The accusations concerning the violations of the Versailles Treaty are included in the conspiracy by the prosecution, although the violations were not carried out under Hitler's leadership, but rather under the leadership or with the approval of the then democratic government in Germany. This sho* that the indictment does not only want to hit National-Socialism with this trial, as has been emphasized again and again during the war and after the collapse, but, beyond that, it affects large circles in Germany that had nothing to do with National Socialism and partly even were direct enemies of National-Socialism. presentation of evidence in the Raeder case, to clear up the question of the violation of the Treaty of Versailles. I tried to do this in minute detail and with the approval of the Court. I am of the firm opinion that I have succeeded. I do not need to discuss in detail the precisely treated infractions which the Prosecution has produced in document C-32. It should be sufficient if I refer to the extensive presentation of evidence, as well as the following facts: such as, for example, the anti-aircraft batteries, and others, which were based exclusively on ideas of defense. Raeder has plainly admitted that treaty infractions occurred, in which, however, the smallness of the infractions showed that these could not possibly be connected with an intention to wage a war of agression. view a treaty violation cannot ipso jure be a crime. Surely the violation of a treaty between nations is no more permissible than the violation of a contract between private firms in commercial law. Such a violation is, however, not a punishable action, much less a crime. Also, according to the argument of the Prosecution, an action would be punishable only if the violation were the result of a criminal intention, and so was aimed at agression in contradiction to the Kellogg Pact.
this, and have indirectly admitted it by no longer taking up these points during the cross-examination of witnesses. by the Prosecution during cross-examination concerning the participation navy in U-boat constructions in Holland, for which the Prosecution has relied upon Document C-156, the book by Naval Captain Schuessler entitled, "The Navy's Struggle Against Versailles", as well as on the statements contained in the notes of the naval historian, Admiral Assmann, found in Document D-854. ing office in Holland, namely the firm N.V. Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw. This participation falls into the period before the navy was under Raeder's command. The court will recall that Raeder did not become head of the navy until 1 October 1928, whereas participation in the Holland designing office dates back to 1923 and the following years. the German navy and that consequently no U-boats were purchased or put into commission by the German navy, either. In this connection, I refer to the Versailles Treaty, Raeder Exhibit No. 1. In Article 188, following, of the Treaty of Versailles, will be found the regulations about the navy. According to Article 188, Germany had assumed the obligation of delivering her Uboats to the Allied Nations, or of dismantling them. This obligation Germany fulfilled completely. Moreover, article 191 stimulates the following:
"The construction and purchase of all underseas vessels, even for commercial purposes, if forbidden in Germany". Dutch firms was net a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. According to Article 191, Germany was only forbidded to construct or purchase U-boats, moreover, strictly speaking, only in Germany. Treaty. But as a matter of fact, no U-boat was built for Germany abroad, either. Participation in a foreign submarine designing office was not forbidden, nor was this the meaning or the sens, of the Treaty of Versailles.
The decisive point was merely that Germany did not create a submarine force. The navy, however, was Permitted to participate in a designing office so as to be kept informed in this way about the field of modern submarine construction and to gather information for the future, and thereby to lay the foundation for a possible construction of submarines later on, when permittedby educating a technically trained cadre. (See Reader Exhibit No. 2. Lohmann Affidavit.)
that the submarines designed by the Dutch firm and built abroad were put into service abroad, namely in Turkey and by Finland. prohibited, then what has been said in paragraph I is also valid here. The designing was limited to only a few submarines, so that the small number of them in itself proves that there cannot have been any intention to wage wars of aggression.
3. Even if the High Tribunal is unwilling to follow my preceding train of thought without more further development, going even beyond this, the lack of an aggressive intention appears from the fact that the trivial violations of the treaty are in a certain way compensated for, I take the liberty to refer to the second affidavit of Admiral Lehmann, Raeder Exhibit No.8. It appears from this document that according to the Treaty of Versailles,Germany was allowed to build 8 armored ships, but however, only built armored ships, and it appears further that instead of 8 cruisers, only 6 cruisers were built up to 1935, and instead of 32 destroyers or torpedo boats, only 12 destroyers and no torpedo boats were built. As a matter of fact, the navy stayed far behind that was permitted by the Treaty of Versailles with respect to the really important weapons, and especially in these which may be considered as weapons of offense and indeed to such an extent that in comparison the trivial violations in naval matters hardly count.
4. According to the Weimar Constitution of 14 August 1919, articles 47 and 50 (Raeder Exhibit No.3) the President of the Rech has Supreme Command of all the armed forces. In order to be valid the derees of the President of the Reich require the counter-signature of the Chacellor of the Reich or the appropriate Reich Minister, and thus the Minister of National Defense. "Responsibility is assumed with the counter-signature." Thereby, in National law it is absolutely clear that the responsibility ests with the Minister of National Defense, that is, with the Reich Cabinet and the President of the Reich. It is, of course, true that before 1928,and so before Raeder became the responsible chief of the naval command, a few measures were taken without the knowledge of the Reich Cabinet. In the preentation of evidence, however, it has been clearly shown , especially by the statement of former Reich Minister Severing, that from the moment when Raeder became chief of the naval command, contrary to the statements of the Prosecution, no more secret measures were taken.
Severing has confirmed that the Mueller-Stresemann-Severing Cabinet, in a Cabinet meeting of 18 October 1923, obtained a clear picture of the secret measures of the armed forces by interrogating Raeder as chief of the naval command and Haye as chief of the army command. obliged by the Cabinet, in conformity with the above-mentioned paragraphs of the Reich Constitution, to take no measures in the future without the knowledge of the Minister of National Defense, that is,the Cabinet. At the same time the parliamentary cabinet established that the secret measures taken before Rader's time were only a question of trifles and expressly assumed the responsibility for them. If, however, the Cabinet, in conformity with the Constitution, assumed the responsibility, this is a legally and constitutionally effective proceeding which exonerates Raeder as Chief of the Naval Command and relieves him of responsibility. It seems, therefore, inadmissible that the defendant, who no longer bears the responsibility, should be made responsible for actions for which the Cabinet assumed the responsibility. 1923, however, further shows that all these actions cannot have any criminal intention to wage a war of aggression as their basis, for even the Prosecution will not want to assert that men like Stresemann, Mueller and Severing had the intention of waging wars of aggression, but will have to believe Severing that Stresemann, Mueller and himself only assumed responsibility for these violations because these violations were only based on ideas ofdefense. One will also have to believe Severing that thoughts of defense were justified in the boldest measures, only not war."
I even will not go as far as Mr. Justice Jackson, but I believe that the measures taken by the Navy are certainly covered by his own trend of ideas about the "boldest measures."
The British Prosecutor, Mr. Elwyn Jones, attempted during the crossexamination of Severing to prove that Raeder did not observe the obligations of the cabinet meeting of 18 October 1928 because Severing,according to his testimony, was not informed of the construction abroad of the smallsubmarines for Turkey and for Finland. Against this, two things must be considered:
a. During his testimony, Severing did not remember details, but only the fundamental and decisive questions, and moreover, he naturally relied on the competent technical minister, thus the Reichswehr Minister, concerning details.
b. According to Severing's testimony it was an exceptional case on 16 October 1928 when the Chief of the Navy High Command appeared before the entire cabinet. Raeder as Chief of the Navy High Command was not obliged to inform all the members of the cabinet from time to time, but was, in accordance to the Const itution, merely obliged to inform the incumbent Reichswehr Minister. But Raeder did this. Whatever the Reichswehrminister on his part submitted then to the other members of the Cabinet and the Reichstag, is not only beyond Raeder knowledge, but is also net his responsibility for this.
In conclusion, I take the liberty to point out only the following: violations of the Treaty of Versailles on the part of the Navy as an intention of aggression, the then incumbent Social Democratic or Democratic Government bears the responsibility for this.
With this the indictment collapses relating to this period. For t o hold the then incumbent governments to account for theintention to wage wars of aggression would mean to prosecute on this point "ad absardum."
5. Also the treaty violations during the period from 1933 until the German-English Naval Agreement of 1935 show the same actual and juridical picture. Also during these approximately 2 years, no decisive expansion of naval armament took place. The only disputable accusation made by the Prosecution in this respect is in Document D855, which was submitted during cross examination. It concerns the report of Flottenitendent Thiele. According to this it was decided in March 1935, thus few monthsbefore the naval agreement, to make the plans for the"Scharnhorst" and the "Gneisenau" with 27,000 tons displacement, although at this moment alimit of 10,000 tons displacement according to the Treaty of Versailleswas still formally in force for 3 months, in contrast to the 35,000 tons displacement provided for in the naval agreement of 1935. Germany could count on a speedy conclusion of German-English agreement, while much more time passes from the planning stage until the completion of a battleship, which cannot be counted in months, but in years.
As a matter of fact, the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" were not commissioned until 3 or 4 years after the Naval Pact, i.e. in 1938 or 1939 (see Raeder Exhibit No.2, affidavit Lehnann, under IV).
The other matters enumerated by the Prosecution are again trifles; for instance, the selection (not the construction, as the Prosecution terms it) of 4 to 5 merchantmen (see C 166), on the construction of 5 E-boats at 40 tons each, (See C 141) which, for technical reasons,were constructed, and 12 torpedo boats of 200 tons each. The Prosecution cannot in all seriousness severly blame this all the more so as the above-mentioned deviations from the Versailles Treaty were well known to foreign technical specialists or -- as the witness Schulte-Moenting termed it succinctly -- they were an "open secret."
6. And now the most decisive juridical angle in judging all developments until the summer of 1935. Rights accorded by a Treaty between states are of equal validity with those accorded by Commercial Law. Breathes of agreement are considered adjusted and settled with the signing of a new agreement. In the present case the "Angle-German Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935" -- Raeder Exhibit No. 11 -- stands for the new treaty. This Naval Agreement brings complete deviation from the Versailles Treaty with respect to the high-tennage.vessels as well as the U-boats. It is only on the basis of the ratio permitted Germany by this new agreement that the insignificance of the previous very small violations of the Versailles Treaty becomes apparent. ban on the construction of U-boats was replaced by equality in U-boat tonnage. Germany's demands were not unreasonable; quite the contrary, His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom, in the above mentioned document, explicitly confirmed the German proposal "as an exceedingly important contribution to future limitation of naval armaments."
This agreement between England/Germany makes the debate on the Versailles Treaty obsolete factually and juridically, as far as the Navy is concerned.
Germany. The Naval Agreement was supplemented by a new agreement on 17 June 1937 (see Reader Exhibit No. 14). As proof, of the fact, that the navy has violated also the Naval Agreement, with aggressive intentions, the prosecution has raised two charges :
1. In the Agreement of 1937 both contracting Governments were bound to a mutual exchange of information, namely annually, within the first four month of every calendar year, with reference to details of the building program. According to document C 23, the navy violated this obligation in so far as it gave the displacement and the draught of both battleships "Bismarck" and Tirpitz" which were being built at the beginning of 1933, as too low, namely 35.000 tons instead of 40700 tons. The fact of this violation is openly admitted by Raeder, but here as Well, it is not such a great violation as it is described to be by the Prosecution, namely there is no violation which shows any grounds for proof of criminal intention. This is shown in the exhaustive descriptions in my presentation of evidence and in the testimonies of witnesses which I do not need to repeat here. It will be sufficient if I refer to the absolutely convincing testimony of ship building director Dr. H.C. Suechting, which I have submitted as Raeder Exhibit No. 15. The tonnage increases demanded by the navy during the construction were to be used exclusively within the concept of the defensive, namely the idea to increase the armor plating of the battleships and to arrange the bulkheads in such a way that the battleships should be as much as possible unsinkable; a concept of the defensive which, as Dr. Suechting emphasizes, has proved to be actually correct during the combatting and sinking of the battleship "Bismarck". But as it is a question of concept of the defensive, no aggressive intentions can beconstrued from this treaty violation. certain conditions in the naval agreement of 1937 in articles 24, 25 and 26 that the Contracting governments may deviate from the contracted agreements and especially from the tonnage limitation of battleships, if any other see power builds or acquires larger battleships. This case of article 25 occurred and the violation of the agreement consists solely in the fact that the navy had certainly a right to build henceforth larger battleships but should have informed England that Germany wanted to make use of her right.
It concern only the violation of the obligation for exchange of information. How meeningless this measure was is proved by the alteration of the German-English Naval agreement based on the London Protocol of 30 June 1938, which I have submitted in document Raeder Exhibit No. 16. document C 23, England on her part reported according to the London Protocol of 30 June 1938, that she must make use of the afore mentioned right, by virtue of article 25, and proposed therefore that the battleship tonnage will be increased from 35,000 to 45,000. This agreement was then signed by both countries on 30 June 1938, and thus the violation of agreement became illusory as is seen from the document C 23.
2. The British prosecutor has raised a second charge during cross-examination by submitting document D 854. It concerns the notes made by Admiral Assmann for his writing of history, on sheet 15 of which he writes that in the sphere of submarine building Germany followed the terms of the GermanEnglish Naval Agreement the least; 55 submarines could be contemplated until 1938; but 118 were actually completed or contracted for. These statements by Assmann are actually incorrect. In reality, Germany followed strictly all the sitpulations of the German-English Naval Agreement. Despite the assurance of equality of rights, Germany limited herself voluntarily in the Naval Agreement of 1935 to 45 %; but she reserved for herslef the right to increase this percentage at any time by friendly agreement with England. The presentation of evidence has shown (see the testimony of witness Raeder and SchulteMoenting) that in December 1938 the appropriate negotiations took place between the British Admiral Lord Cunningham and the Grand Admiral Raeder, during which his Majesty's Government conceeded the increase up to 100 %. It was not clear in the presentation of evidence whether this concession was put in writing as it is to be assumed. Meanwhile I could establish that a document must have existed, certainly from the afore-mentioned Assmann-Document D 854, where on page 169 (in connection with page 161) the letter in question of 18 January 1939 is mentioned. It is necessary to say only in conclusion that the Figure of 55 submarines mentioned by Assmann corresponds to 45 % whereas the figure of 118 submarines makes 100 % accordingly Assmann and therefore the prosecution as well are wrong : actually there is no violation at all of the Naval agreement in respect to submarines.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, new that we have got a transcript of your speech, it appears to us that you might perhaps read a little bit faster. Perhaps you could take that up with the interpreters.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well, Mr. President.
(a recess was taken.)
Fleet Raeder had taken part in a conspiracy for waging wars of aggression and in particular supported Hitler and National Socialism, despite his alleged knowledge that Hitler from the beginning had the intention of conducting wars of aggression. at that time have reckoned with an intention of aggression on the part of Hitler? to do with National Socialism and know neither Hitler nor the Party collaborators; he get to know Hitler on 2 February 1933 when he and the other commanders were introduced to Hitler by Baron von Hammerstein. As chief of the Naval Command Staff, there was for Raeder only one superior, i.e. the President of the Reich von Hindenburg, who, according to the constitution and the Wehrmacht Law was the commander in chief of the whole Wehrmacht. As President of the Reich Hindenburg had appointed Hitler as Chancellor of the Reich, and thus was of necessity created a connection between Hitler and the Wehrmacht. Any decision of Raeder therefore did net come into consideration. As a subordinate to Hindenburg he had to put up with the political decision Hindenburg had taken as President of the Reich. The constitutional basis in regard to the Wehrmacht was in no way altered by the fact that Hitler came into power. As Chief of the Naval Command Staff Raeder took no part in this political decision, any more than he had taken part previously when Mueller of the Social Democratic Party or Bruening of the Center Party became chancellors of the Reich. his internal political decision, for Hitler explained to Raeder and the other high officers at the first conference of 2 February 1933 and particularly also upon the occasion of the first naval report in the same month, that nothing would be changed in the Wehrmacht and that the Wehrmacht was to remain outside of politics as provided by the constitution and the Wehrmacht Law. delivery of the naval report explained his fundamental ideasin regard to a peaceful policy, for which, in spite of the friendly revision of the Versaille Treaty that he was striving for, it was necessary to come to a reasonable understanding with England by virtue of treaty, in regard to the development of the Navy in keeping with the general limitations of naval armament.
During this conversation Hitler clearly gave to understand that he did not want to institute any Naval Armament race and that the development of the Navy was to take place only by friendly agreement with England. This was a thought which absolutely corresponded to the fundamental viewpoint of Raeder and of the Navy It would have been absolutely out of question for Raeder on this given basis to go to his superior Hindenburg and declare that because of Hitler he could no longer held the leadership of the Navy. Germany already knew Hitler's true intentions from Hitler's book "Mein Kampf". The Prosecution cited as proof several quotations partly torn from the context of Hitler's 1924 propaganda book. This line of argument by the Prosecution does not seem right because Hitler wrote this book as a private individual, belonging to an opposition party. In this trial it has several times been pointed out that the statements of private foreign individuals are irrelevant, oven when these foreigners are ever so well known and subsequently -- as in Hitler's case -- were given a position in their government. Raeder could be allowed to assume, as could anyone else, that as Reich Chancellor Hitler would not maintain all the party doctrines he defended years before purely as a member of the opposition, particularly not when the statements of Hitler on military matter contradicted these former party ideas. Moreover for the Navy, too relation to England was always decisive end in this very connection Hitler had even on page 154 of his book "Mein Kampf" declared verbatim:
"For such a policy of course there was only one possible partner: England Prosecution, that they are all taken from the 1933 edition and that, in spite of great pains the General Secretary's Office has been unable to procure an earlier edition, particularly the first edition of 1925 and 1927. It is a known fact that Hitler himself in later years made changes on many points in numerous places in his bock; it follows that the quotations from the 1933 edition cannot without further ado be taken as a basis.
wanted to depart from the described fundamental idea of a policy of understanding with England, end is it possible to follow the line of argument of the Prosecution that Raeder should have refused his further collaboration at any given time before 1939? and that the necessity of negation results quite naturally from the combining of various faces which were submitted by the Prosecution or by the Defense during the demonstration of evidence: with having thereupon taken an oath and particularly that he in this oath put the Fuehrer in the place of the Fatherland.
I must therefore only refer to the error made by the Prosecution in its assertion; the Prosecution itself produced document D-481 which indicates the official oath taken by the soldiers of the Wehrmacht on Hitler's orders. The document is a law signed by Hitler, Frick and Blomberg. According to this law it is ascertainable that it was not Raeder, who replaced the word Vaterland by Hitler, but that the latter himself had demanded that allegiance be pledged 10 him as Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht by all soldiers. Before the issue of the decree concerning this oath, cleverly deviced by Hitler and so portentous for the following years, Raeder had neither been informed of it nor had his advice been solicited as to the textual draft of this oath. He was simply summoned to the Reich Chancellery without being given a hint as to what it was all about. cal one, a question of legislation upon which Raeder in his capacity as soldier and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had no influence. political decisions and of having, as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, drafted on those occasions strategic plans and preparations. It is a question of the cases of the withdrawal from the League of Nations on 14 October 1933, the occupation of the Rhinoland on 7 March 1936, the Austrian Anschluss in March 1938, the incorporation of the Sudentenland in the fall of 1938 and the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939. I can refer to jointly in this connection. that Raeder has not politically taken part in any of these decisions. Raeder had never before been asked for any advice, he as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, had no authority to collaborate in such decisions. Raeders sole activity consisted in receiving these documents and messages, and in the subsequent issue of military orders, which he was supposed to draw up in anticipation of the event, should belligerent complications arise. It is wholly incomprehensible how a Commander-in-Chief of a branch of the Wehrmacht can be reproached for having made strategic preparations for possibly forthcoming belligerent complications.
I believe, that it is the same all over the world. An Admiral never takes part in political decisions, while being obliged to make certain precautionary preparations according to these political decisions of the Government. This again is a case of the discrepancy I have mentioned before with regard to the position of a military commander, which though considered by the Prosecution to be a political one, is a purely military position in reality. military commands, involved in political decisions or interested in them, were likewise making military plans. of Hitler were crimes or merely offenses against International Law, and particularly not if he was never summoned to the discussions. Neither the withdrawal from the League of Nations resulting from the failure of trying to have all countries disarm according to the Versailles Treaty - nor the occupation of the Sudetenland, nor the establishment of the Protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia could be regarded by the Prosecition as criminal activities committed by the uninterested Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in the sense of the indictment. There certainly were deviations from the Versailles Treaty, but even the British Chief Prosecutor, Sir Hartley Shawcross, himself, declared on 4 December 1945 that "many objections against Versailles were possibly justified." measures would have been justified for the purpose of a revision of this treaty, but not a war.
without a war, and therefore come under the category of measures considered justified by Justice Jackson, even more so since they were silently tolerate by foreign countries, as for instance in the case of the incorporation of the Sudetenland, Munich Agreement of September 1938, or in the case of Austria where an agreement was made with the affected country itself. establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, rightfully points out from an impartial and retrospective point of view that Hitler had used most doubtful and possibly criminal measures for this achievement, it can have no significance for the Commander in Chief of the Navy, since it is firmly established that he was not informed about these activities, and far less about the measures used. ed of the details concerning the Austrian Anschluss nor of the kind of conference which ultimately led to an agreement with President Hacha. He never Knew of the discussions with Hacha, nor of the menace of a bombardment of Prague -- expressed in the xourse of this discussion - in which case I might refer to the depositions of the witnesses Raeder and Schultz- Moenting. All these measures were therefore in the eyes of Raeder, activities admitted by International Law, or agreements which could not lead him to interfere in any way or to make any inquiries of Hitler, quite apart from the fact that he as military commander would have no right whatsoever to do so. military standpoint even if complications had arisen, which is evident immediately from the location of the countries concerned. It would have been impossible if the almost completely disinterested Commander-in-chief of the navy had paid attention to these things, although hardly any naval prepare for were under considerations. One should keep in mind the case of Czechoslovakia. in which connection document 388- S has a provision that the navy is to parti cipate in possible army operations by commitment of the Danube flotilla which for that purpose comes under the orders of the High Command of the Army, a flotilla consisting of very small ships, that is of a few gunboats, if I remember correctly.
Hartley Shawcross of 4 December 1945 concerning the German-Polish non-aggression pact of 1934:
"Hitler, by concluding this treaty, convinced many people that his in tentions were really peaceful." February 1938. The fact proved in the meantime, that the secret cabinet council was purely a farce, is equally correct. It is therefore unnecessary to deal with this point which was in the beginning considered so important by the Prosecution. ment and Reichsminister has been refuted in the same manner. This claim of the Prosecution has been incomprehensible from the start. Document 2098 PS presented by the Prosecution only states in an absolutely unequivocal manner, the von Brauchitsch the Commander-in-chief of the Army and Raeder the Commanderin-Chief of the Navy held a rank equivilant to that of a Reich Minister." This proves, that he was no Minister but for reasons of etiquette held a rank equal to that of Reich Minister. This stakes it evident that Raeder was not assigned any political task through this decree of Hitler, as the prosecution would like to have it. receive the right to participate in cabinet sessions if he wished to do so, but. as stated by Hitler in the above-mentioned document only, "upon my order". This therefore means nothing more that that Raeder could have been called upon to participate in a cabinet session if technical naval problems were involved. In reality this politically unmaterial, hypothetical case never did occur. 2194 PS can also not be considered incriminating. On the one hand it dais, as becomes evident from the text, only with "measures for the preparation of Reich defense", therefore not with political activity nor with activity connected in any political sense with aggressive war.
Moreover, Raeder, contrary to the claim of the Prosecution, according to Document to the created Ministerial Council for Reich Defense at that time, and this simply for the reason that he was not a Minister. Defense Council or Reich Defense Committee. I want to remind you of the wellknown fact that there existed in the British Government already a long time before the First World War a Reich Defense Committee which was of much greater importance than the equivalent institution in Germany. of the Prosecution that Raeder had been a party member has also proved untenable. It is true that Raeder received the golden insignia of honor from Hitler; this was nothing else, however, than the award of a medal and it couldn't be anything else, because a soldier could not be a member of the Party. This becomes evident beyond doubt from Paragraph 36 of the Armed Forces Law, according to which soldiers can never engage in politics and which forbids them to be a member of a political organization. sufficiently that Raeder never had connections with the party, that he rather had differences of opinion with party circles and that he was spurned by typical National Socialists because of his political and religious attitude; for instance he had on Goebbels the same effect as a red rag on a bull, and this was no wonder either, for on the one hand he prevented the Party again and again from obtaining any influence on the officer corps of the navy, and on the other hand assisted the Church to the greatest extent, contrary to the principles of the Party, and saw to it that the spirit of the navy received a Christian basis. I may refer in this connection to the typical National Socialist phrase of Bormann:
"National Socialistic and Christian concepts are incompatible."
strongly in a train of thought contradictory to the culture against Christianity so violently propagandized for the destruction of all Christian ideas, that this attitude toward the party sufficiently proves that Raeder, as a convinced Christian never could have affiliated himself with the Party.
the fundamentals of his policy to make Germany by peaceful means a sound and strong nation and that it was absolutely necessary for peaceful development to acknowledge British hegemony and to come to an agreement with England about the size of the German fleet and, if possible, even to come to an alliance, These ideas agreed with the fundamental attitude of Raeder, who stated it in detail during his examination. Within the limits of my defense, it may be an open question, if an when Hitler abandoned that basic thought. For in any case Hitler has always emphasized this basic thought to Raeder and also supported it by deeds; this ever recurring thought runs like a red thread all through the years until the outbreak of war. The realization of this thought led to the conclusion of the German-British naval agreement in 1935, the conclusion of the German-British naval agreement of 1937, the agreement about submarines with Lord Cunningham in 1938 and to the London protocol of 30 June 1939 concerning the battleships. This, throughout the years of the reconstruction of the German navy runs always the same idea, namely ever the idea of agreeing with England, of acknowledging England's supremacy and of avoiding any difference which might lead to a break with England. facts proved during this trial, it may be an established fact that Hitler at some time, probably in 1938, may have become unfaithful to his own thought and that thereby he has become guilty of the tragic fate of Germany. thing is not that which must be acknowledged as being objectively true after having a knowledge of all facts, but the only decisive thing is whether Raeder has realized or could ever possibly know of this deviation by Hitler from his own ideas. This, however, is not the case, Raeder could not guess, and even less know that Hitler had at any given time become unfaithful to his own political ideas which he had repeatedly stressed and demonstrated and thus had become guilty of instigating the frightful danger of World War II.
period before the war, Hitler sopke to him differently from what he thought, and also sopke differently from the way he acted. In the matter of the Navy, in particular, the relatively slow rebuilding of the German fleet showed that Hitler intended to remain faithful to the train of thought I referred to. A change of mind on Hitler's part in this connection was not perceptible; for a change of mind would have had precisely the result that die would have developed the navy to a larger extent than lie did. He would then have had at least fully to exploit the possibility of the German-British naval agreement as to the size of the respective fleets. According to the naval agreement, the German fleet was allowed a total tonnage of 420,593 tons. As a matter of fact, this maximum was never reached. Even in regard to battleships, Germany remained short of the naval agreement, with the result that the battleships "Dismarck" and "Tirpitz" were not available in the first year of the war, and therefore could take no part in the occupation of Norwar; the "Bismarck"was completed only in August 1940, and the "Tirpitz" in 1941. have the same tonnage of submarines as England. Actually, however, U-hear construction was so little speeded up, that at the beginning of the war in 1939, as the evidence has proved, Germany had available early the minimum figure of 26 submarines suitable for Atlantic service. And further, as late as end of May 1939, according to document L.79, the so-called "Little Schmindt" was instructed verbatim that "nothing is changed in the shipbuilding program". commander in chief of the navy, from his point of view, and from this field of action, that Hitler would stand by his oft stressed basic line, not to allow a war to came to pass.