Dr. Gisevius, however, perhaps wanted to say that Keitel had dealt with his subordinates in the Army High Command in a morally reprehensible way. evidence it is shown that the accusations arising from the testimony of the witness Gisevius are not correct. Gisevius would not be illuminated according to his own evidence. This judgement is made up from two factors:
1) The career and the position of the witness.
2) The trustworthiness of his information.
On page 92 of my text, I state in detail which functions Dr. Gisevius has undertaken. In particular, I have not emphasized anything which, from my point of view, might accuse him in any way for having testified here to all the things which you have heard. I have only objectively ascertained the following:
a) He evaded the military service through falsified papers put at his disposal by Oster.
b) He lived in Germany during the whole time since 1933 without restriction of liberty and remained in office up to 20 July 1944.
c) He was an official of the German Reich and was in its pay from the middle 1937 to the beginning of 1939 with the exception of leave.
d) He was Vice-Consul of the Reich in Switzerland since 1943 in the Consulate General at Zurich placed through Canaris as intelligence agent and was naturally paid for it. At the same time he was in connection with the enemy's intelligence service.
e) He had since 1933, when he worked in the Gestapo, the exact knowledge of all horrible happenings and the perception what consequences could arise from it for the German people.
f) A special circumstance, which shows the witness Dr. Gisevius in his true light, is the advice, or the suggestion, which he gave to the experienced bank specialist, Dr. Schacht -- and that is on Page 8280 of the record -- that he should thus allow the inflation and get the controls of affairs into his own hand This suggestion leaves only two possibilities:
A complete ignorance of the national economical importance and social effect of an inflation or a boundless unscrupulousness which completely disregards the fate of the employees and workmen. An inflation brought about knowingly can be described only as a crime against the people. Schacht described it as a catastrophe. He said, "You want the catastrophe; I want to avoid it".
To 2.)
GISEVIUS before this Tribunal, I must refer to the book submitted by the witness as evidence : "To the bitter end". This book is also a "statement" of the witness GISEVIUS. Germany - a book appears in which facts and occurences are communicated of historical and for those personally involved of moral and even criminal importance, the incorrectness of which has become obvious in the meantime, then the mistake is unforgiveable and there is no longer an excuse for refering to false informations. book which were established before this tribunal through the cross examination by Dr. KUBUSCHOK (Page 8413 of the German transcript 26 April 1946). There are 4 incorrectness which refer to the defendant Von Papen and I beg you to take official cognizance of it. described dubious and the author not reliable. this problem. The statement of Gisevius contains the entire tragedy of the German people, it is for me a proof of the weakness and of the decadence of the German circles who played with the idea of revolt and high treason, without apprehending intimately the distress of the people. They were a top level of the future ministers and generals without support from the large masses of our people, working classes, as Reich Minister Severing has declared here with all clearness.
Mr. Justice Jackson has used the word "resistance movement" in connection with the examination of the witness Gisevius. We have often heard during the progress of this trial about unfrightened, brave men and women, who fought for their country, have suffered and died. They were our enemies. But nobody would deny the acknowledgment of their heroism, who tried to judge these things objectively. But where will you find this heroism in the group around Gisevius?
If one reads his book "To the bitter end" and one has heard him here, one looks in vain for a self-sacrificing man. Even the late deed of a Stauffenberg lacks heroism, as it lacked the decision of the self-sacrifice.
Gisevius speaks in the time up to 1938 - as if there was time - to hold back the wheel of the fate successfully, always about negotiations, conferences, but all these men wish that the others - that is the generals - should negotiate.
If one considers the knowledge of affairs, which Gisevius had as member of the Gestapo and all his friends, if one takes into account the perception of the great danger in which the people were suspended, then the decision for action should not be doubtful for an instant for the patriotic men, as the members of the group claimed themselves to be. But what did they do ? As the leaders of the army hesitated or refused, they did not think about their own action, but turned to the foreign countries. itself is of no importance in the question of trustworthiness to be discussed here. Wherever is a conspirator out of pure motives, who, in the realization of the danger which threatens his country, risks his life, is not only clean, but also desirves the gratitude of the fatherland. everything which, in its entire frightfulness, most Germans have only learned through this trial, had served their country in unselfish sacrifice, than perhaps we and the world would have been spared much distress and suffering.
Grand Admiral Doenits, who know Admiral Canaris well, said : "During the time that he was in the Navy, Admiral Canaris wan an officer in whom little trust was placed. He was an altogether different person from us. We said that he had seven souls in his breast." But, gentlemen, what does Dr. Gisevius say on page 319 of the book "To the bitter end" ? "The successor was Canaris, at that time captain in the Navy, quite clever and more cunning than Himmler and Heydrich together." quoted by Gisevius as being the chief sources of information. I do not wish to come to this in any detail. We are here concerned with the persons of Canaris, Nebe, and Thomas.
As regard pages 96 to 102, I shall make the following brief summary. In reference to Canaris, I only want to say that he was living in the closest touch with Himmler, Heydrich and the Gestapo although he was their sworn enemy as he admitted.
Thomas, who had been a member of the Gestapo, was an excellent General Staff officer, and he was an untiring worker in the Army Command Staff under Keitel.
Reference is also made to that in document 2353-PS. That man was the spirit and the driving power of rearmament which he, Keitel, and others considered necessary to the extent which he energetically pursued. But it is the same man who worked on the Barbarossa Plan and who later, under the Four Year Plan became the head of the economic Staff of the Plan Oldenburg. The results of that plan need not be explained here by me. General Thomas who, according to his very convincing exterior appearances used all his powers for the economic situation of the war, and who after leaving Speer was by no means dismissed but was given the task of writing the book which is the main evidence of the Prosecution. PS-2353. had played a double game, then he was an opportunist and not a man who can be expected to give objective information. I draw your attention to page 103 where witness Gisevius has described Nebe as one of his most intimate friends, and according to the statements by Dr. Gisevius, Nebe had been his friend since 1933 and was thoroughly familiar with the trend of thought of the witness, He remained in RSHA - discussed numerous times here - until 20 July 1944, and in the year 1944 he had power to issue orders to headquarters of the Special Service Office (Sonderdienst) in charge of prevention of escape of prisoners of war. This is shown by enclosure to document USSR 413, submitted by the prosecution, testimony of the witness Wiellen also heard here.
To characterize this witness - from whom Dr. Gisevius after leaving the Gestapo claims to have received information currently - it should be pointed out that from 1933 to July, 1944, Nebe served in the RSHA, evidently to the satisfaction of his superiors Himmler, Heydrich and Kaltenbrunner; otherwise he would not have stayed in office that long and would not have been promoted to the rank of Police General and SS Gruppenfuehrer (SS Major General). While thus, on the one hand he fulfilled the tasks incumbent upon him by reason of his position, for 11 years, with the well known methods of the Gestapo and later the Kripo which were under HIMMLER, Dr. GISEVIUS refers to him as his friend and political associate.
Now, it might be assumed, perhaps, that in the position he held he was able to prevent disaster, possibly even to hold up execution of orders. Document USSR 433, just referred to, shows that this is not what NEBE did; rather did he work as a loyal HIMMLER police general. In the deposition by WIELEN -forming part of the document- the horrible case of the 50 escaped RAF fliers in which case General NEBE and Dr. GISEVIUS were involved is dealt with.
I quote from Wielen's testimony: "One day during that time I received an order around noontime, by telegraph, from General NEBE to proceed to Berlin immediately, to become acquainted with a confidential order. Arriving in Berlin on the evening of that day, I reported to General NEBE at his office, Wendischer Markt 5 to 7. I rave him a condensed report on the status of the matter at that time. He than showed me a teletype order, signed by KALTENBRUNNER, to the effect that, in conformity with the Fuehrer's explicit and personal order, more than half of the officers who escaped from Sagan were to be shot when recaptured. The following paragraph and any commentary appears superfluous. I said this violates martial law and undoubtedly was bound to result in reprisal measures against those of our own officers who were in English camps, as prisoners of war, and that I simply refuse to take any responsibility. General NEBE declared that in this instance I was not at all responsible since the state police was to act entirely a its own and that, after all, orders given by the Fuehrer had to be executed without pretest. NEBE added furthermore that, naturally, it was my duty to keep the matter in deepest secrecy and that the reason for his showing me the original order was so that I would make no trouble for the state police."
Any comment seems superfluous. This is significant for NEBE's personality. The trustworthiness of a person is an inseparable part of his entire personality. Information obtained from a person who, for mere than a decade was able to play such an abominable double role can have no claim to faith.
I believe that this analysis of the statements of the witness Dr. GISEVIUS and of the men belonging to the GISEVIUS group gives me the right to say that the charges made against the defendant KEITEL by the witness can be no suitable foundation for the argument of the prosecution, that the defendant Keitel: 1. formed a circle around HITLER 2. his influence on the OKW and the armed forces was tremendous 3. he did not submit reports on atrocities and crimes to HITLER 4. That he did not protect his suboridnates, even thereatened them with the Gestapo. however important it may have seemed to outsiders, was neither decisive nor of determinating importance, whether for the total sum of event or also for the basic and important decisions of HITLER. Justice can be done to the actual importance of this activity if one says that it was tremendous, because physically and spiritually it went beyond human strength; because it placed the defendant permanently in a delemma between his military point of viewand the unbending will of HITLER, to whom he was faithfully, far too faithfully devoted. Physically because it was nearly insoluble, because it had no sharply defined, clear outlines, but consisted in the eternal equalizing of factual differences, the adjustment of personal sensitiveness, the "self-protection" against encroachments of the individual offices among themselves or against the OKW; in clever manoeuvring when HITLER, in explosive reaction to disagreeable news, wished to issue extravagant orders, in the settlement of all disagreeable matters which HITLER did not wish to attend to himself. It was a tremendoudly thankless task, which found only very slight compensation in the brilliant situation in the immediate proximity to the head of the State, in the decorative participation in all events of what is called world history, in the representative duties of a Field Marshal.
Was Keitel a political General ? promoting the planning, preparing of and inciting to aggressive wars with violations of international treaties and engagements.
The defendant stated in the witness box in this connection. Insofar as knowledge or having cognizance of the intention to attack is concerned, I shall come back to the subject in connection with other things. The facts as such are set forth by the defendant Keitel. concerned, the defence counsel for General Jodl will deal with those questions. the defendant Keitel a personal importance during this trial : the conversation between Hitler and von Schuschnigg on the Ober-Salzberg on February 12th 1938. This was the sheet-lightning that could have revealed the coming of the storm to clear sighted peoples. Keitel chief of the German High Command for only a week, so far without any contact with high political events, did not perceive these signs of approaching stormy weather. Hitler who after the sudden change of 4 Feb. 38 had immediately gone to the Obersalzberg, called Keitel for the first time, without giving any explanation. Keitel came, without knowing what Hitler wanted or what was to happen in Obersalzberg Only the course of the day did he realize that his presence could have any connection with the presence of Schuschnigg and the discussion of the Austrian question proved in any of the conversations, especially with Schuschnigg or Dr. Schmidt, he however realized that his presence, together with th* of Generals von Reichenau and Sperrle should have a significance for the conversations with Schuschnigg; for, since, Hitler did not speak to him at all about military matters, he was forced to the conclusion that the representatives of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, the Army and the Air Force had been invited to demonstrate the power of the Wehrmacht in Schusschnigg's eyes. the representatives of the Wehrmacht as a means of pressure for the realization of his political plans, that they had no knowledge of this beforehand, and that they realized this intention only later on.
This meeting at the Obersalzberg is now being used by the prosecution as a basis for the accusation that Keitel was a political general. The prosecution introduced the conversations between Hitler and Hacha and Tiso, at which the defendant Keitel also was present, as a further symptomatic event. This evidence does not appear convincing, if it is intended to prove that Keitel was also an active party in the political conversations. with foreign statesmen, he did not participate in the conversations, but he was present. Hitler liked to have Keitel in his entourage as representative of the Wehrmacht. Thus Keitel was also present at Godesberg when Prime Minister Chamberlain went there, also at Munich on September 30th 1938, and at the visit of Molotov in November 1940. He was also present at the meetings of Hitler with Marshall Petain, with General Franco, King Boris, with Regent con Horthy and with Mussolini. into a General who would have taken a determinative part in the political evolution. How little this assertion is justified is seen from the fact testified to by admiral Buerckner, that Keitel was extremely careful not to intrude himself into the affairs of the Foreign Office and gave his officers the order not to engage in matters of foreign policy. from the removal of the Reich Minister for War, already dealt with, and the elimination thereby aimed at an achieved of the political represention of the Wehrmacht in the Cabinet. It is self-evident, and has already been pointed out, that the position of the defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW implied and in time of war must have implied to an increased extent his coming into some kind of contract of with all the Ministries and highest Offices, and his dealing with them as the representative of the OKW, that is to say of HITLER.
That did not make Keitel a politician, i.e., a man who took part in an advisory capacity in the determination of Governmental aims and had an influence on the same.
In his high office he naturally worked to carry out these aims and thus far bears a responsibility, but not as a political General.
Mr. President, maybe I am wrong, but I am now beginning a large chapter. Do you want me to start with it ?
THE PRESIDENT: Go on reading then until five o'clock.
DR. NELTE:
The idea of war against Russia was rejected by Keitel. This found visible expression in the memorandum which Field Marshall Keitel drew up, discussed with von Ribbentrop, and handed over to Hitler. According to his sworn statements the reasons were as follows: a) military considerations. b) the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, dated 23 August 1939. In spite of personal presentation the memorandum had no success. Hitler as usual in questions of strategic nature, rejected Keitel's point of view as unconvincing:.
In this connection and due to Hitler's strict refusal, Keitel asked for release and transfer to the front. This is the case which Reich Marshal Gearing confirmed in his interrogation. Hitler refused, sharply critisizing the habit of Generals asking to be released or tendering their resignation whenever he (Hitler) did not approve their opinions or suggestions. That settled it for Keitel : he remained in his post, did his duty, and fulfilled his obligations in carrying out the tasks falling to him within the frame work of further preparations. Here, too, in keeping with his conception of duty, Keitel did not make known to the outside world his basically negative attitude towards the war with Russia, after Hitler had made his decision. This case is in several respects typical of Keitel and his judgment by others We know -and it has been proved by the evidence- that other Generals were also opposed to war with the Soviet Union. Their objections, too, were dispersed or rejected by Hitler. They, too, accepted the decision of the Supreme Commander of the Whermacht, continued to do their duty and carried out the orders given to them.
But there was one basic difference; these other Generals went back to their Headquarters after the discussion. There, in their own circle of officers they spoke about the decision made by Hitler. Of course, it was disputed, but they acted in accordance with it. Since Field Marshal Keitel, due to his military conception as already depicted did not make public to the generals, when they appeared in the Fuehrer Headquarters for discussions, his own attitude, although it too was at variance, the impression was bound to be created that Field Marshal Keitel completely agreed with Hitler and did not support the scruples of Wehrmacht branches. through the entire army that Field Marshal Keitel was a "Yes man", a tool of Hitler, that he was betraying the interests of the Wehrmacht. These generals did not see and were not interested in the fact that this man maintained a constant battle day after day over all possible problems with Hitler and the forces which influenced him from all sides. This picture which definitely did not apply to Keitel, especially not in the sphere of strategic operations -planning and execution-, as has been stated here in detail became a distorted picture which has maintained its effect up to and in these trials. May be not without the fault of the defendant Keitel, About the justification of his conception of duty there can basically be no argument, it has been confirmed here by the witness Admiral Schulte-Moenting to be ture for the defendant Grand Admiral Raeder, too. There can be no doubt that the other Admirals and Generals took basically the same point of view, that it is impossible in the military sphere to criticize before subordinates the decision of a superior as expressed in an order, even if one has scruples against the order oneself. ted and used in a reasonable way, that every exaggeration of a good principle means its devaluation. In the case of Keitel this objection touches the problem of his responsibility and guilt altogether.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I think you might stop there.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 9 July 1946, at 1000 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the defendants Hess and Fritsche are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: I have an order to read. The Tribunal orders:
1. Applications for witnesses for organizations to be heard by the Tribunal in open court in accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Tribunal's order of March 13, 1946 should be made to the General Secretary as soon as possible, and in any case not later then the 20th of July.
2. The Tribunal believes that so much evidence has already been taken and so wide a field has been covered that only a very few witnesses need be called for each organization.
DR. NELTE (Counsel for the defendant Keitel): Mr. President, gentlemen of the court, yesterday I treated the problem of Keitel and the Russian campaign, and I remind you of what Keitel has said in the witness box concerning the so-called ideological orders, "I knew their content. In spite of my objections I passed them on without the possibility of serious consequences deterring me." have to say now. It is on page *--*, the fourth paragraph. Thus the opinion was created in the course of time and disseminated through the entire army that Field Marshal Keitel was a "yes man", a tool of Hitler that he was betraying the interests of the Wehrmacht. These generals did not see and were not interested in the fact that this man maintained a constant battle day after day over all possible problems with Hitler and the forces which influenced him from all sides. This picture which definitely did not apply Keitel, especially not in the sphere, of strategic operations, planning and execution, as has been stated here in detail, became a distorted picture which has maintained its effect up to and in these trials, maybe not without the fault of the defendant Keitel.
About the justification of his conception of duty there can basically be no argument. It has been confirmed here by the witness Admiral SchulteMoenting to be true for the defendant Grand Admiral Raeder, too. There can be no doubt that the other admirals and generals took basically the same point of view, that it is impossible in the military sphere to criticize before subordinates the decision of a superior as expressed in an order, even if one has scruples against the order oneself. and used in a reasonable way, that every exaggeration of a good principle means its devaluation. In the case of Keitel this objection touches the problem of his responsibility and *--* altogether. rect is being exaggerated and in this way endangers the goods for the protection of which it has been established constitutes guilt ? ciple. The thoughts and ideas which the defendant Keitel had in this connection were the following: armed forces; one may say that obedience -- a virtue in civilian life and therefore more or less unstable in its application -- must be the essential ce the aim which is to be accomplished, by the armed forces could not be accomplished. maintenance of the most valuable national possessions, is so sacred that the importance of the principle of obedience cannot be evaluated high enough.
From this springs the duty for these who are called upon to preserve that national insturment, the Wehrmacht, within the scope of its higher task, to emphasize the importance of obedience. But what the General demands of the soldier, because it is indispensable, must remain in force for himself, too. The same applies to the principle of obedience. It would now be dangerous to relax an order or even an essential principle by tion. Such relaxation would leave the principle of decision to the individual which means to his judgment. There might be such cases, where the decision depends or must be made dependent on actual circumstances. In principle, such relaxation would lead to devaluation, even to the abrogation of the principle. In order to prevent this danger and to eliminate any doubt as to its absolute importance, the principle of obedience has been changed in military life into one of "absolute obedience" and embodied in the military oath. This, too, is valid for the General as well as nor the common soldier. The defendant Keitel has not only grown up in these ways of thinking, but in the 37 years of his military service (up to 1938), among it in the first World War, he had also come to the conviction that this principle of obedience is the strongest pillar upon which the Wehrmacht rests and with, it the security of the country. Deeply imbued with the importance of his profession, he had served the Kaiser, Ebert, and von Hindenburg in accordance with this principle. But while they, as the representatives of the state, had in some way an impersonal and symbolic effect on Keitel, Hitler from 1934, at first appeared the same to him, i.e., without any personal touch; in spite of the fact that his name was mentioned in the military oath, but only as representative of the State. In 1938 Keitel as Chief of the OKW came into the immediate circle and the personal sphere of activity of Hitler. It would appear to be important for the further development and for the judging of Keitel, to realize that Keitel was now exposed to the direct effects of Hitler's personality, due to the soldierly conception of duty which was especially developed in him, and due to the pronounced feeling for soldierly obedience.
I incline to the assumption that Hitler had clearly realized, in the preliminary discussions with Keitel which had to the Fuehrer order of 4 February 1938, that Keitel was a personality, such as he had included in his calculations:
A man upon whom he could rely as soldier at any time; who was devoted to him in convinced soldierly faithfulness; who could by his appearance, worthily appear for the Wehrmacht in his environment, i.e., for purposes of representation; who by reason of his power of judgment, was an extraordinary organizer, (according to the report of Field Marshal v. Blomberg). That Hitler consequently strongly influenced this man who really admired him, and that he brought him completely under his charm is a fact which Keitel himself has admitted. It must be remembered if one wishes to understand how it could happen that Keitel made out and forwarded orders of Hitler which were incompatible with the traditional conception of a German officer, as for instance the orders C 50 and PS 44 and others, which were submitted by who Soviet Russian Prosecution. By the exploitation of the readiness for action for Germany, which was presumed to be a matter of course for all Generals. Hitler understood how to camouflage his Party-political aim with the defense of national interests, and to present the pending fight against the Soviet Union as an inevitable dispute, even as defensive war, imposed by positive news reports, in which it was a question of to be or not to be for Germany. Therewith Hitler asked the fateful question. That the conscience of the old officer nevertheless pricked him (Keitel) and that he repeatedly raised objections to the drafts of the orders, although without success, that has been confirmed by General Jodl here in the witness box. During the cross-examination by the representative of the American Prosecution the defendant Keitel has openly stated that he was conscious of the criminal de the instructions of the Supreme Commander of the Army and of the Head of the State whose final word against all objections was:
"I do not knew why you are worrying; after all, you have no responsibility. Only I have it towards the German people.
This is the analysis of Keitel's attitude towards the so-called ideologically qualified orders of Hitler. Keitel's last, and in many cases justified hope was that the commanders-inchief and subordinate commanders of the Wehrmacht would in practice either not apply at all or only moderately these hard and even inhuman orders within the framework of their judgment and their responsibility. In his position, Keitel had only the choice of military disobidience by refusing to forward the orders or of the carrying out of the instruction to forward the orders. whether and what else he could or should have done, I shall examine in another connection. The question here is to make clear how it happened that Keitel forwarded orders which undeniably violated the regulations of land warfare and humanity, and that he did now recognize the point at which even the strict duty of the soldier to obey must end, by reason of his duty to obey, of his sworn faithfulness to the Supreme Commander, and of the fact that he saw in the order of the Head of the State the absolution of his own responsibility. All soldiers who appear here as defendants or as witnesses have referred to the duty of allegiance. The all, even so far as they sooner or later recognized that Hitler had drawn them and the Wehrmacht into his egocentric and risky game, have considered the oath of allegiance as given to their country, an have believed that they must continue their duty under circumstances which my appear inconceivable to us and to themselves, after realising the resulting disaster.
Not only soldiers like Raeder, Doenitz, and Jodl, but also Paulus have kept their positions and have remained in their posts, and we have hear the same from other defendants, too. The statements of the defendants Speer and Jodl in this connection were deeply moving. It must be examined as to whether these facts relieve the defendant Keitel of a punishable responsibility. Keitel does not deny that his is a heavy moral responsibility. He has recognized that whoever flayed even the small part in this terrible drama, cannot feel himself free from a moral guilt in which he was entangled. If I nevertheless emphasize the legal point of view, I am so doing because Justice Jackson has expressly referred in his speech for the prosecution, to law as basis of your verdict to International Law, the law of the in Individual States, and to the law which the victorious Powers have embodied, in the State I herewith state that the defendant Keitel has recognized that some of Hitler's orders violated International Law.
The Statute has determined that a soldier cannot refer to an order of a superior or of a Government in order to clear himself. At the beginning of my statement I have asked you to examine whether independent of the terms of the Statute, the principle is unimpeachable that the standard for what is right or wrong can be settled on a national basis only.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I see that in the next few pages you pass into the realm of metaphysics. Do you not think that part you might leave for the Tribunal to read ? adjournment and you have get over seventy pages left of your speech to read.
DR. NELTE: I have limited it and I shall be through by lunch time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Do you think it is necessary to read those passages about metaphysical forces and the individual cannot detach himself from that.
Yes, I shall have to recommence on page 121. Just before that I come to Hitler's character. Perhaps I my just read from page 120 at the bottom.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you tell the Tribunal that you have limited your presentation. I think you began yesterday at a quarter past twelve. Go on then. Take your own course, but do your best to limit it, and go to page 120 now.
DR. NELTE: I am coming to paragraph three on page 120.
Hitler was the exponent of an idea. He was not only the representative of a party political program, but also of a philosophy which divided him and the German people from the ideology of the rest of the world. All toleration and all compromise were unknown to him as a convinced enemy of the parliamentary democracy, possessed by the idea of two correctness of his idealogy. This led to an egocentric ideology which recognized only his own ideas and his own decisions as right. It led to the Fuehrer State, in which he was enthroned on a lonely height as the incarnation of this faith, unapproachable by all scruples and pretexts distrustful of all whom he suspected as potential dangers to his power, and brutal, if something crossed his ideological course. incompatible with the assumption of the Prosecution that a partnership of interests could have existed between Hitler and the defendant. There wasno partnership of interests and no common planning between Hitler and the men who were supposed to be his advisers. The hierarchy of the Fuehrer State, in association with the Fuehrer Order No. 2, which expresses the separation of work in its most flagrant form, admits only the conclusion that the so-called ccworkers were only executive mouthpieces or tools of an overwhelming Will but not men who translated their own will into deeds. The only question therefore, which can be raised is whether these men were guilty in that they put themselves at the disposal of such a system and that they submitted to the will for power of a man like Hitler.
This problem-needs special examination, as far as soldiers are concerned; because this submitting to somebody's will, which is remote from the existence of a free man, is for the soldier the basic element of his profession: Obedience and the duty of allegiance which exact for the soldier in all political systems.
with by my colleague Dr. Stahmer and also by Dr. Jahrreiss. In the individual case of the defendant Keitel I should like only to point out the sentences of the speech as starting point of my statements:
"It is not sufficient that the plan is common to them all; they must know about it being common to all of them, and each one of them must accept voluntarily the plan as his own.
"That is why a conspiracy with a dictator at the head is a contradiction in itself. The dictator does not conspire with his followers; he docs not conclude an agreement with them, but he dictates."
Dr. Stahmer haspointed out that no one acting under or on account of pressure can therefore be a conspirator. I should like to modify this for the circle to which the defendant Keitel belonged. It would not conclusively represent the real circumstances if it were said that the defendants belonging to the military branch have acted on account of or under pressure. It is correct to say that soldiers do not act voluntarily, i.e. of their own free will. They must do what they are ordered, without it mattering whether or not they approve of it. The training of will power, or in any case consideration of the training of will power, is accordingly eliminated in connection with soldiers' duties; it will always and everywhere be eliminated because of the nature of the military profession, and it cannot appear as a determinative factor in the genesis and execution of orders, if the absolute Fuehrer principle is not in force in the Wehrmacht. The question, therefore, is this military sphere is not one of an abstract and with it theoretical deduction, but of a compelling conclusion resulting from the nature and from the practice of the Military profession, when I say: orders. The activity of the defendant Keitel concerning the genesis of orders, decrees and other measures of Hitler, even in so far as they are criminal, cannot therefore be considered aspartnership work, i.e. as the result of a common planning within the meaning of conspiracy. Keitel's activity concerning the execution of orders consists in the due transmission of orders in the Operations Sector and in the due carrying out of orders in the administration of the war, i.e. the so-called Administrative Sector.
These activities however could be juridically qualified; the Prosecution has, as I think, so far submitted nothing which could possibly refute this consideration. the system of orders holds good. The significance of this assertion is particularly important in the case of the defendant Keitel. It would be possible to oppose such a presentation of evidence by considering that Keitel did not act as a soldier or in any case as soldier only and that therefore he cannot be considered responsible for the consequences of what is merely a system of orders. The unfortunate structure of his position and the manifold tasks of a chief of the OKW, sometimes even not systematically conceivable, dim the recognition of the primary conceptions regarding the defendant Keitel, namely that whatever he, Keitel, did, with which authority or organization he dealt or was in contact with, he always acted as a soldier, and it was always the general or particular order of Hitler, which placed him in the foreground and sent him into action. The facts of conspiracy seem to me comprehensibly and logically incompatible with the tasks of a soldier and with Keitel's position as head of the OKW. conspiracy to be prejudice, the purpose of this conspiracy is an activity, performed by members of a gang departing from their normal and private activity. The result of this is - on the contrary - that any activity practised by somebody on the strength of his vocation or employment cannot be called conspiracy. In the case of a soldier it may be added that he does not act on his own initiative but in accordance with orders. A soldier might therefore well take part in a conspiracy, directed against the duties he has undertaken as a soldier, but never can his activity within the framework of his military functions be designated as a conspiracy. WFST included. When I say the OKW i mean the Staff OKW. It is well known that Hitler as OKW, i.e. Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces, dealt himself with all matters concerning the conduct of this ideological war of his own and interfered in it.