But there was one basic difference; these other Generals went back to their Headquarters after the discussion. There, in their own circle of officers they spoke about the decision made by Hitler. Of course, it was disputed, but they acted in accordance with it. Since Field Marshal Keitel, due to his military conception as already depicted did not make public to the generals, when they appeared in the Fuehrer Headquarters for discussions, his own attitude, although it too was at variance, the impression was bound to be created that Field Marshal Keitel completely agreed with Hitler and did not support the scruples of Wehrmacht branches. through the entire army that Field Marshal Keitel was a "Yes man", a tool of Hitler, that he was betraying the interests of the Wehrmacht. These generals did not see and were not interested in the fact that this man maintained a constant battle day after day over all possible problems with Hitler and the forces which influenced him from all sides. This picture which definitely did not apply to Keitel, especially not in the sphere of strategic operations -planning and execution-, as has been stated here in detail became a distorted picture which has maintained its effect up to and in these trials. May be not without the fault of the defendant Keitel, About the justification of his conception of duty there can basically be no argument, it has been confirmed here by the witness Admiral Schulte-Moenting to be ture for the defendant Grand Admiral Raeder, too. There can be no doubt that the other Admirals and Generals took basically the same point of view, that it is impossible in the military sphere to criticize before subordinates the decision of a superior as expressed in an order, even if one has scruples against the order oneself. ted and used in a reasonable way, that every exaggeration of a good principle means its devaluation. In the case of Keitel this objection touches the problem of his responsibility and guilt altogether.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I think you might stop there.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 9 July 1946, at 1000 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the defendants Hess and Fritsche are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: I have an order to read. The Tribunal orders:
1. Applications for witnesses for organizations to be heard by the Tribunal in open court in accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Tribunal's order of March 13, 1946 should be made to the General Secretary as soon as possible, and in any case not later then the 20th of July.
2. The Tribunal believes that so much evidence has already been taken and so wide a field has been covered that only a very few witnesses need be called for each organization.
DR. NELTE (Counsel for the defendant Keitel): Mr. President, gentlemen of the court, yesterday I treated the problem of Keitel and the Russian campaign, and I remind you of what Keitel has said in the witness box concerning the so-called ideological orders, "I knew their content. In spite of my objections I passed them on without the possibility of serious consequences deterring me." have to say now. It is on page *--*, the fourth paragraph. Thus the opinion was created in the course of time and disseminated through the entire army that Field Marshal Keitel was a "yes man", a tool of Hitler that he was betraying the interests of the Wehrmacht. These generals did not see and were not interested in the fact that this man maintained a constant battle day after day over all possible problems with Hitler and the forces which influenced him from all sides. This picture which definitely did not apply Keitel, especially not in the sphere, of strategic operations, planning and execution, as has been stated here in detail, became a distorted picture which has maintained its effect up to and in these trials, maybe not without the fault of the defendant Keitel.
About the justification of his conception of duty there can basically be no argument. It has been confirmed here by the witness Admiral SchulteMoenting to be true for the defendant Grand Admiral Raeder, too. There can be no doubt that the other admirals and generals took basically the same point of view, that it is impossible in the military sphere to criticize before subordinates the decision of a superior as expressed in an order, even if one has scruples against the order oneself. and used in a reasonable way, that every exaggeration of a good principle means its devaluation. In the case of Keitel this objection touches the problem of his responsibility and *--* altogether. rect is being exaggerated and in this way endangers the goods for the protection of which it has been established constitutes guilt ? ciple. The thoughts and ideas which the defendant Keitel had in this connection were the following: armed forces; one may say that obedience -- a virtue in civilian life and therefore more or less unstable in its application -- must be the essential ce the aim which is to be accomplished, by the armed forces could not be accomplished. maintenance of the most valuable national possessions, is so sacred that the importance of the principle of obedience cannot be evaluated high enough.
From this springs the duty for these who are called upon to preserve that national insturment, the Wehrmacht, within the scope of its higher task, to emphasize the importance of obedience. But what the General demands of the soldier, because it is indispensable, must remain in force for himself, too. The same applies to the principle of obedience. It would now be dangerous to relax an order or even an essential principle by tion. Such relaxation would leave the principle of decision to the individual which means to his judgment. There might be such cases, where the decision depends or must be made dependent on actual circumstances. In principle, such relaxation would lead to devaluation, even to the abrogation of the principle. In order to prevent this danger and to eliminate any doubt as to its absolute importance, the principle of obedience has been changed in military life into one of "absolute obedience" and embodied in the military oath. This, too, is valid for the General as well as nor the common soldier. The defendant Keitel has not only grown up in these ways of thinking, but in the 37 years of his military service (up to 1938), among it in the first World War, he had also come to the conviction that this principle of obedience is the strongest pillar upon which the Wehrmacht rests and with, it the security of the country. Deeply imbued with the importance of his profession, he had served the Kaiser, Ebert, and von Hindenburg in accordance with this principle. But while they, as the representatives of the state, had in some way an impersonal and symbolic effect on Keitel, Hitler from 1934, at first appeared the same to him, i.e., without any personal touch; in spite of the fact that his name was mentioned in the military oath, but only as representative of the State. In 1938 Keitel as Chief of the OKW came into the immediate circle and the personal sphere of activity of Hitler. It would appear to be important for the further development and for the judging of Keitel, to realize that Keitel was now exposed to the direct effects of Hitler's personality, due to the soldierly conception of duty which was especially developed in him, and due to the pronounced feeling for soldierly obedience.
I incline to the assumption that Hitler had clearly realized, in the preliminary discussions with Keitel which had to the Fuehrer order of 4 February 1938, that Keitel was a personality, such as he had included in his calculations:
A man upon whom he could rely as soldier at any time; who was devoted to him in convinced soldierly faithfulness; who could by his appearance, worthily appear for the Wehrmacht in his environment, i.e., for purposes of representation; who by reason of his power of judgment, was an extraordinary organizer, (according to the report of Field Marshal v. Blomberg). That Hitler consequently strongly influenced this man who really admired him, and that he brought him completely under his charm is a fact which Keitel himself has admitted. It must be remembered if one wishes to understand how it could happen that Keitel made out and forwarded orders of Hitler which were incompatible with the traditional conception of a German officer, as for instance the orders C 50 and PS 44 and others, which were submitted by who Soviet Russian Prosecution. By the exploitation of the readiness for action for Germany, which was presumed to be a matter of course for all Generals. Hitler understood how to camouflage his Party-political aim with the defense of national interests, and to present the pending fight against the Soviet Union as an inevitable dispute, even as defensive war, imposed by positive news reports, in which it was a question of to be or not to be for Germany. Therewith Hitler asked the fateful question. That the conscience of the old officer nevertheless pricked him (Keitel) and that he repeatedly raised objections to the drafts of the orders, although without success, that has been confirmed by General Jodl here in the witness box. During the cross-examination by the representative of the American Prosecution the defendant Keitel has openly stated that he was conscious of the criminal de the instructions of the Supreme Commander of the Army and of the Head of the State whose final word against all objections was:
"I do not knew why you are worrying; after all, you have no responsibility. Only I have it towards the German people.
This is the analysis of Keitel's attitude towards the so-called ideologically qualified orders of Hitler. Keitel's last, and in many cases justified hope was that the commanders-inchief and subordinate commanders of the Wehrmacht would in practice either not apply at all or only moderately these hard and even inhuman orders within the framework of their judgment and their responsibility. In his position, Keitel had only the choice of military disobidience by refusing to forward the orders or of the carrying out of the instruction to forward the orders. whether and what else he could or should have done, I shall examine in another connection. The question here is to make clear how it happened that Keitel forwarded orders which undeniably violated the regulations of land warfare and humanity, and that he did now recognize the point at which even the strict duty of the soldier to obey must end, by reason of his duty to obey, of his sworn faithfulness to the Supreme Commander, and of the fact that he saw in the order of the Head of the State the absolution of his own responsibility. All soldiers who appear here as defendants or as witnesses have referred to the duty of allegiance. The all, even so far as they sooner or later recognized that Hitler had drawn them and the Wehrmacht into his egocentric and risky game, have considered the oath of allegiance as given to their country, an have believed that they must continue their duty under circumstances which my appear inconceivable to us and to themselves, after realising the resulting disaster.
Not only soldiers like Raeder, Doenitz, and Jodl, but also Paulus have kept their positions and have remained in their posts, and we have hear the same from other defendants, too. The statements of the defendants Speer and Jodl in this connection were deeply moving. It must be examined as to whether these facts relieve the defendant Keitel of a punishable responsibility. Keitel does not deny that his is a heavy moral responsibility. He has recognized that whoever flayed even the small part in this terrible drama, cannot feel himself free from a moral guilt in which he was entangled. If I nevertheless emphasize the legal point of view, I am so doing because Justice Jackson has expressly referred in his speech for the prosecution, to law as basis of your verdict to International Law, the law of the in Individual States, and to the law which the victorious Powers have embodied, in the State I herewith state that the defendant Keitel has recognized that some of Hitler's orders violated International Law.
The Statute has determined that a soldier cannot refer to an order of a superior or of a Government in order to clear himself. At the beginning of my statement I have asked you to examine whether independent of the terms of the Statute, the principle is unimpeachable that the standard for what is right or wrong can be settled on a national basis only.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I see that in the next few pages you pass into the realm of metaphysics. Do you not think that part you might leave for the Tribunal to read ? adjournment and you have get over seventy pages left of your speech to read.
DR. NELTE: I have limited it and I shall be through by lunch time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Do you think it is necessary to read those passages about metaphysical forces and the individual cannot detach himself from that.
Yes, I shall have to recommence on page 121. Just before that I come to Hitler's character. Perhaps I my just read from page 120 at the bottom.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you tell the Tribunal that you have limited your presentation. I think you began yesterday at a quarter past twelve. Go on then. Take your own course, but do your best to limit it, and go to page 120 now.
DR. NELTE: I am coming to paragraph three on page 120.
Hitler was the exponent of an idea. He was not only the representative of a party political program, but also of a philosophy which divided him and the German people from the ideology of the rest of the world. All toleration and all compromise were unknown to him as a convinced enemy of the parliamentary democracy, possessed by the idea of two correctness of his idealogy. This led to an egocentric ideology which recognized only his own ideas and his own decisions as right. It led to the Fuehrer State, in which he was enthroned on a lonely height as the incarnation of this faith, unapproachable by all scruples and pretexts distrustful of all whom he suspected as potential dangers to his power, and brutal, if something crossed his ideological course. incompatible with the assumption of the Prosecution that a partnership of interests could have existed between Hitler and the defendant. There wasno partnership of interests and no common planning between Hitler and the men who were supposed to be his advisers. The hierarchy of the Fuehrer State, in association with the Fuehrer Order No. 2, which expresses the separation of work in its most flagrant form, admits only the conclusion that the so-called ccworkers were only executive mouthpieces or tools of an overwhelming Will but not men who translated their own will into deeds. The only question therefore, which can be raised is whether these men were guilty in that they put themselves at the disposal of such a system and that they submitted to the will for power of a man like Hitler.
This problem-needs special examination, as far as soldiers are concerned; because this submitting to somebody's will, which is remote from the existence of a free man, is for the soldier the basic element of his profession: Obedience and the duty of allegiance which exact for the soldier in all political systems.
with by my colleague Dr. Stahmer and also by Dr. Jahrreiss. In the individual case of the defendant Keitel I should like only to point out the sentences of the speech as starting point of my statements:
"It is not sufficient that the plan is common to them all; they must know about it being common to all of them, and each one of them must accept voluntarily the plan as his own.
"That is why a conspiracy with a dictator at the head is a contradiction in itself. The dictator does not conspire with his followers; he docs not conclude an agreement with them, but he dictates."
Dr. Stahmer haspointed out that no one acting under or on account of pressure can therefore be a conspirator. I should like to modify this for the circle to which the defendant Keitel belonged. It would not conclusively represent the real circumstances if it were said that the defendants belonging to the military branch have acted on account of or under pressure. It is correct to say that soldiers do not act voluntarily, i.e. of their own free will. They must do what they are ordered, without it mattering whether or not they approve of it. The training of will power, or in any case consideration of the training of will power, is accordingly eliminated in connection with soldiers' duties; it will always and everywhere be eliminated because of the nature of the military profession, and it cannot appear as a determinative factor in the genesis and execution of orders, if the absolute Fuehrer principle is not in force in the Wehrmacht. The question, therefore, is this military sphere is not one of an abstract and with it theoretical deduction, but of a compelling conclusion resulting from the nature and from the practice of the Military profession, when I say: orders. The activity of the defendant Keitel concerning the genesis of orders, decrees and other measures of Hitler, even in so far as they are criminal, cannot therefore be considered aspartnership work, i.e. as the result of a common planning within the meaning of conspiracy. Keitel's activity concerning the execution of orders consists in the due transmission of orders in the Operations Sector and in the due carrying out of orders in the administration of the war, i.e. the so-called Administrative Sector.
These activities however could be juridically qualified; the Prosecution has, as I think, so far submitted nothing which could possibly refute this consideration. the system of orders holds good. The significance of this assertion is particularly important in the case of the defendant Keitel. It would be possible to oppose such a presentation of evidence by considering that Keitel did not act as a soldier or in any case as soldier only and that therefore he cannot be considered responsible for the consequences of what is merely a system of orders. The unfortunate structure of his position and the manifold tasks of a chief of the OKW, sometimes even not systematically conceivable, dim the recognition of the primary conceptions regarding the defendant Keitel, namely that whatever he, Keitel, did, with which authority or organization he dealt or was in contact with, he always acted as a soldier, and it was always the general or particular order of Hitler, which placed him in the foreground and sent him into action. The facts of conspiracy seem to me comprehensibly and logically incompatible with the tasks of a soldier and with Keitel's position as head of the OKW. conspiracy to be prejudice, the purpose of this conspiracy is an activity, performed by members of a gang departing from their normal and private activity. The result of this is - on the contrary - that any activity practised by somebody on the strength of his vocation or employment cannot be called conspiracy. In the case of a soldier it may be added that he does not act on his own initiative but in accordance with orders. A soldier might therefore well take part in a conspiracy, directed against the duties he has undertaken as a soldier, but never can his activity within the framework of his military functions be designated as a conspiracy. WFST included. When I say the OKW i mean the Staff OKW. It is well known that Hitler as OKW, i.e. Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces, dealt himself with all matters concerning the conduct of this ideological war of his own and interfered in it.
The army led, but Hitler was in steady and close collaboration with the Supreme chief of the Army and with was Chief of the General Staff, until December 1941 when, after having taken over the supreme command of the Army he also took over the direct leadership. Commander in Chief of the Army evidently led to many mistakes which resulted in the severe charges against the German High Command, as Staff of the General High Command and its Chief of Staff General Keitel. war against Russia which he has frakly stated in the witness box. It is therefore not only understandable but also the duty of the defense to clarify Keitel's responsibility for all these facts of the most terrible atrocities and incredible degeneration. most complicated, I handed the affidavit of defendant Keitel to the Tribunal. It is Exhibit No. K 10. I refer to it without reading its contents. war against the Soviet-Union hasbeen subject to three factors for its execution:
First, military operations and orders: Commander in Chief of the Army, OKH. three factors and no authoritative power. Neither can it be contested that in the course of his aforementioned truly anarchistic methods of work, Hitler, when all is said and done, held all the strings in his hands and sometimes used the German High Command for the forwarding of his, Hitler's orders nor it qualified to change the principal responsibility. Soviet Prosecution, I can refer, within the compass of my statement, only to a comparatively small number of the documents. The documents on pages 126 up to 136, which have been dealt with in detail, will be summarized by me as follows, briefly. 366, 106 and 407, and I shall try to prove in detail that the accusations against the OKW and Keitel as the guilty parties have no value as evidence as far as these documents are concerned. I have referred earlier in Part 2 of my presentation, in which I dealt with official documents. If I refer to official reports of the Investigation Commission in this connection, it is not done because of their actual contents but because they have been produced as support for the indictment of Keitel. They, on the strength of their own statements, furnish the proof that Keitel's indictment and that of the OKW and the State are not based on facts as far as these serious things are concerned. dealt with USSR 9, 35 and 38. In these official reports, which implicate the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, any concrete facts are lacking which might refer to the staff of the OKW--that is, Keitel--as the perpetrator or initiator of these atrocities.
am merely pointing out that Keitel, in his position, had neither the authority nor the possibility to give orders which led to the crimes asserted.
Then, on page 134, paragraph1: are named as the responsibility party. However, there are many such official reports which have been quoted during the presentation of the prosecution as evidence for Keitel's guilt, in which neither the name of the defendant nor the OKW is even mentioned. 39, 8, 29, 45, 46 and 63. equally carefully to that effect and to ascertain whether, if they are submitted in connection with Keitel and the OKW, they allow any final conclusion regarding Keitel's guilt or whether that is not the case in the documents which have been presented. the bottom of page 134 will not be read by me, and that I am not referring to them either. omic exploitation of the occupied territories, and I should like to submit them--they begin at page 137--without reading them. Since the defense counsel of Reichsmarshal Goering has already dealt with this problem and has made clear the authority and responsibility, it would merely be repetition, which I shall certainly avoid. However, I shall refer to the contents of this part of my presentation and beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. assertion made by the French prosecution regarding the participation of the OKW and Keitel in the cases of Oradour and Tulle. sonally with war crimes and crimes against humanity. The accusation concerns putting to death French civilians without judicial decision.
In this connection the cases of Oradour and Tulle were particularly emphasized. They are recorded in a report by the French Governmentdocument F-236. The French prosecution declared--and I quote: "Keitel's guilt in all these things is undoubted." ful happenings of Oradour and Tulle. As defense counsel for defendant Keitel, I have to examine whether the assertion of the prosecution that defendant Keitel bears any guilt or responsibility in these atrocious occurrences is founded. intent on producing evidence to the effect that he is not responsible for these terrible occurences, and furthermore, that when such things came to his knowledge he was anxious to have them cleared up in order that the actual offenders might be brought to account. in these crimes. Any responsibility and guilt of the defendant can therefore be derived only from his official position. No orders of any kind bearing Keitel's signature have been submitted by the prosecution, so that whoever is guilty, Keitel does not, at any rate, belong to the circle of those directly responsible. villages are recorded in the notes of General Berard dated 6 July and 3 August, 1944. I have already pointed out, when this document was submitted, that by the submission of those notes of complaint alone--that is, without simultaneous production of the replies, which are also in the possession of the prosecution--no objective picture can be presented of the facts as they are for a pronouncement on the guilt of the defendant Keitel. As the defendant Keitel, owing to his lack of authority to issue orders in the matter, cannot possibly be taken into consideration as the author of the orders which led to the complaint, any responsibility and guilt of Keitel's can therefore be proved only by the fact that he did not cause the necessary stops to be taken after being informed by the German Armistice Commission. Whatever Keitel did or failed to do can be gathered only from the reply notes and from the stipulations of the OKW to the German Armistice Commission.
Keitel even in this case, had not the French prosecution themselves submitted a document which was to serve as proof of Keitel's individual guilt. This document is worded as follows, and was read by the French prosecution at the session of 31 January 1946.
I pass on to page 147, and there I say:
This document signed by Keitel, shows:
1. Upon receipt of the French memorandum of complaint of 26 September, 1944, the OKW issued orders to the German Armistice Commission to investigate and handle this matter.
2. Thereupon the German Armistice Commission instructed Commander-in-Chief West to investigate the incidents.
3. Upon receipt of a letter from Army Group B, the OKW expressed itself as follows:
"It was in the German interest to answer these charges at the earliest possible moment.
"The manner in which this case was handled indicates that perhaps there still exists a great deal of ignorance as to the importance to be attached to all reproaches against the German Wehrmacht, to counteract any enemy propaganda, and to refute immediately any purported German acts of atrocity. The German Armistice Commission is hereby instructed to continue giving this matter attention with all possible emphasis. It is requested to render any assistance possible and especially to take all steps for expeditious handling of the matter as far as it regards your own sphere of action. The fact that PZ, AOK 6 no longer forms part of the forces of Colonel West is no reason to prevent continuation of the needed investigation so as to bring light into and refute the French charges." the defendant Keitel, upon receipt of information, undertook with due energy such steps as were within the scope of his authority and ability as the chief of the OKW.
This eliminates the prosecution's contention in so far as it has assumed the guilt of the defendant Keitel. At the sane time, however, the handling of this case by the defendant Keitel points to the conclusion that he acted in a similar manner in other cases.
Mr. President, before coming to the problem of hostages, which I thought I would leave for a later time, possibly, I was going to come to the serious evidence concerning Nacht und Nebel, which is at page 154.
It may be said that there is hardly any order in which, during the proceedings of this Tribunal made a deeper impression on people's minds than the order "Nacht und Nobel". By this is meant an order which originated during the fight waged against acts of sabotage and the Resistance Movement in France.
Asaa result of the departure of the troops in connection with the march against the Soviet Union, plots against the security of the German troops remaining in France, especially acts of sabotage against all means of communication increased from day to day. From this resulted the need for increased activity of couter-espionage offices, which led to proceedings and verdicts of military courts against members of the Resistance Movement and its accomplices. Those sentences were very severe. In addition to capital punishment, imprisonment also. During meetings for discussion of the situation, reports which arrived daily caused violent disputes with Hitler, who, as always, was trying to find someone on whom to fix the blame, and who, according to Hitler was in this instance to be found in the far too cumbersome handling of military justice. True to his spontaneously explosive temperament, he ordered, the working out of directives to create a quick effective and lasting spirit of intimidation. He declared that confinment could, not be considered an effective means of intimidation. When Keitel objected that not everyone could possibly be sentenced to death, and that Military Courts would, furthermore, refuse to comply, he replied that he didn't mind about that. Cases where the offense has been established to be so serious as to impose capital punishment without lengthy Court proceedings, should continue to be dealt with as heretofore; that in other cases, however, where this was not the case, he ordered the suspected persons to be brought secretly to Germany while withholding all news as to what had happened to them, it being a fact that promulgation of sentences for penal servitude in occupied territory failed to have an intimidating effect in view of the amnesty at the end of the war.
the chief of the Judge advocate's Office of the Wehrmacht and with the chief of the foreign Counter-Intelligence Office (Canaris), from when also came the letter of 2 February 1942 (document UK 35), deliberations as to what should be done. When repeated remonstrances with Hitler to refrain from this system, or at least to relax the demand for complete secrecy failed to have any effect, a draft was finally submitted which became the Decree of 7 December 1941 (UK 35), which we have before us here. ded in establishing the competency of the Reich Administration of Justice for the persons removed to Germany (see last paragraph of directives of 7 December 1941). Keitel had guaranteed this stipulation by means of the first Enactment-Decree governing the directives, in that he made the clarifying statement (last sentence in paragraph 1, of IV) that unless otherwise oredered by OKW, the case would be referred to civilian judicial authorities according to section 3, paragraph 2, second sentence. The defendant believed that in such manner he had at least ensured that the person involved would have the benefit of regular court proceedings and that according to German provisions for accomodating and treating prisoners upon trial and prisoners serving a sentence, there could be no danger to life and limb. Keitel and his staff of exports believed that they could find comfort in the fact that however cruel the suffering, and the uncertainty endured, by those concerned might be, neverthelss, the life of the deported persons had at least been saved. the cover letter of 12 December 1941. As already stated by the co-defendant General Jodl during his examination, there had been adopted a certain wordking when the signatory wished to express his dissent with the order submitted. The cover letter begins with the words:
"It is the well considered desire of the Fuehrer...."
The closing sentence runs:
"The attached directives....comply with the Fuehrer's interpretation". that once again this was an order of the Fuehrer which could not be evaded, and they concluded the refrom that this order should he applied as mildly as possible.
Espionage Office III (Amt Ausland/Abwehr), the original of which must have been signed by Canris. At that time the defendant was not in Berlin where, after promulgation of the decree of 7 December 1941, the matter was dealt with further. Keitel, at the Fuehrer Headquarters, was not informed of the contents of the letter. In the light of the above remarks, the wording of the letter justified the assumption that a milder carrying out would be made possible through the provision that Counter-Espionage Offices were directed "to see to it that before an arrest is made, evidence will be at hand fully sufficient to warrant the transfer of the perpetrator". It was also provided that before the arrest took place the competent military court must be approached in order to establish whether the evidence were adequate. ministration of Justice. Sufficient prrof for the correctness of the assumption of the defendant Keitel is found in the fact that in view of the attitude of this Admiral which is sufficiently known to the Tribunal, Canaris would never have ordered the transfer to the Gestapo. the letter of 2 February 1942. everything possible to safeguard those involved, the "Nacht und Nobel" decree - as it came to be termed later - caused him great mental anguish.
Keitel does not deny that this decree is not compatible with International Law, and this was known to him.
to the Nunrberg trial he know, that after arrival in the Reich the persons involved were imprisoned by the police and then transferred to concentration camps. This was contrary to the meaning and purpose of that decree. The defendant Keitel could not learn anything about it because after the persons involved were turned over by the competent Law,Lords of the Military Courts to the competent judicial authority for transfer to Germany - to be turned over to the Administration of Justice - the competency of the Wehrmacht ceased, unless the case involved proceedings by a Military Court. The defendant Keitel is unable to explain from personal information how it happened that such a great number of persons were brought into concentration carps to experience a treatment described as "NN' such as was described by witnesses who appeared here. Results obtained through evidence presented to this Tribunal load to the assumption that without so informing military authorities, police authorities indicated as "NN" prisoners all politically suspicious persons who on the basis of political measures were removed from occupied territories to Germany, to be placed in concentration camps. According to evidence, persons held in "NN" camps were primarily people who had not been sentenced, after formal proceedings by Military Courts in occupied territories, to be brought to Germany. occupied territories made use of this decree as a general and unrestricted charter for deportation, exceeding every imaginable measure and regardless of the preorgatives of the Military Authorities alone, and the rules of procedure imposed upon them. territories without the knowledge of the Wehrmacht authorities can only be explained by the fact that as a result of the appointment of Senior SS and police chiefs, the carrying out of police duties was withdrawn from the military authorities, and that these higher SS and police chiefs received their orders from the Reich leader SS.