Fleet Raeder had taken part in a conspiracy for waging wars of aggression and in particular supported Hitler and National Socialism, despite his alleged knowledge that Hitler from the beginning had the intention of conducting wars of aggression. at that time have reckoned with an intention of aggression on the part of Hitler? to do with National Socialism and know neither Hitler nor the Party collaborators; he get to know Hitler on 2 February 1933 when he and the other commanders were introduced to Hitler by Baron von Hammerstein. As chief of the Naval Command Staff, there was for Raeder only one superior, i.e. the President of the Reich von Hindenburg, who, according to the constitution and the Wehrmacht Law was the commander in chief of the whole Wehrmacht. As President of the Reich Hindenburg had appointed Hitler as Chancellor of the Reich, and thus was of necessity created a connection between Hitler and the Wehrmacht. Any decision of Raeder therefore did net come into consideration. As a subordinate to Hindenburg he had to put up with the political decision Hindenburg had taken as President of the Reich. The constitutional basis in regard to the Wehrmacht was in no way altered by the fact that Hitler came into power. As Chief of the Naval Command Staff Raeder took no part in this political decision, any more than he had taken part previously when Mueller of the Social Democratic Party or Bruening of the Center Party became chancellors of the Reich. his internal political decision, for Hitler explained to Raeder and the other high officers at the first conference of 2 February 1933 and particularly also upon the occasion of the first naval report in the same month, that nothing would be changed in the Wehrmacht and that the Wehrmacht was to remain outside of politics as provided by the constitution and the Wehrmacht Law. delivery of the naval report explained his fundamental ideasin regard to a peaceful policy, for which, in spite of the friendly revision of the Versaille Treaty that he was striving for, it was necessary to come to a reasonable understanding with England by virtue of treaty, in regard to the development of the Navy in keeping with the general limitations of naval armament.
During this conversation Hitler clearly gave to understand that he did not want to institute any Naval Armament race and that the development of the Navy was to take place only by friendly agreement with England. This was a thought which absolutely corresponded to the fundamental viewpoint of Raeder and of the Navy It would have been absolutely out of question for Raeder on this given basis to go to his superior Hindenburg and declare that because of Hitler he could no longer held the leadership of the Navy. Germany already knew Hitler's true intentions from Hitler's book "Mein Kampf". The Prosecution cited as proof several quotations partly torn from the context of Hitler's 1924 propaganda book. This line of argument by the Prosecution does not seem right because Hitler wrote this book as a private individual, belonging to an opposition party. In this trial it has several times been pointed out that the statements of private foreign individuals are irrelevant, oven when these foreigners are ever so well known and subsequently -- as in Hitler's case -- were given a position in their government. Raeder could be allowed to assume, as could anyone else, that as Reich Chancellor Hitler would not maintain all the party doctrines he defended years before purely as a member of the opposition, particularly not when the statements of Hitler on military matter contradicted these former party ideas. Moreover for the Navy, too relation to England was always decisive end in this very connection Hitler had even on page 154 of his book "Mein Kampf" declared verbatim:
"For such a policy of course there was only one possible partner: England Prosecution, that they are all taken from the 1933 edition and that, in spite of great pains the General Secretary's Office has been unable to procure an earlier edition, particularly the first edition of 1925 and 1927. It is a known fact that Hitler himself in later years made changes on many points in numerous places in his bock; it follows that the quotations from the 1933 edition cannot without further ado be taken as a basis.
wanted to depart from the described fundamental idea of a policy of understanding with England, end is it possible to follow the line of argument of the Prosecution that Raeder should have refused his further collaboration at any given time before 1939? and that the necessity of negation results quite naturally from the combining of various faces which were submitted by the Prosecution or by the Defense during the demonstration of evidence: with having thereupon taken an oath and particularly that he in this oath put the Fuehrer in the place of the Fatherland.
I must therefore only refer to the error made by the Prosecution in its assertion; the Prosecution itself produced document D-481 which indicates the official oath taken by the soldiers of the Wehrmacht on Hitler's orders. The document is a law signed by Hitler, Frick and Blomberg. According to this law it is ascertainable that it was not Raeder, who replaced the word Vaterland by Hitler, but that the latter himself had demanded that allegiance be pledged 10 him as Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht by all soldiers. Before the issue of the decree concerning this oath, cleverly deviced by Hitler and so portentous for the following years, Raeder had neither been informed of it nor had his advice been solicited as to the textual draft of this oath. He was simply summoned to the Reich Chancellery without being given a hint as to what it was all about. cal one, a question of legislation upon which Raeder in his capacity as soldier and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had no influence. political decisions and of having, as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, drafted on those occasions strategic plans and preparations. It is a question of the cases of the withdrawal from the League of Nations on 14 October 1933, the occupation of the Rhinoland on 7 March 1936, the Austrian Anschluss in March 1938, the incorporation of the Sudentenland in the fall of 1938 and the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939. I can refer to jointly in this connection. that Raeder has not politically taken part in any of these decisions. Raeder had never before been asked for any advice, he as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, had no authority to collaborate in such decisions. Raeders sole activity consisted in receiving these documents and messages, and in the subsequent issue of military orders, which he was supposed to draw up in anticipation of the event, should belligerent complications arise. It is wholly incomprehensible how a Commander-in-Chief of a branch of the Wehrmacht can be reproached for having made strategic preparations for possibly forthcoming belligerent complications.
I believe, that it is the same all over the world. An Admiral never takes part in political decisions, while being obliged to make certain precautionary preparations according to these political decisions of the Government. This again is a case of the discrepancy I have mentioned before with regard to the position of a military commander, which though considered by the Prosecution to be a political one, is a purely military position in reality. military commands, involved in political decisions or interested in them, were likewise making military plans. of Hitler were crimes or merely offenses against International Law, and particularly not if he was never summoned to the discussions. Neither the withdrawal from the League of Nations resulting from the failure of trying to have all countries disarm according to the Versailles Treaty - nor the occupation of the Sudetenland, nor the establishment of the Protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia could be regarded by the Prosecition as criminal activities committed by the uninterested Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in the sense of the indictment. There certainly were deviations from the Versailles Treaty, but even the British Chief Prosecutor, Sir Hartley Shawcross, himself, declared on 4 December 1945 that "many objections against Versailles were possibly justified." measures would have been justified for the purpose of a revision of this treaty, but not a war.
without a war, and therefore come under the category of measures considered justified by Justice Jackson, even more so since they were silently tolerate by foreign countries, as for instance in the case of the incorporation of the Sudetenland, Munich Agreement of September 1938, or in the case of Austria where an agreement was made with the affected country itself. establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, rightfully points out from an impartial and retrospective point of view that Hitler had used most doubtful and possibly criminal measures for this achievement, it can have no significance for the Commander in Chief of the Navy, since it is firmly established that he was not informed about these activities, and far less about the measures used. ed of the details concerning the Austrian Anschluss nor of the kind of conference which ultimately led to an agreement with President Hacha. He never Knew of the discussions with Hacha, nor of the menace of a bombardment of Prague -- expressed in the xourse of this discussion - in which case I might refer to the depositions of the witnesses Raeder and Schultz- Moenting. All these measures were therefore in the eyes of Raeder, activities admitted by International Law, or agreements which could not lead him to interfere in any way or to make any inquiries of Hitler, quite apart from the fact that he as military commander would have no right whatsoever to do so. military standpoint even if complications had arisen, which is evident immediately from the location of the countries concerned. It would have been impossible if the almost completely disinterested Commander-in-chief of the navy had paid attention to these things, although hardly any naval prepare for were under considerations. One should keep in mind the case of Czechoslovakia. in which connection document 388- S has a provision that the navy is to parti cipate in possible army operations by commitment of the Danube flotilla which for that purpose comes under the orders of the High Command of the Army, a flotilla consisting of very small ships, that is of a few gunboats, if I remember correctly.
Hartley Shawcross of 4 December 1945 concerning the German-Polish non-aggression pact of 1934:
"Hitler, by concluding this treaty, convinced many people that his in tentions were really peaceful." February 1938. The fact proved in the meantime, that the secret cabinet council was purely a farce, is equally correct. It is therefore unnecessary to deal with this point which was in the beginning considered so important by the Prosecution. ment and Reichsminister has been refuted in the same manner. This claim of the Prosecution has been incomprehensible from the start. Document 2098 PS presented by the Prosecution only states in an absolutely unequivocal manner, the von Brauchitsch the Commander-in-chief of the Army and Raeder the Commanderin-Chief of the Navy held a rank equivilant to that of a Reich Minister." This proves, that he was no Minister but for reasons of etiquette held a rank equal to that of Reich Minister. This stakes it evident that Raeder was not assigned any political task through this decree of Hitler, as the prosecution would like to have it. receive the right to participate in cabinet sessions if he wished to do so, but. as stated by Hitler in the above-mentioned document only, "upon my order". This therefore means nothing more that that Raeder could have been called upon to participate in a cabinet session if technical naval problems were involved. In reality this politically unmaterial, hypothetical case never did occur. 2194 PS can also not be considered incriminating. On the one hand it dais, as becomes evident from the text, only with "measures for the preparation of Reich defense", therefore not with political activity nor with activity connected in any political sense with aggressive war.
Moreover, Raeder, contrary to the claim of the Prosecution, according to Document to the created Ministerial Council for Reich Defense at that time, and this simply for the reason that he was not a Minister. Defense Council or Reich Defense Committee. I want to remind you of the wellknown fact that there existed in the British Government already a long time before the First World War a Reich Defense Committee which was of much greater importance than the equivalent institution in Germany. of the Prosecution that Raeder had been a party member has also proved untenable. It is true that Raeder received the golden insignia of honor from Hitler; this was nothing else, however, than the award of a medal and it couldn't be anything else, because a soldier could not be a member of the Party. This becomes evident beyond doubt from Paragraph 36 of the Armed Forces Law, according to which soldiers can never engage in politics and which forbids them to be a member of a political organization. sufficiently that Raeder never had connections with the party, that he rather had differences of opinion with party circles and that he was spurned by typical National Socialists because of his political and religious attitude; for instance he had on Goebbels the same effect as a red rag on a bull, and this was no wonder either, for on the one hand he prevented the Party again and again from obtaining any influence on the officer corps of the navy, and on the other hand assisted the Church to the greatest extent, contrary to the principles of the Party, and saw to it that the spirit of the navy received a Christian basis. I may refer in this connection to the typical National Socialist phrase of Bormann:
"National Socialistic and Christian concepts are incompatible."
strongly in a train of thought contradictory to the culture against Christianity so violently propagandized for the destruction of all Christian ideas, that this attitude toward the party sufficiently proves that Raeder, as a convinced Christian never could have affiliated himself with the Party.
the fundamentals of his policy to make Germany by peaceful means a sound and strong nation and that it was absolutely necessary for peaceful development to acknowledge British hegemony and to come to an agreement with England about the size of the German fleet and, if possible, even to come to an alliance, These ideas agreed with the fundamental attitude of Raeder, who stated it in detail during his examination. Within the limits of my defense, it may be an open question, if an when Hitler abandoned that basic thought. For in any case Hitler has always emphasized this basic thought to Raeder and also supported it by deeds; this ever recurring thought runs like a red thread all through the years until the outbreak of war. The realization of this thought led to the conclusion of the German-British naval agreement in 1935, the conclusion of the German-British naval agreement of 1937, the agreement about submarines with Lord Cunningham in 1938 and to the London protocol of 30 June 1939 concerning the battleships. This, throughout the years of the reconstruction of the German navy runs always the same idea, namely ever the idea of agreeing with England, of acknowledging England's supremacy and of avoiding any difference which might lead to a break with England. facts proved during this trial, it may be an established fact that Hitler at some time, probably in 1938, may have become unfaithful to his own thought and that thereby he has become guilty of the tragic fate of Germany. thing is not that which must be acknowledged as being objectively true after having a knowledge of all facts, but the only decisive thing is whether Raeder has realized or could ever possibly know of this deviation by Hitler from his own ideas. This, however, is not the case, Raeder could not guess, and even less know that Hitler had at any given time become unfaithful to his own political ideas which he had repeatedly stressed and demonstrated and thus had become guilty of instigating the frightful danger of World War II.
period before the war, Hitler sopke to him differently from what he thought, and also sopke differently from the way he acted. In the matter of the Navy, in particular, the relatively slow rebuilding of the German fleet showed that Hitler intended to remain faithful to the train of thought I referred to. A change of mind on Hitler's part in this connection was not perceptible; for a change of mind would have had precisely the result that die would have developed the navy to a larger extent than lie did. He would then have had at least fully to exploit the possibility of the German-British naval agreement as to the size of the respective fleets. According to the naval agreement, the German fleet was allowed a total tonnage of 420,593 tons. As a matter of fact, this maximum was never reached. Even in regard to battleships, Germany remained short of the naval agreement, with the result that the battleships "Dismarck" and "Tirpitz" were not available in the first year of the war, and therefore could take no part in the occupation of Norwar; the "Bismarck"was completed only in August 1940, and the "Tirpitz" in 1941. have the same tonnage of submarines as England. Actually, however, U-hear construction was so little speeded up, that at the beginning of the war in 1939, as the evidence has proved, Germany had available early the minimum figure of 26 submarines suitable for Atlantic service. And further, as late as end of May 1939, according to document L.79, the so-called "Little Schmindt" was instructed verbatim that "nothing is changed in the shipbuilding program". commander in chief of the navy, from his point of view, and from this field of action, that Hitler would stand by his oft stressed basic line, not to allow a war to came to pass.
was to the utmost extent strengthened by the attitude of foreign countries:
Winston Churchill wrote in 1935 in his book, "Great Contemporaries":
"It is not possible to pass just judgement on a personality in public life who has reached the enormous proportions of Adolf Hitler, before his life's work stands revealed before us as a whole...... We cannot say whether Hitler will be the man who one, again will unleash a world war in which civilization will go down irrevocably, or whether he will enter history as the man who has restored the honor and the peaceful intent of the great German nation, and has brought it back, cheerful, helpful and strong to the front rank of the European family of nations". year 1936, the representatives of the foreign countries appeared in a body and greeted Hitler in a manner which, in its approval and partial enthusiasm, was incomprehensible to many Germans who were sceptically inclined. Subsequently, the greatest foreign politicians and also members of various governments have visited Hitler and reached a complete understanding with him, and finally, in the austiun of 1938, an understanding was again reached under Chamberlain and Halifax which strengthened Hitler immeasurably, and by means of which Hitler tried to prove to the Germans, how correct all of his actions had been, as they were being recognized by foreign countries. The proclamation defining their aims, which was issued by Hitler and Chamberlain in Munich on 30 September 1938, cannot be estimated high enough. I would, therefore, like to cite the two first decisive phrases from Raeder Exhibit No.23:
"Today we had a further discussion, and agree in the realization that the question of German-English relations is of primary importance for both countries and for Europe.
"We regard the agreement which was signed last night, and the German-English Naval treaty as symbolic of the wish of our two nations never again to conduct war against each other". ask: Can it be demanded that a German Grand-Admiral, who has never been a politician and always only a soldier, should have looked farther ahead in judging Hitler than the great British statesmen, Chamberlain and Churchill? I believe that the form of the question already harbors the negative form of the answer. points of view with some few documents which might speak for Raeder's knowledge of Hitler's affressive plans. The Prosecution has presented indeed, innumerable documents in which it pointed out that Raeder or the Naval Operations Staff or the Supreme Command of the Navy received a copy. However, in a very considerable number of documents the Prosecution could not state anything beyond the fact that Raeder received a copy, while a realistic connection on the subject did not exist for the most part and was not presented by the Prosecution either. It is naturally not surprising that military documents, for the sake of uniformity, went to all branches of the armed forces, oven if in individual cases one branch of the armed forces was not at all, or hardly concerned with them. Of all these documents in the case of Raeder, only the 4 documents which the Prosecution described as key documents, because of their importance, can be really incriminating. These are the four speeches of Hitler, when he was commander-in-chief of 5 November 1937, 23 May 1939, 22 August 1939, 23 November 1939, to the Commanders-in-Chief. pation in the conspiracy, and that it could be clearly recognized from these speeches that Hitler wanted to wage wars of aggression.
I would therefore like to state my opinion in detail as to these documents, and in so doing show why these documents cannot influence the picture which I have given as a whole. sequent historical findings as to what trains of thought have directed Hitler and for the reason that they are expressions of opinion by Hitler, and in spite of the large extent of the captured documentary material there exist almost no written drafts by Hitler. First of all the thought is also no written drafts by Hitler. First of all the thought is also attractive that the contents must be ture, because they deal with expressions of opinion which were only expressed before a small circle, before which Hitler, in accordance with his nature, preferred to express himself openly rather than in his public speeches. Even though I do not fail to recognize the value of the documents in any way, I still believe that the Prosecution overestimates by far the importance of these 4 documents. They certainly are key-documents to a certain extent, and that inasfar as they provide the key to the recognition of Hitler psychologically and to the understanding of Hitler's methods. The documents, however, are not a key to the real intentions of Hitler and particularly not a standard for the final conclusions which the listener would have had to draw from these documents, according to the opinion of the Prosecution. connection, I would like to group in advance several general points which apply equally to each of these 4 documents. All these points limit the evidential valve of these documents which was overestimated by the Prosecution: do not have the actual text of any speech. In accordance with this, Hoesbach in the record of 5 November 1937 correctly chose the indirect address, just like General Admiral Boehm in his record of the speech of 22 August 1939. Surprisingly and not quite correctly, Schmundt chose the direct address in the record; however, he was at least careful, and stated in the beginning that Hitler's statements were being reproduced "according to their sense."
August 1939, submitted by the Prosecution, have chosen the direct address and the authors of this document whose names unknown, have not even considered it necessary to give an indication, as was done by Schmundt. However this may be, in considering the documents it must be kept in mind that they were not reproduced word by word, and that therefore the reliability of the reproduction depends on the manner of work and attitude of the originator of the document, especially on the fact of if an how many notes the individual made during the speech, and when he prepared his record. In connection with this appears important that the Adjutant Hossbach, as is shown by document 386 PS only made the record a full 5 days later, to wit, only on 10 November, while the speech had already been made on 5 November. In the case of Schmundt, a date for the record is missing altogether, and likewise in the two Prosecution documents regarding the speech of 22 august 1939. The latter also lacks the signature, so that in this case it cannot even be ascertained who bears the responsibility for the record at all. The same applies to the document regarding the speech of 23 November 1939, so many formal mistakes add just as many doubts concerning the value as evidence and reliability of the document certifies, in lieu of oath, that he wrote down Hitler's speech simultaneously and of particularly important parts jotted down the exact text, and who further more certifies that on the same evening he wrote down the final draft which has been submitted here. If in all these documents the true text does not exist, then it is plain how important it is if it can at least be established that the record was made simultaneously with the speech, or at least on the very same day, and not, as in the case of Hossbach, 5 days later. Even the best Adjutant with the best of memories who daily has to handle quite many new things, can not possibly make an absolutely reliable reproduction of a speech after 5 days. to other military documents these are not official documents with a distribution list, therefore not documents which were subsequently received by those concerned.
That the documents were not received by Raeder was established in the evidence by him and the witness Schulte-Moenting, apart from the fact that it is already shown by the lack of a distribution list on the document. This point particularly, appears of great importance to me. Listening to a speech once listener to final conclusions in the same way as the presentation of a record, by which he can always make certain inquiries about the contents of the speech We who have come to know these speeches in the proceedings by way of wirting and have again and again judged them by the wording, naturally consider the individual words and application of phrases more important than we would have done with a quickly-delivered address. In addition to this there is the fact that all of us easily tend to lend more importance to the individual application of phrases, because all of us now can overlook everything better from the present standpoint and out of more extensive knowledge : because we do not only have one speech to base our opinions on, but also all speeches and in addition all the many other documents which show the historical development. In discussing these documents it must again and again be kept in mind how different the individual listener will react to the spoken word, and how frequently, after a few hours even, the reports of various listeners will differ from one another. piracy, and presents it in such a manner, as if Hitler had on this occasion consulted with the Commanders, and had then concluded a certain plan of conspiracy with them, and had finally reached a certain decision. The Prosecution must maintain this, because in this lies the basis of a conspiracy, which can only then be spoken of if something is being planned in common. In reality contrary to what the Prosecution states no influential group of Nazis assembled in order to examine the situation and to make decisions, but it was rather a one-sided presentation by Hitler in which no discussion and no consultation took place. No decision was reached, either, but Hitler rather spoke quite generally about possibilities of developments. As far as one could speak of resolutions at all, it was merely a matter of the sole decision of Hitler. All this stands in contrast to a real conspiracy.
I furthermore have the impression that the Prosecution, in its conception of a conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, has formed for itself a completely false picture of the real power conditions in the National-Socialist State. In my opinion. it fails to recognize the characteristics of a dictatorship and it actually may be very difficult to understand the immeasurable dictatorial power of Hitler if one has not personally constantly lived through the whole 12 years in Germany, and in particular in its development from the first beginnings until it finally became a dictatorship, which worked with the most terrible, the most horrible and the most undignified human terror. A dictator like Hitler, who further more obviously exercised an immense suggestive and fascinating force, is not the President of a parliamentary government. I have the impression that the Prosecution in judging the situation as a whole has never completely freed itself from the idea of the a parliamentary government, and it has never taken the uncompromising work of a dictator into account. of the Cabinet or between him and the Commanders is averse to Hitler's mind became evident in the course of this trial through numerous examinations of witnesses. Particularly striking in that respect, was the testimony of the Swedish industrialist Dahlerus, who by reason of his contacts with England and with Germany -in each case equally excellent and extensive- was in cours of time enabled to obtain an objective picture of England as well as Germany, and who during his negotiations with Chamberlain and Halifax on one hand, and Hitler and Goering on the other hand, was best prepared to recognize the difference between the Parliamentary British Government and the German Hitler Dictatorship. The accounts of Dahlerus prove convincingly that the difference was such that no bridging-over was possible. After having spoken with Chamberl ain and Halifax, a discussion with the Cabinet took place, naturally before a final decision was taken. On the other hand, in the night of 26 to 27 August 1939, when Dahlerus had a discussion of the utmost importance with Hitler in which only Goering was present , Hitler at once made 6 prepositions, without saying a word to any of the Cabinet members or any of the military commanders, without even advising with Goering who sat there silently :proposals, by the way, which in no manner were in line with what he had said to Sir Nevil Henderson.
A stronger argument against a conspiracy with Commanders or members of Cabinet there hardly exists, unless reference be made to the equally important fact which the witness Dahlerus added, namely that during the entire two and a half hours Goering did not once dare to open his mouth, and that it was a humiliation to see the degree of servility which Hitler demanded of Goering, his closest associate.
All of these Hitler speeches are full of contradictions. Such contradictions naturally impair clarity of thought, and they rob the individual thought of its importance. Reading documents in their entirety, the number of contradictions becomes evident, a fact on which a remark by witness Admiral Schuelte-Moenting during examination and cross-examination was much to the point. It is just because of such contradictions and inconsistent thoughts that the evidential value of documents is diminished. It is quite natural that for a military Adjutant such as Hessbach or Schmundt, it is difficult to record an unclear and contradictory train of thought; and it is equally easy to understand that a military adjutant will be inclined to introduce as clear a line of thought as possible, and because of such endeaver he may happen to stress thoughts which have become clear to him more strongly than they actually presented themselves in the orally pronounced word. To this should be added the very appropriate remark of Raeder - who not only points to contradictions, but to Hitler's extraordinary sense of imagination, and who in that respect termed him "Master of bluff". definite tendency. He had a definite purpose in view namely to bring about a desired impression on all or some of his hearers, either through intended exaggeration or by making things appear deliberately harmless, depending upon the purpose he pursued. While he spoke, Hitler followed the intuition of the moment. As Schulte-Moenting termed it, he freed himself of his concept. He thought out loud and wanted to carry his hearers with him, but he did not wish to be taken at his word. One must agree with me that with such practices and such purposefully designed speeches there is at this time nothing really reliable to go by in order to discover Hitler's true opinion.
In addition to that there is the following point of view for all these documents in general:
Following his address of 23 Hay 1939--the so-called "Small Schmundt" -- Raeder had an interview with Hitler alone, in which he called Hitler's attention to contradictions in that address and, on the other hand, to contradictions deriving from the wordsa remark previously made to him by Hitler - that under all circumstances he would also settle the case of Poland peacefully. Hitler then calmed Raeder down and told him that he, Hitler, had a firm hold of matters, politically. This was stated by the witness Schulte-Moenting who added that Hitler allayed Raeder's fears by an example of the contradiction between the speeches of 23 May 1939 and his other statements. He told him, that for him (Hitler) t here were three ways of keeping things secret: firstly, the conversation with someone without other witness: secondly, the thoughts which he, Hitler, kept to himself and, thirdly, thoughts which he, himself, did not even think through to the end. how little reliance could ultimately be placed or statements made by Hitler, before a snail or large group of people. It seems to me quite natural, then, that in his deliberations Raeder kept neither to Hitler's general speeches nor to the address to the Commander which was discussed here, but that he went solely by what Hitler had told him when alone with him. In that respect, however, testimonies by Schulte-Moenting, Boehm and Albrecht are in agreement in that they prove that as late as the year 1939, Hitler still gave Raeder repeatedly the explicit assurance that there would be no war; that is, he did this on occasions when for some reason or other Raeder was particularly worried and wanted to call Hitler's attention to danger's ahead.
the so-called key documents are extremely interesting for a psychological opinion on Hitler; their evidential value as regards Hitler's real intentions, however, is very circumscribed and weak. No one can expect Raeder to accept, for his guidance, tendencious speeches made by Hitler before his Commanders on the spur of the moment, but he based himself on assurances given him by Hitler, with no one else present, and on the fact that until the summer of 1939, until the outbreak of the war, these assurances were in perfect accord with facts and Hitler's actions, namely, with the four Naval Agreements and the Munich Pact.
There is some justification for Rader's not permitting himself to have this basic attitude shattered by the speeches to the Commanders-in-Chief, though undoubtedly of a suspicious nature, but that he held steadfastly to his belief that Hitler would not deceive him. From the fact that we subsequently come to find that after all Hitler deceived Raeder in his private conversations, as well as by his special method of second a nd third classification of secrecy, as described a bove, no guilt is attached to Raeder, but solely to Hitler. Considering the voluminous amount of evidential matter, there is no justification in it for evidence proving that even in 1938 and 1939 Raeder planned for a war of aggression, in violation of International Law; it reveals only the intention on the part of Hitler to engage in a war of aggression, in violation of International Law. I am now asking the Tribunal's permission to add a few points to each individual document, since the Prosecution over and over again stressed such documents as basis for their charge of conspiracy.
Discussion of 5 November 1937 in the Reich Chancellery: and they were cited often enough by the Prosecution. In dis cussing that document it should, at the same time, be taken into consideration that Goering and Raeder unanimously stated that Hitler announced in advance that he wished to express a certain trend by his speech.