To this subject I should like to clear up one point. During the entire war he lived at his staff-headquarters, first on North-Sea coast, since 1940 in France, and in 1943 for a short time in Berlin and then in the camp "Koralle" near Berlin. When he was at the Fuehrer headquarters he lived with the navy staff there. Off duty he associated almost exclusively with naval officers. This may have been a weakness, but it is a fact, which explains the lack of knowledge about certain occurrences. for Armaments to employ 12,000 men from concentration carps as workers in the shipyards proves for the Prosecution that Admiral Doenitz know and approved of the arrest of countless innocent people and their ill-treatment and killing in concentration caps. also knewthat, besides the professional criminals,people arrested for political crimes were kept there. As a ready explained here, the keeping in custody of political adversaries, for reasons of safety, is a mode of acting, executed by all States in times of danger. Knowledge of such an institution can therefore incriminate no one. However, an unusually high number -- out of proportion with the number of the population -- of political arrestees may stamp a regime as a regime of terror. Taking into account a population of 80 million and the 5th year of a grim war, even twice or three times the number of 12,000 men mentioned by Admiral Doenitz would not yet be the sign of a regime of terror. This is a point that the Prosecution will hardly want to stress. navy as well as his collaborators and the overwhelming part of the German people did not know of the abuses and killings that occurred in concentration camps. All that the Prosecution has put forward against this are assumptions but no proofs. then Minister for Armaments, Speer, according to which the inmates of concentration caps were much better off than in camp than when they worked in industry and that these jobs were much desired. The proposition forwarded therefore did not signify anything inhuman but on the contrary, rather the opposite. measures against sabotage in Norwegian and Danish shipyards where 7 out of 8 new constructions had been the victims.
If need be, the personnel should be entirely or in part replaced by "CC-workers." Because, so it says, a sabotage of such dimensions can only be possible if all the workers silently condone it. We have here a proposition for security measures in which workers who actively or passively participated in sabotage are kept in a camp close to the shipyard whereby their connection to sabotage agents was to be cut off. I do not believe that juridical objections can be raised against such measures of security. punishment measures would be justified in such cases. Prosecution very likely presents thorn only for the purpose of bringing against Admiral Doenitz a general accusation of a brutal attitude towards the inhabitants of occupied territories. For this purpose it even refers to a statement of the Fuehrer at a conference on the military situation in the summer 1944, according to which, terror in Denmark must be fought with terror. The only part Admiral Doenitz had in this statement was that he heard it and that his companion, Admiral Wagner, wrote it down. The Navy had no part in it, nor did it take any measures as result of it. I should like to emphasize the attitude which Admiral Doenitz actually showed towards the population of the occupied territories. There is before the Tribunal a survey concerning the administration of justice by the Naval Court for the protection of the inhabitants of the occupied territories against excesses of members of the Navy. The survey is based on an examination of about 2,000 delicts and part of the judgments rendered are given together with circumstances and reason. Judging from that one can fairly say that the Naval Courts protected the inhabitants in the West as well as in the East, protected them with justice and strictness, that is to say, lives as well as property and the honor of their women. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy as the highest legal authority. According to court regulations he was competent for the confirmation of death penalties meted out to German soldiers.
judgments. What is formulated in one of them applies to all: All soldiers must know that also in occupied territory the life and property of others will be fully safeguarded. This was the general attitude in the Navy and the severity of the penalties inflicted proves how seriously it was taken. in which a German prisoner of war, an N.C.O., was presented as an example, because he had in a prison coup unobtrusively and according to plan had communists liquidated, who attracted attention. As Wagner recalled, it was actually the liquidation of ax informer. But the facts were camouflaged in the manner mentioned in order not to give enemy intelligence any clue as to the camp and the person of the NCO. That this order in its true principle was capable of being justified cannot be doubted by anyone, in view of the enormous number of political murders which have been committed with the toleration or assistance of governments engaged in the war, and the perpetrators of which are today extolled as heroes. I cannot, however, seriously consider that the unfortunate camouflaged wording could be proof of a general plan to liquidate communists. An order issued for the protection of communists will reveal the true circumstances. for Soviet prisoners of war and had broken out a dead prisoner's geld teeth. This sergeant was condemned to death by a Naval Court and executed after the sentence had been confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief. Finally, the Prosecution also established a connection with the Jewish question through a statement in which the Grand Admiral speaks of the "lingering poison of Jewry." Here I wish to say: as he did of its execution. He knew of the evacuation to the Government General of Jews living in Germany. I do not think that this evacuation can be condemned at a time when deportations of Germans on a much larger scale are taking place before the eyes of the world silently looking on. Here, too, I refer to a sentence of long penitentiary terms against 2 German sailors. Together with some Frenchmen they had robbed French Jews. From the opinion of the Court I again quote a sentence which characterizes the general attitude: "That the crime's were committed against Jews does not excuse the defendants in any way."
to include Admiral Doenitz in their interpretation of conspiracy by way of the so-called fanatical Nazi have failed. prominent until his promotion to Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The assertion of the Prosecution that he became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy because of his political attitude is without any foundation. He had no reason to participate in National Socialism afterwards, because to him, as a professional officer, every political activity was forbidden according to the Compulsory Service Law. However, he, too, like millions of other Germans,recognized the unique success of Hitler's conduct in social and economic fields and, of course, also the liberation from the obligations of Versailles which concerned him as a soldier especially. Therefore, he Served entirely without political activism but in loyalty to the National Socialist State when he received his promotion to Commander-in-Chief. There was first of all his personal contact with Adolf Hitler. like almost everyone else who had personal connections with this man, he too was most deeply impressed. To the respect for the Head of the State, and faith to the Supreme Commander, which the professional officer is trained in, to this was added the admiration for the Statesman and Strategist. It is difficult to understand completely such an attitude, from, the information as convoyed by this trial, I neither feel qualified nor capable to judge a personality like Adolf Hitler. But one thing seems to me certain, namely that with the art of an export he skilfully concealed the camouflage from the human standpoint, objectionable traits of character, from those of his co-workers to whom he did not dare to reveal this port of his nature.
The Hitler with whom the new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy become acquainted at that time and whom he venerated was therefore entirely different from the the one which the worldrightly or wrongly -- sees today. National Socialism consisted in the fact that in the performance of his military duties he necessarily came in contact with the political authorities of the Reich. Whether he needed more men, more ships, or more arms, it was in the end always political authorities with whom he had to discuss matters. In order to be successful in his demands it was necessary that all political mistrust be eliminated from the very start. He did this intentionally and demanded the same of his subordinates. To him the Party was not an ideological factor but rather the actual representative of the political pow He was linked with it in the common aim to win the war. For the achievement of this aim he c onsidered it as his ally. But for the advantages which one expects of an ally, one must be willing to make certain sacrifices, overlook certain faults, and to ignore controversies. Party which were concomitants of his position and of his duties as a Commander in Chief of the Navy, never led him to participate in anything for which he could not assume the responsibility before his conscience. Exactly some points of the prosecution prove this. The Fuehrer demanded action against the shipwrecked; Admiral Doenitz rejected it. The Fuehrer was for withdrawal from the Geneva Convention; Admiral Doenitz was against it. He stubbornly and successfully resisted the Party's influence upon the Armed Forces. Thanks to his resistance the National-Socialist education al officers did not become political commissars, but were, as genuine officers, merely advisors to their commander, who retained the sole responsibility of leadership of his unit. The transfer of proceedings against soldiers on political grounds from the military courts to the People's courts, which had been advocated by the Party , was prevented by Admiral Doenitz until the winter of 1944 - 1945, and afterwards, in spite of a Fuehrer order, never carried out in the Navy.
Thus he never identified himself with the party and therefore certainly cannot be held responsible for its ideological endeavors or its excesses, no more than in foreign politics a government would be ready to assume the responsibility for such things committed by an ally. was not a National Socialist. To the contrary, I want to exactly use him as an example to prove the incorrectness of the thesis that every National Socialist as such must be a criminal. This Tribunal is the solo instance where authoritative personalities of the allied chief powers are occupying themselves intensively with the last twelve years of the German past. It is, therefore, the only hope of very many Germans for the removal of a fatal error which caused the weaker characters of our nation to become hypocrites and thus prove a decisive obstacle on the read to political recovery. the charge that Admiral Doenitz had, out of political fanaticism, protracted the inevitable surrender, then I am doing so because of a particular reason. This charge, which does not seem to have anything to do with the indictment before an international tribunal, weighs particularly heavy in the eyes of the German people. This nation truly knows what destructions and what losses it has yet endured in the months from February until May 1945. I submitted declarations of Darlan, Chamberlain and Churchill from the year 1940, in which these statesmen, in a critical hour of their country, called for desperate resistance, for the defense of every village and of every village and of every house. Nobody will conclude therefrom that those men were fanatical National Socialists. The question of unconditional surrender is, indeed, of such colossal import to a nation, that, in fact, it is possible only after the events to judge whether a statesman who had to face this question did or did not do the right thing. Admiral Doenitz, however, was not a statesman in February 1945, but the supreme commander of the navy. Should he have requested his subordinates to lay down arms at a time when the political authority of the state still considered military resistance as opportune and necessary? Nobody will demand this in earnest.
Hitler esteemed so much, should not have had the duty to point out to Hitler with all due clearness the hopelessness of a prolonged resistance. people, if he had himself considered at that time a surrender was justified. He has not done so, and has stated the reasons herefore. Surrender implies stopping the armies and stopping the population. The German army on the Eastern Front -- still more than two millions strong in February 1945 -and the entire civilian population of the German eastern provinces would therefore have fallen into the hands of the Soviet armies, and this in a bitter cold winter month. Admiral Doenitz, therefore, was of the opinion -shared by Colonel General Jodl -- that the human losses occurring in such a manner would have been far greater than those which a protracting of the capitulation until the warmer season should of needs have caused. Only in future years, when more exact evidence concerning casualties of the army and of the civilian population, both before and after the surrender in the East and in the West, will be available, there will be a possibility to judge the objective truth of such an interpretation. But it may not be said today that such arguments were exclusively founded upon a stern consciousnes of responsibility for the life of the German people. assumption of the office of heard of the State on May 1st 1945, to cease hostilities against the host, but to protract, on the contrary, the surrender to the East for a few days, days in winch hundreds of thousands were able to escape in a Western direction. Since the moment when he got -- to his own complete surprise -- a political task, he has avoided, with an intelligent hand, a threatening chaos; he has prevented desperate acts of masses without leaders, and has assumed responsibility, for the German people, for the gravest action which a statesman can make at all. To come back to the beginning of the indictment, he has not done anything to start this war, but has taken decisive steps to end it. expect, and more than once the unconditional surrender, which the last head of the State has carried out, has been pointed out.
It is for the Tribunal to decide whether, in the future, this nation will be referred to the binding value of the signature of a man who is being outlawed as a criminal, in front of the whole world, by his very partners in the treaty. trial against war criminals is bound to induce in the heart of any lawyer. They weigh upon everyone who bears a co-responsibility for such a trial. I could not better mark the task of all the responsible persons than by quoting the words coined by a British attorney about the trials before the German Reich court in the year 1921. I quote:
"The War Criminals' trials were demanded by an angry public rather than by statesmen or the fighting services. Had the public opinion of 1919 had its way, the trials might have presented a grim spectacle, of which future generations would be ashamed. But thanks to the statesmen and the lawyers, a public yearning for revenge was converted into a real demonstration of the majesty of Right and the Power of Law." judgment of History.
THE PRESIDENT: I call on Dr. Siemers for the defendant Raeder.
DR. SIEMERS (Counsel for the defendant Raeder): Gentlemen of the Tribunal, in my final pleading for the defendant Grand-Admiral Dr. Raeder, I should like to keep to the order I chose for my document book and for the which presentation of evidence. I think a survey of the whole case will thus be easier. of 18, that is to say for half a century or so, and in an eventful period, exclusively a soldier, body and soul. Although he has never known anything but his duties as a soldier, the Prosecution has accused him, in this major trial against National-Socialism, not only as a soldier, namely as commanderin-chief of the German Navy, but -- what is singular and decisive -- as a politician, as a political conspirator, and as a government member, altogether three things which he in truth never was. politician, although it was precisely, as I shall demonstrate, his life principle to be completely detached from politics as an officer end to common an officers' coprs and a navy which were likewise committed to remain entirely free from politics. this is primarily due to the fact that they have constructed an entirely foreign motion of the German Wehrmacht, namely the motion of an admiral responsible for the foreign policy and for the outbreak of a war. conception is equally unjustified and unfounded as regards Hitler's NationalSocialist state. True, Hitler has repeatedly placed politics in the forefront of the nation and endeavored to educate the nation in one political direction only. Foreign countries knew this, and they would therefore be all the more surprised by the fact that Hitler refrained from such political interference in one single instance. Every administration, every organization, and every police institution was run by Hitler on political principles with the single exception of the Wehrmacht.
The Wehrmacht, and indeed the navy in particular remained for a long time and far into the war absolutely unpolitical. And n only did Hitler give Raeder an assurance to this effect, but Hindenburg as President, had also given the same assurance. This explains the fact, which has also been made clear in this trial, that up to 1944 an officer could not be a member of the Party or suspend his membership if he was in the Party. why Raeder, as shown by his interrogation, was disconcerted and amazed by these accusations which amount to a political charge. A man who is altogether a soldier cannot understand why he is suddenly and without any relation to his military duties made responsible for things which at no time came within the compass of his activity. of the U-boat warfare, which, for the sake of uniformity, has already received the attention of Dr. Kranzbuehler for Raeder, too. case of Norway and Greece -- that time and again the discrepancy between the points of view of politics and of the military is the following: Raeder acts as commander-in-chief on the basis of military considerations, and the Prosecution calls him to account out of political considerations, thus considering military actions as political ones. tions which have been raised against Raeder already far the period before 1933, which means before National-Socialism. For this time the peculiarity has to be added that Hitler, the head of the alleged conspiracy for the waging of wars of agression, does not oven yet rule in Germany, and yet there is already supposed to exist a common conspiracy between Hitler and a part of the defendants. 1928 as Chief of the Naval Command, had at that time nothing at all to do with National-Socialism, and he did not even know Hitler and his co-workers in the Party.
The accusations concerning the violations of the Versailles Treaty are included in the conspiracy by the prosecution, although the violations were not carried out under Hitler's leadership, but rather under the leadership or with the approval of the then democratic government in Germany. This sho* that the indictment does not only want to hit National-Socialism with this trial, as has been emphasized again and again during the war and after the collapse, but, beyond that, it affects large circles in Germany that had nothing to do with National Socialism and partly even were direct enemies of National-Socialism. presentation of evidence in the Raeder case, to clear up the question of the violation of the Treaty of Versailles. I tried to do this in minute detail and with the approval of the Court. I am of the firm opinion that I have succeeded. I do not need to discuss in detail the precisely treated infractions which the Prosecution has produced in document C-32. It should be sufficient if I refer to the extensive presentation of evidence, as well as the following facts: such as, for example, the anti-aircraft batteries, and others, which were based exclusively on ideas of defense. Raeder has plainly admitted that treaty infractions occurred, in which, however, the smallness of the infractions showed that these could not possibly be connected with an intention to wage a war of agression. view a treaty violation cannot ipso jure be a crime. Surely the violation of a treaty between nations is no more permissible than the violation of a contract between private firms in commercial law. Such a violation is, however, not a punishable action, much less a crime. Also, according to the argument of the Prosecution, an action would be punishable only if the violation were the result of a criminal intention, and so was aimed at agression in contradiction to the Kellogg Pact.
this, and have indirectly admitted it by no longer taking up these points during the cross-examination of witnesses. by the Prosecution during cross-examination concerning the participation navy in U-boat constructions in Holland, for which the Prosecution has relied upon Document C-156, the book by Naval Captain Schuessler entitled, "The Navy's Struggle Against Versailles", as well as on the statements contained in the notes of the naval historian, Admiral Assmann, found in Document D-854. ing office in Holland, namely the firm N.V. Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw. This participation falls into the period before the navy was under Raeder's command. The court will recall that Raeder did not become head of the navy until 1 October 1928, whereas participation in the Holland designing office dates back to 1923 and the following years. the German navy and that consequently no U-boats were purchased or put into commission by the German navy, either. In this connection, I refer to the Versailles Treaty, Raeder Exhibit No. 1. In Article 188, following, of the Treaty of Versailles, will be found the regulations about the navy. According to Article 188, Germany had assumed the obligation of delivering her Uboats to the Allied Nations, or of dismantling them. This obligation Germany fulfilled completely. Moreover, article 191 stimulates the following:
"The construction and purchase of all underseas vessels, even for commercial purposes, if forbidden in Germany". Dutch firms was net a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. According to Article 191, Germany was only forbidded to construct or purchase U-boats, moreover, strictly speaking, only in Germany. Treaty. But as a matter of fact, no U-boat was built for Germany abroad, either. Participation in a foreign submarine designing office was not forbidden, nor was this the meaning or the sens, of the Treaty of Versailles.
The decisive point was merely that Germany did not create a submarine force. The navy, however, was Permitted to participate in a designing office so as to be kept informed in this way about the field of modern submarine construction and to gather information for the future, and thereby to lay the foundation for a possible construction of submarines later on, when permittedby educating a technically trained cadre. (See Reader Exhibit No. 2. Lohmann Affidavit.)
that the submarines designed by the Dutch firm and built abroad were put into service abroad, namely in Turkey and by Finland. prohibited, then what has been said in paragraph I is also valid here. The designing was limited to only a few submarines, so that the small number of them in itself proves that there cannot have been any intention to wage wars of aggression.
3. Even if the High Tribunal is unwilling to follow my preceding train of thought without more further development, going even beyond this, the lack of an aggressive intention appears from the fact that the trivial violations of the treaty are in a certain way compensated for, I take the liberty to refer to the second affidavit of Admiral Lehmann, Raeder Exhibit No.8. It appears from this document that according to the Treaty of Versailles,Germany was allowed to build 8 armored ships, but however, only built armored ships, and it appears further that instead of 8 cruisers, only 6 cruisers were built up to 1935, and instead of 32 destroyers or torpedo boats, only 12 destroyers and no torpedo boats were built. As a matter of fact, the navy stayed far behind that was permitted by the Treaty of Versailles with respect to the really important weapons, and especially in these which may be considered as weapons of offense and indeed to such an extent that in comparison the trivial violations in naval matters hardly count.
4. According to the Weimar Constitution of 14 August 1919, articles 47 and 50 (Raeder Exhibit No.3) the President of the Rech has Supreme Command of all the armed forces. In order to be valid the derees of the President of the Reich require the counter-signature of the Chacellor of the Reich or the appropriate Reich Minister, and thus the Minister of National Defense. "Responsibility is assumed with the counter-signature." Thereby, in National law it is absolutely clear that the responsibility ests with the Minister of National Defense, that is, with the Reich Cabinet and the President of the Reich. It is, of course, true that before 1928,and so before Raeder became the responsible chief of the naval command, a few measures were taken without the knowledge of the Reich Cabinet. In the preentation of evidence, however, it has been clearly shown , especially by the statement of former Reich Minister Severing, that from the moment when Raeder became chief of the naval command, contrary to the statements of the Prosecution, no more secret measures were taken.
Severing has confirmed that the Mueller-Stresemann-Severing Cabinet, in a Cabinet meeting of 18 October 1923, obtained a clear picture of the secret measures of the armed forces by interrogating Raeder as chief of the naval command and Haye as chief of the army command. obliged by the Cabinet, in conformity with the above-mentioned paragraphs of the Reich Constitution, to take no measures in the future without the knowledge of the Minister of National Defense, that is,the Cabinet. At the same time the parliamentary cabinet established that the secret measures taken before Rader's time were only a question of trifles and expressly assumed the responsibility for them. If, however, the Cabinet, in conformity with the Constitution, assumed the responsibility, this is a legally and constitutionally effective proceeding which exonerates Raeder as Chief of the Naval Command and relieves him of responsibility. It seems, therefore, inadmissible that the defendant, who no longer bears the responsibility, should be made responsible for actions for which the Cabinet assumed the responsibility. 1923, however, further shows that all these actions cannot have any criminal intention to wage a war of aggression as their basis, for even the Prosecution will not want to assert that men like Stresemann, Mueller and Severing had the intention of waging wars of aggression, but will have to believe Severing that Stresemann, Mueller and himself only assumed responsibility for these violations because these violations were only based on ideas ofdefense. One will also have to believe Severing that thoughts of defense were justified in the boldest measures, only not war."
I even will not go as far as Mr. Justice Jackson, but I believe that the measures taken by the Navy are certainly covered by his own trend of ideas about the "boldest measures."
The British Prosecutor, Mr. Elwyn Jones, attempted during the crossexamination of Severing to prove that Raeder did not observe the obligations of the cabinet meeting of 18 October 1928 because Severing,according to his testimony, was not informed of the construction abroad of the smallsubmarines for Turkey and for Finland. Against this, two things must be considered:
a. During his testimony, Severing did not remember details, but only the fundamental and decisive questions, and moreover, he naturally relied on the competent technical minister, thus the Reichswehr Minister, concerning details.
b. According to Severing's testimony it was an exceptional case on 16 October 1928 when the Chief of the Navy High Command appeared before the entire cabinet. Raeder as Chief of the Navy High Command was not obliged to inform all the members of the cabinet from time to time, but was, in accordance to the Const itution, merely obliged to inform the incumbent Reichswehr Minister. But Raeder did this. Whatever the Reichswehrminister on his part submitted then to the other members of the Cabinet and the Reichstag, is not only beyond Raeder knowledge, but is also net his responsibility for this.
In conclusion, I take the liberty to point out only the following: violations of the Treaty of Versailles on the part of the Navy as an intention of aggression, the then incumbent Social Democratic or Democratic Government bears the responsibility for this.
With this the indictment collapses relating to this period. For t o hold the then incumbent governments to account for theintention to wage wars of aggression would mean to prosecute on this point "ad absardum."
5. Also the treaty violations during the period from 1933 until the German-English Naval Agreement of 1935 show the same actual and juridical picture. Also during these approximately 2 years, no decisive expansion of naval armament took place. The only disputable accusation made by the Prosecution in this respect is in Document D855, which was submitted during cross examination. It concerns the report of Flottenitendent Thiele. According to this it was decided in March 1935, thus few monthsbefore the naval agreement, to make the plans for the"Scharnhorst" and the "Gneisenau" with 27,000 tons displacement, although at this moment alimit of 10,000 tons displacement according to the Treaty of Versailleswas still formally in force for 3 months, in contrast to the 35,000 tons displacement provided for in the naval agreement of 1935. Germany could count on a speedy conclusion of German-English agreement, while much more time passes from the planning stage until the completion of a battleship, which cannot be counted in months, but in years.
As a matter of fact, the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" were not commissioned until 3 or 4 years after the Naval Pact, i.e. in 1938 or 1939 (see Raeder Exhibit No.2, affidavit Lehnann, under IV).
The other matters enumerated by the Prosecution are again trifles; for instance, the selection (not the construction, as the Prosecution terms it) of 4 to 5 merchantmen (see C 166), on the construction of 5 E-boats at 40 tons each, (See C 141) which, for technical reasons,were constructed, and 12 torpedo boats of 200 tons each. The Prosecution cannot in all seriousness severly blame this all the more so as the above-mentioned deviations from the Versailles Treaty were well known to foreign technical specialists or -- as the witness Schulte-Moenting termed it succinctly -- they were an "open secret."
6. And now the most decisive juridical angle in judging all developments until the summer of 1935. Rights accorded by a Treaty between states are of equal validity with those accorded by Commercial Law. Breathes of agreement are considered adjusted and settled with the signing of a new agreement. In the present case the "Angle-German Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935" -- Raeder Exhibit No. 11 -- stands for the new treaty. This Naval Agreement brings complete deviation from the Versailles Treaty with respect to the high-tennage.vessels as well as the U-boats. It is only on the basis of the ratio permitted Germany by this new agreement that the insignificance of the previous very small violations of the Versailles Treaty becomes apparent. ban on the construction of U-boats was replaced by equality in U-boat tonnage. Germany's demands were not unreasonable; quite the contrary, His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom, in the above mentioned document, explicitly confirmed the German proposal "as an exceedingly important contribution to future limitation of naval armaments."
This agreement between England/Germany makes the debate on the Versailles Treaty obsolete factually and juridically, as far as the Navy is concerned.
Germany. The Naval Agreement was supplemented by a new agreement on 17 June 1937 (see Reader Exhibit No. 14). As proof, of the fact, that the navy has violated also the Naval Agreement, with aggressive intentions, the prosecution has raised two charges :
1. In the Agreement of 1937 both contracting Governments were bound to a mutual exchange of information, namely annually, within the first four month of every calendar year, with reference to details of the building program. According to document C 23, the navy violated this obligation in so far as it gave the displacement and the draught of both battleships "Bismarck" and Tirpitz" which were being built at the beginning of 1933, as too low, namely 35.000 tons instead of 40700 tons. The fact of this violation is openly admitted by Raeder, but here as Well, it is not such a great violation as it is described to be by the Prosecution, namely there is no violation which shows any grounds for proof of criminal intention. This is shown in the exhaustive descriptions in my presentation of evidence and in the testimonies of witnesses which I do not need to repeat here. It will be sufficient if I refer to the absolutely convincing testimony of ship building director Dr. H.C. Suechting, which I have submitted as Raeder Exhibit No. 15. The tonnage increases demanded by the navy during the construction were to be used exclusively within the concept of the defensive, namely the idea to increase the armor plating of the battleships and to arrange the bulkheads in such a way that the battleships should be as much as possible unsinkable; a concept of the defensive which, as Dr. Suechting emphasizes, has proved to be actually correct during the combatting and sinking of the battleship "Bismarck". But as it is a question of concept of the defensive, no aggressive intentions can beconstrued from this treaty violation. certain conditions in the naval agreement of 1937 in articles 24, 25 and 26 that the Contracting governments may deviate from the contracted agreements and especially from the tonnage limitation of battleships, if any other see power builds or acquires larger battleships. This case of article 25 occurred and the violation of the agreement consists solely in the fact that the navy had certainly a right to build henceforth larger battleships but should have informed England that Germany wanted to make use of her right.
It concern only the violation of the obligation for exchange of information. How meeningless this measure was is proved by the alteration of the German-English Naval agreement based on the London Protocol of 30 June 1938, which I have submitted in document Raeder Exhibit No. 16. document C 23, England on her part reported according to the London Protocol of 30 June 1938, that she must make use of the afore mentioned right, by virtue of article 25, and proposed therefore that the battleship tonnage will be increased from 35,000 to 45,000. This agreement was then signed by both countries on 30 June 1938, and thus the violation of agreement became illusory as is seen from the document C 23.
2. The British prosecutor has raised a second charge during cross-examination by submitting document D 854. It concerns the notes made by Admiral Assmann for his writing of history, on sheet 15 of which he writes that in the sphere of submarine building Germany followed the terms of the GermanEnglish Naval Agreement the least; 55 submarines could be contemplated until 1938; but 118 were actually completed or contracted for. These statements by Assmann are actually incorrect. In reality, Germany followed strictly all the sitpulations of the German-English Naval Agreement. Despite the assurance of equality of rights, Germany limited herself voluntarily in the Naval Agreement of 1935 to 45 %; but she reserved for herslef the right to increase this percentage at any time by friendly agreement with England. The presentation of evidence has shown (see the testimony of witness Raeder and SchulteMoenting) that in December 1938 the appropriate negotiations took place between the British Admiral Lord Cunningham and the Grand Admiral Raeder, during which his Majesty's Government conceeded the increase up to 100 %. It was not clear in the presentation of evidence whether this concession was put in writing as it is to be assumed. Meanwhile I could establish that a document must have existed, certainly from the afore-mentioned Assmann-Document D 854, where on page 169 (in connection with page 161) the letter in question of 18 January 1939 is mentioned. It is necessary to say only in conclusion that the Figure of 55 submarines mentioned by Assmann corresponds to 45 % whereas the figure of 118 submarines makes 100 % accordingly Assmann and therefore the prosecution as well are wrong : actually there is no violation at all of the Naval agreement in respect to submarines.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, new that we have got a transcript of your speech, it appears to us that you might perhaps read a little bit faster. Perhaps you could take that up with the interpreters.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well, Mr. President.
(a recess was taken.)