was to the utmost extent strengthened by the attitude of foreign countries:
Winston Churchill wrote in 1935 in his book, "Great Contemporaries":
"It is not possible to pass just judgement on a personality in public life who has reached the enormous proportions of Adolf Hitler, before his life's work stands revealed before us as a whole...... We cannot say whether Hitler will be the man who one, again will unleash a world war in which civilization will go down irrevocably, or whether he will enter history as the man who has restored the honor and the peaceful intent of the great German nation, and has brought it back, cheerful, helpful and strong to the front rank of the European family of nations". year 1936, the representatives of the foreign countries appeared in a body and greeted Hitler in a manner which, in its approval and partial enthusiasm, was incomprehensible to many Germans who were sceptically inclined. Subsequently, the greatest foreign politicians and also members of various governments have visited Hitler and reached a complete understanding with him, and finally, in the austiun of 1938, an understanding was again reached under Chamberlain and Halifax which strengthened Hitler immeasurably, and by means of which Hitler tried to prove to the Germans, how correct all of his actions had been, as they were being recognized by foreign countries. The proclamation defining their aims, which was issued by Hitler and Chamberlain in Munich on 30 September 1938, cannot be estimated high enough. I would, therefore, like to cite the two first decisive phrases from Raeder Exhibit No.23:
"Today we had a further discussion, and agree in the realization that the question of German-English relations is of primary importance for both countries and for Europe.
"We regard the agreement which was signed last night, and the German-English Naval treaty as symbolic of the wish of our two nations never again to conduct war against each other". ask: Can it be demanded that a German Grand-Admiral, who has never been a politician and always only a soldier, should have looked farther ahead in judging Hitler than the great British statesmen, Chamberlain and Churchill? I believe that the form of the question already harbors the negative form of the answer. points of view with some few documents which might speak for Raeder's knowledge of Hitler's affressive plans. The Prosecution has presented indeed, innumerable documents in which it pointed out that Raeder or the Naval Operations Staff or the Supreme Command of the Navy received a copy. However, in a very considerable number of documents the Prosecution could not state anything beyond the fact that Raeder received a copy, while a realistic connection on the subject did not exist for the most part and was not presented by the Prosecution either. It is naturally not surprising that military documents, for the sake of uniformity, went to all branches of the armed forces, oven if in individual cases one branch of the armed forces was not at all, or hardly concerned with them. Of all these documents in the case of Raeder, only the 4 documents which the Prosecution described as key documents, because of their importance, can be really incriminating. These are the four speeches of Hitler, when he was commander-in-chief of 5 November 1937, 23 May 1939, 22 August 1939, 23 November 1939, to the Commanders-in-Chief. pation in the conspiracy, and that it could be clearly recognized from these speeches that Hitler wanted to wage wars of aggression.
I would therefore like to state my opinion in detail as to these documents, and in so doing show why these documents cannot influence the picture which I have given as a whole. sequent historical findings as to what trains of thought have directed Hitler and for the reason that they are expressions of opinion by Hitler, and in spite of the large extent of the captured documentary material there exist almost no written drafts by Hitler. First of all the thought is also no written drafts by Hitler. First of all the thought is also attractive that the contents must be ture, because they deal with expressions of opinion which were only expressed before a small circle, before which Hitler, in accordance with his nature, preferred to express himself openly rather than in his public speeches. Even though I do not fail to recognize the value of the documents in any way, I still believe that the Prosecution overestimates by far the importance of these 4 documents. They certainly are key-documents to a certain extent, and that inasfar as they provide the key to the recognition of Hitler psychologically and to the understanding of Hitler's methods. The documents, however, are not a key to the real intentions of Hitler and particularly not a standard for the final conclusions which the listener would have had to draw from these documents, according to the opinion of the Prosecution. connection, I would like to group in advance several general points which apply equally to each of these 4 documents. All these points limit the evidential valve of these documents which was overestimated by the Prosecution: do not have the actual text of any speech. In accordance with this, Hoesbach in the record of 5 November 1937 correctly chose the indirect address, just like General Admiral Boehm in his record of the speech of 22 August 1939. Surprisingly and not quite correctly, Schmundt chose the direct address in the record; however, he was at least careful, and stated in the beginning that Hitler's statements were being reproduced "according to their sense."
August 1939, submitted by the Prosecution, have chosen the direct address and the authors of this document whose names unknown, have not even considered it necessary to give an indication, as was done by Schmundt. However this may be, in considering the documents it must be kept in mind that they were not reproduced word by word, and that therefore the reliability of the reproduction depends on the manner of work and attitude of the originator of the document, especially on the fact of if an how many notes the individual made during the speech, and when he prepared his record. In connection with this appears important that the Adjutant Hossbach, as is shown by document 386 PS only made the record a full 5 days later, to wit, only on 10 November, while the speech had already been made on 5 November. In the case of Schmundt, a date for the record is missing altogether, and likewise in the two Prosecution documents regarding the speech of 22 august 1939. The latter also lacks the signature, so that in this case it cannot even be ascertained who bears the responsibility for the record at all. The same applies to the document regarding the speech of 23 November 1939, so many formal mistakes add just as many doubts concerning the value as evidence and reliability of the document certifies, in lieu of oath, that he wrote down Hitler's speech simultaneously and of particularly important parts jotted down the exact text, and who further more certifies that on the same evening he wrote down the final draft which has been submitted here. If in all these documents the true text does not exist, then it is plain how important it is if it can at least be established that the record was made simultaneously with the speech, or at least on the very same day, and not, as in the case of Hossbach, 5 days later. Even the best Adjutant with the best of memories who daily has to handle quite many new things, can not possibly make an absolutely reliable reproduction of a speech after 5 days. to other military documents these are not official documents with a distribution list, therefore not documents which were subsequently received by those concerned.
That the documents were not received by Raeder was established in the evidence by him and the witness Schulte-Moenting, apart from the fact that it is already shown by the lack of a distribution list on the document. This point particularly, appears of great importance to me. Listening to a speech once listener to final conclusions in the same way as the presentation of a record, by which he can always make certain inquiries about the contents of the speech We who have come to know these speeches in the proceedings by way of wirting and have again and again judged them by the wording, naturally consider the individual words and application of phrases more important than we would have done with a quickly-delivered address. In addition to this there is the fact that all of us easily tend to lend more importance to the individual application of phrases, because all of us now can overlook everything better from the present standpoint and out of more extensive knowledge : because we do not only have one speech to base our opinions on, but also all speeches and in addition all the many other documents which show the historical development. In discussing these documents it must again and again be kept in mind how different the individual listener will react to the spoken word, and how frequently, after a few hours even, the reports of various listeners will differ from one another. piracy, and presents it in such a manner, as if Hitler had on this occasion consulted with the Commanders, and had then concluded a certain plan of conspiracy with them, and had finally reached a certain decision. The Prosecution must maintain this, because in this lies the basis of a conspiracy, which can only then be spoken of if something is being planned in common. In reality contrary to what the Prosecution states no influential group of Nazis assembled in order to examine the situation and to make decisions, but it was rather a one-sided presentation by Hitler in which no discussion and no consultation took place. No decision was reached, either, but Hitler rather spoke quite generally about possibilities of developments. As far as one could speak of resolutions at all, it was merely a matter of the sole decision of Hitler. All this stands in contrast to a real conspiracy.
I furthermore have the impression that the Prosecution, in its conception of a conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, has formed for itself a completely false picture of the real power conditions in the National-Socialist State. In my opinion. it fails to recognize the characteristics of a dictatorship and it actually may be very difficult to understand the immeasurable dictatorial power of Hitler if one has not personally constantly lived through the whole 12 years in Germany, and in particular in its development from the first beginnings until it finally became a dictatorship, which worked with the most terrible, the most horrible and the most undignified human terror. A dictator like Hitler, who further more obviously exercised an immense suggestive and fascinating force, is not the President of a parliamentary government. I have the impression that the Prosecution in judging the situation as a whole has never completely freed itself from the idea of the a parliamentary government, and it has never taken the uncompromising work of a dictator into account. of the Cabinet or between him and the Commanders is averse to Hitler's mind became evident in the course of this trial through numerous examinations of witnesses. Particularly striking in that respect, was the testimony of the Swedish industrialist Dahlerus, who by reason of his contacts with England and with Germany -in each case equally excellent and extensive- was in cours of time enabled to obtain an objective picture of England as well as Germany, and who during his negotiations with Chamberlain and Halifax on one hand, and Hitler and Goering on the other hand, was best prepared to recognize the difference between the Parliamentary British Government and the German Hitler Dictatorship. The accounts of Dahlerus prove convincingly that the difference was such that no bridging-over was possible. After having spoken with Chamberl ain and Halifax, a discussion with the Cabinet took place, naturally before a final decision was taken. On the other hand, in the night of 26 to 27 August 1939, when Dahlerus had a discussion of the utmost importance with Hitler in which only Goering was present , Hitler at once made 6 prepositions, without saying a word to any of the Cabinet members or any of the military commanders, without even advising with Goering who sat there silently :proposals, by the way, which in no manner were in line with what he had said to Sir Nevil Henderson.
A stronger argument against a conspiracy with Commanders or members of Cabinet there hardly exists, unless reference be made to the equally important fact which the witness Dahlerus added, namely that during the entire two and a half hours Goering did not once dare to open his mouth, and that it was a humiliation to see the degree of servility which Hitler demanded of Goering, his closest associate.
All of these Hitler speeches are full of contradictions. Such contradictions naturally impair clarity of thought, and they rob the individual thought of its importance. Reading documents in their entirety, the number of contradictions becomes evident, a fact on which a remark by witness Admiral Schuelte-Moenting during examination and cross-examination was much to the point. It is just because of such contradictions and inconsistent thoughts that the evidential value of documents is diminished. It is quite natural that for a military Adjutant such as Hessbach or Schmundt, it is difficult to record an unclear and contradictory train of thought; and it is equally easy to understand that a military adjutant will be inclined to introduce as clear a line of thought as possible, and because of such endeaver he may happen to stress thoughts which have become clear to him more strongly than they actually presented themselves in the orally pronounced word. To this should be added the very appropriate remark of Raeder - who not only points to contradictions, but to Hitler's extraordinary sense of imagination, and who in that respect termed him "Master of bluff". definite tendency. He had a definite purpose in view namely to bring about a desired impression on all or some of his hearers, either through intended exaggeration or by making things appear deliberately harmless, depending upon the purpose he pursued. While he spoke, Hitler followed the intuition of the moment. As Schulte-Moenting termed it, he freed himself of his concept. He thought out loud and wanted to carry his hearers with him, but he did not wish to be taken at his word. One must agree with me that with such practices and such purposefully designed speeches there is at this time nothing really reliable to go by in order to discover Hitler's true opinion.
In addition to that there is the following point of view for all these documents in general:
Following his address of 23 Hay 1939--the so-called "Small Schmundt" -- Raeder had an interview with Hitler alone, in which he called Hitler's attention to contradictions in that address and, on the other hand, to contradictions deriving from the wordsa remark previously made to him by Hitler - that under all circumstances he would also settle the case of Poland peacefully. Hitler then calmed Raeder down and told him that he, Hitler, had a firm hold of matters, politically. This was stated by the witness Schulte-Moenting who added that Hitler allayed Raeder's fears by an example of the contradiction between the speeches of 23 May 1939 and his other statements. He told him, that for him (Hitler) t here were three ways of keeping things secret: firstly, the conversation with someone without other witness: secondly, the thoughts which he, Hitler, kept to himself and, thirdly, thoughts which he, himself, did not even think through to the end. how little reliance could ultimately be placed or statements made by Hitler, before a snail or large group of people. It seems to me quite natural, then, that in his deliberations Raeder kept neither to Hitler's general speeches nor to the address to the Commander which was discussed here, but that he went solely by what Hitler had told him when alone with him. In that respect, however, testimonies by Schulte-Moenting, Boehm and Albrecht are in agreement in that they prove that as late as the year 1939, Hitler still gave Raeder repeatedly the explicit assurance that there would be no war; that is, he did this on occasions when for some reason or other Raeder was particularly worried and wanted to call Hitler's attention to danger's ahead.
the so-called key documents are extremely interesting for a psychological opinion on Hitler; their evidential value as regards Hitler's real intentions, however, is very circumscribed and weak. No one can expect Raeder to accept, for his guidance, tendencious speeches made by Hitler before his Commanders on the spur of the moment, but he based himself on assurances given him by Hitler, with no one else present, and on the fact that until the summer of 1939, until the outbreak of the war, these assurances were in perfect accord with facts and Hitler's actions, namely, with the four Naval Agreements and the Munich Pact.
There is some justification for Rader's not permitting himself to have this basic attitude shattered by the speeches to the Commanders-in-Chief, though undoubtedly of a suspicious nature, but that he held steadfastly to his belief that Hitler would not deceive him. From the fact that we subsequently come to find that after all Hitler deceived Raeder in his private conversations, as well as by his special method of second a nd third classification of secrecy, as described a bove, no guilt is attached to Raeder, but solely to Hitler. Considering the voluminous amount of evidential matter, there is no justification in it for evidence proving that even in 1938 and 1939 Raeder planned for a war of aggression, in violation of International Law; it reveals only the intention on the part of Hitler to engage in a war of aggression, in violation of International Law. I am now asking the Tribunal's permission to add a few points to each individual document, since the Prosecution over and over again stressed such documents as basis for their charge of conspiracy.
Discussion of 5 November 1937 in the Reich Chancellery: and they were cited often enough by the Prosecution. In dis cussing that document it should, at the same time, be taken into consideration that Goering and Raeder unanimously stated that Hitler announced in advance that he wished to express a certain trend by his speech.
Hitler was dissatisfied with remeasures taken by Field Mars hal von Blomberg, and especially these of Generaloberst von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he felt that rearmament made but also progress in the army. As a result, Hitler made a point of exaggerating a fact known only to Goering and to Raeder, so that it is but natural that the impression of that Speech on Neurath, who had no idea about this intention, was entirely different and deeply alarming. what he wanted, because the two last paragraphs of the document indicate that to same extent Blomberg and Fritsch saw through Hitler's scheming, and that his exaggerations failed to deceive them. Though on similar occasions Hitler did not permit discussions, Blomberg and Fritsch intervened on this occasion and pointed to the need of preventing England and Fra nce from lining up as Germany's adversaries. Blomberg explained the reasons for his protest, and in the penultimate paragraph the document unmistakably expressed his scepticism as to Hitler's words, in that he remarked that under such circumstances he would not be able to carry out his planned vacation abroad scheduled to begin on 10 November. came round and, in contrast to his early statements, declared himself convinced of England's non-participation, and that, consequently, he also did not believe in military action by France against Germany.
The lack of tenability of Hitler's ideas shown in this document finds further expression in that he took as starting point for his statements an idea truly fantastic, namely an Italo-French-English war or -- equally fantastic -- a civil war in France.
Continuing such contradictions, Hitler mentioned in his speech an application of force on one hand, an attack by Poland against East Prussia on the other hand -- something which bore out a defensive idea only; and in regard to Czechoslovakia he said that in all probability England and France had already written Czechoslovakia off their books without further ado. This hint is an indication, however, that Hitler was prepared to negotiate, and this is in keeping with actual historic developments. He mentions that Lower Austria and Czechoslovakia will be brought to their knees but, nevertheless, one year later, in March, as well as in September 1938, he carried on negotiations and settled both questions without war. This fact in particular seems very significant, in that it proved to Raeder by the events which collowed that he was right in not ascribing undue importance to Hitler's rash words of 5 November 1937, because they were not supported by the fact that in reality Hitler, at a later date, carried on negotiations. second Naval Pact that had been concluded with England just a few months earlier and that as a result he could not really expect Hitler seriously to leave a path on which he was engaged.
And as a last point of view: Throughout its entire length, the document is dealing with political questions on one hand,and with possible land operations on the other. Raeder had nothing whatever to do with political questions because he was no politician: while Neurath as Foreign Minister naturally had reason to place greater importance on Hitler's political attitude. It is of equal importance that Neurath testified that, as a result of that speech, he too asked Hitler in a confidential interview for his personal attitude, and that he refused to continue in the Foreign Office because Hitler stated that those were his actual intentions. To me it seems typical of Hitler to declare to one person, namely Neurath, that perhaps he would go to war, while he told another person,namely Raeder, that he would under no circumstances make war. This difference in expressing his position obviously can be explained by the fact that at that time he no longer appreciated Neurath as Foreign Minister, because he realized that in the foreign policy which he proposed to follow, Neurath would no longer be as yielding as a successor he had in view, Ribbentrop.
On the other hand, at that time he still wanted in any case to keep Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. This is another instance of Hitler's method of acting as the situation demanded, always and without any compunction paying homage to the principle: The end justifies the means.
Hitler's speech of 23 May 1939, "Small Schmundt", US 27. Here Hitler expresses himself once more in a most dubious fashion. He speaks of a program of aggression, of the preparation of a planned attack and of the decision to attack Poland. I in no way fail to recognize that there is good reason for the Prosecution to consider this document as particularly good evidence. I believe, however,that in the case of Reader, and taking into account the numerous points of view I pointed out, the value of this document as evidence is very much less than the Prosecution is inclined to think, and much less than warranted by the impression first gained from the wording of the Schmundt version. Schmundt obviously madean endeavor to formulate Hitler's contradictory, fantastic and highly chaotic statements along the lines of his exact military thinking. This gives the document a clarity which is not that of Hitler. We do not know when Schmundt prepared the document, and Schmundt failed to show the copy he had made to other interested parties. Schulte-Moenting pointed to the contradictions of this document in particular, which I need not repeat here. Of greater importance is the decisive point, the contradiction between these words and the words which Hitler at the same time spoke to Raeder, again and again, and which always pursue the same old path, namely that he does not intend war and that he would not make excessive demands. until after he had a private conversation with Hitler, directly after that speech, as Hitler assured him in that personal interview that under all circumstances he would settle also the case of Poland in a peaceful manner.
he believed him, and he had every right to conclude HITLER was telling him the truth in answer to a question equally precise. I refer to the very precise statement on that document during the RAEDER examination and the examination of the witness SCHULTE-MOENTING. I especially refer to the comprison HITLER used ( according to SCHULTE MOENTINGS's testimony), stating that nobody would go to Court if he had received 99 Prennigs while the dispute involved one Mark, and concluded from it that he had received what he had asked politically, and that there could not be war because of the last political question, namely the Polish Corridor. them the deposition by DOENITZ is not the last in importance, to the effect that, incidental to the last U-boat manoeuvers in the Baltic Sea in July 1939, RAEDER EXPRESSED HIS firm conviction that in that respect he relied on HITLER's assurances. RAEDER, furthermore, knew that the navy was absolutely unfit for a war at sea against England: he had explained that to HITLER time and time again : he trusted HITLERS words and was confident that also in the Polish question HITLER would resort to negotiations again and - as shown by the testimony of the witness DAHLERUS negotiations were in fact taking place, even sucessful negotiations in the beginning. The reason why the attempt finally failed after all and that it had to come to a second World war was stated in detail by the witness DAHLERUS? who thus show portrayed the awful tragedy of this event. It seems important to me that up to August 1939 not only the witness DAHLERUS but also CHAMBERLAIN still believed in HITLER' good intentions. Therefore, here too we have the same question again and the same answer : One cannot expect RAEDER as a soldier to have been more farseeing and to have recognized HITLER dangerous ideas, if men like CHAMBERLAIN, HALIFAX and DAHLERUS themselves had not yet seen through HITLER at that time. ting character of this document, may I ask you to take into consideration that the incriminating character, just as in the document of 5 November 1937, concerns itself with political matter As defense counsel for the Commander-inChief of the Navy, I have to judge the facts, not from the political but from the military aspect.
From a military viewpoint, however, it is impossible to follow the arguments of the Prosecution under any circumstances, for the military are not authorized to take part in decisions of war or peace, but are merely obliged to make such military prepara tions as the political leaders consider necessary. In no country of the world does an Admiral have to give an opinion as to whether the possible war, for which he must make plans is a war of aggression or a defensive war. In no country of the world does the decision of the question as to whether war is to be waged rest wit the military, but on the contrary is always left to the political leaders, that is to the legislative bodies. Accordingly, article 45 of the German constitution stipulates that the President of the Reich is to represent the Reich in questions of international law and stipulates further : " The declaration of war and the conclusion of peace take place by national law. Therefore, the question whether a war was to be waged against Poland rested with the Reichstag and not with the military leader professor JAHREISS Has already explained that in the legal development of the National Socialist state these decisions rested in the last analysis exclusively with HITLER. From the viewpoint of my RAEDER case it is of no consequence whether HITLER would be regarded as legally authorized to start a war himself, as he actually did in the autumn of 1939. The deciding factor is only that in any case the military leaders, from either a practical or a constitutional point of view, do not have to participate in this decision. It is an untenable thought if the prosecution tries to regard as a crime every act of military planning which has taken place on the part of Germany; for the military leaders, who merely receive the order to work out a specified plan, are neither authorized nor obligated to decide whether the execution of their plan will later on involve an aggressive or a defensive war.
It ist well known that the allied military leaders rightly hold the same viewpoint. No admiral or general of the allied armed forces would understand it if someone should bring a charge against him because of military plans that were made on the Allied side a long time before the war. I do not have to explain this any further I believe it will suffice if I refer, for instance, t the RIBBENTROP Document exhibit No. 221. This is a question of a secret document, which, according to the title concerns " Second Phase of the Anglo-French General Staff Conferences". From this document it appears that exact plans were wormed out on the part of the Allied forces for a war embracing many countries; plans which, according to this document include a war in Europe and a war in the Far East. There it expressly says that the French and British High Commands in the Far East " worked out a joint pla of operations." There it expressly speaks about the importance of the possession of the Belgian and Dutch national territories as a starting point for the beginning of the offensive against Germany and the decisive point for this in this parallel military case se to me to be the fact that this document is dated from the same month as HTTLER' s speeech to the commanders-in-chief, which has already been discussed, namely, May 1939. The document bears the inscription : " London, May 5th 1939". on 22 august 1939 at the Obersalzberg.
Regarding the value as evidence of both the documents 1014PS and 798 PS submitted by the Prosecution, for the sake of brevity I should like first of all to refer to my previous statements which I made to this Court, when I made the formal proposal to cancel Document 1014 PS.
Although this high Tribunal did not accept this proposal, I still believe that my statements on the limited value of this document as evidence are important, in so far that only an very small value as a evidence can be attached to both these documents and particularly to Document 1014 PS. The American Prosecution, when submitting these documents, duly pointed able to submit a more accurate version of this speech. In accordance therewith I submitted the Reader Exhibit No. 77, a version coming from the witness General that it is here a question of a more accurate version, then the versions of the Prosecution documents. Thereupon, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe handed in two documents under Nos.
GB 464 and GB 465 in which he compares in the most scrupulous way BOEHM'S version with the versions 1014 PS and 798 PS, by which he considerably facilitated the comparison of these document for all of us. In order on my part to facilitate also this comparison for the high Tribunal and for the prosecution, I requested Generaladmiral BOEHM in the meantime to compare the versions under consideration himself also and that by using the compilations of the British Prosecution mentioned just now. The result is to be found in BOEHM'S Affidavit which I submitted as RAEDER Exhibit No. 129.
tremely incomplete and inaccurate, alls the more so as,apart from its formal deficienies, it is only 11/2 pages long, and for this reason cannot be an adequate reproduction of a 21/2 hour's speech.
as shown by BOEHM'S Affidavit. It is hot a question of every passage. The point, Commanders - in-Chief might more likely be charged have actually not been spoken according to BOEHM' s sworn statement. According to BOEHM'S Affidavit it is not true that HITLER declared, that he had decided as early as Spring 1939, to attack the West first of all, and only afterwards to attack the East. Nor have the words been used; " I only fear that at the last moment a filthy fellow Will submit me an offer od mediation, we shall continue in the pursuit of our political goal". And the most decisive thing is that the words:
" Annihilation of Poland in the foreground, the aims is to eliminate the living forces and not to reach a determined line", have not been used; HITLER only spoke of the breaking up of the military forces. For the differences lie precisely in the sharp phrasing to which the Prosecution national law, even the intention to assassinate civilians, can be derived. If these phrases had been spoken, we would justly reproach the Commanders - in - Chi present with having waged the war at Hitler's order, in spite of the criminal and in view. If, however, these sentences have hot been used, but, as Boehm testifies under oath, merely sentences aiming at the establishing of a military goal, the Prosecution cannot reproach any of the Commanders- in - Chief present with having remained at their posts. No one can in earnest demand of an Admiral the resignation of his post a few days before the outbreak of a war, thus shaking the military power of his own Fatherland. I am quite sure that the most serious reproaches can be leveled at any rate against Hitler's attitude after the Munich Agreement up to the outbreak of the war in Poland, but and this is decisiv for the Raeder case - not against the military Command, but exclusively against the political Leader. we knew that Hitler himself also admitted this, and evaded the responsibility by committing suicide, without having the slightest regard even for the life and the well-being of the German people during and especially at the end for the war, I shall now come to Hitler's speech delivered to the Commanders-in-Chief on 23 November 1939, which I shall mention only very briefly. If, Mr. President, you will permit me to do, then I should like to complete that brief part of the case, because after that follows a rather long section.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe I can cut it relatively short with regard to this last key document.
Again, it is a document without signature, the author of which, therefore, is not knwon, and without indication as to the date of writing. It is no official transcript; again it pursues a special trend.
Early in November 1939 a serious difference arose between Hitler and the General; for Hitler inten of a differenttopinion, and apparently hoped that the outbreak of a real World War might still be avoided.
Hitler's dissatisfaction and annoyance with his Generals show themselves clearly. In consequences of this, he strives to show, by customary repetition of his former actions, what he has accomplished, and further to show that he has always been in the right. It is really a typical Hitler speech, which corresponds to his public speeches in which he also loved to put on airs and to boast of being gifted with genius. Hitler, after all. belonged to these people who always believe themselves in the right, and avail themselves of every opportunity to prove it. He further took the opportunity of stifling at birth, by threats, resistance in high military circles, resistance which had become known to him, and in this way of establishing his dictatorship. It is absolutely significant, when he says literally in this document: I shall not shrink from w anything and will destroy everyone who is against me."This has also been recognized by leading foreign military personalities.I refer for example to General Marshall's official report, which speaks about the "Lack in far- reaching planning in military respect" and in particular about the fact that the German High Command did not have an all- embracing strategic plan, and points out in this connection that " Hitler's prestige reached the stage that one no longer dared to oppose his views." at this time the war was already in progress, and that the higher military officers cannot be blamed if in the war they strove in all their plannings to come off victorious. The Allies were also planning at the same time. I refer to the documents RIBBENTROPS Exhibit No. 22 and RAEDER Exhibit Nr. 34. The former document dates from 1 September 1939; it is a confidential latter from General GAMELIN to DALADIER' and contains the basic idea that it is necessary to invade Belgium in order to wage the war outside the French frontier. The latter document deals with military plans in the same wa , in a confidential letter from General GAMELIN to General LELONG, military attache of the French Embassy in London, of 13 November 1939, and also concerns the enterprise in Holland and Belgium planned by the Allies.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 17 July 1946, at 1000 Hours.
DR. SIEMERS: Yesterday I dealt with the events before the outbreak of war. Now I shall turn to the events which occurred during the war. in all events prior to the War, and that the transactions in which the Navy was authoritatively involved were carried out on a peace basis, namely, on the basis of the Naval Treaty with England. When the war nevertheless ultimately broke out on the 3 September 1939, also involving England, a regrettable incident occurred at the outset, on the first day, namely the sinking of the "Athenia", from which the Prosecution attempts, in exaggerated terms, to construe a ponderous moral accusation against Raeder, not so much indeed on the basis of its actual military side, that is, the sinking, which my colleague Dr. Kranzbuehler has already discussed, as on account of an article published in the "Voelkischer Boebachter" of 23 October 1939 and entitled "Churchill Sinks the 'Athenia'." Were the statement of facts brought forward by the Prosecution correct, the moral accusations against Raeder and the Navy would be justified, even though, of course, an untruthful newspaper article is no crime. Consequently, the accusation brought by the Prosecution is only made for the purpose of deprecating Raeder's personality in contradiction to the life-long esteem which Raeder has enjoyed in the whole world and especially abroad. facts presented by the Prosecution is not correct. Surely this must be our conclusion if the Prosecution believed at first that the odious article in the "Voelkischer Boebachter" could not have appeared without the knowledge of the Naval Command. they think there was permanent intelligence and close cooperation between the various departments and especially between the Navy and Propaganda Ministry, between Raeder and Goebbels, was far greater than the opposition between individual departments in a democratic State.