary will, such immense power, as Hitler. The French Prosecutor said in a particularly pertinent way on 7 February 1946 before this Tribunal word for word:
"Hitler was actually the incarnation of all willpower". Prosecution, and, in any case, it has not been taken into consideration at the presentation of the facts and the loyal conclusions. How great this power is, Gustavo Le Bon shows in his famous book "Psychology of the Masses" in the chapter "The Leader of the Masses".
I quote from it:
"Within the class of leaders a somewhat strict division can be made.
belong to the one kind; the people with a strong, persevering less brilliant appearance."
this quotation, exercised an immense influence, and who, on the other hand, was unimpreessive in his brown uniform.
Gustavo le Bon continues:
"The unyielding will, which they possess is an exceedingly rare and powerful attribute which subordinates everything to it.
One does not always realize what a strong and persisten will can achieve.
Nothing can resist it, neither nature nor Gods nor men."
either.
Accordingly, only the question remains; can revolt ever be a soldier's duty, an open revolt? This question will be denied by every commander all over the world and likewise by any other non with one exception only, if it is the case of a dictator committing a crime the criminality of which is recognized by the military commander himself. Accordingly, Raeder could be made responsible for a military crime only, but not for a political one, because for the political crime, the dictator himself must answer. Should the Prosecution have come to some other conclusion regarding Raeder it has only occurred -- as I have already emphasized in my introduction -because, in their misconception of the actual and juridical facts, they regarded Raeder as politician and soldier.
But he was a soldier only. He lived for the Navy alone, for the welfare of the Navy for which he also is now prepared to bear all responsibility to the full extent. He has led the Navy in a unified manner, and, aided by his Officer-corps, has taught them to think decently and to fight morally, to fight up to humanity's expectations of a soldier. It must not be that, as a result of the deeds of a Hitler and his National Socialism, the officers and soldiers of this Navy be defamed by their highest ranking officer being declared a criminal. From a historical viewpoint Raeder may be guilty, because he, as many others within the country and abroad, did not know or see through Hitler, and did not have the strength to resist the dynamic strength of a Hitler, but an omission is no crime. What Raeder did or left undone in his life was in the belief that he was acting correctly and, that as a conscientious soldier, he had to act in this way. Raeder is highly regarded as an officer who is not a criminal and cannot be a criminal since all his life he has lived honorably and as a Christian. A man who believes in God does not commit crimes, and a soldier who believes in God is not a war criminal.
I therefore beg the Tribunal to acquit completely Grand Admiral Dr. h.c. Erich Raeder regarding to all points of the indictments.
THE PRESIDENT: I call on Dr. Sauter for the defendant Schirach.
DR. SAUTER: Baldur von Schirach, who at that time was Reich Youth Leader welcomed in 1936 the guests to the Olympic Games in Berlin with the following words:
"Youth throws a bridge across all frontiers and seas!"
I call to the Youth of the World and through them, to Peace."
And Baldur von Schirach, then Gauleiter of Vienna, said to Hitler in 1940:
"Vienna cannot be conquered with bayonets, but only with music." defendant. It is the duty of the Defense to examine the evidence produced in this trial for the purpose of ascertaining whether the said Baldur von Schirach who expressed his political programme by such utterances, really committed those crimes against law and humanity, with which he is charred by the Prosecution.
Schirach is the youngest defendant here. He is also, of all the defendants, the one who was by far the youngest on his joining the Party, which he did when he was not yet 18. Those facts are perhaps already of some significance for the judging of his case. When still at school he entered the fold of the rising National Socialism; he was particularly attracted by the Socialist idea which had already in his country school, recognized no difference between the sons of fathers of different classes and professions; those boys around Schirach actually in the popular movement of the 1920 's in Germany the promise of the resurgence of our Fatherland from the aftermath of the lost Great War, to a happy future, and fate willed it that as early as 1925 Schirach came into personal contact, with Hitler in Weimar, Goethe's old town when he was seventeen Hitler' personality made a fascinating impression on young Schirach, as he himself admitted; the program for the Racial Community (Volksgemeinschaft) which Hitler had evolved at that time met with Schirach's hearty approval, because he thought he saw reproduced therein on a full-size scale that which he had personally experienced in a small way in the comradeship of the country school and in his Youth organization.
To him and his comrades Hitler appeared as the man who would open for the younger generation the road into the future; from him this younger generation also get its hope for a possibility to work its hope for a profession its hope for a happy life. So the young man became a convinced National Socialist; he became one as a result of the environment in which he had spent his youth, and which offered a soil which was only too fertile for the growth of that ideology ("Weltanschauung") which young Schirach embraced, because at that period he held it to be the right one. This environment of his childhood and a biased reading of political books, which the young man devoured in his hunger for knowledge, made of him, while still an inexperienced youth, also an anti-semite. It is true that he did not become an anti-semite in the sense of these fanatics who ended in ot receiling with horror from acts of violence and programs, nor in the sense of those fanatics who finally created an Auschwitz and murdered millions of Jews; but an anti-semite in that moderate sense, who would merely restrict Jewish influence in the government of the state and in cultural life, but for the rest would leave untouched the freedom and rights of Jewish fellocitizens, and who never thought of exterminating the Jewish people. At least that is the picture of Hitler's anti-Semitism which young Schirach drew for himself during those years.
That this was really Schirach's opinion is also substantiated by the statement which Schirach made here in the morning of 24 May 1946, in which he described without reservation the crimes committed by Hitler as a spot of shame in our history, as a crime which fills every German with shame ;
that statement in which he openly expresses that Auschwitz was bound to be the end of each and every racial policy and anti-Semitism. This statement came from the deepest spot in the heart of the defendant Schirach; it was the result of the terrible disclosures which these trials have brought to him also, and Schirach has given this statement here before the broadest public in order to bring back the German youth from a wrong road to the road of justice and tolerance. been raised against Schirach, and the major results which the evidence has shown in the individual points :
1. The defendant Schirach is first of all accused that before the seizure of power, that is before the year 1933, he actively furthered the National Socialist Party and the youth-organization affiliated with it, and that he had thereby contributed so that the Party could come into power. He had been, as is stated in the Trial Brief, a close and subordinate follower of Hitler; he had stood in blind loyalty to Hitler and the letter's National Socialist world of thinking; and he had, as leader of the student-league, led the students ideologically and politically to National Socialism and won them for it.
All this is not denied by Schirach in any manner : he has done what he is being accused of in this respect; this he confesses openly, and for this he naturally holds himself responsible today also. The only thing which he denies for this as also for the later time the more emphatically, is the accusation that he has participated in a conspiracy. According to Schirach's opinion, the Fuehrer-principle and dictatorship in their character and their theory are absolutely incompatible with the idea, of a conspiracy, and a conspiracy appears to him as a logical impossibility if many millions of members are to be included in it and if its existence and aims lie exposed before the country in question as well as the foreign countries. We furthermore know from the results of these trials that Hitler, aside from Bermann and Himmler did not have nay firend, any advisor, with whom he expressed himself as to his plans and aims; he rather drove the Fuehrer-principle to the furthest extremes.
He took no cognizance of any advisory meetings and discussions, but reached hi decisions solely by himself, without even listening to the opinion of those closest to him. With him there were only orders on his part and unconditional obedience on the other side and I do not wish to make any further statements about that chapter. That is how the"conspiracy" actually looked; and all of us who have lived through these trials would never have considered this most radical increase of the Fuehrer-principle possible had not all defendants and all witnesses who know about this, in complete agreement and without a single exception, shown the same picture to us again and again. he came completely under the influence of Hitler; that he had placed himself with his whole young personality in the service of this idea; and that at the time, as is stated in the indictment quite correctly, he was devoted to Hitler with unconditional loyalty. more experienced, mature Germans have committed with him, then you, gentlemen as Judges, may condemn him for this if our law code furnishes a legal basis for it. This then would be a further disappointment, in addition to the many others which he has already experienced for years. Schirach knows today that he has given loyal support into the end to a man who did not deserve this, an no also knows today that the ideas for which he was enthusiastic in his young years and for which he sacrificed himself led in practice to aims, which he himself had never thought of. But also the Schirach of today, cleansed by many experiences, cannot see any criminal act in that activity of his younger years carried out in good faith together with millions of other Germans, which he developed for Hitler and the latter's party. Because the Party at that time appeared quite legal to young Schirach, Schirach neverhad any doubt that it also came into power by legal means. The seizure of power by the Party, the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor by Reich President von repeated elections, confirmed for young Schirach again and again the legality of the movement which he had joined.
If today he is to be punished because he acknowledged this same Hitler as gnized as legal head of the state, Schirach could never acknowledge such a decision as being just. In spite of the severe judgment which he himself has pronounced in this Court Room about Hitler and had to pronounce here according to his convictions, he would feel himself a victim of his political convictions if he were to be sentenced because as a young enthusiastic man he had joined the National Socialist Party and collaborated in its construction and seizure of power. At the time he did not recognize that as a crime but from his standpoint he considered it his patriotic duty.
2. The second, far more important accusation which has been raised against the defendant von Schirach goes to the effect that he, as Reich Youth Leader in the years 1932-1940, to quote the accusation literally "poisoned the world of thought of the youth with the Nazi-ideology, and especially trained it for aggressive war." claims have not been substantiated either by the results of the evidence. The law on the Hitler Youth of 1936 described Schirach's task as Reich Youth Leader "to deucate the youth outside of the parental home and outside of the school physically, intellectually and morally for service to the people and to the community of the people, in the spirit of National Socialism through the Hitler Youth Movement and itsleader, the defendant v. Schirach." This is how for the program went, being repeated word for word in the enactment decree of 1939, which came out so late because Schirach did not intend to introduce compulsory membership until the movement would practically inclu de the entire German youth on the basis of voluntary membership, so that future joining by compulsion would exist on paper only. and writings, --because no other program of the Hitler Youth exists, does not contain a single word which would indicate a military education of youth, much less an education for aggressive warfare. But even in practice, the education of youth according to Schirach's ideas in no way gives evidence of a military education of German youth for such a purpose.
In that respect the point was stressed by the prosecution that the Hitler Youth was organized in various "Battalions and divisions". That is correct although the designations listed by the prosecution are not correct and although they do not have too least bit in common with military formations. But in the last analysis, every youth movement the world over will show a classification into smaller or larger units; each of these units naturally needs a name also, and it must also have a responsible leader. Similar to other countries, as also in the German Hitler Youth, the leader of the unit was designated by some sign of his rank.