In order to clarify the defendant Keitel's responsibility and competence, it is necessary to analyze the concept of OKW. I ask, Mr. President, that this statement not be considered a theoretical and, therefore, superfluous discussion. mental assertion-
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Dr. Nelte, may I ask what you have been doing if you haven't been analyzing the concept of the OKW?
DR. NELTE: Up until now I have explained Keitel's position as the Chief of the OKW. In statements on page 74 and the following pages I was going to explain to you that the prosecution, and others as well, have talked about the OKW: and "OKW" is a word which has three different types of significance.
Mr. President, if you will be good enough to permit me to submit this in its written form, and if you would consider it as having been presented in Court, then I am willing to leave out the pages up to 77 and submit them to you. explanation regarding the interpretation of the word "OKW", and, in particular, it is important to show that this is not identical with Keitel. and what share he had in the happenings as a whole after investigating his legal competencies, I now wish to examine what actual influence he had upon the development and carrying out of the measurers the effects of which constitute the subject of this trial. From everyday experience we know that it does not matter so much what a person should be in a particular position, but what he has made of that position by virtue of his personality. ality of no other defendant has been judged in such varying and contradictory ways as that of the defendant Keitel.
Keitel's material responsibility is proportionate to his actual position in the tug-of-war with and around Hitler, his effective indluence upon that group and with it on those circumstances as a whole which could prove the cause of the effects of Hitler's Headquarters in the military field. charges made by the prosecution against Keitel on the strength of the cross-examination of Dr. Gisevius, in other words, after presentation of evidence has been completed.
In view of the comprehensive scope of Justice Jackson's questions and the answers given thereto by Dr. Gisevius, the testimony of Dr. Gisevius has become of tremendous importance in the case of the defendant Keitel.
Had Dr. Gisevius' statements about Keitel been true--i.e. statements made by him in most instances in terms of conclusive findings, derived from information--the defendant Keitel would not have told the truth during the presentation of evidence. The importance of that fact becomes evident when it is considered that a negative opinion on truthfulness would of necessity destroy Keitel's defense, which in its essence draws on the subjective aspect of facts as a whole. In view of this fact and the importance of the testimony of Dr. Gisevius also for other defendants, it becomes my duty not to leave anything undone to explain the contrast between Keitel's answers and the testimony of the witness Gisevius. because the rendering of their purported utterances cannot be directly refuted. Testifying on the strength of information belongs to another group of statements which almost defy refutation. he bases his testimony primarily on information obtained from witnesses who are dead. It seems to me that Justice Jackson uses Dr. Gisevius as star witness in his global attack on the defendant Keitel After completion of presentation of evidence against Keitel he did not bring forward One individual circumstance but an indictment on all counts.
one hand and as far as possible, with proving the objective incorrectness of facts based upon information obtained from certain individuals, and, further, with establishing proof of the unreliability of the information. I call to mind the words which the defendant Keitel said under oath upon completion of his direct examination by me while in the witness box:
"One may hold it against me that I was wrong and made mistakes, that my attitude toward the Fuehrer Adolf Hitler was wrong and weak, but it should not be said of me that I was a coward, that I was untruthful, and that I was disloyal". dant Keitel, during interrogation by the Prosecution, as follows:
1) Keitel built an inpenetrable ring round Hitler so that the latter could be told nothing.
2) Keitel failed to pass on to Hitler reports he had received from Canaris whenever such reports covered atrocities, crimes and the like, or he gave orders to modify them.
3) Keitel had a tremendous influence on the OKW and the army.
4) Keitel threatened his subordinates, when they made political statements that he would not protect them; he even said that he would turn them over to the Gestapo. Dr. GESEVIUS says in one part of his statement that KEITEL had no influence over HITLER. He exonerates HITLER by explaining that KEITEL had formed a ring round HITLER, in order that the latter should be told nothing. called KEITEL a powerful staff officer who had exerted great influence over HITLER; the French prosecution described KEITEL as a willing tool of HITLER; the German generals called him a "yesman" who could not carry anything through; and now KEITEL grows, according to the statement of Dr. GISEVIUS, into a real handyman and buffer of HITLER, who hid from the latter anything bad, who submitted to him only what he, KEITEL, saw fit, and permitted no one to approach HITLER.
only be maintained by somebody who did not know the conditions prevailing around HITLER. Before the war KEITEL worked in Berlin in the Bendler Strasse, while HITLER was in the Wilhelmstrasse. KEITEL came perhaps once a week to report, or on special order. At that time, on account of space conditions, it was in fact impossible for KEITEL to exert any influence over access to the Fuehrer.
was at the Berghof near Berchtesgaden for weeks at a tire whilst KEITEL remained in Berlin.
c) At the beginning of operations, KEITEL was with JODL and the Supreme General Staff at the Fuehrer's headquarters. Here also they were separated. KEITEL did not sit in HITLER'S anteroom, but rather in other buildings or barracks. He came at the proper time with General JODL to the conference on the situation, in which, besides HITLER, some 15 or 20 officers of all three branches of the Wehrmacht took part. Apart from the conferences on the situation there was a physical contact. When HITLER wanted KEITEL for anything he sent for him. HITLER and his adjutants, the chief of the Party Chancellery, the chief of the Presidential chancellery, and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. not possibly prevent anybody going to HITLER.
HITLER'S sources of information were the responsible heads of each department; it was occasionally not clear whence HITLER detained, his information.
GISEVIUS did not knew these conditions from his own experience; he himself was never near KEITEL, who never saw or spoke to him, and whose name he did not know. If he gave his opinion here, he could only base it on information given him by CANARIS, THOMAS, and OSTER.
General JODL has been heard regarding this question. He certainly is the best witness in this matter, since he, as well as KEITEL, lived in the immediate vicinity of HITLER and therefore could form his own judgment. He stated, concerning this matter:
"Unfortunately, it was impossible to keep things from HITLER. Many channels of information led to HITLER direct."
that what KEITEL had testified was quite correct, and that which witness GISEVIUS stated was, in general, merely a figure of speech. that the allegations of the witness GISEVIUS that KEITEL was able to keep the high commanders of the branches of the Wehrmacht away from HITLER is false.
If, however, this wasnot the case, it follows that the way from the branches of the Wehrmacht to the Fuehrer was open at any tine.
from JODL, the Chief of the Supreme General Staff, and also in particular, CANARIS, had immediate access to HITLER. a ring round HITLER is proved false. KEITEL by CANARIS about atrocities in connection with deportations, extermination of Jews, concentration camps, the persecution of the church, and the killing of insane persons, which KEITEL withheld from HITLER. Defense Economy Office, the purpose of which was to inform HITLER about the war potential of the enemy and bring him to reason. Concerning admiral CANARIS'S reports, it must be said that as chief of espionage and counterintelligence he naturally delivered regular reports which concerned the conduct of the war, including the conduct of economic warfare. neither to the jurisdiction of theCounter-Intelligence Office nor of the Army High Command (OKW). It has been proved that HITLER took strict care that every worker confined himself to his own special field, and it was particularly forbidden to military offices to concern themselves with political affairs. and especially a bout the extermination of the Jaws, and the concentration camps. This is in absolute contradiction to the assertion of the witness GISEVIUS that CANARIS submitted reports to the defendant KEITEL on the above-mentioned subjects. One can affirm that reports of any kind whatsoever were delivered to Keitel without having to fear being contradicted, especially when one does not have to fear that those reports will be found.
For if they are not delivered, neither can they be found, because they do not exist. Now Gisevius has declared that he gathered documents from the beginning which contained incriminating material. Is it not remarkable, under these circumstances, that up to now, none of those reports have been produced. If they were on hand at the Army High Command (OKW) they were to that extent an object of the accusation and the evidence. Can it be sufficient under these circumstances if a witness declares he knows from third parties that such reports were submitted to Keitel? to foreign countries on personal, secret errands for Hitler, had access to Hitler at all times. He would thus have had an opportunity to go to Hitler immediately if he had had serious misgivings of conscience, as Gisevius has declared he did. Why did he not do so? has luckily for Keitel, at one point of his deposition made a positive declaration that permits of objective verification:
"...........I believe that I have still two examples to mention, which to me are particularly characteristic: first, the attempt was made by all possible means to induce Field Marshal Keitel to warn Hitler against the invasion of Holland and Belgium, that is, to inform Hitler that the information submitted by Keitel about alleged violations of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians was false. The Counter Intelligence Office (Abwehr) was to prepare reports incriminating the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral Canaris at that time refused to sign these reports. I request that this be verified. He told Keitel repeatedly that this report which was ostensibly made by the Army High Command (OKW) was false. This is an instance where Mr. Keitel did not transmit to Hitler what he was supposed to have transmitted.........." Document PS 790 which refers to the case of the White Book about violations of neutrality by Holland and Belgium. Jodl testified, word for word:
"..........I understand the question and would like very briefly to state the fact, as it really was, so long as disgust does not choke me.
I was present when Canaris case to the Field Marshal in the Reich Chancellery with these report notes and laid before him the project of the Foreign Office's White Book. Field marshal Keitel then locked through this book, above all listening to the chief remarks which Canaris made at the request of the Foreign Office, namely, that the reports were perhaps stillsusceptible of some improvement, that he should confirm the fact that a military operation against Holland and Belgium was absolutely necessary, and that asit is expressed, here, a final really striking violation of neutrality was still lacking. Before Canaris had said a word, Field Marshal Keitel threw the book on the table and said; I refuse to do this, how does it happen that I should take any responsibility for a political decision. In this White Book appear word for word, true and correct, the very same reports that you, yourself, Canaris, brought to me." To this Canaris said: "I am entirely of the same idea. It is, in my opinion too, entirely superfluous to have this document signed on the part of the Wehrmacht and the reports that we have here, are in their totality completely sufficient to prove the violations of neutrality which have taken place in Holland and Belgium." And he advised Field Marshal Keitel not to sign it at all. That is the way it happened. The Field Marshal then took the book with him and I do not know what happened subsequently.........." Keitel did not sign the White Book. Therefore in the only verifiable case a clear proof is obtained of the inexactitude of Gisevius' testimony. dous influence on the Army High Command (OKW) and the Army. These words, without are presentation of concrete facts are only a phrase in the mouth of a man who had no contact whatsoever with Keitel. They are refuted by the statements of Goering, Doenitz and Raeder. Jodl has qualified this statement as merely a figure of speech. Insofar the witness speaks of his tremendous influence on the OKW, it must appear questionable what the witness really means. that the influence which resulted from his position which I have already discussed How he stood with his subordinates will be taken up later.
culpable influence on what happened. This influence, however, could only take effect on Hitler or the Branches of the German Armed Forces. That Keitel had no decisive influence on Hitler has even been confirmed by Gisevius and his being without decisive influence a the Branches of the Armed Forces, has been established by the results of the testimony.
Against the defendant Keitel was "that instead of placing himself in front of his subordinate officers to protect them, he threatened to hand then ever to the Gestapo". in the Army High Command was dismissed in the years up to 1944; furthermore, until 20 July1944, the day of the attempt on Hitler's life and the transfer of the judicial power in the home-army to Himmler, no officer of the Army High Command was turned ever to the Police. Grand Admiral Doenitz has confirmed that the Brandies of the Armed Forces and the Army High Command were very scrupulous in maintaining the privileges of the Armed Forces as opposed to the police. the defendant Keitel. I think this remark has a special importance, not only because Keitel lived, a companionable and friendly terns with his official subordinate, General Jodl, during their long years of cooperation. As natural as that may appear, the less natural it is, if one reflects that Jodl in spite of his officially subordinate position, in reality became more and more Hitler's only strategic advisor. What this means, considering the preponderance of the operational tasks in the war, has been convincingly demonstrated here by General Jodl. of his subaltern Jodl in this domain, this proves in Keitel a trait of character which refutes the information derived from obscure sources by the witness Gisevius. his subordinate Chief of Office, Canaris, also is incompatible with the contrary assertion of witness Gisevius. Keitel but testified to by Jodl without Keitel's consent, that the latter supported and helped Canaris' family after his arrest.
I only refer to this to refute the perhaps most serious personal reproach, according to which Keitel did net behave decently towards his subordinates and abused his superior position - which was especially powerful in military life - even to the point of threatening violence.
According to Gisevius' evidence, Admiral Canaris not only played a double role in the service, but also with respect to the defendant Keitel, while exploiting the friendship shown to him, he expressed a similar attitude, whereas in the midst of his own group he openly spoke in a spiteful way about Keitel. the witnesses v. Buttlar and Brandenfels (session of 8 May 1946, page 11119 of the German transcript), from which it is clear that Keitel always treated the officers of the German Armed Forces Operational Staff kindly. Ziervogel on the one hand and Himmler on the ether, in which Keitel, to whom the incident was reported, immediately and energetically intervened in writing to protect his subordinates against Himmler. The affidavit of the Chief of Office in Canaris' office, Admiral Buerkner, to which I refer also testifies in the same way to Keitel's kindly a ttitude towards his subordinates. occasion to speak energetically to his office and department chiefs. generally concern themselves with politics, and that when the situation deteriorated, they made political information the subject of their argumentation. And in explanation I state that Keitel has, in fact, defined his attitude with words which were based on his assumption that the soldier in war would have to testify to his faith and obedience, and that if Keitel ever heard anything, he would reprimand these officers.
Keitel did this with "words". That docs not mean that this was mere camouflage which did not correspond to his inner attitude; but it does mean, that the form, perhaps often rough and harsh, in which the defendant Keitel spoke to his officers did not - even in a single case - lead to an officer being punished or discipline.
Dr. Gisevius, however, perhaps wanted to say that Keitel had dealt with his subordinates in the Army High Command in a morally reprehensible way. evidence it is shown that the accusations arising from the testimony of the witness Gisevius are not correct. Gisevius would not be illuminated according to his own evidence. This judgement is made up from two factors:
1) The career and the position of the witness.
2) The trustworthiness of his information.
On page 92 of my text, I state in detail which functions Dr. Gisevius has undertaken. In particular, I have not emphasized anything which, from my point of view, might accuse him in any way for having testified here to all the things which you have heard. I have only objectively ascertained the following:
a) He evaded the military service through falsified papers put at his disposal by Oster.
b) He lived in Germany during the whole time since 1933 without restriction of liberty and remained in office up to 20 July 1944.
c) He was an official of the German Reich and was in its pay from the middle 1937 to the beginning of 1939 with the exception of leave.
d) He was Vice-Consul of the Reich in Switzerland since 1943 in the Consulate General at Zurich placed through Canaris as intelligence agent and was naturally paid for it. At the same time he was in connection with the enemy's intelligence service.
e) He had since 1933, when he worked in the Gestapo, the exact knowledge of all horrible happenings and the perception what consequences could arise from it for the German people.
f) A special circumstance, which shows the witness Dr. Gisevius in his true light, is the advice, or the suggestion, which he gave to the experienced bank specialist, Dr. Schacht -- and that is on Page 8280 of the record -- that he should thus allow the inflation and get the controls of affairs into his own hand This suggestion leaves only two possibilities:
A complete ignorance of the national economical importance and social effect of an inflation or a boundless unscrupulousness which completely disregards the fate of the employees and workmen. An inflation brought about knowingly can be described only as a crime against the people. Schacht described it as a catastrophe. He said, "You want the catastrophe; I want to avoid it".
To 2.)
GISEVIUS before this Tribunal, I must refer to the book submitted by the witness as evidence : "To the bitter end". This book is also a "statement" of the witness GISEVIUS. Germany - a book appears in which facts and occurences are communicated of historical and for those personally involved of moral and even criminal importance, the incorrectness of which has become obvious in the meantime, then the mistake is unforgiveable and there is no longer an excuse for refering to false informations. book which were established before this tribunal through the cross examination by Dr. KUBUSCHOK (Page 8413 of the German transcript 26 April 1946). There are 4 incorrectness which refer to the defendant Von Papen and I beg you to take official cognizance of it. described dubious and the author not reliable. this problem. The statement of Gisevius contains the entire tragedy of the German people, it is for me a proof of the weakness and of the decadence of the German circles who played with the idea of revolt and high treason, without apprehending intimately the distress of the people. They were a top level of the future ministers and generals without support from the large masses of our people, working classes, as Reich Minister Severing has declared here with all clearness.
Mr. Justice Jackson has used the word "resistance movement" in connection with the examination of the witness Gisevius. We have often heard during the progress of this trial about unfrightened, brave men and women, who fought for their country, have suffered and died. They were our enemies. But nobody would deny the acknowledgment of their heroism, who tried to judge these things objectively. But where will you find this heroism in the group around Gisevius?
If one reads his book "To the bitter end" and one has heard him here, one looks in vain for a self-sacrificing man. Even the late deed of a Stauffenberg lacks heroism, as it lacked the decision of the self-sacrifice.
Gisevius speaks in the time up to 1938 - as if there was time - to hold back the wheel of the fate successfully, always about negotiations, conferences, but all these men wish that the others - that is the generals - should negotiate.
If one considers the knowledge of affairs, which Gisevius had as member of the Gestapo and all his friends, if one takes into account the perception of the great danger in which the people were suspended, then the decision for action should not be doubtful for an instant for the patriotic men, as the members of the group claimed themselves to be. But what did they do ? As the leaders of the army hesitated or refused, they did not think about their own action, but turned to the foreign countries. itself is of no importance in the question of trustworthiness to be discussed here. Wherever is a conspirator out of pure motives, who, in the realization of the danger which threatens his country, risks his life, is not only clean, but also desirves the gratitude of the fatherland. everything which, in its entire frightfulness, most Germans have only learned through this trial, had served their country in unselfish sacrifice, than perhaps we and the world would have been spared much distress and suffering.
Grand Admiral Doenits, who know Admiral Canaris well, said : "During the time that he was in the Navy, Admiral Canaris wan an officer in whom little trust was placed. He was an altogether different person from us. We said that he had seven souls in his breast." But, gentlemen, what does Dr. Gisevius say on page 319 of the book "To the bitter end" ? "The successor was Canaris, at that time captain in the Navy, quite clever and more cunning than Himmler and Heydrich together." quoted by Gisevius as being the chief sources of information. I do not wish to come to this in any detail. We are here concerned with the persons of Canaris, Nebe, and Thomas.
As regard pages 96 to 102, I shall make the following brief summary. In reference to Canaris, I only want to say that he was living in the closest touch with Himmler, Heydrich and the Gestapo although he was their sworn enemy as he admitted.
Thomas, who had been a member of the Gestapo, was an excellent General Staff officer, and he was an untiring worker in the Army Command Staff under Keitel.
Reference is also made to that in document 2353-PS. That man was the spirit and the driving power of rearmament which he, Keitel, and others considered necessary to the extent which he energetically pursued. But it is the same man who worked on the Barbarossa Plan and who later, under the Four Year Plan became the head of the economic Staff of the Plan Oldenburg. The results of that plan need not be explained here by me. General Thomas who, according to his very convincing exterior appearances used all his powers for the economic situation of the war, and who after leaving Speer was by no means dismissed but was given the task of writing the book which is the main evidence of the Prosecution. PS-2353. had played a double game, then he was an opportunist and not a man who can be expected to give objective information. I draw your attention to page 103 where witness Gisevius has described Nebe as one of his most intimate friends, and according to the statements by Dr. Gisevius, Nebe had been his friend since 1933 and was thoroughly familiar with the trend of thought of the witness, He remained in RSHA - discussed numerous times here - until 20 July 1944, and in the year 1944 he had power to issue orders to headquarters of the Special Service Office (Sonderdienst) in charge of prevention of escape of prisoners of war. This is shown by enclosure to document USSR 413, submitted by the prosecution, testimony of the witness Wiellen also heard here.
To characterize this witness - from whom Dr. Gisevius after leaving the Gestapo claims to have received information currently - it should be pointed out that from 1933 to July, 1944, Nebe served in the RSHA, evidently to the satisfaction of his superiors Himmler, Heydrich and Kaltenbrunner; otherwise he would not have stayed in office that long and would not have been promoted to the rank of Police General and SS Gruppenfuehrer (SS Major General). While thus, on the one hand he fulfilled the tasks incumbent upon him by reason of his position, for 11 years, with the well known methods of the Gestapo and later the Kripo which were under HIMMLER, Dr. GISEVIUS refers to him as his friend and political associate.
Now, it might be assumed, perhaps, that in the position he held he was able to prevent disaster, possibly even to hold up execution of orders. Document USSR 433, just referred to, shows that this is not what NEBE did; rather did he work as a loyal HIMMLER police general. In the deposition by WIELEN -forming part of the document- the horrible case of the 50 escaped RAF fliers in which case General NEBE and Dr. GISEVIUS were involved is dealt with.
I quote from Wielen's testimony: "One day during that time I received an order around noontime, by telegraph, from General NEBE to proceed to Berlin immediately, to become acquainted with a confidential order. Arriving in Berlin on the evening of that day, I reported to General NEBE at his office, Wendischer Markt 5 to 7. I rave him a condensed report on the status of the matter at that time. He than showed me a teletype order, signed by KALTENBRUNNER, to the effect that, in conformity with the Fuehrer's explicit and personal order, more than half of the officers who escaped from Sagan were to be shot when recaptured. The following paragraph and any commentary appears superfluous. I said this violates martial law and undoubtedly was bound to result in reprisal measures against those of our own officers who were in English camps, as prisoners of war, and that I simply refuse to take any responsibility. General NEBE declared that in this instance I was not at all responsible since the state police was to act entirely a its own and that, after all, orders given by the Fuehrer had to be executed without pretest. NEBE added furthermore that, naturally, it was my duty to keep the matter in deepest secrecy and that the reason for his showing me the original order was so that I would make no trouble for the state police."
Any comment seems superfluous. This is significant for NEBE's personality. The trustworthiness of a person is an inseparable part of his entire personality. Information obtained from a person who, for mere than a decade was able to play such an abominable double role can have no claim to faith.
I believe that this analysis of the statements of the witness Dr. GISEVIUS and of the men belonging to the GISEVIUS group gives me the right to say that the charges made against the defendant KEITEL by the witness can be no suitable foundation for the argument of the prosecution, that the defendant Keitel: 1. formed a circle around HITLER 2. his influence on the OKW and the armed forces was tremendous 3. he did not submit reports on atrocities and crimes to HITLER 4. That he did not protect his suboridnates, even thereatened them with the Gestapo. however important it may have seemed to outsiders, was neither decisive nor of determinating importance, whether for the total sum of event or also for the basic and important decisions of HITLER. Justice can be done to the actual importance of this activity if one says that it was tremendous, because physically and spiritually it went beyond human strength; because it placed the defendant permanently in a delemma between his military point of viewand the unbending will of HITLER, to whom he was faithfully, far too faithfully devoted. Physically because it was nearly insoluble, because it had no sharply defined, clear outlines, but consisted in the eternal equalizing of factual differences, the adjustment of personal sensitiveness, the "self-protection" against encroachments of the individual offices among themselves or against the OKW; in clever manoeuvring when HITLER, in explosive reaction to disagreeable news, wished to issue extravagant orders, in the settlement of all disagreeable matters which HITLER did not wish to attend to himself. It was a tremendoudly thankless task, which found only very slight compensation in the brilliant situation in the immediate proximity to the head of the State, in the decorative participation in all events of what is called world history, in the representative duties of a Field Marshal.
Was Keitel a political General ? promoting the planning, preparing of and inciting to aggressive wars with violations of international treaties and engagements.
The defendant stated in the witness box in this connection. Insofar as knowledge or having cognizance of the intention to attack is concerned, I shall come back to the subject in connection with other things. The facts as such are set forth by the defendant Keitel. concerned, the defence counsel for General Jodl will deal with those questions. the defendant Keitel a personal importance during this trial : the conversation between Hitler and von Schuschnigg on the Ober-Salzberg on February 12th 1938. This was the sheet-lightning that could have revealed the coming of the storm to clear sighted peoples. Keitel chief of the German High Command for only a week, so far without any contact with high political events, did not perceive these signs of approaching stormy weather. Hitler who after the sudden change of 4 Feb. 38 had immediately gone to the Obersalzberg, called Keitel for the first time, without giving any explanation. Keitel came, without knowing what Hitler wanted or what was to happen in Obersalzberg Only the course of the day did he realize that his presence could have any connection with the presence of Schuschnigg and the discussion of the Austrian question proved in any of the conversations, especially with Schuschnigg or Dr. Schmidt, he however realized that his presence, together with th* of Generals von Reichenau and Sperrle should have a significance for the conversations with Schuschnigg; for, since, Hitler did not speak to him at all about military matters, he was forced to the conclusion that the representatives of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, the Army and the Air Force had been invited to demonstrate the power of the Wehrmacht in Schusschnigg's eyes. the representatives of the Wehrmacht as a means of pressure for the realization of his political plans, that they had no knowledge of this beforehand, and that they realized this intention only later on.
This meeting at the Obersalzberg is now being used by the prosecution as a basis for the accusation that Keitel was a political general. The prosecution introduced the conversations between Hitler and Hacha and Tiso, at which the defendant Keitel also was present, as a further symptomatic event. This evidence does not appear convincing, if it is intended to prove that Keitel was also an active party in the political conversations. with foreign statesmen, he did not participate in the conversations, but he was present. Hitler liked to have Keitel in his entourage as representative of the Wehrmacht. Thus Keitel was also present at Godesberg when Prime Minister Chamberlain went there, also at Munich on September 30th 1938, and at the visit of Molotov in November 1940. He was also present at the meetings of Hitler with Marshall Petain, with General Franco, King Boris, with Regent con Horthy and with Mussolini. into a General who would have taken a determinative part in the political evolution. How little this assertion is justified is seen from the fact testified to by admiral Buerckner, that Keitel was extremely careful not to intrude himself into the affairs of the Foreign Office and gave his officers the order not to engage in matters of foreign policy. from the removal of the Reich Minister for War, already dealt with, and the elimination thereby aimed at an achieved of the political represention of the Wehrmacht in the Cabinet. It is self-evident, and has already been pointed out, that the position of the defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW implied and in time of war must have implied to an increased extent his coming into some kind of contract of with all the Ministries and highest Offices, and his dealing with them as the representative of the OKW, that is to say of HITLER.
That did not make Keitel a politician, i.e., a man who took part in an advisory capacity in the determination of Governmental aims and had an influence on the same.
In his high office he naturally worked to carry out these aims and thus far bears a responsibility, but not as a political General.
Mr. President, maybe I am wrong, but I am now beginning a large chapter. Do you want me to start with it ?
THE PRESIDENT: Go on reading then until five o'clock.
DR. NELTE:
The idea of war against Russia was rejected by Keitel. This found visible expression in the memorandum which Field Marshall Keitel drew up, discussed with von Ribbentrop, and handed over to Hitler. According to his sworn statements the reasons were as follows: a) military considerations. b) the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, dated 23 August 1939. In spite of personal presentation the memorandum had no success. Hitler as usual in questions of strategic nature, rejected Keitel's point of view as unconvincing:.
In this connection and due to Hitler's strict refusal, Keitel asked for release and transfer to the front. This is the case which Reich Marshal Gearing confirmed in his interrogation. Hitler refused, sharply critisizing the habit of Generals asking to be released or tendering their resignation whenever he (Hitler) did not approve their opinions or suggestions. That settled it for Keitel : he remained in his post, did his duty, and fulfilled his obligations in carrying out the tasks falling to him within the frame work of further preparations. Here, too, in keeping with his conception of duty, Keitel did not make known to the outside world his basically negative attitude towards the war with Russia, after Hitler had made his decision. This case is in several respects typical of Keitel and his judgment by others We know -and it has been proved by the evidence- that other Generals were also opposed to war with the Soviet Union. Their objections, too, were dispersed or rejected by Hitler. They, too, accepted the decision of the Supreme Commander of the Whermacht, continued to do their duty and carried out the orders given to them.